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Abstract
The role of investor countries remains poorly understood in the contemporary 
“land grab” debate. This book provides a comparative historical-institutional 
and politico-economic account of “land grabbing” from a home country per-
spective. Specifically, the book investigates large-scale land acquisitions from 
two investor countries: the UK and China. The regional focus is on Sub-Sa-
haran Africa, a major target of such land-consuming investments since 2000. 
The assessment provides an empirical-analytical account of 40 Chinese and 
British “land grab” projects that occurred during 2000-2015. It also reviews 
the specific details of the home country’s industrial set-up, development chal-
lenges, ideological framing, political economy, and significant events critical to 
understanding what is happening. 
The book advances three arguments: Firstly, it shows that Chinese outward 
foreign direct investment (OFDI) mentioned in the “land grab” literature 
reflects the demands of the country’s resource-intensive and market-depen-
dent manufacturing industry, and is part of economic upgrading. In the case of 
the UK, large-scale land acquisitions occur in response to reforms in the host 
countries, to international and domestic energy and climate policies, and to 
reindustrialization efforts. 
Secondly, the comparative analysis reveals that in spite of their politico-eco-
nomic differences, both countries share many similarities, such as the mul-
tiplicity of agencies, structures, and events involved, the guiding ideology in 
place, and the institutional framework supporting such OFDI projects. Notably, 
both countries’ governments consider outward foreign direct investments (of 
which “land grabs” form a part) as a strategic instrument to pursue partic-
ular national development ambitions. These projects allegedly “push the limits” 
of profitable business and/or social mobility in an increasingly globalized 
economy, and serve as a tool to “fight the limits” of national development trajec-
tories that cannot provide sufficient (and good) jobs, erode the national resource 
base, and are strongly vulnerable in their reliance on export markets.
Thirdly, the book reviews the main features of late 19th century colonial 
and imperial practices, to be aware of important factors and dynamics in the 
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evaluation of contemporary land acquisitions. From this historical perspective, 
it shows that contemporary land-consuming OFDI activities have novel and 
“old” features in comparison to the Scramble for Africa. On the one hand, core 
institutions, ideas, and structures that emerged in the 19th century are still 
part of the fabric of today’s global society. The multiplicity of motives, actors, 
and sectors at play also strongly resembles that of the past. On the other hand, 
a more detailed assessment of those features reveals that their characteristics 
have changed with regard to key aspects: Corporations have gained discre-
tionary power vis-à-vis the state; host country governments proactively seek to 
attract foreign capital (rather than it being forced upon them); existing institu-
tional structures supporting OFDI have been strengthened domestically and 
internationally, both at home and in the host countries. Moreover, contempo-
rary capital exports by newcomers such as China reflect processes of global 
economic restructuring of which these overseas investments form a part. 
Ultimately, the book shows that the risks associated with overseas invest-
ment projects—which tend to be minimised or overlooked by public and private 
actors—remain high. In many of the investigated cases, the expectations 
attached to going overseas have not been realized. Moreover, many projects 
have resulted in “loss-loss” scenarios for the host and home country. Finally, 
the findings suggest it is useful to leave behind the polarized framing of invest-
ment as land grab or development. Instead, it can be both, in the sense that 
the “land grabbing” investment is the material expression of a particular idea 
of modern development whose socioeconomic promises and developmental 
potential needs critical revisiting.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 
Land Grabbing from a Home Country Perspective 
1. The “L and Gr abbinG” debaTe
To understand the contemporary debate on “international land acquisitions” 
or “foreign direct investment (FDI),” it is necessary to revisit the years of 
2007/2008. This was a period of multiple crises of food, energy, and finance, 
where rising commercial pressure on land and agriculture gained international 
attention under the headings of “land grabbing,” “international land acquisi-
tions,” or “land deals.” The term “land grabbing” was first applied by the inter-
national non-governmental organization (NGO) GRAIN to describe events of 
dispossession, privatization, and ownership concentration in the form of FDI in 
agriculture.1 Since then, hundreds of studies have been published underlining 
the dramatic empirical dimensions of this phenomenon, both with regards to 
the affected lands and project scales. The International Land Coalition (ILC), 
for instance, suggested that approximately 71 million hectares (ha) of land were 
under negotiation during the 2000 to 2012 period (confirmed);2 research by 
the World Bank (WB, 2011) concluded that approximately one quarter of such 
land-consuming projects were larger than 200.000ha, while only one quarter 
of the reported “land deals” involved less than 10.000ha;3 and as of July 2018, 
the global land monitoring initiative Land Matrix lists a total of 1,591 concluded 
“land grab” projects in their observatory database, involving roughly 49,193,878 
ha of land.4 
Importantly, the debate about “land grabbing” has been constantly evolving. 
While the initial focus by GRAIN (2008) lay on the agricultural sector and 
1 | GRAIN (2008).
2 | ILC (2012), 4.
3 | WB (2011), 51. 
4 | See the website of Land Matrix at https://landmatrix.org/en/ (last accessed: 13 
July 2018). Note: Section 5 discusses the data problems associated with the Land 
Matrix’s global observatory.
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related dynamics threatening the livelihoods of peasants in the form of dispos-
session, farmland-use change and ownership concentration, later, the body of 
empirical research on the topic of commercial pressure on land came to include 
non-agricultural forms of “land grabbing.” Accordingly, the 2012 report by the 
ILC about international, large-scale investments in land has demonstrated 
that these occur in multiple sectors, such as tourism, industrial production, 
forestry, and mineral extraction.5 At the same time, the ILC report has indi-
cated great differences across regions, both with regards to the share of total 
land-consuming FDI and to the origin of related FDI flows. The position of 
Africa is unique, as it has received the largest overall share of land-consuming 
FDI flows, which have reportedly implicated 134 million ha (34 million of which 
have been confirmed).6 The major share of FDI in Africa has come from outside 
the continent, while intra-regional capital flows have predominated in “land 
grabbing” events in Europe, Latin America, and Asia.7
Related analyses focus largely on the host country dynamics and oscillate 
between descriptions of “development opportunity” or “land grab,” depending 
on the particular framing underpinning the respective study.8 However, 
the empirical evidence lends urgency to the topic, with a large number of 
case studies reporting negative effects of such “land deals” for the recipient 
country’s9 social, economic, or ecological development. Even the World Bank 
report (2011) concludes that contrary to the (liberal) theoretical promises of job 
creation, diffusion of technology, capacity building, productivity increases, and/
or food security improvements associated with capital imports in the form of 
FDI, many projects seem to have “contributed to asset loss and left local people 
5 | ILC (2012), 4. While FDI flows in agriculture seem to make up the largest share, 
representing 78% (by value) of total investments during 2000-2012, approximately 
three quarters of these investments have targeted biofuels rather than food produc-
tion. These figures are confirmed by data from the Financial Times database (2011). 
Accordingly, during 2003-2008, an increasing share of global FDI in primary agriculture 
went into the alternative/renewable energy sector (in 2003: USD 7.9 billion; in 2008: 
USD 90.7 billion; in 2010: USD 42 billion). During the same time period, only a moderate 
growth of FDI could be observed in the food and tobacco sector (in 2003: USD 1.4 
billion; in 2010: USD 1.6 billion). See Heumesser and Schmid (2012), 13. 
6 | It is followed by Asia, with 29 million ha (confirmed). See ILC (2012), 4.
7 | ILC (2012), 22. Note: Given the complex set of data constraints that the Land Matrix, 
as well as other databases on the topic, is confronted with, the argument that Asia is the 
largest provider of FDI to Africa seems questionable. 
8 | IIED/FAO/IFAD (2009). 
9 | To ensure terminological clarity, please note that the terms “recipient country” and 
“host country” are used interchangeably.
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worse off than they would have been without the investment.”10 The findings of 
this book support this observation, particularly in view of the many instances in 
which projects failed due to unrealistic business models, financial constraints, 
or fraudulent behavior. Furthermore, research on sustainable resources man-
agement emphasizes that the process of privatization of communal or public 
lands, which often accompanies land-consuming FDI projects, may constrain a 
country’s future land planning capacity, thereby curtailing its ability to manage 
and provide for key social needs, such as housing, food, energy, and water, in 
the face of rising eco-scarcity and climate change.11 
But why do these land-consuming investments occur in the first place? In 
contrast to the diverse set of analyses of the impact of land-consuming FDI 
projects in the target countries, explanations about why these projects happen 
from a home country and investor perspective—the focus of this book—remain 
surprisingly homogeneous and superficial.
The general reasoning of standard explanations assumes that the aforemen-
tioned crises of food, finance, and energy in 2007/200812 triggered the global 
“land rush.”13 Alongside the crises, continues the narrative, “more immediate 
drivers” were the rising “market demands for food, biofuels, raw materials, and 
timber” and the resultant scarcity that drove up commodity prices. In addition, 
carbon offset markets and capital flows speculating on an increase in the value 
of land have been important.14 Take, for example, the widely cited analysis by 
McMichael which states that “the land grab is both a response to food price 
reversals generating export bans and government initiatives to secure offshore 
food and biofuel supplies and reflects a speculative interest in food and biofuel 
futures and associated land price inflation on the part of finance capital” 15 (see 
Table 1-1 for more examples).
10 | WB (2011), 51. 
11 | Home (2009), 107. 
12 | For a detailed and or thodox explanation of the interdependency effects of rising 
food and energy prices, see Headey and Fan (2010), xii-xvii.
13 | E.g., GRAIN (2008); and Arezki et al. (2013), 1; ILC (2012), 4; and Weingärtner 
(2010), 13.
14 | ILC (2012), 4.
15 | Mc Michael (2012), 683.
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Table 1-1 – Standard Explanations of Foreign Land Acquisitions: Prominent 
Examples from Academia, NGOs and Development Agencies
Source Quotation
Quotes from Academia:
Ingwe et al. 
(2010), 29-30.
 “Some attempts to explain the motives and forces driving these 
MNCs to grab land IN [sic] DCs have presented two major agenda 
[sic] thought to be behind their quest. The first agenda has been 
linked to food security problems in their home countries. It has 
been posited that due to the dependence of the populations of such 
countries, on food imported from abroad and the tightening of the 
global food markets, they have been forced to embark upon a new 
programme of outsourcing their national food production to other 
countries where MNCs provide a suitable platform for implementing 
the food production projects. Some of the countries that have been 
listed under this category are: Saudi Arabia, Japan, China, India, 
Korea, Libya, and Egypt. 
The second agenda is linked to profit making potential or favorable 
financial returns that the MNCs have overseen in the outsourcing of 
food production. It is argued that under the context of the ongoing 
global financial meltdown and economic recession, MNCs think 
that land acquisition presents a good strategy for making higher and 
reliable profit. Two strategic thoughts or considerations have emerged 
in the debate on land grabbing in developing countries (DCs). Some 
attribute the new scramble for Africa to the collapse of derivatives 
markets that were involved in the management of investments, pri-
vate equity funds, investment houses, and so forth before the global 
financial and economic crisis of 2008. Therefore, the new thinking by 
investors in land is that food production constitutes a business sector 
that guarantees fast and stable turnover. Second, the investors in land 
in DCs, think that land serves multiple purposes of profit making, 
including its other uses (e.g. for the production of either food or 
bio-fuels and so forth).”
R.Hall (2011), 
194.
“China, India, South Korea and the Gulf States are among those at 
the forefront of this agricultural expansion, as they seek to produce 
food overseas for their growing populations. Most deals are private 
investments [...]. Among these are European and North American 
banks and financial investors seeking alternatives to volatile inter-
national financial markets.”
White et al. 
(2012), 627.
“High world food and fuel prices in 2007-08 led to a wave of protests 
and anti-government riots in more than 60 countries [...], precipita-
ting protectionist measures by those with food production capacities 
and expansionist strategies by those without. The combined effects of 
global climate change, agro-industrial development, natural resource 
extraction, neo-liberal austerity policies and rapid urbanization have 
increased insecurity and vulnerability in rural areas across the globe.”
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Cotula (2012), 
649.
“These acquisitions involve outright land purchases or, more com-
monly, long-term leases mainly on government-owned land. It is 
widely thought that private sector expectations of higher agricultural 
commodity prices and government concerns about longer-term food 
and energy security underpin much recent land acquisition for agri-
cultural investments.”
McMichael 
(2012), 681.
“Land grab appears to be a phenomenal expression of deepening con-
tradictions in the corporate food regime. In particular, the end of che-
ap food (signaled in the 2008 ‘food crisis’) has generated renewed in-
terest in agriculture for development on the part of the development 
industry, matched by a rising interest in offshore land investments, 
driven by governments securing food and fuel exports and financiers 
speculating on commodity futures and land price inflation.”
Brown (2013), 
1.
“Saudi Arabia, South Korea, China, and India are among the count-
ries that are leading the charge to buy or lease land abroad, either 
through government entities or through domestically based agribusi-
ness firms. Saudi Arabia’s population has simply outrun its land and 
water resources. The country is fast losing its irrigation water and will 
soon be totally dependent on imports from the world market or over-
seas farming projects for its grain. [...].
Investment capital is coming from many sources, including invest-
ment banks, pension funds, university endowments, and wealthy 
individuals. Many large investment funds are incorporating farmland 
into their portfolios. In addition, there are now many funds dedicated 
exclusively to farm investments. These farmland funds generated a 
rate of return from 1991 to 2010 that was roughly double that from 
investing in gold or the S&P 500 stock index and seven times that 
from investing in housing. Most of the rise in farmland earnings has 
come since 2003.” 
Quotes from NGOs and Development Agencies:
GRAIN (2008), 
1.
“Today’s food and financial crises have, in tandem, triggered a new 
global land grab. On the one hand, “food insecure” governments that 
rely on imports to feed their people are snatching up vast areas of 
farmland abroad for their own offshore food production. On the other 
hand, food corporations and private investors, hungry for profits in 
the midst of the deepening financial crisis, see investment in foreign 
farmland as an important new source of revenue. As a result, fertile 
agricultural land is becoming increasingly privatised and concen-
trated. If left unchecked, this global land grab could spell the end 
of small-scale farming, and rural livelihoods, in numerous places 
around the world.”
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Shepard and 
Mittal (2009), 
3-4.
“A number of factors threatening food security [...] have led many na-
tions, particularly in the Middle East and Asia, to reexamine domestic 
food security policies. Many governments are looking to stabilize 
supplies by acquiring foreign lands for food production in the hopes 
of averting domestic social unrest and political instability over food 
price and supply. [...] nations such as China, Japan, and South Korea 
are also seeking to acquire land as part of a long-term strategy for 
food security. China, which aims to increase its rice production from 
100.000 tons to 500.000 tons in the next five years, has looked abroad 
to other Asian and African states, purchasing 101,171 hectares in 
Zimbabwe in June 2008 and investing 800 million dollars in Mozam-
bique to modernize agriculture for export rice production.”
GTZ16 (2009), 
12, 14-15.
“The biggest deals are negotiated with investors from Saudi Arabia, 
other Gulf States and some Asian countries (China, South Korea, 
India). These countries are characterised by a shortage of fertile land 
due to unfavourable climate conditions or population growth on the 
one hand and sufficient financial means on the other hand. [...] Based 
on available information, it seems that the investors from oil rich 
and emerging countries mainly are governments or state enterprises 
or state funds respectively. In contrast, investors from industriali-
sed countries primarily are private companies investing mainly in 
agro-fuel projects. When governments try to follow their food or 
energy strategies by investing in foreign lands, they usually set up 
investment contracts with the governments in the target countries 
themselves or with companies through which they act. While private 
investments are mainly driven by the goals of the companies (especi-
ally short and long term profit, sustainable development of the firm), 
public investments can result from different objectives.”
UN DESA17 
(2010), 1; and 
UN DESA 
(2012), 146.
“Foreign Land purchases: Private investors and governments have re-
cently stepped up foreign investment in farmland in the form of pur-
chases or long-term lease of large tracks [sic] of arable land, notably in 
Africa. [...] Importantly, the new investment strategy is more strongly 
driven by food, water and energy security than a notion of compa-
rative advantage in the large scale production of indigenous crops 
for global markets, which has been more characteristic of foreign 
owned plantations since the end of the colonial era. The current 
land purchase and lease arrangements are about shifting land and 
water uses from local farming to essentially long distance farming to 
meet home state food and energy needs. It is, in practice, purchasing 
food production facilities. The growing scale of this practice today, 
combined with the increasing economic and environmental concerns 
that are motivating this surge, are creating a new dynamic of global 
importance. “
16 | GTZ is the acronym for German Agency for Technical Cooperation (merged into the 
German Agency for International Cooperation [GIZ] in 2011).
17 | UN DESA is the acronym for United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs.
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The quotes (presented in Table 1-1) also highlight that standard explanations 
tend to further differentiate between two types of economies to elucidate how 
and why “land grabs” occur from a home country perspective. In the case of the 
state-capitalist countries, (i.e. countries where the government plays a central 
role in the economic system), the state is said to be the main actor in large-
scale land acquisitions, and often state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth 
funds are seen as major facilitating mechanisms.18 Accordingly, the increase of 
commodity prices, together with the implementation of export bans by major 
food exporting countries, brought resource-scarce state-capitalist countries to 
focus on land-consuming investments as a way to secure resources “offshore” 
for consumption back home. This narrative is often applied when describing 
China’s activities in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Simultaneously, land-consuming investment activities of actors from 
liberal countries are described as profit-driven and seen as a response to the 
wealth destruction of equity investments during the 2007/2008 financial 
crisis. This narrative is used to describe overseas investments originating from 
the UK. Specifically, large-scale land acquisitions are what Hall and Soskice 
have (in another context) called “equilibrium outcomes of firm behavior”19 
in a free market system, outcomes based on market factors such as demand/
supply and/or capital-rich/resource-rich rationales. For example, a “land 
grabbing” panel at the 2014 academic conference of the European Consortium 
for Political Research announces that “increasing concerns about scarcity of 
water resources and arable land have incentivized investor groups from capi-
tal-rich, resource-poor countries to engage in large-scale land acquisitions [...] 
in resource-rich, capital-poor countries.”20 Similarly, Odusola argues that “the 
primary factor pulling investors to grab land on the continent is that Africa is 
home to 600 million ha of uncultivated arable land — about 60 per cent of the 
world’s total [...].”21
18 | Martin (2010), summary; Magdoff (2013), 1.
19 | P. Hall and Soskice (2001), 8.
20 | Haller (2014). Also, see Rulli and D’Odorico (2014), 1; and Odusola (2014), 9. The 
projections about land availability that led to the above framing of countries as land-
scarce and land-abundant largely stem from modeling exercises. Consequently, these 
figures about arable land reserves available for cultivation are highly contested. It is 
safe to say that these models are problematic, as many of them only assess the poten-
tially suitable land as measured by irrigation or climatic conditions, without considering 
its actual use, or the socioeconomic and ecological repercussions of land use change. 
See, for instance, the models used by the FAO (Bruinsma, J. (2003)). 
 Odusola (2014), 9.
21 | Odusola (2014), 9.
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The problem is that these typical explanations, which run through major 
academic publications of otherwise different framing and outlook, deviate from 
the emerging empirical evidence on the topic. They also diverge from histor-
ical explanations of economic expansion, and/or suffer from serious analyt-
ical incoherence. The following paragraphs will briefly highlight each of the 
explanatory shortfalls that sparked this research’s interest in assessing “land 
grabbing” dynamics from a home country perspective. 
Most importantly, the growing number of studies that do provide a detailed 
empirical assessment of investor countries22 all cast doubt on the stereotypes 
and presumptions on which this standard explanation relies. For instance, 
research on Chinese “land grabbing” projects in African countries highlights 
that they are not intended for food security back home, as would be expected 
from the common narrative about state-driven investments, but serve multiple 
purposes and involve numerous actors, both public and private.23 Moreover, 
a study on Japan suggests that even though the country should rank among 
the major investor countries—with its levels of foreign exchange reserves and 
dependency on food imports—this seems not to be the case.24 Even the case of 
South Korea, whose failed investment project by Daewoo in Madagascar has 
become a prominent example of offshore farming in the debate, the dynamics 
are more complex, the scale exaggerated, and the whole undertaking only mar-
ginally related to the 2007/2008 food crisis.25 The standard explanation also 
fails to account for agency in the recipient countries, while empirical evidence 
suggests this to be a significant component of how and why these investments 
take place.26 
From a historical perspective, this common narrative is surprising, if not 
puzzling. Implicitly, it proposes that contemporary land acquisitions differ 
from past ones in fundamental ways. Contemporary “land grabs” are portrayed 
as an outcome of purely economic factors. Historical evidence about inter-
national land acquisitions in the past, however, highlights that many factors 
were not economic in character, but rather related to particular ideologies (e.g., 
civilizing mission),27 actor constellations, or incidents of great power competi-
22 | Please note that the terms“investor country” and “home country” are used inter-
changeably to refer to the country and the related context from which land-consuming 
FDI is originating.
23 | Ekman (2010); Rosen and Hanemann (2009); and Brautigam (2011a). Also, see 
Chapters 4 and 5.
24 | See D. Hall (2012).
25 | Lee and Riel Müller (2012).
26 | Boamah (2014); Kragelund (2009); Brautigam and Ekman (2012).
27 | See extended version of a speech on socialism and colonial policy by Kautsky 
(1907).
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tion.28 Moreover, contemporary explanations often assume that international 
land acquisitions are driven by a rational choice interest in land as a natural 
resource, whereas historical research shows that other functions of land as a 
territory, strategic post, sphere of influence, or mythical promise were equally 
important in previous “grabs.” So, does this mean that contemporary “land 
grabs” together make up a historically unprecedented phenomenon, and if so, 
in which way would this be the case? Unfortunately, the available literature 
does not provide a detailed historical comparison, nor does it offer any evidence 
for its implicit claims. Instead, most descriptions either reveal an unawareness 
that the alleged resource focus of contemporary land acquisitions would make 
them different from the ones in the past, or they tend to oversimplify key traits 
of historical land acquisitions.29
Finally, this narrative builds on presumptions and dichotomies that stem 
from mainstream economics30 (e.g., liberal vs. illiberal economy; state vs. 
market; supply and demand; pricing signals), the prevailing operative paradigm 
of (inter)national economic governance. Yet, this frame cannot meaningfully 
explain the “accumulation of anomalies”31 that these land-consuming capital 
flows represent for it. Why, for instance, would rational actors prefer to acquire 
28 | See Chapter 3 for the historical review.
29 | Explicitly, some authors argue that the “land grabs” in Africa, the continent 
that has been most affected by the phenomenon since 2000, resemble strongly the 
Scramble of the late 19th century. At that time, European powers brought most of the 
continental territory under their control. Many infer the historical similarity on the basis 
of particular empirical traits, such as poor labor conditions, resources focus, and/or 
asymmetric trade relations (e.g., Jauch (2011)). Chapter 3 provides a critical discussion 
of this narrative against the background of historical evidence on late 19th century 
colonialism and imperialism.
30 | This book follows the assessment and definition of mainstream economics 
provided by Lavoie (2014). Accordingly, mainstream economics can be used inter-
changeably with or thodox economics, neoclassical economics, marginalism, and/or 
the dominant paradigm. Distinct from heterodox economists, “mainstream economists 
exhibit great confidence in the ability of uninhibited markets to deliver stability and 
full employment, and to deliver solutions to any economic or social problem. The most 
extreme versions of neoclassical theory claim that instability and unemployment can 
prevail only when government inter feres in the operation of markets, thus hampering 
the price mechanism from achieving equilibrium” (Lavoie (2014), 5-30). Regarding 
international organization, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) are the two most prominent institutions whose policy advice has been informed by 
and promoted mainstream economic theory. For a detailed overview of key parameters 
and theoretical proponents, see Lavoie (2014).
31 | P. Hall (1990), 9.
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land in countries with weak governance and/or a deteriorating context of polit-
ical stability, a particular characteristic of international land acquisitions since 
2000?32 And why would governments back these capital exports in some cases, 
particularly at a time of financial crisis when capital markets are tight? In fact, 
explanations that try to accommodate such “anomalies”33 within the reasoning 
of the mainstream economics framing are rare, empirically unsound,34 and 
tend to contradict themselves analytically. For instance, the 2011 report by the 
WB argues that land acquisitions are a function of “commodity price volatility, 
growing human and environmental pressures, and worries about food secu-
rity.”35 Interestingly, all of these factors are key indicators of a failure in the 
liberal paradigm, despite its promotion as the best alternative for the effective 
and efficient provision and use of cheap resources. Yet, the WB recommends 
further liberalization as a remedy to the crises and promotes the creation of 
land markets.36 This approach screens out the analytical incoherence, while 
ignoring the question of the degree to which the operative paradigm might 
have contributed to the commercial pressure on land through policy advice 
and/or theoretical framing, as critiqued by Olivier De Schutter.37
Apparently, the context of crises, the high-risk environment of recipient 
countries, and the supporting role of states, as well as the multitude and diver-
sity of actors and events that together compose the global “land grab” phenom-
enon, render an international assessment of what is happening impossible. 
Having to rely on aggregate-level conceptualizations of actors and events, and/
or having to draw on broad theoretical frames for explanatory purposes, such 
32 | For instance, Africa Confidential (18 October 2013) suggests deteriorating 
security situations in countries that have been favored by investors during recent years, 
such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, Nigeria, and the DRC. Also see WB Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, 1996-2011 (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp);the 
Ibrahim Index of African Governance (http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/iiag/). 
Concerning the regional distribution of land-consuming FDI, see ILC (2012), 4.  
33 | P. Hall (1990), 9.
34 | The case of Ethiopia is particularly interesting. It has been argued that Ethiopia 
is a major target of foreign investments in land and agriculture due to its comparative 
advantage of land-related resource abundance. However, according to research in the 
field of ecological economics, Ethiopia is categorized as a country with an “ecological 
deficit.” This implies that it belongs to the bulk of countries identified as “net-exporters 
of biomass and sink-capacity” whose ecological capital is “eroding already due to local 
overuse of available biocapacity,” a fact that is worsened by the external factor of trade. 
See Andersson and Lindroth (2001), 116. Also, see Zebregs (1998).
35 | WB (2011), xiii.
36 | WB (2011).
37 | De Schutter (11 June 2009), 15. 
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assessments necessarily fail to fully capture how and explain why these invest-
ments take place. More specifically, they cannot explain why the investments 
take place in some country cases but not in others, why different countries 
display different patterns in view of these international land acquisitions, or the 
significance of different actors in these investments. 
Thus, this book argues that the phenomenon of “land grabbing” cannot be 
meaningfully understood through a deductive analysis that assumes unitary 
actor groups and states that exhibit rational (choice) behavior, and relies on 
predefined ideas about causal mechanisms in the form of demand and supply 
to explain what is happening. Clearly, rational (choice) and economic motiva-
tions and/or circumstances play a role in this phenomenon, as do international 
events. However, they do not a priori define actor motivations, policy outcomes, 
and/or land uses as is commonly hypothesized. Instead, contemporary, as well 
as historical, research about decision making and foreign (economic) policy 
indicates that non-rational (choice) and non-economic factors, such as ideas, 
political economy, development ambitions, events, or power politics might be 
equally important factors. 
2. The rese arch ProjecT
This research project provides a comparative historical-institutional and polit-
ico-economic account of “land grabbing” from a home country perspective. It 
also explains the specific roles of land-consuming FDI in home country devel-
opment. Specifically, the project explores the global phenomenon of “land 
grabbing” from the comparative perspective of two central investor countries, 
the United Kingdom (UK) and China, and does so in the context of their polit-
ical economy and development. The regional focus is on Chinese and British 
projects in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)—a region which appears to be a major 
target of large-scale, land-consuming investments (see Table 1-2 for an expla-
nation of terminology).38 Throughout, the research project is guided by the two 
overarching questions it aims to answer: How do these investments occur? 
Why do these investments take place? The timeframe of the analysis focuses on 
Chinese and British land-consuming FDI projects from 2000 to 2015. Through 
process tracing, the main empirical characteristics evident since 2000 are pre-
sented, connecting project-level data with insights about relevant aspects of the 
home country’s political economy, ideology, and development. The empirical 
assessment of contemporary “land grabs” since 2000 is complemented by a 
historical review of land acquisitions during the late 19th century to clarify to 
38 | ILC (2012), 4. For a discussion and explanation of the term “land-consuming 
investments,” see Table 1-2.
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what extent and in which ways today’s land-consuming FDI projects differ 
from past ones. 
Table 1-2 – A Note on Terminology
FDI in Land, Land Grab, or Land Acquisitions?
The terminological ambiguity that characterizes the “land grab” debate 
represented a conceptual challenge for this project. Hereafter, the book will 
primarily use the term “land-consuming FDI” to refer to listed “land grab” 
projects of over 100 hectares in scale. The use of other terms will be identified 
by quotation marks, inserted to remind the reader about the diversity of terms 
that are characteristic of the contemporary debate. The term land-consuming 
FDI highlights a major finding of this research project, namely that the 
primary purpose of many investments mentioned in the “land grab” debate is 
neither the acquisition of land nor the investment in agricultural production. 
Instead, “land grabs” occur due to investments in all sectors and industries of 
a host country. Often, these investments have commercial opportunities or the 
acquisition of financial assets as a primary driver. However, what is charac-
teristic of these investments is that they consume large areas of land in their 
operations. 
Importantly, the use of these terms does not mean that the book subscribes to 
the assumptions of the particular framework that usually accompanies them. 
Instead, the conceptual choice of referring to these activities as capital flows 
and FDI is due solely to the fact that under the contemporary operative econo-
mic paradigm that is embedded in domestic and international institutions, as 
well as programs of economic governance, these flows are framed and treated 
as FDI. At no point does the use of this terminology imply that the assessment 
and explanation follows the normative statements of many policy makers and/
or theoretical discussions about FDI.39 For reasons of clarity in terms of the di-
rection of FDI flows from a country perspective, the book also uses the terms 
“outward foreign direct investment” (OFDI) and “inward foreign direct invest-
ment” (IFDI) where it is deemed necessary. OFDI refers to capital exports, 
IFDI refers to capital imports. For a more detailed discussion of the political 
dimension of “land grabbing” terminology, see Chapter 2 (Section 3).
The timeframe from 2000 onwards has been chosen for two reasons: to 
investigate whether the 2007/2008 crises that orthodox explanations cite as 
having triggered the “land rush” actually led to a dramatic rise in land-con-
suming outward FDI (OFDI); and to account for the circumstance that 
the debate about “land grabbing” arose in relation to land-consuming FDI 
projects that occurred at the beginning of the 21st century. In fact, the most 
39 | For a discussion of mainstream economic assumptions about FDI costs and 
benefits, see, for instance, Sornarajah (2010), 49-53; and Moran (2011), 1-9.
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comprehensive database on “land grabs,” the Land Matrix, lists projects from 
2000 onwards. 
The case selection of China and the UK stems from several considerations. 
Both countries appear among the central “land grabbers” according to the 
existing databases (measured by the total scale of their companies’ operations 
overseas), which makes their study significant for a more meaningful under-
standing of what seems to be happening.40 Moreover, they are also commonly 
framed as embodiments of the aforementioned antithetic investor country 
model (i.e., state vs. market) running through standard explanations, meaning 
that a comparative study of these contrasting cases enables the research project 
to systematically explore alternative explanations of the political economy of 
“land grabs,” in view of the case-specific factors and dynamics at play, as well as 
regarding those that apply across the two cases. 
In addition, the choice of China and the UK as comparative cases is par-
ticularly compelling in terms of the research project’s aim to consider the role 
of land-consuming FDI in the context of home country development. This is 
because the countries differ in their industrial set-up and socioeconomic ori-
entation and history. They allow us to explore the ways in which international 
land acquisitions are reflective of a home country’s particular setting and devel-
opment context in and over time. On the one hand, Chinese (land-consuming) 
OFDI is interesting because of the country’s newcomer status as a source of 
capital exports. Such exports have to be understood against the background of 
the opening up of China in the late 1980s, which turned the country into an 
increasingly powerful international actor in the group of so-called “emerging 
economies.” Therefore, any study of Chinese land-consuming investments in 
Sub-Saharan Africa has to take account of the potential processes of interna-
tional development, such as the global economic and political restructuring, 
that these investments might reflect. The rise of China since the 1990s has been 
closely associated with a domestic development path that Jiang summarized as 
“heavy industrialization, labour- and capital- intensive manufacturing indus-
tries, export-led growth, low labour cost and high environmental damage.”41 In 
2013 (est.), the industrial sector continued to represent the largest share of gross 
domestic product (GDP) at 45.3%, compared to 45% for services and 9.7% for 
agricultural activities.42 With respect to the benchmark of genuine and sustain-
able development, this economic success has come at a high price in the form 
40 | See Land Matrix (http://landmatrix.org/en/get-the-idea/web-transnational- dea 
ls/).
41 | Jiang (2009), 587.
42 | US Central Intelligence Agency (20 June 2014).
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of low wages and worker welfare, plus contentious issues associated with “the 
eco-system and political reforms.”43 
On the other hand, and quite removed from China’s emergence as the 
“Workshop of the World”44 since the 1990s, the UK, as a former empire, has a 
long (industrial) history of economic presence worldwide, both as an investor 
and trading country. After the empire’s disintegration post-WWII, the UK has 
remained a ‘cosmopolitan’ economy, whose operations are integrated in, and 
dependent on the world economy. Domestically, its economic development 
after WWII was characterized by deindustrialization and the post-oil-crisis 
collapse of the manufacturing sector during the late 1970s, the financializa-
tion45 of the economy, and the adoption of neo-classical development policies 
that slowed reinvestments by the private sector which would have been needed 
to modernize the UK’s industrial base.46 As a result, the tertiary sector features 
prominently in the UK’s development context: financial and other services 
make up 78.9% of GDP (est. 2013), and related (overseas) earnings have become 
an increasingly important revenue source for the state, compensating for the 
negative terms of trade that result from the economy’s great dependence on 
foreign inputs and its relatively small secondary and primary sectors, which 
represent 20% and 0.7% of total GDP, respectively.47 The political economy of 
UK development since the 1980s, characterized by an “embedded financial 
orthodoxy”48 and a financialization-led growth model, has come at the high 
price. The country faces an escalating private and public-sector debt, rising 
wealth inequality, an employment crisis, and a growing fear that heightened 
international economic competition might weaken the positional ability of the 
country to “punch above its weight” in world politics. Alongside the financial 
43 | Jiang (2009), 587. 
44 | See, for instance, Martin and Manole (June 2004).
45 | Financialization describes the increasing importance and dominance of actors, 
instruments, and rationalizations of the financial sector in processes of the real 
economy. Stepping stones towards this shif t of power from industry towards financial 
capitalism were the deregulation and liberalization of financial markets, the increasing 
marketization of financial relations, the dramatic increase in financial instruments, 
and the rise of the shareholder value ideology (amongst others). The phenomenon has 
begun to attract attention following its effects on the real economy of countries, and, in 
the case of “land grabbing,” due to novel forms of engagement by actors from the finan-
cial sector in many land-consuming FDI projects, and related problems of speculation, 
short-termism, and unrealistically high profit expectations. See, for instance, Heires 
and Nölke (2014).
46 | The New Political Economy Network (2010), 14, 11-12.
47 | US Central Intelligence Agency (20 June 2014).
48 | Cerny and Evans (2004), 51.
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sector crisis, which has led to a prolonged stagnation of the home economy, 
the Cameron-led government of the period began to consider the possibility of 
modifying economic policy to rebalance the distribution of economic sectors 
through reindustrialization. 
In both countries, the costs of these development challenges have become 
a matter of concern for the political elite due to a dramatic increase in domestic 
protests over working conditions and pollution (China), and public concerns 
over inequality, economic recession, and the consequences of the latter for the 
country’s international positional status (UK). 
A major challenge that this research project was confronted with was the 
collection of data to give an overall empirical sense of overseas land-consuming 
investments. The details of most investment projects are shrouded by secrecy, 
corporate reports are often vague, the projects themselves are constantly 
changing, and there exists no (accessible) land deal inventory that registers 
every investment that occurs. To deal with the problem of data, this research 
project used the 2008-2010 project listings of three influential “land grab” 
reports, published by the International Institute for Environment and Devel-
opment (IIED)/United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)/
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the Global Land 
Project (GLP), and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 
as a starting point (not endpoint) of the research process (see Appendices 1 and 
2 for the finalized list of process-traced projects by British and Chinese actors 
in Sub-Saharan Africa).49 In addition, this research project monitored Chinese 
investment activities and relevant home country developments that occurred 
thereafter. 
The process tracing of over 40 Chinese and British outward foreign direct 
investments, and the continuous observation of both countries’ investment 
activities until 2014 made it possible to capture and understand the main 
empirical characteristics of what is happening and why in both country cases. 
The findings presented are the best estimate of the main trends and periods of 
Chinese and British land-consuming OFDI from 2000 to 2015. 
The approach taken in this book results in three contributions to the debate 
on “land grabbing,”50 all of which are effectively alternative interpretations of 
what happened. Firstly, the study provides an empirically grounded overview 
and meaningful understanding of Chinese and British land-consuming FDI 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Secondly, the study contributes to the existing body 
of research through its comparative design, which allows it to identify sim-
ilarities and differences between the two cases. It highlights that the differ-
ences of political economy between the two investor countries are exaggerated, 
49 | IIED/FAO/IFAD (2009); GLP (2010); and IFPRI (2009).
50 | For a detailed discussion, see Chapter 2.
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and it suggests that they are not necessarily significant for the explanation of 
“land grabbing,” as is often assumed. Thirdly, the comparative study of two 
contrasting cases contributes to the broader debate about the role that these 
land-consuming capital exports play in the context of home country develop-
ment. It also develops a framework that could also be utilized to study other 
cases.
Finally, it is important to note that due to the emphasis on investors and 
home countries, their perspectives, and the role of these investments in the 
context of home country development, empirical evidence about the impact 
of land-consuming FDI in host countries, or the role that host country actors 
play in this phenomenon are mentioned throughout the book only insofar as 
they provide for a better understanding of the nature of these projects. This 
approach is largely due to time and space constraints, and not reflective of 
any conclusion that the actors, institutions, and other host country factors are 
unimportant with regard to a comprehensive explanation of what is occurring. 
To the contrary, there is ample empirical evidence in the form of reports and 
case studies which highlights the importance of host country actors, dynamics, 
and institutions in these investment processes—they often shape what takes 
place and how.51 In practice, these analyses do not mutually exclude each other, 
but call for more research on the linkages, overlaps, differences, and broad 
structures that together compose the global “land grab.”
3. synoPsis of Ke y arGumenTs
The book argues that specific details of the home country’s industrial set-up, 
development challenges, ideological framing, political economy, and signifi-
cant events are critical to understanding what is occurring, as well as contin-
gency.52 Both country cases are characterized by a complexity of (f)actors at 
play, rather than a single masterplan. 
51 | See, for instance, Sikor (2012); Fairbarn (2013); McCarthy et al. (2012); Visser et 
al. (2012); and Wolford et al (2013b). See also the papers presented at the conferences 
“Global Land Grabbing I” in 2011 (Sussex University) and “Global Land Grabbing II” in 
2012 (Cornell University).
52 | Importantly, the book’s central argument that a comprehensive assessment of 
“land grabs” has to account for the domestic political economy context of outward FDI 
activities is (at best) country-centric, not state-centric. While the analysis of Chinese 
and British land-consuming FDI activities in Sub-Saharan Africa takes note of the 
particular foreign economic policy, it does not primarily focus on the activities of the 
state.
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In the Chinese case, OFDI, of which “land grab” projects form a part, 
reflects the interests of the country’s resource-intensive and market-dependent 
manufacturing industry, and is part of economic upgrading. Consequently, the 
land-consuming investments are intended to diversify the country’s energy and 
industrial minerals’ supply, open new export markets, and facilitate the inter-
nationalization of Chinese companies’ production chains. At the same time, 
private actors are involved, hoping for livelihood improvements or business 
opportunities that are lacking back home. Also, Chinese diplomatic engage-
ment with Africa aims to establish or maintain international political alliances.
In the case of the UK, large-scale land acquisitions occur in response to 
reforms in the host countries, to international and domestic energy and climate 
policies, and to reindustrialization efforts. This means they occur because com-
panies make use of the business opportunities offered to them in the form of 
divestiture programs in host countries, or the creation of markets by (inter)
national climate and energy policies. Moreover, the expectation that Africa will 
be the new growth region drives the investments to the continent at a time 
of the financial crisis and economic stagnation back home. The latter percep-
tion also led the previous UK government to promote land-consuming OFDI 
to Sub-Saharan Africa as way to economic recovery and international political 
power through rising exports and industrial activity. 
In historical comparison with late 19th century Scramble for Africa, contem-
porary land-consuming OFDI has novel and “old” features. On the one hand, 
core institutions, ideas, and structures that emerged in the 19th century are still 
part of the fabric of today’s global society and the multiplicity of motives, actors, 
and sectors at play also strongly resembles that of the past. On the other hand, 
a detailed assessment of those features reveals that their characteristics have 
changed with regard to key aspects: Corporations have gained discretionary 
power vis-à-vis the state; host country governments proactively seek to attract 
foreign capital (rather than it being forced upon them); and existing institu-
tional structures supporting OFDI have been strengthened domestically and 
internationally, both at home and in the host countries. Moreover, contempo-
rary capital exports by newcomers such as China reflect processes of global 
economic restructuring of which these overseas investments form a part. 
Ultimately, the book advances the broader comparative argument that these 
investments are reflective of international developmental regimes, national 
development trajectories, and transnational development imaginaries. In fact, 
the rhetoric by governments and investors frames these capital exports as a 
strategy of national and individual development. On the one hand, they allow 
a range of diverse actors to “push the limits” of profitable business and/or social 
mobility in an increasingly globalized economy. This includes the observation 
that land-consuming FDI projects are often about controlling or consuming 
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“land-based wealth (stemming from different land uses and activities).”53 On 
the other hand, they serve as a tool to “fight the limits” that different actors face 
at home in view of advancing their economic, political, and/or ideology-driven 
interests, as well as national development trajectories that cannot provide suffi-
cient (and good) jobs, erode the national resource base, and are strongly vulner-
able in their reliance on export markets. This explains why Chinese and British 
land-consuming OFDI projects are pursued, even when they are not at all eco-
nomically successful. A substantial number of projects do not live up to the 
promise of extraordinary returns, and many projects collapse in the medium 
term, resulting in “loss-loss” scenarios for the home and host country. Never-
theless, they seem to serve the interests of diverse agents (firms, governments, 
individuals) who are involved with them, (geo-) politically and/or economically. 
This is true for both countries, in spite of the quite different forms of these 
investments. At last, this means to revisit the divided perception of investment 
as land grab or development. Instead, land-consuming FDI projects can be 
both, in the sense that investments that grab land are the factual expression of 
a particular ideology of development embedded in institutions, agencies, and 
practices of (inter-)national organization.
4. sTrucTure of The booK
The remainder of Chapter 1 describes the research approach in terms of meth-
odological issues and the framework of analysis. 
Chapter 2 provides an analytical review of the contemporary body of research 
on “land grabbing” that has emerged since 2007. It explains gaps in the liter-
ature, offers an overview over influential policy paradigms, and concludes by 
highlighting the key aspects that this project contributes to the debate. 
The review of historical literature on international land acquisitions in 
Chapter 3 complements the introduction of the contemporary debate, which 
remains inconclusive and relatively imprecise in view of the questions of how, 
and in which way, contemporary “land grabs” differ from or resemble those 
of the past. The discussion of the central features of “land grabs” in the late 
19th century, often referred to as the high watermark of globalization, aims to 
contribute a meaningful summary of key empirical characteristics and expla-
nations. To that end, the categories studied are similar to the ones applied in 
the empirical assessment process of the case studies in order to ensure compa-
rability of data.
Following this introduction of contemporary debates about and past expe-
riences of “land grabbing,” Chapters 4 to 7 then present the empirical-ana-
53 | Goetz (2015), 180-181. Also, see GRAIN ( 2008); Borras and Franco ( 2010).
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lytical assessment of Chinese and British large-scale land-consuming invest-
ments from a home country perspective. Together, Chapters 4 and 5 compose 
the China case study. Chapter 4 shows the main empirical characteristics of 
Chinese land-consuming FDI in African countries. The chapter is structured 
according to the same categories that guided the historical review and process 
tracing. Additionally, this chapter incorporates a section on the role of Chinese 
labor in these projects, a hotly debated phenomenon that requires clarification 
for a meaningful explanation of what is happening.
Chapter 5 complements the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 
4. It explains these investments’ characteristics in light of China’s political 
economy; OFDI policy framework (called “home country measures”); guiding 
ideology; and development context. The chapter discusses how and why these 
investments are taking place from a home country perspective; and it explains 
what makes them Chinese, rather than British, in nature.
The UK case study is also divided into two chapters. Chapter 6 presents the 
key empirical characteristics of British land-consuming FDI in African coun-
tries since 2000. Again, it does so according to the categories outlined previ-
ously. Similar to the China case study, this chapter contains a country-case-spe-
cific section on the role of British investment funds active in agricultural 
investments. This allegedly novel phenomenon features prominently in the 
“land grab” debate and seems to represent a significant share of the UK invest-
ments. Therefore, it is important to clarify misconceptions about these cases.
Chapter 7 explains these investments and their characteristics in view of the 
UK’s political economy; OFDI policy framework (“home country measures”); 
guiding ideology; and development context. The chapter addresses how and 
why these investments are taking place from a home country perspective and 
explains what makes them British.
Chapter 8 compares the key findings of both country cases, and contrasts 
them with both historical evidence on international land acquisitions and the 
standard explanations in the contemporary “land grab” debate. It concludes 
with a discussion of what these findings tell us with regard to the linkage of 
OFDI and home country development.
5. a noTe on me ThodoLoGicaL issues and The fr ame worK  
 of anaLysis 
The empirical characteristics of land-consuming FDI projects by Chinese 
and British actors in various countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were explored 
by using the method of process tracing and triangulation. Consequently, and 
building on these empirical findings, alternative analytical explanations of why 
particular actors have been involved in these activities were investigated, largely 
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by evaluating key empirical characteristics in the context of the home country’s 
political economy and in view of its social, ecological, political, and economic 
development context. The comparative research design, as well as case selec-
tion, allowed for differentiation between common and unique patterns of each 
country’s land-consuming outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) activi-
ties. The selection of dissimilar cases also challenged standard typologies of 
investor countries previously outlined and explored the role of land-consuming 
OFDI from a home country perspective.54
The next section will discuss the database constraints that this project was 
confronted with; explain the project’s heuristic framework of analysis; and 
introduce relevant literature that has guided the study of political economy, as 
well as OFDI, in the context of home country development. 
Database and Data Collection
This project’s assessment and analysis of land-consuming FDI has drawn on a 
wide range of data accessible via desk review, including official documentation, 
corporate reports, speeches, field reports, semi-scholarly literature, statistical 
accounts, academic publications, and interviews. The following paragraphs 
recapitulate the particular nature of database constraints that this research on 
“land grabbing” was confronted with, and that shaped its research approach 
and design.
A central challenge has been the unreliable nature of the data available 
on the topic, together with its high degree of politicization.55 While the latter 
results in a biased focus on large-scale FDI in farmland in the available “land 
grab” literature, the first feature means that existing databases can only serve as 
starting points of research, because they contain false reports, double postings, 
and outdated information. They also obviously suffer from the unwillingness 
of many governments and corporations to share information about investment 
deals. Even the World Bank was unable to overcome this lack of transparency 
and ultimately had to rely on the scattered information available in NGO-led 
databases.56 Against this background, Oya’s methodological critique of the 
54 | For a methodological discussion, see, for instance, Falleti (2006). Goldstone 
(2008); George and Bennett (2005), 27, 19; Khan and Van Wynsberghe (2008), 5.
55 | The multiple epistemological and methodological challenges that researchers 
as well as available “land grab” databases (provided by Land Matrix and GRAIN) are 
confronted with have been discussed in detail by Oya (2013b); Edelman (2013); 
Anseeuw et al. (2013); GRAIN (2013); Scoones et al. (2013a).
56 | The WB report primarily relies on the collection of data available on the blog 
hosted by the international NGO GRAIN (www.farmlandgrab.org). Contrary to the WB 
Managing Director Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala’s promise that the report would help to lif t “the 
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“land grab” literature warns us that many “authors’ conclusions have an air of 
scientific rigour” that “represent[s] an instance of ‘false precision’,” particularly 
in those cases where “the underlying data are actually riddled with uncertain-
ties,” and where selection biases and/or prevailing assumptions go unchal-
lenged.57
The assessment process of this research project has confirmed that most 
databases seem to lack rigid fact checking of reported projects. Take, for 
example, the Land Matrix, which is the most comprehensive database on large-
scale land acquisitions. Since it went public in 2012, it has constantly faced the 
problem of incorrect listings, resulting in great deviations of the number of 
“land grabs” over time (due to corrections, changes in categorization, and new 
listings, see Table 1-3). 
Table 1-3 – Evolving Listings: May 2012, September 2012, and April 2014 (Land 
Matrix)58
Country May 2012 
(Land Matrix)
Sept 2012 
(Land Matrix)
April 2014 
(Land Matrix)
UK 
46 projects, 
3,008,472ha 
41 projects, 
2,736,104ha 
98 projects,
2,232,547ha
China
51 projects, 
3,482,616ha 
46 projects, 
2,068,796ha 
90 projects,
1,342,034ha
Overall, it must be acknowledged that no complete list of total hectares by 
sector and/or country could be found—nor does it seem likely or even feasible 
for such a list to exist in the future, due to terminological inconsistencies of 
what constitutes a “land grab,” the lack of administrative data by states and 
companies, and/or the constant changes to project details during a project’s 
lifecycle. Consequently, the figures of, and information about the phenomenon 
of “grabbed land” are only a proxy for commercial pressure on land, and they 
vary greatly across databases and reports, as a brief comparison of the total 
number and scale of assumed “land grabs” highlights: as of 2012, GRAIN listed 
416 land deals in the agricultural sector that had been reported since 2006. 
veil of secrecy that often surrounds these land deals,” the report does not provide any 
information (data) in addition to that available on the blog. Moreover, instead of intro-
ducing 30 country case studies, it only includes 14. Out of these, not a single contract 
was published at the time. See WB (2011). Also see GRAIN’s critique of the report (8 
September 2010).
57 | Oya (2013b), 503-504.
58 | These listings are taken from the Land Matrix at dif ferent points in time, namely 
May and September 2012, and April 2014.
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Altogether these were using “35 million hectares of land in 66 countries.”59 In 
comparison, The Land Matrix, which lists land-consuming investments from 
multiple sectors, including tourism, agriculture, mining and petroleum, and 
forestry, since 2000, counted 924 land deals covering 48,829,193ha of land.60 
Lastly, the “grassroots environmental network”61 Friends of the Earth has been 
quoted as saying “that anywhere from 80 to 227 million hectares of rural, often 
agrarian land, typically in poorer countries hungry for foreign investment, 
have been taken over by private and corporate interests in recent years.”62 
In addition, the ahistorical, in time approach of these databases ignores land 
banks accumulated by foreign companies over time and prior to 2000. This 
posed a particular challenge for the comparative research design of this study 
with its focus on new and established investor countries, specifically China and 
the UK. For example, a rough investigation of the situation in Kenya (based on 
a review of corporate reports) showed that between 1999 and 2010, British food 
companies controlled approximately 22.000ha of agricultural land in the form 
of plantations or outgrower schemes under a fully integrated supply chains 
system—some being present in the Kenyan economy since 1869, as the case of 
Williamson Kenya illustrates.63 Yet, none of these projects or hectares existed 
in the aforementioned databases and while these figures might seem insig-
nificant in view of the scale of some contemporary FDI projects, they do high-
light that investor (country) legacy, and the related foreign control over land 
banks accumulated before the year 2000, deserve greater scrutiny to ensure 
a balanced comparison of emerging powers and Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.
Finally, the method of crowdsourcing to collect data that is applied across 
databases and reports aggravates the problem of false and/or biased data on 
the phenomenon, as the active contributors that function as the “crowd,” such 
as international media outlets, governments, and NGOs, often appear to give 
skewed attention to certain countries and phenomena, such as emerging coun-
tries’ investment activities or biofuel projects. As a result, it seems that some 
countries’ activities or certain investment types are potentially underreported 
in the aggregate.
59 | GRAIN (23 February 2012). 
60 | Land Matrix (http://www.landmatrix.org/en/, accessed 21 November 2012).
61 | Friends of the Earth website (http://www.foei.org/).
62 | Biron (23 April 2012).
63 | Based on information from IDE-JETRO (n.d.); Mwega and Ngugi (2006), 119, 
138-140; Kariuki (1999); British American Tobacco (BAT) (http://www.bat.com/); 
Williamson (https://www.williamsontea.com/); and Wei and Balasubramanyam (2004).
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Heuristic Framework
The process of data collection and analysis is guided by several categories (see 
Table 1-4).64 Accordingly, each land-consuming FDI project in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the associated country case, was assessed in view of 13 categories, 
namely the actors, institutions, and sectors involved throughout the project 
cycle; particular timelines of the projects; the role of land in the investments; the 
purpose of the investments; and the role of the projects in the recipient country 
context. Key outcomes of this process are documented in the appendix tables on 
Chinese and British investments since 2000. These also provide the final list 
of projects that this research project investigated in great detail.
Moreover, the empirical findings were discussed in view of the political 
economy and social, economic, and ecological development context of the home 
country. Particular attention was given to relevant home country measures65 and 
guiding ideologies; specific events significant for investor choices, investment 
outcomes, and/or OFDI-relevant regulations; and the role played by investor 
legacy in these investments, in the form of linkages, quality of connections, and 
foreign policy traditions (see summary in Table 1-4). In order to enhance com-
parability of empirical findings over time, the historical review of international 
land acquisitions at the turn of the 20th century was also structured according 
to these categories. To complement the very detailed information obtained 
during process tracing, the study incorporated an extensive literature review 
about the history of the OFDI regimes, foreign economic policies, development 
trajectories, and the political economies of the home countries. To the degree 
necessary, it accounted for the political economy in host countries. 
64 | Collier (2011), 824.
 Collier (2011), 824.
65 | Home country measures refer to the policy frameworks of the investor country 
that support OFDI activities of the domestic industry. See, for instance, Sauvant et al. 
(2010).
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Table 1-4 – Categories and Sub-Questions Guiding the Assessment of  
Land-Consuming FDI
Empirical Characteristics of FDI in 
SSA
Home Country Context
Actors
• Who is involved?
• At which stage of the project?
• To which end?
Development context 
• What is the social, economic, and 
ecological state of home country 
development?
Institutions
• What institutions play a role in 
these projects?
Home country measures 
• What is the institutional framework 
that OFDI is embedded in?
• Do these institutions play a role in 
OFDI in SSA?
Sectors
• What sectors do these projects go to?
•What are core characteristics of this 
sector in the host country?
Guiding ideologies
• How are capital exports rationalized 
by actors involved?
Timelines
• What does the project life-cycle look 
like?
• When did the project start?
• How does the project develop?
Investor (country) legacy
• Does the investor legacy play a role 
in how these investments occur?
Purpose
• Is the project producing for export 
markets? Political economy
• What are relevant features of 
state-market relations?Role of land 
• How is land used?
• How is land governed?
• How is land accessed?
Recipient country context
• What is the official position towards 
inward FDI?
• Is the project embedded in national 
development plans?
Events
• Which events were significant in 
the context of OFDI?
• In which ways were these events 
significant?
 
Consequently, this research project’s analysis of land-consuming FDI is the 
result of a trying decision-making process in respect of which information to 
include and which to exclude. Throughout, the research has been determined 
to depict the diversity of factors at play, and to weigh them according to their 
importance. Therefore, it presents the empirical and analytical findings of each 
case study in two distinct chapters. This structure provides the space to high-
light the multiple factors that are part of the main empirical characteristics of 
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each case and, in a second step, to draw broader analytical conclusions about 
why they occur from a home country perspective.
Political Economy, Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 
and Development
The research project is inspired by three sets of literature: comparative polit-
ical economy, FDI, and development. These will be introduced in this section 
in order to elucidate the premises upon which this study’s assessment and 
analysis of Chinese and British land-consuming FDI is built.
Political Economy
Firstly, the study of the comparative political economy of these projects was 
influenced by the work of key historical institutionalists. Drawing on the theo-
retical work of C/IPE66 scholars such as Katzenstein, Hall, and Rueschemeyer 
and Mahoney, the project has not assumed that the interests of involved actors 
are exogenous, fixed, or necessarily material. Instead, it was based on the 
assumption that any study of the political economy of land-consuming FDI 
would have to be open to potentially new factors and variables that might shape 
relevant policy, project, and/or actor rationale, including the decision-making 
environment itself, psychological factors, international factors, domestic 
factors, and economic reasoning.67
Additionally, the study’s interest in OFDI from the viewpoint of political 
economy was influenced by Katzenstein’s argument that the “management 
and the analysis of interdependence must start at home.”68 Conventionally, 
IPE scholars accentuate the role of international factors in the form of inter-
national regimes, trade, FDI, epistemic communities, and civil society, while 
comparative political economists concentrate on domestic factors to explain 
policy outputs and outcomes. In the case of land-consuming OFDI, however, 
neither approach can fully capture what is happening. Instead, the literature 
review69 suggests that national and international factors are at play, and that 
distinct domestic developments together make up the global phenomenon. In 
this context, the work by Katzenstein exemplifies a third way to study land-con-
suming FDI. He bridges the outlined divide between C/IPE scholars in his 
66 | C/IPE refers to scholars that combine comparative political economy (CPE) and 
international political economy (IPE) research.
67 | See, for instance, Katzenstein (1977a; 1978); P. Hall (1990); and Rueschemeyer 
and Mahoney (2003). Other disciplines have acknowledged the multiplicity of factors in 
decision making. See DeRouen and Mintz (2010).
68 | Katzenstein (1977b), 606.
69 | See Chapter 2.
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research on the foreign economic policy making of advanced industrial states, 
highlighting that it is the outcome of “the interaction of international and 
domestic forces.”70 
This research project’s assessment and analysis of land-consuming FDI has 
adopted Katzenstein’s argument that it is not possible to understand societies 
without examining the regional and global contexts within which they exist. 
At the same time, this logic suggests that one cannot understand regional and 
global phenomena without considering the distinctiveness of the societies (and 
the domestic structures of the nation-states) involved. Katzenstein’s work also 
underlines the importance of accounting for differences in national responses 
to international challenges, such as the food or energy crisis in 2007/2008, even 
at a time when international interdependence and “the pervasiveness of trans-
national relations” are important phenomena in the reality of nation-states.71 
The above implies that the assessment of how international land acquisitions 
are actually carried out by actors from two major investor countries provides for 
a better understanding of why they might be happening in the home country 
context, how they relate to issues of crisis, and what their implications could be 
for international economic and political relations. Moreover, the institutional 
assessment differentiates between means (instruments) and ends (objective) 
while remaining aware that “means can become an end in itself, and ends can 
become a means in the attainment of other objectives.”72 
With regard to actor analysis, the study starts out by sorting actors into major 
interest groups of production relations (such as industry, finance, commerce, 
labor and agriculture) and political action groups related to the structures of 
political authority (state bureaucracy and political set-up). However, neither 
actor group should ultimately be seen as unitary during the process of assess-
ment and analysis; nor should a strict normative distinction between private 
and public actors be upheld during process tracing and analysis. State power 
itself is made up of particular individuals belonging to a particular group in 
society, and their strategic considerations for foreign (economic) policy might 
end up conflicted between national interests (as state power held by particular 
groups) and the public good. Also, private actors within the same field might 
pursue very different interests and experience highly dissimilar outcomes. 
Furthermore, with regard to influence, a priori presumptions are not helpful 
for a meaningful understanding of how and why land-consuming FDI occurs. 
While interest groups, particularly in the field of economic policy, are important 
70 | Katzenstein (1977b), 587, 591.
71 | Also see, for instance, Dore (2000).
72 | Katzenstein (1977b), 588.
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in influencing public preference and choice, it can also work the other way 
around, with public policy influencing private preferences.73 
More broadly, the analysis of land-consuming OFDI from an investor per-
spective treats agencies, clusters of ideas that perform ideological functions74 
(hereafter: guiding ideologies), structures, and events as co-determinant, and 
it does not assume variable independence. Consequently, the emphasis has 
been on studying in-depth “these interactive effects of the interdependence of 
multiple causal variables”75 in the Chinese and British cases. The study has 
accepted that “history and ideas matter,” that “institutions structure actor 
choices but are subject to change by actors themselves,” and that actors “make 
decisions that are not always efficiently or purely self-interested.”76 
Concerning the aspect of power in the study of the two home countries’ 
political economy, the assessment was influenced by the theoretical work of 
Barnett and Duvall. The authors developed a heuristic model of power as a 
social relation.77 Accordingly, power transpires in the interaction of actors 
(“power over”), as well as in the structural setting within which this interac-
tion takes place (“power to”).78 Therefore, the book has taken note of the home 
countries’ development trajectories and political economies, as well as the exis-
tence and application of a particular discourse or cluster of ideas and refer-
73 | Katzenstein (1977b). Also see Levy and Prakash (2003) on transnational corpora-
tions in global governance or Chandler and Mazlish (2005).
74 | Ideological functions refer to the fact that ideologies tend to justify and reflect 
powerful interest structures. The assessment of Chinese and British OFDI from a home 
country perspective takes note of such powerful clusters of ideas that play a role in 
the promotion and rationalization of these investments. However, Gouldner (1976, 33) 
stressed that ideologies dif fer from propaganda which is purely strategically in nature. 
Instead, ideologies “are intended to be believed in by those affirming them publicly 
and by all men, because they are “true,” and they thus have universal character.” The 
universal appeal of ideologies, such as the claim that they serve the national interest, 
conceals the interest formation that they represent in their “concern for What is and by 
their world-referencing ‘reports’.” In this sense, then, the clusters of ideas supporting 
OFDI to Africa fulfill an ideological function: they mobilize support, conceal the inter-
ests of the particular political economy that drives them, and appear to be universal in 
character. Moreover, these guiding ideologies justify as well as create the institutions 
and purposeful agents at play in OFDI activities to Africa.
75 | Steinmo (2008), 166.
76 | Steinmo (2008), 178.
77 | Barnett and Duvall (2005).
78 | Barnett and Duvall (2005), 48. Clearly, this distinction should only be understood 
as a heuristic tool, because in practice, both power dimensions are inter twined.
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ence systems that determine the subjectivities of actors, their capacity, and that 
shape preferences and perceptions.79 
FDI Research
Secondly, the study has drawn on FDI research in its consideration of poten-
tial links between OFDI flows, domestic development, and foreign economic 
policy. OFDI research largely comprises economic-historical and legal-institu-
tional studies on OFDI in and over time, and it bridges the analytical divide 
between micro-level OFDI activities and macro-level economic development 
by documenting the empirical correlations between them. Accordingly, “OFDI 
is one part of the country’s overall strategy of economic development,” i.e. “a 
means to an end, not the goal itself.”80 
The essay by Lall was particularly helpful, as it provides important findings 
on the significance of particular development challenges in influencing gov-
ernment policies on FDI activities. Lall’s research documents the use of “FDI 
flows for furthering the growth of national ownership and locational advan-
tages,” mostly in cases of market failure, and it reveals the relevance of the 
home country context for explaining the large OFDI variations between and 
within investor countries in and over time.81 The documented cases are not 
confined to state-capitalist countries, as the orthodox description of “land 
grabbing” countries would suggest, but include liberal economies such as the 
UK, whose statistics from 1973-2002 show that investment-related bilateral aid 
to improve the host country’s investment environment positively correlated 
with OFDI flows over time.82 
Also, the comparative study on OFDI by emerging economies, edited by 
Sauvant et al., was useful. It identifies key frameworks and elements of OFDI 
regulation by emerging economies, as well as OECD countries; and it outlines 
their emergence in the context of their economic development process. From its 
legal-institutional standpoint, the antithetic framing used in the contemporary 
debate on “land grabbing” (e.g., state vs. market) is not helpful in explaining 
what seems to be happening, since the resulting contrastive description of 
Chinese and British political economies does not correspond with the actual 
institutional frameworks in place in both countries, which are relatively similar 
with regard to OFDI regulation and promotion.83
79 | Gouldner (1976), 33.
80 | Broadman (2010), 331; Sauvant et al. (2010); Te Velde (2007); Hyam (2010); 
Nunnenkamp (2006); and Dumett 1999.
81 | Lall (1996), 324-325.
82 | Te Velde (2006), 24-25; and Te Velde (2007), 96.
83 | Sauvant et al. (2010).
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At the same time, these works indicate that any implicit or explicit claims 
about the benefits of OFDI for domestic development need to be critically 
probed against empirical evidence. In practice, particular cost and benefit ratio-
nalizations by investors and governments often do not materialize, and capital 
exports might not turn out to be in the best interest of the country. Prominent 
examples are the “hollowing out” of the Japanese manufacturing industry,84 
the export of jobs, or cases of wealth destruction through project failure.85 His-
torical FDI research also raises awareness of the fact that the contemporary pro-
motional policy stance towards OFDI that is characteristic of China and the UK 
(since 2000) is unique. Over time, governments have shifted back and forth 
between restricting and/or liberalizing such capital flows, which emphasizes 
the need to be aware of potential changes in the respective policy landscape and 
guiding ideology over time.
Home Countr y Development 
Thirdly, this project has studied Chinese and British land-consuming invest-
ments in view of home country development through the lens of four dimen-
sions: the ecological dimension (pollution; resource availability and access); the 
social dimension (unemployment; education; lack of skilled personnel; demo-
graphic change; inequality of wealth and opportunity); the political dimension 
(public policies; political landscape; state-market relations); and the economic 
dimension (crisis; debt; job creation; sectoral distribution; productivity; external 
vulnerability; ambitions). These factors have been derived from a body of liter-
ature that discusses the trajectories, dynamics, potentials, and challenges of 
development approaches since the late 19th century.86
84 | Also see Moran (2011), 124.
85 | See Lall (1996); Moran (2011); Snyder (1991); and Cottrell (1975). 
86 | E.g., Gillespie (2001); Bird and Velasquez (2006); Robbins (2004); Victor (2008); 
Hirsch (2005); Snyder (1991); Jackson (2011); Cato (2011); Ekins (1993); and Saeed 
(2008). Also see the literature review in Chapter 3 on the historical dynamics of home 
country development and overseas investment. 
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A new international division of labour in agriculture is 
likely to emerge between countries with large tracts of 
arable land—and thus a likely exporter of biomass or 
densified derivatives—versus countries with smaller 
amounts of arable land (i.e. biomass importers, 
e.g. Holland). The biggest biomass export hubs are 
expected to be Brazil, Africa and North America.
(World Economic Forum 2010)
Like trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) has occurred 
throughout history. From the merchants of Sumer 
around 2500 BCE to the East India Company in the 
17th century, investors routinely entered new markets 
in foreign dominions. In 1970 global FDI totaled $13.3 
billion. By 2007 it was nearly 150 times higher, peaking 
at $1.9 trillion.
(WB 2010)
Importantly, the new investment strategy is more 
strongly driven by food, water and energy security than 
a notion of comparative advantage in the large scale 
production of indigenous crops for global markets, 
which has been more characteristic of foreign-owned 
plantations since the end of the colonial era. The 
current land purchase and lease arrangements are 
largely about shif ting land and water uses from local 
farming to essentially long-distance farming to meet 
home state food and energy needs.
(UN DESA 2010)
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1. inTroducTion
Diversity of frames and perspectives characterize the contemporary debate 
on “land grabbing” since 2007. While the emerging empirical evidence 
about dynamics in host countries is growing, meaningful assessments of 
land-consuming FDI from a home country perspective remain limited. The 
more nuanced assessments that have emerged all highlight the complexity of 
home-country-specific political economies involved, plus the significant share 
of non-resource focused, yet land-consuming OFDI projects. 
This chapter introduces central concerns, trends, and paradigms of the 
“land grab” debate since 2008. It proceeds as follows: Firstly, key factors will 
be discussed that might explain the unexpected surge of international interest 
in, and research on the topic of “land grabbing.” Secondly, the main termino-
logical challenges will be outlined. Alongside the data challenges presented in 
Chapter 1, these are important in understanding the constraints and pitfalls 
that confront research on this topic. Thirdly, a review of major publications 
since 2008 will be presented, highlighting core explanations, and summa-
rizing how the debate has evolved over time, analytically and empirically.1 
Fourthly, the three most influential framings that shape the policy debate and 
the research literature will be discussed. Aside from their significant role in 
identifying the problems of “land grabbing,” and, on that basis, recommending 
potential remedies, these framings also mirror core actor constellations and 
paradigmatic contestations that affect what is being discussed in the academic 
literature on the topic. Finally, the contribution made by this research project to 
the debate will be briefly outlined. 
2. why “L and Gr abbinG” made iT onTo The    
 inTernaTionaL rese arch aGenda
Before going into the debate on “land grabbing” itself, it seems important to 
reflect upon its basic parameters on a broader scale, namely the factors that 
put this topic on the international research agenda in the first place as well as 
the terminological ambiguity that characterizes it. These prior considerations 
about the context and terminology of the debate will allow us to identify poten-
tial interests, dynamics, and events that might be important for a better under-
standing of the “land grab” phenomenon. Clearly, processes of dispossession, 
concentration of ownership, and other aspects of commercial pressure on land 
1 | For clarification: While the “land grabbing” debate begun with the framing by GRAIN 
(2008) in 2008, it is important to note, that the projects that are referenced in the 
debate often trace back to the year 2000, or even fur ther back.
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that are discussed under the heading of “land grabbing,” “international land 
acquisitions,” or “FDI in land and agriculture,” are by themselves nothing new, 
nor do the authors who contribute to the respective literature and policy debate 
seem to make a particular effort to understand whether anything about the 
phenomenon differs from the past. What exactly does the broader context of 
timing, actor constellation, or terminology then tell us about the renewed pop-
ularity of land issues? 
It appears that the interplay of five factors has prepared the ground for new 
interest in the phenomenon. These factors can be described under the headings 
of framing, empirical evidence, crisis, competition, and opposition. 
Firstly, the “land grab” framing itself seems important. “Land grabbing” 
has not only become the title under which a huge body of interdisciplinary 
research on the topic is emerging, but it also provides international NGOs such 
as GRAIN2 with a powerful diagnostic tool and political platform to pool and 
jointly articulate their discontent with the predominant policy paradigms of 
the national and international development institutions and agencies that ini-
tially supported these “investments” and related policy reforms in the name of 
“development,” “poverty reduction,” and/or “food security.”3 
Secondly, in this process of paradigmatic contestation there is growing 
empirical evidence of the often high social, environmental, and/or economic 
costs of “land grabs” at the local level, which has been admitted by the WB.4 
Together with the sheer, unheard of scale of the projects, this has lent practical 
credibility to the alternative framing that challenges the widely institutionalized 
policy paradigm of mainstream economics over its failed promises—pointing, 
for instance, to the poor job creation and skills transfer, limited taxation, dis-
possession, displacement, pollution, and ownership concentration.5 
Thirdly, the context of the financial, energy, and food crises of 2007/2008 
has increased interest in the topic. On the one hand, the rise of FDI in land and 
agriculture, especially at a time when investments elsewhere were declining, 
generated attentiveness to the phenomenon on a general level—first from a 
quantitative angle by UNCTAD, and increasingly from a qualitative angle.6 On 
the other hand, the crises had governments worldwide worrying about political 
and economic regime security in the face of food riots, high energy and food 
prices, unemployment, debt pressure, and lagging growth. These concerns 
2 | GRAIN (2008).
3 | WB (2007); De Schutter (2011a); Caffentzis (2002); De Angelis (2005). 
4 | WB (2011).
5 | WB (2011).
6 | UNCTAD (2009).
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redirected their attention towards issues of food, job, and energy security, all of 
which are issues linked to land-consuming investments.7 
Fourthly, the renewed attention to “land grabs” was also fueled by the wide-
spread concern among public and private actors in old investor countries over 
heightened international competition and global economic restructuring.8 
This is evidenced by the high research output of OECD-based institutions on 
the rise of new economic powers as well as the officially documented fears of 
old economic powers over their declining international influence.9 
Finally, the opposing interests and paradigms of dominant institutions, 
such the WB, the FAO, or the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
have led to a lively, global-level policy debate on the issues of “land grabbing,” 
food security, and the role of agriculture for development.10 In this context, a 
well-prepared civil society, which had pushed the FAO since 2002 to change 
the course of its agricultural policy stance towards smallholder farming, also 
played a prominent role. It made productive use of the 2007/2008 food crisis 
and its established institutional linkages with the Rome-based agency once the 
crisis hit.11
In sum, these elements point to the political side of the debate, and they 
call attention to the fact that not everyone who engages in it does so out of an 
interest in “land grabbing” itself. Instead, part of the discussion taking place 
under the label of “land grabbing” seems to be the result of media diplomacy 
and the furthering of other agendas. This is highlighted by the great discrep-
ancy between empirical facts and rhetorical claims about what is happening. 
This discrepancy, which this research project witnessed in many cases during 
process tracing, cannot be explained by the complex set of data constraints 
alone. 
7 | Against this background, the observation by Ayoob (2005) that the securitization of 
an issue is preceded by its politicization seems important. 
8 | See UNCTAD (2009, 124), especially regarding the rise of transnational corpora-
tions (TNCs) from Asian countries among the top 25 TNCs globally. Also see Dicken 
(2007), 33-69.
9 | See Chapters 6 and 7.
10 | See WB (2007); IAASTD (2008); De Schutter (2011a); WB (2011); and IIED/FAO/
IFAD (2009).
11 | Personal communication, Steering Committee member of the Committee on 
World Food Security, November 2013.
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3. on TerminoLoGicaL ambiGuiT y 
The politics of the discourse on “land grabbing” that were discussed in the 
previous section are also reflected in the history of its terminology. The “land 
grab” terminology was brought to life by GRAIN’s publication “Seized,” which 
first applied it to describe an allegedly new global trend, namely the securing 
of large tracts of (farm)land by foreign governments and private actors. While 
the term “land grabbing” had previously been used to describe historical inci-
dents of “arbitrary seizure of land either by military force or through dishonest 
or illegal means,”12 GRAIN’s reframing of international investments in land 
as “land grabs” pointed to the similarities between contemporary events and 
those of the past for the affected populations in the form of “the brutal expul-
sion of indigenous communities” and intensifying “struggles over land.”13 At 
the same time, it put the spotlight on the prevailing economic approach’s “accu-
mulation of anomalies,”14 such as misleading assumptions about the benefits of 
such investments for the social and economic development of host countries. 
These assumptions did not match the empirical evidence and were plagued by 
an analytical inability to explain these investments meaningfully: why would 
investors target primarily countries with particularly low governance perfor-
mance?
Subsequent reports by international institutions,15 NGOs (e.g., Action 
Aid16 and Oxfam17), and academia followed up on the core questions raised by 
GRAIN’s alternative framing by assessing whether farmland acquisitions con-
stituted a “land grab” or a “development opportunity.”18 Yet, these reports con-
tinued using different terminologies to describe land-consuming investments, 
such as “FDI in land,”19 depending on their respective framing. In addition to 
the resulting pluralism of terms and frames to describe foreign investments in 
farmland, academic research broadened the focus of “land grabbing” to include 
“radical changes in the use and ownership of land” through FDI in sectors 
other than agriculture, such as tourism or industry.20 The resulting termino-
12 | UNCCD (2010).
13 | GRAIN (2008), 1-2.
14 | P. Hall (1990), 9.
15 | IIED/FAO/IFAD (2009); WB (2011).
16 | Action Aid has a thematic work area and several publications on “Biofuels and 
Land Grabs” (http://www.actionaid.org/eu/what-we-do/biofuels-and-land-grabs).
17 | Oxfam produces research on the political economy and outcomes of land policy 
(http://oxf.am/4LX).
18 | IIED/FAO/IFAD (2009).
19 | Weingärtner 2010; WB (2011); and WB (2010).
20 | Zoomers (2010).
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logical ambiguity led Borras and Franco to conclude that “the ‘global land grab’ 
has become a catch-all to describe and analyze the current explosion of large 
scale (trans)national commercial land transactions.”21 
At the same time, the analytical value of the concept came under increased 
scrutiny: as not all “land grabs” are the same, R. Hall argued that the con-
cept’s primary value was for activist rather than analytical purposes, because 
it ignored the context-specific dynamics and processes at play in the host coun-
tries.22 Moreover, an increasing number of case studies began to question 
certain presumptions at the core of the “land grab” framing that were related 
to its peasant activist origin.23 Studies on international farmland acquisitions 
in Russia and Ukraine challenged, for instance, the common supposition 
that peasants are inherently opposed to large-scale investments and farming 
models.24 Instead, large-scale investments in farming can encounter a relatively 
positive expectation of production and expansion in country contexts where 
uncultivated land has a negative connotation as a further retreat of the state. 
This clearly highlights that research on “land grabbing” must account for the 
host country’s specific development practice and history, rather than assuming 
a unitary peasant culture. Moreover, D. Hall’s research on South East Asian 
crop booms advises “that we need to pay attention to smallholders as potential 
agents of land grabbing,”25 instead of assuming (a priori) that they are all neces-
sarily victims in the process. At the same time, the shortcomings of the “land 
grabbing” frame’s narrow focus on smallholder farming and food sovereignty 
in particular institutional contexts and in view of de-peasantization have been 
highlighted.26 
As of 2016, this struggle over the adequacy of the terms and frames used 
to describe what seems to be happening in the context of “land grabs” con-
tinues. How significant this struggle is for the assessment of “land grabbing” 
becomes obvious when considering that under the existing terms and frames, 
it is impossible to clearly identify whether a “land deal” is a “land grab” or not.27 
While GRAIN used the term to refer to any foreign investment in agriculture, 
over time research has challenged this definition, which only captures a minor 
21 | Borras and Franco (2010), 2. 
22 | R. Hall (2011), 193.
23 | Borras et al. (2011).
24 | Steggerda and Visser (2012); Mamonova (2012). Also see special journal editions 
on “Global Land Grabs” by Third World Quarterly 2013 (Volume 34, Issue 9) (see 
Edelman et al. (2013)); and “Land Grabbing and Global Governance” by Globalizations 
2013 (Volume 10, Issue 1) (see Margulis et al. (2013)).
25 | D. Hall (2011), 838.
26 | De Master (2013).
27 | See also D. Hall (2013), 1592.
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share of the total dynamic, ignoring, for instance, the significant dynamics of 
land dispossession and ownership concentration attributed to domestic inves-
tors of the respective host countries. The importance of the latter has resulted 
in case studies assessing “land grabbing” through a focus on the political econ-
omies of the host countries. Similarly, attempts to update the “land grab” ter-
minology in line with the empirical evidence, such as the Tirana Declaration,28 
tend to forget that even under democratic methods, compensation and deliber-
ation procedures might not solve the underpinning conflicts of land use and 
land struggles. Again, the definition is not precise enough to differentiate what 
is not a “land grab.” Yet, such a definition would be needed to discuss “land 
grabbing” in the broader development context, especially in view of the fact that 
it is both part of and symptomatic of pressure on land in the form of economic 
upscaling, growth, and/or economic liberalization. 
For the purpose of this research project, it is important to remember that it 
largely uses the term land-consuming FDI. This term best captures a common 
feature of many “land grab” projects that matters when assessing them from a 
home country perspective—namely, that their primary purpose is neither the 
acquisition of land nor the investment in agricultural production. Instead, what 
is characteristic of these investments is that they consume large areas of land 
in their operations. 
4. The “L and Gr ab” debaTe since 2008
In spite of the widespread and growing academic criticism of “false preci-
sion,” it is important to note that in the ongoing debate, as well as the public 
perception about the topic, a set of empirical facts continue to form a sort of 
“empirical fiction”29 about the phenomenon.30 Borras and Franco argue that the 
predominant empirical storyline about “land grabbing,” which runs through 
28 | The Tirana Declaration (ILC (2011), 8-10) was the outcome document of an interna-
tional multi-stakeholder conference organized by the National Federation of Communal 
Forests and Pastures of Albania (NFCFPA), the Government of Albania, and the ILC on 
the theme “Securing land access for the poor in times of intensified natural resources 
competition” (24-26 May 2011). 
29 | This term does not mean to argue that the empirical observation of a concentra-
tion of land ownership, access, and control is false. Instead, it wants to highlight that 
available reports and databases often pretend to provide precise figures in view of 
land “grabbed” by project or in aggregate (e.g., Land Matrix), even though these figures 
might frequently be incorrect for various reasons. 
30 | For a detailed critique of the data foundation of the “land grab” debate, also see 
Rulli and D’Odorico (2013a) and (2013b); Scoones et al. (2013b); and Oya (2013b).
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many scholarly, as well as para-scholarly, publications from the beginning, 
basically consists of five hypotheses: (1) land used for domestic consumption 
changes into land used for export production; (2) the main investor countries 
are “the Gulf states, Chinese and South Korean governments and companies;” 
(3) land deals also “involve finance capital, partly leading to speculative deals;” 
(4) they “are often shady in character, being non-transparent, non-consultative, 
and fraught with corruption involving national and local governments;” and 
(5) “land grabs” necessitate better regulation to prevent negative, and generate 
positive, outcomes.31 In light of the growing and increasingly differentiated 
research on land-consuming FDI since 2008, this simplified empirical nar-
rative is predominantly an ossification of the original theme of 2008, when 
the topic attracted international attention. The remainder of this section will 
provide an overview of the main themes, publications, and perspectives that 
have been characteristic of the evolving debate on land-consuming FDI over 
time. 
The key milestones in the literature are reports by NGOs32 and interna-
tional institutions;33 research papers submitted to conferences on “Land 
Grabbing” and “Food Sovereignty;”34 and articles in particular journals, such 
as the “Global Land Grabs” issue of the journal Development;35 the Journal of 
Peasant Studies, which not only published selected papers on the topic,36 but 
also special issues covering specific aspects of international land acquisitions 
(e.g., green grabbing; the peasant in relation to the state and class; biofuels, 
land, and agrarian change);37 the Globalizations journal (e.g., land grabbing 
and global governance);38 or Third World Quarterly (e.g., agrarian reform).39 In 
addition to this increasingly multi-faceted body of literature, numerous books 
on the topic have been written.40
31 | Borras and Franco (2012), 38. ILC (2012), 4.
32 | GRAIN (2008); and ILC (2012).
33 | IIED/FAO/IFAD (2009); WB (2011). 
34 | See the conference documentation of the international conferences on Land 
Grabbing I (6-8 April 2011 at University of Sussex) and II (17-19 October 2012 at Cornell 
University), and the conferences on Food Sovereignty: A Critical Dialogue (14-15 
September 2013 at Yale University; and 24 January 2014 at the International Institute 
of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague).
35 | Harcourt (2011).
36 | E.g., Zoomers (2010).
37 | Fairhead et al. (2012); JPS (Vol. 34, Nr. 3-4, 2007); McMichael and Scoones 
(2010).
38 | Margulis et al. (2013).
39 | Edelman et al. (2013).
40 | Fritz (2010); Pearce (2012); and Liberti (2012),
Chapter 2: International Land Acquisit ions Today 61
When starting off in 2008, the discussion of “land grabbing” focused 
largely on investments in farmland made by foreign agribusiness or financial 
investors in the context of the global food and financial crises.41 Based on over 
100 cases of “offshore food production,” GRAIN argued that the governments 
of food importing countries, namely China, Saudi Arabia, Japan, China, India, 
Korea, Libya, and Egypt, were “snatching up vast areas of farmland abroad for 
their own offshore food production” and food security, as the food price crisis 
and food export bans in 2008 indicated the market’s failure to provide for cheap 
and secure food commodities. Foreign agribusiness and private investors were 
also identified as acquirers of farmland, but for different reasons, namely the 
search for profitable investment opportunities at a time of financial crisis.42 
The empirical description of investments in farmland has become more 
detailed and complex. Institutional and academic publications largely followed 
the original description of what seems to be happening,43 but added the energy 
alias “peak oil”44 crisis and the climate crisis to the range of “land grab” 
triggers—with the argument that these had resulted in domestic legislation 
with land-intensive (trans)national consequences.45 Under the header of “green 
grabbing,” a growing number of publications study the implications of biofuel 
policies, the REDD scheme,46 and/or other policy regimes and cases “where 
‘green’ credentials are called upon to justify appropriations of land for food 
or fuel—as where large tracts of land are acquired not just for ‘more efficient 
farming’ or ‘food security’, but also to ‘alleviate pressure on forests’.”47 
At the same time, the 2009 report by FAO/IIED/IFAD emphasized the 
importance of domestic investors. It suggested that government-backed deals 
could be more about investing profitably than securing food, and stressed that 
the terminology of land acquisition might be misleading overall, as many land 
41 | See more about the interrelation of food prices and financial sector speculation in 
the joint report by UNCTAD and Arbeiterkammer Wien (2011).
42 | GRAIN (2008); also see Table 1-1.
43 | Shepard and Mittal (2009); Smaller and Mann (2009); IIED/FAO/IFAD (2009); WB 
(2011).
44 | International Energy Agency (2013).
45 | Seiwald and Zeller (2011), Matondi et al. (2011).
46 | See the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD) website (http://www.un-redd.org/).
47 | See the introduction of the special issue of JPS 2012 (Vol. 39, No. 2) on Green 
Grabbing: a new appropriation of nature?, written by the editors Fairhead et al. (2012), 
237. For an overview of relevant green grabbing publications, also see Steps Centre (25 
April 2012). 
Land Grabbing and Home Countr y Development62
deals—depending on the regulatory context of the host country—were in effect 
land leases rather than purchases.48 
With time, more sub-themes emerged. For instance, the definition of “land 
grabbing” was broadened by some authors to include a wide range of land-con-
suming investments, such as tourism, infrastructure, and mining.49This 
broader definition illuminates the land-use competition dynamics at play. 
Additionally, the notion of “grabbing” was taken up by (often environmental) 
researchers and applied to other resources whose “grabbing” seemed to be 
part of the “land grab” package, particularly water and forests. The briefing by 
Skinner and Cotula, titled “Are land deals driving ‘water grabs’?” is an example 
of this discursive shift from a focus on peasant struggles and food security to 
the topic of comprehensive and integrated resource management.50 The publi-
cation highlighted that the Malian government transferred water (use) rights 
together with land (use) rights to large investors, “with little regard for how this 
will impact the millions of other users—from fisherman to pastoralists.”51 It 
also warned about the potential consequences of such transfers, namely the cor-
responding inflexibility and exclusiveness that would hamper future attempts 
to implement comprehensive resource management in the affected countries.52 
The latter aspect has been underlined by research on the relation of popula-
tion, land use, and land ownership; for example, a study on the UK concludes 
that private land ownership at a time of rising eco-scarcity and climate change 
is unsustainable and might necessitate a public intervention in the medium 
term in order to regain the land planning capacity needed “for the successful 
management and security” of key social needs, namely “housing, food, energy, 
water, waste, ecosystems, transport and utilities.”53
Simultaneous to the build-up of empirical case studies and the diversifi-
cation of the debate, there has also been a rising number of distinct analytical 
approaches observable in the academic “land grab” debate. The phenomenon 
has been investigated using (multiple) theoretical frames and related concepts 
of political ecology,54 Marxism,55 world system theory,56 mainstream econom-
48 | IIED/ FAO/IFAD (2009); D. Hall (2013).
49 | See GLP (2010) and ILC (2012).
50 | Skinner and Cotula (2011).
51 | Skinner and Cotula (2011), 1. Also see Smaller and Mann (2009) and Bizikova et 
al. (2013), 1.
52 | Skinner and Cotula (2011).
53 | Home (2009), 107.
54 | White et al. (2012). 
55 | Oya (2013a).
56 | Baumann (2013).
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ics,57 human rights,58 peasant studies,59 gender studies,60 political economy,61 
discourse analysis,62 and/or (global) governance.63 This varied body of analyt-
ical approaches has contributed to a more comprehensive understanding of 
what seems to be happening by studying the object from multiple angles. 
However, these assessments largely focus on the host country and IFDI-side 
of “land grabbing.” Moreover, the existing explanations of what is happening, 
and why, remain divided between two analytical trends. On the one hand, fairly 
structuralist approaches address transnational zero-sum dynamics, but neglect 
to account for more complex or less clear dynamics on a case by case basis. 
Take, for example, the Marxist or political ecology delineations, which often 
limit their focus to instances of, and pre-assumed ideas about “accumulation 
through dispossession”64 and/or the transnational, socioeconomic, and environ-
mental consequences of land-intensive policies, such as the renewable energy 
policies.65 On the other hand, when examining more case-based analyses in the 
area of human geography66 that do examine the details of local politics and the 
concrete business models of particular investors, they lack a structural outlook 
that would place the findings in the broader context of (trans)national develop-
ments and home country dynamics that they are part of—including economic 
restructuring and/or geopolitical strategizing.67
Overall, the debate about “land grabbing” still suffers from being “both 
wide and narrow,” not only with regard to analytical explanations, as high-
lighted above, but also in terms of focus on investments in farmland.68 FAO 
case studies, for instance, account merely for “broad processes of rural land and 
capital concentration in the context of neoliberal globalization,”69 and confine 
the assessment to themes of food security, foreign government involvement, 
57 | WB (2011).
58 | Bernstor f f (2013); and Golay and Biglino (2013).
59 | Jansen (2014).
60 | Zetterlund (2013).
61 | Chasukwa (2013).
62 | Li (2012).
63 | Margulis et al. (2013).
64 | Harvey (2003), 137-182; also see the critical commentary on this framing by D. 
Hall (2013). 
65 | Ariza-Montobbio et al. (2010); Borras et al. (2010); and Fairhead, et al. (2012). 
66 | Boamah (2011).
67 | The special issue “Governing the Global Land Grab: The Role of the State in the 
Rush for Land” in Development and Change 44:2 (Wolford et al. (2013a)) tries to 
address this problem.
68 | Borras et al. (2012), 847. Amanor (2012), 731-49.
69 | Borras et al. (2012), 847.
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and the significance of scale. Environmental groups70 primarily focus on the 
problem of resource security, often without consideration for social implica-
tions, while land governance research71 tends to leave out the ecological impli-
cations of “land grabs.” 
Moreover, studies generally do not account sufficiently for the differences 
and commonalities between and within regions, while the emphasis on con-
flictive land deals in Africa has yielded a particular understanding of the “land 
grabbing” dynamics that does not seem to be applicable to other parts of the 
world.72 Take, for instance, “land grabbing” in Latin America, where empirical 
evidence shows that land acquisitions are largely made by regional or domestic 
actors rather than extra-regional actors as in Africa, and that they mostly 
occurred prior to the year 2000. Due to the narrow focus on foreign investors, 
these trends often remain invisible in many of the aggregate accounts on the 
phenomenon which center on foreign investments since 2008.73 
Finally, a large share of the research output concentrates on host coun-
tries and the implications of capital imports, whereas the depiction of investor 
countries relies strongly on preconceived notions of their motivations.74 Home 
country governments and corporations, so goes the narrative, acquire (farm)
land overseas to produce food and other primary resources for export back 
home; or speculate on rising land values and commodity prices. The few (yet 
rising number of) studies that do provide a detailed assessment all call to 
question related stereotypes.75
70 | Bizikova et al. (2013).
71 | ILC (2012).
72 | See the interview with Saturnino Jr. Borras on The Water Channel (http://www.
thewaterchannel.tv/en/videos/categories/viewvideo/1387/food-security/5-ways-to-
re-think-land-grabs).
73 | Borras et al. (2012), 847.
74 | Again, these preconceived notions about investor country’s rationales largely 
reflect on the predominance of themes of the first “land grab” publication by GRAIN 
(2008).
75 | See, for instance, D. Hall (2012) on Japan; and Alden (2007); Brautigam (2009); 
Ekman (2010); Rosen and Hanemann (2009); Smaller et al. (2012); Cotula (2012) on 
China.
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5. whaT abouT PoLicy? infLuenTiaL fr ames and   
 Par adiGms in The debaTe
The range of analytical approaches to study the “land grabbing” phenomenon 
has diversified with time, particularly regarding the dynamics in the host coun-
tries. At the same time, standard narratives that framed the debate in the begin-
ning remain influential concerning investor and home country perspectives.76 
It is in this context that the policy debate comes into view: not only is the policy 
debate a major component of the overall body of research on “land grabbing;” it 
also is one of the factors explaining the normative outlook of the debate. 
Specifically, the policy debate is characterized by a competition of different 
framings regarding the problem definition of “land grabbing.” The focus 
remains largely limited to investments in agricultural production, in spite of the 
empirical evidence that emphasizes the importance of other land-consuming 
activities in the global “land grab,”77 such as tourism, infrastructure, manufac-
turing, and mining. In addition, most documents have a reductionist expla-
nation of why international land acquisitions are occurring at this moment in 
time, based on economic notions of supply, demand, and international crises/ 
resource scarcities that are also a core part of many academic explanations.78
In practice, the academic and policy debates overlap in view of framings 
and persons, making it often impossible to clearly differentiate between schol-
arly and policy-related research outputs. For instance, the NGO publication 
by GRAIN set the tone and focus of the debate on “(farm)land grabbing,” and 
the original assessment and problem definition continues to inform a sig-
nificant share of academic research or media output.79 Moreover, the work of 
certain actors, such as Deininger from the WB, is published and widely cited 
in academic as well as policy channels. Deininger’s publications are refer-
enced in the “land grab” literature as a source of empirical evidence, and/or 
76 | Borras and Franco (2012), 38. ILC (2012), 4.
77 | See, for instance, Skinner and Cotula (2011).
78 | Accordingly, the increasing food commodity demand (e.g., population growth and 
rising middle class), declining food supply (e.g., climate change and biofuel production), 
and the financial crisis (e.g., search for new speculative assets and biofuel production 
reducing food production) have led to a rise in food prices. As a result, there has been a 
surge in “FDI in land, agriculture, forestry” motivated by the profit rationales of private 
investors, and a strategy by investor countries to engage in “offshore” production to 
increase global supply and/or secure resources for import back home. Time-wise, the 
international food and financial crisis in 2007/2008 has become the marker to explain 
the occurrence of “land grabbing” in time. See ILC (2012), 4. Also, see Weingärtner 
(2010), 13.
79 | Simantke (12 August 2013).
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discussed regarding their conceptual validity.80 In particular, the World Bank 
report81 on large-scale land acquisitions,—produced under the lead authorship 
of Deininger and Byerlee—has stirred a conceptual and highly normative 
debate in the “land grab” literature. In this context, Starr writes that Deininger 
and Byerlee “are among a handful of authors who have built typologies of land 
deals.”82 
This section will present key framings of the policy debate and their respec-
tive actor constellations. The debate has at its core a process of contestation or 
defense of the prevailing operative paradigm of (inter)national economic gov-
ernance; and is shaped by (the interests behind) the three predominant analyt-
ical approaches. The next paragraphs will discuss these approaches under the 
labels of peasant activism, mainstream economics, and Right to Food.
Peasant Activism
Central to the policy debate on “land grabs” is the corresponding framing by 
GRAIN that is a function of a peasant activist worldview and shared by other 
civil society organizations, such as the international NGO, La Via Campesina. 
Its recommendations are closely aligned with the policy advice of the final 
report of the International Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology 
for Development, an intergovernmental panel under the co-sponsorship of the 
FAO, Global Environmental Fund (GEF), United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the WB, 
and the World Health Organization (WHO) (2005–2007) which was entrusted 
to assess how agriculture, science, and technology could contribute to a rural 
development process that was socially, economically, and environmentally sus-
tainable.83 This peasant activist framing challenges the predominant frame of 
mainstream economics (see below).
According to the peasant activist worldview, the fundamental complex of 
problems identified with regard to international land acquisitions relates to the 
fact that “fertile agricultural land is becoming increasingly privatized and con-
centrated,” a tendency that “could spell the end of small-scale farming, and rural 
80 | Voget-Kleschin and Stephan (2013) referencing Deininger’s work as empirical 
input. Also, see critical discussion of Deininger’s work in view of concepts and norms 
in Li (2011); Wolford et al. (2013a); McMichael (2014). 
81 | WB (2011).
82 | Starr (2013), 6.
83 | IAASTD (2008). See more under the internal NGO website on the International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and Technology for Development, 
IAASTD (http://www.agassessment.org/).
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livelihoods, in numerous places around the world”—“[i]f left unchecked.”84 In 
particular, four problems stand out as worrisome: firstly, the securing of food 
supplies overseas by state-capitalist countries that have lost faith in the market 
and are bypassing existing market structures to reduce food import costs, 
thereby aggravating the world food crisis. The second problem is the loss of 
access to, and control over land by local communities and governments, and the 
prioritizing of “large industrial estates” that are connected to world markets – 
all of which will undermine the future ability of countries and communities to 
implement the concept of food sovereignty. The third issue is the lack of sus-
tainable investment planning by host governments in two areas: a long-term 
vision of economic activity and agricultural development, both of which are 
necessary to ensure that agricultural investment contributes to rural develop-
ment. Then fourthly and finally, there is the difficulty of food insecurity in host 
countries that are themselves net food importers, which might be growing as a 
result of these investments, particularly as the policy leaning in these countries 
heads towards an industrial model of export-oriented agriculture with a track 
record of “creating poverty and environmental destruction, and exacerbating 
loss of biodiversity, pollution from farm chemicals and crop contamination 
from modified organisms.”85 
Food sovereignty is a central concept in this framing, and it takes on 
multiple functions as analytical tool, as well as vision, depending on who is 
promoting it.86 Going against the descriptive concept of food security which 
remains silent about how and by whom such security should be achieved, the 
concept of food sovereignty deliberately “puts the aspirations and needs of 
those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems 
and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations”—to use the 
words of the Declaration of the Forum for Food Sovereignty.87 It provides an 
antithetic frame to the mainstream economic paradigm and the related “cor-
porate trade and food regime,”88 and it also represents part of a mobilizing 
rhetoric that passes the “revolutionary agency [...] from the proletariat to the 
84 | GRAIN (2008), 1.
85 | GRAIN (2008), 7-8.
86 | See, for instance, the papers presented at the Agrarian Studies Conference “Food 
Sovereignty: A Critical Dialogue” at Yale University, 14-15 September 2013 (http://
www.yale.edu/agrarianstudies/foodsovereignty/) and at the ISS in The Hague, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, 24 January 2014 (http://www.iss.nl/news_events/iss_news/
detail/article/57242-food-sovereignty-a-critical-dialogue/).
87 | At the first multi-stakeholder Forum for Food Sovereignty in Mali in 2007, partic-
ipants endorsed the Declaration of Nyéléni, which sets out the core principles of food 
sovereignty. See Nyéléni (2007); Rosset (2011); and Clapp (2015).
88 | Nyéléni (2007).
Land Grabbing and Home Countr y Development68
peasantry.”89 The latter aspect differentiates it from Marxist framings,90 and 
it re-politicizes the questions of resource management in view of use, access, 
control, distribution, and location.91
In practice, the actors that use this food sovereignty perspective, such as 
FIAN and GRAIN, have cooperated with the FAO in an initiative to develop 
guidelines for the governance of land tenure and natural resources which are 
supposed to ensure “adequate and secure access to land and natural resources 
by the rural and urban poor” and serve as “an instrument for social movements, 
marginalized groups and civil society at large democratizing land and natural 
resources tenure for the well-being of the whole society.”92 In May 2012, after 
three years of negotiations between multiple stakeholders (governments and 
civil society organizations) the FAO’s Committee on World Food Security rec-
ognized suitable principles and practices under the “Voluntary Guidelines on 
the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests.”93 
Overall, the peasant activist framing has questioned the notion, widespread 
in mainstream economics, that the location of capital ownership is irrelevant 
to assessing its potential impact or related implications for the host country. 
It has also mobilized widespread political support. However, from a method-
ological and analytical point of view, the framing has several shortcomings. 
For instance, it reflects a certain degree of peasant essentialism.94 This is 
necessary for ascribing “revolutionary agency”95 to the peasantry, but it also 
poses a methodological challenge. According to Bernstein and Byres, this chal-
lenge lies in the “argument (or assumption) that the core elements of peasant 
‘society’—household, kin, community, locale—produce (or express) a distinc-
tive internal logic or dynamic, whether cultural, sociological, economic, or in 
some combination,”96 which is oppressed by external actors and factors.97 This 
assumption does not match empirical evidence on “land grabbing,” which calls 
into question the unitary (essentialist) peasantry presumption, as highlighted 
before.98 So far, the food sovereignty concept does not sufficiently explain how 
it can be gradually realized and implemented in countries where corporations 
89 | Brass (1997).
90 | For a comparison of Marxism and peasant populism, see Brass (1997).
91 | Nyéléni (2007).
92 | Suárez et al. (2009), 1.
93 | See PANAP (2013) (http://www.panap.net/en/fs/page/food-sovereignty/77); 
and FAO (2012b).
94 | Bernstein and Byres (2001).
95 | Brass (1997), 27.
96 | Bernstein and Byres (2001), 6-7.
97 | Bernstein (1977), 73. 
98 | D. Hall (2011); Steggerda and Visser (2012); and Boamah (2014).
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are already important actors in food production and trade activities; in coun-
tries where peasants are integrated in the corporate food and trade system 
through outgrower schemes and/or processes of de-peasantization are at work; 
or against the background of a global setting in which the prevalence of private 
governance schemes (i.e. transnational supermarket chains) has led to the 
systemic marginalization of local voice and/or representation, while agricul-
ture has become part of the food business within the global governance struc-
tures.99 From a systemic point of view, the primary focus on the Global South 
underestimates equal processes in the Global North, while perhaps overempha-
sizing the role of foreign investors in the “land grab” dynamics.
Mainstream Economics
The second worldview, the one challenged by the peasant activist framing of 
“land grabbing,” is composed of the models and assumptions of mainstream 
economics. It refers to “land grabs” as “international land acquisitions” or 
“investment projects,” and it applies a supply/demand market lens to the 
phenomenon. Compared to the activist peasant framing, which supports an 
agro-ecological model, the mainstream economics framing promotes a produc-
tionist agricultural model with life science elements.100 It associates the transi-
tion from small- to large-scale farming with economic development, often con-
stricts the analysis of poverty to an evaluation of income levels, and supports 
the coexistence of genetically modified and organic, peasant and industrial 
farming. In the policy debate, the mainstream economic frame is applied by 
key policy entrepreneurs and policy makers, such as the WB,101 bilateral devel-
opment agencies,102 many host governments’ national development plans, and/
or private actors.
The most influential framing in (inter)national economic governance since 
the 1980s, this mainstream economic worldview does not identify “rising 
global interest in farmland” by corporate investors or government companies 
as itself problematic.103 Instead, international land acquisitions are proof of the 
underpinning assumption that the “market” is driven by supply and demand 
and that it has a natural “tendency toward convergence, toward equilibrium” 104 
99 | Konefal et al. (2005). 
100 | Classification taken from Lang and Heasman (2004), 126-167.
101 | WB (2007); WB (2011).
102 | Weingärtner (2010).
103 | WB (2011), x xv.
104 | This argument rests on Harvey’s Marxist reflection on conventional economics: 
“So conventional economics is always talking about the tendency toward convergence, 
toward equilibrium, and that equilibrium is possible provided the right mix of policies 
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of the factors of production. International land acquisitions are seen as part of a 
market process in which land-scarce but capital-rich countries (or their corpora-
tions) invest in land-abundant but capital-poor countries, creating a “win-win” 
scenario and development opportunity. Importantly, this assessment is a core 
component of the standard explanations of investor motives. 
According to the theoretical appraisal of FDI under the liberal paradigm, 
benefits for host countries come from multiple factors. FDI projects make 
domestic capital available for other uses of public benefit; transfer and diffuse 
technology; create new employment; build capacity (new job profiles); transfer 
skills (labor); and build necessary public infrastructure.105 Against the back-
ground of decreasing aid flows and tight public budgets, such capital imports 
allow the host countries to increase productivity and efficiency levels in the 
agricultural sector and to improve food (supply) security both domestically (due 
to corresponding increases in food supply and income levels) and globally.106 
This narrative is supported by a technical discussion that identifies “yield gaps” 
(i.e., the difference between the potential and the actual amount of crops grown 
in a country) as problem that these investments help to close.107 
The problem then is empirical. Emerging evidence about “large-scale land 
acquisitions” highlights that in practice, many investment projects do not live 
up to their theoretical promise. In its 2011 report, the WB admits that in addition 
to low job creation, many projects turn out to be economically unviable, do not 
improve food security or productivity levels significantly, and have a negative 
impact on rural livelihoods.108 Consequently, good governance mechanisms are 
suggested as the solution to the negative side effects of the commercial pressure 
on land. These take the form of a voluntary set of “Principles for Responsible 
Agro-Investment” that corporate investors should abide by; the establishment 
of “effective consultation” that comprises representation, administration, and 
monitoring; the development and improvement of transparent land transfer 
mechanisms; the introduction of an open land market; and the negotiation of 
terms of investment that distribute the benefits more equitably in the recip-
ient context.109 Moreover, Deininger, lead economist in the rural development 
and as long as there isn’t anything external that disrupts the whole system. External 
problems would be so-called natural disasters, wars, geopolitical conflicts, and protec-
tionism. Crisis would then arise because of these external interventions, which take us 
away from the path to equilibrium, which is always possible.” See Harvey, D., & Rivera, 
H.A. (September 2010).
105 | WB (2011), 2.
106 | WB (2011).
107 | E.g., WB (2011); also see Li (2012).
108 | WB (2011), 51; WB (7 September 2010).
109 | WB (2011), xiiv, x xv.
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group within the WB’s Development Research Department, argues that the 
focus should be on raising the productivity of land under cultivation, rather 
than focusing on land expansion.110
Overall, this framework runs into several problems that have been outlined 
before when trying to assess or solve what is happening in the context of “land 
grabbing.” The narrow focus on productivity and efficiency in the context of 
food security, and on transparency and good governance in view of land deals, 
prevents the identification of structural problems that might greatly impede 
the multiplier effect of agriculture. For instance, the assessment leaves aside 
aspects of political economy, and it argues for the coexistence of peasant and 
corporate farming, thereby masking asymmetric power constellations in the 
global food and trade regime.111 Moreover, the fact that FDIs are not only capital 
flows but also part of “a process whereby residents of one country (the investor 
country) acquire ownership for the purpose of controlling the production, dis-
tribution and other activities of a firm”112 and/or land in another country is left 
outside the mainstream economic assessment of productivity and governance. 
Yet, it is exactly this aspect of international investment that has been critiqued 
for its political, environmental and socioeconomic implications. 
Consequently, assessments using this frame tend to negate the problematic 
history of FDI in the form of colonialisms and imperialisms, and they are in 
constant danger of continuing the disreputable “tradition of imperial historiog-
raphy,”113 with its uncritical description of the first wave of globalization.114 At 
the same time, such analyses remain inconsistent. It is, for instance, unclear 
why such reports end on overly optimistic notes by suggesting that the benefits 
of international land acquisitions can be captured through good governance, 
even though major host countries show deteriorating governance performance 
110 | WB (7 September 2010).
111 | WB (2011).
112 | Moosa (2002), 1.
113 | Mann (2012), 406.
114 | See, for instance, the WB (2010, 2) on overseas investments. The report refers 
to the East India Company as a (positive) example of FDI: “Like trade, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has occurred throughout history. From the merchants of Sumer around 
2500 BCE to the East India Company in the 17th century, investors routinely entered 
new markets in foreign dominions.” Such a narrow framing of capital flows obscures the 
very violent history of FDI enterprises, such as the East India Company. It also fails to 
mention that this example is hardly suited to the promotion of “free market” policies, 
as the empirical reality of that time was characterized by trade monopolies and/or alien 
investment restrictions. Also see the historical review of late 19th century colonialisms 
and imperialisms in Chapter 3; Mann (2012); and Davis (2002), 11-13.
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according to the WB’s governance assessment method.115 Most problematic, 
however, is the unwillingness or failure to engage in more profound reflection 
about the sources of the current crises in the fields of agriculture, environment, 
and governance,116 and one that constitutes a general problem in the available 
body of research on land-consuming FDI and commercial pressure on land.
Right to Food
The third framing in the policy debate about “land grabbing,” the Right to Food 
approach, has been promoted by both civil society and the UN Special Rappor-
teur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter (2008-2014). Focusing on the 
human rights challenge represented by increased commercial and speculative 
interest in land, the right to food framing considers issues of access, culture, 
and livelihood that are impacted by shifts in access to, and ownership of land.117
De Schutter criticizes the widespread assumption that the problems asso-
ciated with large-scale investments in farming can be solved simply through 
regulation based on (voluntary) principles and governance approaches, such as 
the above-mentioned Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI) 
put forward by the WB, or the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines.118 These governance 
approaches were developed and promoted by the very same institutions whose 
policy advocacy has in the recent past contributed greatly to the “land grab;” 
for example, by advising host governments to “cut [...] down administrative 
requirements and consultations that might slow down or restrict investments” 
by foreign investors.119 The question of regulation also ignores the “question 
of opportunity costs”120 brought about by acquisition-related changes in land 
access and ownership. For instance, the right to food could be undermined since 
large-scale investments in farmland (and related processes of concentration of 
resources and power) tend to reduce the multiple favorable effects of agricul-
ture in view of rural development. Meanwhile, regulation is likely to actually 
115 | Worldwide Governance Indicators by WB (http://info.worldbank.org/gover 
nance/wgi2007/sc_chart.asp#). 
116 | De Schutter (2011a), 274-275; De Schutter (2009), 15.
117 | The definition says that “the right to food is the right to have regular, permanent 
and unrestricted access, either directly or by means of financial purchases, to quantita-
tively and qualitatively adequate and sufficient food corresponding to the cultural tradi-
tions of the people to which the consumer belongs, and which ensure a physical and 
mental, individual and collective, fulfilling and dignified life free of fear.” See United 
Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (n.d.) .
118 | De Schutter (2011a); FAO (2012b).
119 | Compare also Shepard and Mittal (2009); quote from De Schutter (2011a), 254.
120 | De Schutter (2011a), 255.
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increase the commercial pressure on land and other resources.121 Moreover, the 
governance initiatives proposed by the FAO and WB are arguably marginal in 
comparison to pre-existing treaties, agreements, and related obligations which 
both restrict the performance requirements that can be imposed on foreign 
investors122 and severely limit the leeway of host governments to negotiate and 
steer investments in their interest or seek alternative investment models that 
do not result in changes of access or ownership, for instance, through contract 
farming.123 
Thus, the human rights framing identifies the absence of (a broader debate 
about) a strategy and long-term vision of rights-based resource management as 
a key problem that needs to be addressed—particularly in view of growing com-
mercial pressures, of which “land grabbing” is one.124 Accordingly, the question 
is how to invest in a way that best takes into consideration the “context of ecolog-
ical, food, and energy crises.”125 In practice, the approach proposes Minimum 
Human Rights principles.126 These define states’ obligations on the basis of 
already existing human rights instruments “to clarify the human rights impli-
cations of land-related investments, in order to make it clear that governments 
had obligations they could not simply ignore for the sake of attracting capital.”127 
The key elements of the principles are related to the right of self-determination 
and the right to development, both of which call for governments to ensure 
that investments do not weaken food security by generating a dependency on 
foreign aid or volatile markets if the produced food is intended for export (to 
the home country or the international market); that they do not dispossess local 
populations from productive resources indispensable for their livelihood; and 
that they protect workers’ rights and tenure rights.128
The human rights approach provides a comprehensive analytical basis for 
questioning the limitations of the predominant policy frame of mainstream 
economics in terms of solving the relevant problems, as it accounts for aspects of 
political economy and ecology, but goes beyond the strong producer-rights-ori-
entation of food sovereignty. However, and this is due to the nature of the 
121 | De Schutter (2011a), 249.
122 | The legal agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), for 
instance, regulates the treatment of foreign investors by host countries. The agreement 
is part of the WTO regime, and it bans local content requirements and trade balancing 
rules from the (industrial) policy framework of signatory countries.
123 | De Schutter (2011a), 250, 266.
124 | De Schutter (2011a), 275.
125 | De Schutter (2011a), 250.
126 | De Schutter (2011a), 253.
127 | De Schutter (2011a), 254.
128 | De Schutter (2009).
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UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food’s mandate, it continues to focus 
primarily on investments in farmland, even though commercial pressure on 
land comes from multiple sources, namely industrialization and urbanization. 
Moreover, while putting the role and responsibility of host country governments 
in the spotlight of analysis, the responsibilities of investor countries remain 
largely ignored. Given that land-consuming domestic policies in the form of 
renewable energy policy for biofuels, as well as unsustainable consumption and 
production patterns in home countries,129 are among the factors driving “land 
grabs,” it seems that a crucial link in the rights-based resource management 
approach is still missing. As long as this aspect remains unaddressed, home 
country governments will continue to make unsustainable policy choices that 
have global repercussions. Notably, the rights-based approach itself might pose 
more challenges than solutions. While ideally delivering a strong analytical and 
legal instrument to judge the performance of states in fulfilling their obliga-
tions towards their citizens—revealing an important aspect that should be part 
of the responsibility that comes with sovereignty—its reliance on legal struc-
tures might prove ineffective in countries with weak legal capacities, limited 
rule of law, and a high degree of corruption. 
6. concLusion 
The rising number and increasingly differentiated body of empirical studies 
and analytical approaches on the topic contributes to a more nuanced yet com-
prehensive understanding of what seems to be happening with regards to the 
empirical phenomenon of “land grabbing.” Concurrently, it points out the polit-
ical nature of the debate which takes place in academia as well as policy circles; 
and in which competing frames seem to be as important as empirical facts in 
shaping the perspectives, narratives, and responses towards land-consuming 
OFDI. This is also evidenced by the politics of terminology that sometimes 
cloud our understanding of what is happening. 
129 | Analyses of society-nature interactions show that industrialization led to a 
dramatic increase in the material use per capita. In fact, the material use doubled in 
the global economy, even though the material intensity (i.e. materials used per unit 
of GDP) declined over time. Overall, the material use “increased 8-fold” on a global 
scale from the beginning of the 20th century to 2005. A closer assessment highlights 
distinct trajectories of consumption of dif ferent materials: while “biomass use hardly 
keeps up with population growth,” mineral use increases dramatically, indicating that 
“an increase in material productivity is a general feature of economic development.” 
See Krausmann et al. (2009), 2696; and Krausmann et al. (2008). 
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Overall, the review underlines the need for a critical handling of data and 
potential explanations throughout the research process. It has also become 
evident that certain aspects of “land grabbing” and commercial pressure on 
land are often absent from the academic and policy debate. Take, for example, 
the historical transformation of institutions, ideas, and political economies at 
the national, local, and international level that has resulted in natural resources, 
such as land and forests, being relatively accessible through economic mecha-
nisms in many countries’ economies today.130 This constitutes a fundamental 
change from previous approaches and institutions that restricted foreign access 
to food and land, framing these resources as critical infrastructure to meet a 
society’s basic social needs.131 
In addition, the policy debate, which is largely reflective of the contempo-
rary actor constellation in the area of agriculture, needs to start incorporating 
non-farming aspects of commercial land pressure highlighted in the “land 
grab” literature, as these impact farming in the form of land use and owner-
ship changes, soil erosion, or migratory pressures (as a side effect of extractive 
industry). Interestingly, these aspects have so far primarily entered the policy 
dialogue through broader development debates outside the issue of “land 
grabbing,” such as the negotiations over the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 
or the development and application of certain methods of measurement (e.g., 
virtual land imports).132 Moreover, more academic and policy-relevant research 
about the implications of land-consuming FDI and related changes in rural 
development for regions, urban populations, and local, national, and global 
food systems would be important to grasp the multiple repercussions in terms 
of food security, conflict, exodus, health, and demographic development that 
this trend might be part of or cause. 
Regarding the investor countries, the following assumptions persist about 
how and why “land grabs” occur, particularly in the large majority of reports 
that study the host country context: foreign governments and corporations are 
involved in land-consuming OFDI through land-intensive policies (e.g., green 
grabbing); the launching of offshore agricultural production to secure resources 
for consumption back home; and/or the search for profitable business at a time 
of financial crisis.133 
130 | WB (2010), 25-26.
131 | This fact is, for instance, reflected in governance systems that restricted alien 
land ownership at the time of the last international food crises in the 1970s; and it calls 
for case-based research on how this transition towards liberalizing access to primary 
resources occurred in dif ferent countries. Compare Weisman (1980) and WB (2010).
132 | E.g., Tor tajada (2013); and Marmo (2013).
133 | Borras and Franco (2012), 38.
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It has been argued earlier that this explanation does not offer any evidence 
on the home country and/or project-specific (f)actors at play. Moreover, this 
explanation easily undervalues the role of host country actors, institutions, and 
contingent events in the commercial pressure on land. Therefore, the following 
chapters present rich empirical data about project timelines; the role of land in 
these investments; the markets they produce for; the range of actors involved 
in a single project throughout its lifecycle; the role of the ecological, financial, 
food and/or other crises; the political economies; and/or the cluster of ideas that 
are part of Chinese and British land-consuming OFDI. On the basis of the rich 
empirical accounts of the two countries’ overseas investments, the book identi-
fies the main country-specific as well as cross-country dynamics and factors at 
play, compares the findings with the above assumptions, and deliberates on the 
role of OFDI from a home country perspective.
Chapter 3: Historical Perspectives on Overseas 
Land Acquisitions in the South
1. inTroducTion
In view of the question of what differentiates the allegedly new “global land 
rush” from those of earlier times, the “land grab” debate since 2008 remains 
inconclusive. The ILC report argues that the international timelines can only 
explain the surge of acquisitions, while “[t]he dispossession and marginaliza-
tion of the rural poor are nothing new.”1 Accordingly, the “land rush represents 
an acceleration of ongoing processes, and one that appears set to continue.”2 
A UN Briefing states that the novelty of the phenomenon is to be found in 
the details, namely the trend towards offshore production by major investor 
countries “to meet home state food and energy needs.”3 This largely follows the 
argument presented by GRAIN.4 Meanwhile, a study by the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center argues that details such as their scale and their focus on 
“staples instead of cash crops” distinguish contemporary land investments 
from previous ones—together with the fact that they occur on a contractual 
basis “instead of through the barrel of a gun.”5 Excepting these very broad ref-
erences to historical incidents of foreign investments at a time of colonialism 
and imperialism, there are few detailed comparisons of institutional or other 
empirical characteristics. Alden Wily, for instance, studies the legal practices 
of “land theft” during the Irish and English enclosures of the 17th to 19th cen-
turies, the processes of dispossession in North America, and the Scramble for 
Africa in the late 19th century. She concludes that the historical use of legal 
1 | ILC (2012), 4.
2 | ILC (2012), 4. 
3 | UN DESA (2010), 1.
4 | GRAIN (2008).
5 | Kugelman (2009), 4-5.
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instruments by the state to dispossess traditional land owners strongly resem-
bles current practices.6 
This chapter assesses the main empirical characteristics of, and key theo-
retical explanations for colonial and imperial relations in the late 19th century – 
a period of European imperialism (1870-1914) that is often referred to as the 
“high-water mark of nineteenth century globalization.”7 As such it shares many 
features that are characteristic of the contemporary world, namely large and 
growing “transfers of commodities, people, capital, and ideas between and 
within continents.”8 The period was also shaped by imperial expansion through 
colonization and continues to strongly inform the common notions of colo-
nialism and imperialism prevalent today. Moreover, core ideas and practices 
of contemporary development approaches can often be traced back to that era.9 
The focus of the review is largely on the perspective of the imperial powers.
As a result, the review critically interrogates simplified references to impe-
rialism/colonialism in the contemporary “land grab” debate. While some 
researchers argue that ongoing land-consuming FDI is the “new age” version 
of colonialism characterized by deregulated markets and state involvement, 
other analyses conclude that colonial “land grabbing” has been replaced by a 
form of corporate “land grabbing.”10 Yet, the respective allusion to colonialism 
or imperialism seems largely a function of political sentiment rather than the 
outcome of a careful conceptual and empirical comparison of land-consuming 
investments over time. Take, for example, the article on Chinese investments 
in Africa by Jauch in which the author compares these to colonial undertak-
ings on the basis of their poor labor records and strong resource orientation.11 
Clearly, such a reduced understanding of what constitutes imperial or colonial 
phenomena is problematic, and any comparison of the past and present that 
rests on such a limited set of criteria—i.e. one that could be applied to many 
contemporary contexts within and across countries worldwide—will prove 
rather meaningless. Thus, this review aims to present a more useful theoretical 
and empirical basis for later discussion of the extent to which the imperial or 
colonial framing adequately captures what is happening today. 
The key findings of this chapter are that the late 19th century trade and 
investment relations, which followed earlier imperial expansion in the 
Americas and India, differ greatly from contemporary explanations of “land 
6 | Alden Wily (2012).
7 | Daudin et al. (2010), 6. 
8 | Daudin et al. (2010), 6.
9 | Kegley and Raymond (2011), 110-112, and Craggs (2014), 5-9.
10 | See, for instance, Jauch (2011); Broughton (6 November 2012); Liberti 2012; Aziz 
(15 April 2011); and Sadeque (2012).
11 | Jauch (2011).
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grabbing.” While the latter seem to assume that land acquisitions made since 
2000 resemble colonial undertakings due to their primary rational interest in 
land as a natural resource, historical evidence highlights that factors and moti-
vations extended well beyond a narrow focus on natural resources. From an 
investor country perspective, colonial and imperial relations between the North 
and South, and related “divisions of labor,” were driven by domestic develop-
ment processes, such as the process of industrialization in the home countries 
and the economic crisis of the 1870s, which led to the search for new (exclu-
sive) markets. Moreover, the dynamic was a reflection of the political economy 
of aristocracy in which losses in land value, an outcome of industrialization, 
led landed elites to secure their wealth status by investing overseas. Other 
enabling or influential factors at the time were breakthroughs in technological 
and medical capacity, especially innovations in the transport sector and malaria 
medicine; and external events, such as the European state formation, and the 
great power competition dynamics in Europe. 
This means that while the search for gold and the extraction of resources 
for domestic consumption back home were important characteristics of 
colonial and imperial expansion, the latter was also about the (violent) opening 
of consumer markets, the acquisition of strategic assets, the facilitation of 
planned settlements, and the search for profitable business opportunities and 
financial services. More broadly, the rationalization of these enterprises in the 
home country context claimed that they would improve the state’s international 
positional status relative to others; or, as in the case of Belgium, the enterprises 
simply reflected an individually felt need by the ruler for self-aggrandizement 
in comparison to other nations.12 This diversity of interests and factors is also 
evident on the policy level. Home countries’ imperial economic policies were 
biased towards, yet not exclusively focused on, the production of raw materials 
overseas. Government actors but also business associations had very different 
understandings of imperial politics, resulting in a lack of any clear-cut strategy 
or plan for colonial development.13
In addition to this complex character of imperial and colonial undertak-
ings, historical research questions the widespread assumption, present in 
many theoretical explanations (and visible in contemporary government and 
corporate rhetoric), about the utility of international land acquisitions for the 
home country and/or investor. Contrary to the accompanying rhetoric of effi-
ciency, profit, necessity, or significance used by actors in the past and present to 
justify, motivate, or explain territorial and/or economic expansion and related 
capital exports, empirical evidence illustrates that in practice a high percentage 
of overseas investment projects did not generate profits or failed, and that 
12 | See, for instance, Olukoju (2002); Green (1999); and Davis (1999).
13 | See Schmitt (1979); and Davis (1999). 
Land Grabbing and Home Countr y Development80
projects did not automatically promise higher returns than investments back 
home. Instead, they were often the outcome of a metropolitan bias or non-eco-
nomic interest constellations. This makes it very difficult to assess whether 
the benefits of these endeavors outweighed the costs for the home country.14 
At a minimum, the expansion overseas provided temporary career and income 
options for those involved in it, and in doing so may have contributed to polit-
ical regime stability in the home countries. Most importantly, the historical and 
theoretical research underlines the importance of studying OFDI in the context 
of a home country’s political economy, ideology, and development in order to 
achieve a better understanding of what is happening. 
The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows: starting with the 
key theoretical explanations (Section 2) and main international parameters 
(Section 3) of international land acquisitions between 1870 and 1914 in the 
South, the review will then look more closely at the “Scramble for Africa” due 
to the relevance of contemporary investment flows to Africa, but also because 
the Scramble has become synonymous with the imperial expansion of that era 
(Section 4). It will also highlight key aspects of institutional path dependency 
and change post-WWII whose consideration is important for a meaningful 
understanding of the ‘novel’ character of what is happening today (Section 5). 
The chapter concludes with a brief summary of core findings (Section 6).
2. imPeriaLism and coLoniaLism—    
 Ke y Theore TicaL e xPL anaTions 
Historical materialist, liberal, world systems, and political theories are relevant 
for the study of international land acquisitions insofar as they: (1) outline 
various factors and potential causal mechanisms to be taken into account 
during the process of assessing “land grabs;” (2) underline the importance of 
systemic dynamics that the individual cases under study might be reflective 
of or embedded in; and (3) provide an overview of prevailing narratives about 
imperialism that are present in the public perception and academic debate 
about “land grabbing” (e.g., media).15 Ince, for example, has emphasized that 
“[o]ne line of inquiry approaches land grabs as instances of “primitive accumu-
lation of capital” whereby lands in the Global South are “enclosed” and brought 
within the ambit of global capitalism.”16 
14 | Argument by Cottrell (1975), 47-53.
15 | Makki and Geisler (2011). 
16 | Ince (2013), 104. Also see D. Hall (2013) for a historical materialist interpretation 
of the “land grab” phenomenon. 
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Historically, imperialism appeared in many regions, if we consider the 
Chinese, Roman, and British empires, and it comprised sets of very different 
features—from the commercial dominion of some countries over others to 
violent territorial expansion. As a result, multiple definitions and understand-
ings of imperialism exist, reflecting these distinct forms of dominion. At a 
maximum, imperialism is conceptualized as the “policy or practice of extending 
a state’s rule over other territories,” one form of which has been colonialism, 
defined as “the policy or practice of a power in extending control over weaker 
peoples or areas.”17 At a minimum, imperialism takes place in indirect forms 
of “extension [...] of authority, influence, power, etc.”18 Most imperialist under-
takings combine(d) multiple forms of dominion, territorial as well as non-ter-
ritorial, whereas “[o]ver time, the social and political mobilization of opponents 
of territorial rule in the colonies simply outstripped advances in the technolo-
gies of coercion.”19 Non-territorial sources of power related, for instance, to the 
“dynastic and religious affiliations” of the Habsburg and the Ottoman empires 
prior to WWI; ideologies of supremacy in the case of European empires prior 
to and during WWII; and, later, to liberal ideologies (American Imperium) or 
anti-fascist “ideological capital,” in the case of the Soviet Union.20 Over time, 
the continuous political and economic power discrepancy between industri-
alized and developing countries became referred to as a type of imperialistic 
relationship, with the former dominating the latter.21 
For the purpose of reviewing experiences of international land acquisi-
tions in the South during the late 19th century—the focus of this chapter—it is 
important to keep in mind that imperialism and colonialism describe related 
yet different phenomena. While imperial expansion might involve colonialism 
as a territorial source of power, it goes beyond this particular form of dominion 
and includes a specific outlook on world politics/policy. As a result, colonies 
were not only purposes in themselves for the imperial powers, but they were 
also used as pledges in global power games, particularly during the late 19th 
century when the great powers used colonies as potential weights with which 
to rebalance intra-European power struggles. During that time, colonies were 
17 | Collins English Dictionary (5th edition, first published in 2000), and Collins A-Z 
Thesaurus (1st edition, first published in 1995).
18 | Collins English Dictionary (5th edition, first published in 2000), and Collins A-Z 
Thesaurus (1st edition, first published in 1995).
19 | Katzenstein (2005), 4.
20 | Katzenstein (2005), 4-5. Originally understood as a state strategy, the rise of the 
American Imperium post-WWII, with its emphasis on free markets and global economic 
integration, led to the perception that cer tain phenomena constituted forms of dominion 
of corporations over states, framed as corporate imperialism.
21 | Prahalad and Lieberthal (2003). 
Land Grabbing and Home Countr y Development82
exchanged amongst the great economic powers, and latecomers to the circle of 
great powers needed to achieve recognition of their new status and/or to nego-
tiate the right to colonize.22 
Several theories have tried to explain why the “imperial landrush”23 that 
characterized the “second wave of European imperialism”24 in general, and the 
colonization of Africa in particular, occurred from a home country perspec-
tive and in the context of home country development. These shall be briefly 
introduced in the remainder of this section to raise awareness of potential 
causal mechanisms in the empirical assessment and analytical explanation of 
Chinese and British investments in African countries.
One of the most prominent works on the economic, social, ideological, and 
political dimensions of late 19th century imperialism and colonialism is the 
study by Hobson,25 which heavily influenced the subsequent historical mate-
rialist treatises on imperialism.26 In particular, Hobson’s economic argument 
that “excessive powers of production, [and] excessive capital in search of invest-
ment” were drivers of British imperialist expansions became (and remained) 
very influential.27 Yet, Hobson’s study differs greatly from the large body of 
functional explanations that argues for the inevitability of imperial expansion 
along these lines. Instead, he suggested that imperial expansion could be pre-
vented by addressing the concentration of wealth in the home country, namely 
Britain. Accordingly, high inequality combined with increasing productivity 
composed the “economic taproot of imperialism” in the form of lagging 
domestic demand, over-saving, and overproduction.28 This, however, could 
be remedied through equality-promoting public policy which would balance 
domestic demand with domestic production.29 Interestingly, Hobson’s related 
argument about the importance of qualitative rather than quantitative growth 
efforts—which could be placed under the heading of “inclusive growth”30—is 
very topical again today (as of 2015) in view of the rising inequality within and 
22 | Rough translation of an argument made by Osterhammel (2009), 27.
23 | Davis (2002), 12.
24 | Kegley and Raymond (2011), 110-112.
25 | Hobson (1965).
26 | Siegelman (1965), v.
27 | Siegelman (1965), xiii.
28 | Hobson (1965), 71-93.
29 | Hobson (1965), 85-92.
30 | See, for instance, the respective OECD initiative on Inclusive Growth (OECD 
(2015a)). According to the WB (2009), the “dif ference between pro-poor and inclusive 
growth is that the pro-poor approach is mainly interested in the welfare of the poor while 
inclusive growth is concerned with opportunities for the majority of the labor force, poor 
and middle-class alike.” See WB (2009), 1.
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across developing and industrialized countries (measured by income and accu-
mulated wealth).31 Back in his time, Hobson’s study clearly offered a counter-
point to influential contemporary voices that justified imperial expansion by 
referring to it as a national necessity and whose basic rhetorical elements are 
still common today (see Chapters 5 and 7):
However costly, however perilous, this process of imperial expansion may be, it is nec-
essary to the continued existence of our nation; if we abandon it we must be content to 
leave the development of the world to other nations, who will everywhere cut into our 
trade, and even impair our means of securing the food and raw materials we require to 
support our population. Imperialism is thus seen to be, not a choice, but a necessity.32
While Hobson’s study has been criticized by historians for exaggerating the 
importance of industry and the financial sector in the British empire, his 
empirical observations about imperialism and colonialism seem noteworthy. 
Indeed, they provide useful parameters for studying overseas investments from 
a home country perspective, such as the importance of examining the partic-
ular domestic political economy in home countries to understand their foreign 
economic policy; the significance of ideology in this process; the questionable 
utility and benefit of these overseas activities for the home country; the impor-
tance of public-private partnerships in facilitating overseas economic expan-
sion, with public money used for private gain;33 and, finally, the fact that the 
process of economic expansion also has repercussions back home. Moreover, 
he pointed at the multiplicity of motivations and actors at play, in the form 
of “patriotism, adventure, military enterprise, political ambition, and philan-
thropy,” all of which constituted the “fuel” for imperial expansion.34 
Other historical materialist assessments of imperial and colonial relations 
largely followed Hobson’s outlook on the phenomenon, locating the agency in 
the home country’s capitalist development context, though with a deterministic 
twist. Consequently, imperialist expansion was framed as an inherent compo-
nent of capitalism, and assumed to be profitable for the home country, which, 
according to historical evidence, was (often) not the case.35 Informed by Marxist 
thought about the crisis of capitalist systems in the form of over-accumula-
31 | Hobson (1965), 92. Also, see OECD (2015b) on “social and welfare issues;” and 
Raghavan (2000).
32 | Hobson (1965), 73.
33 | Hobson (1965), 96-97.
34 | Hobson (1965), 59.
35 | Snyder (1991).
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tion,36 “[t]he consequence of the development of industrial capitalistic societies 
is a pressure for expansion which may lead to military or political acquisition 
(colonies) or to maintaining economic dependence (developing countries).”37 
While the various imperialism theories differ in their explanation of the par-
ticular reason for “the pressure of expansion,” they do share the understanding 
that imperialism is the “result of the inability to cope internally [i.e. within the 
spatial limits of the nation-state] with the consequences of permanent techno-
logical innovation and their effects on society.”38 Moreover, distinct from the 
liberal frames with their arguments of efficiency gains, comparative advantage, 
or the international division of labor, imperialism theories focus on zero-sum 
dynamics—nationally and internationally—between capital and labor, states, 
and ecologies.39 
Another strain of imperialism theory emerged after WWII. In view of the 
persistent gap in living standards between industrial and developing coun-
tries after decolonization, and following the failure of modernization theory’s40 
36 | Over-accumulation means that excessive investment occurs and goods cannot 
be sold profitably. This results in capital increasing in some sectors or speculative 
endeavors, instead of being re-invested in productive enterprise. Moreover, this may 
lead to unused plants and equipment, large build-up of unsold commodities, rising 
unemployment, or the rise of financial markets as alternative outlet.
37 | Kuhnen (1986), 20.
38 | Kuhnen (1986), 20.
39 | Basically, classical imperialism theory (e.g., Luxemburg (1913) and Lenin (1975)) 
argues that imperialism is not benefitting the development of the colonies. Instead, the 
“establishment of new markets in underdeveloped areas destroys traditional markets 
and production relations of these areas. While the expansion creates employment back 
home, it signifies an export of unemployment to these underdeveloped areas. At the 
same time, capital exports to these countries are reflective of interests of industrial 
countries, and not the needs of the recipient areas. Given that profits of these invest-
ments are remitted to home countries, this then highlights that these forms of economic 
expansion are at the core exploitative relationships between industrial and so-called 
underdeveloped areas, whereas the exploitation of the latter serves the development of 
the home country.” See summary by Kuhnen (1986), 20. 
40 | At the core, modernization theories assume that “industrialized countries are the 
model for economy and society,” whereas deviations from this model are framed as 
“backwardness.” Definitions of development as “an increase of production and effi-
ciency,” its measurement as GDP and “per capita income,” and the analytical dualism 
promoting the “suppression of the traditional sector by concentrating on and expanding 
the modern sector,” all still inform many programs and policy recommendations of 
multilateral and bilateral development organizations today. See Kuhnen (1986), 12-13; 
and Lepenies (2008). Also, see the development narrative of the WB (2007), which 
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development policies to solve this problem, structural difference and related 
forms of disadvantageous “technological-industrial dependence” were seen as 
causing the persistence of exploitative relationships between industrial and 
developing countries.41 This form of structural dominion occurred through “[i]
ndustrial countries invest[ing] in the production and export of raw material 
in developing countries, influenc[ing] with their potential of power the terms 
of trade in their favour, and thus perpetuat[ing] the international division of 
labour” with detrimental effects for developing economies and societies.42 
At their core, these new imperialism theories, similar to dependency 
theories, presume that post-WWII underdevelopment is a function of the his-
torical legacy of violent and “asymmetric integration” of developing countries 
into an international division of labor defined by industrial countries.43 The 
economic structure of developing countries—namely the dominance of the 
primary sector and the export orientation—together with co-opted elites and 
changes in culture, has contributed to sustaining the international asymmetry 
characteristic of colonial relations, as well as the pattern of overseas investments 
by industrial countries. Similarly, Wallerstein’s world systems theory differen-
tiates between a wealth and power-related core and periphery of regions, and 
argues that “the dependencia-style linkage between development at the core and 
underdevelopment in the periphery (uneven development) remains integral to 
the system and persists through alternating periods of growth and contrac-
tion.”44 
equates rural development and poverty alleviation with increases in production, effi-
ciency and per capita income. 
41 | Kuhnen (1986), 21.
42 | Kuhnen (1986), 21. 
43 | In more detail, dependency theories that explain the genesis of underdevelopment 
in developing countries argue that the asymmetric trade relations of dominion result 
in “deteriorating exchange relations between industrialized and developing countries 
(and, as well, between the industrialized and the agricultural sector in developing 
countries).” Meanwhile, industrialized countries gain from international trade due to 
the rise in productivity, together with elastic demand for value added products in the 
world market, both of which result in increasing incomes and positive terms of trade. 
Developing countries as producers and exporters of primary products cannot reap the 
assumed benefits from trade. To the contrary, rising productivity in primary production 
suppresses prices due to an inelastic demand for such products in the world markets, 
and results in deteriorating incomes as well as terms of trade. At the same time, the 
falling prices in world markets result in increasing exports to compensate for the wors-
ening terms of trade. See summary of major authors of dependencia theory by Kuhnen 
(1986), 19-20.
44 | Wolfe (1997), 404.
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Deviating from these largely economic accounts of imperialism is, for 
instance, the political theory of imperialism developed by classical realists. 
Morgenthau perceives imperialism as a foreign policy of the state. Accordingly, 
imperialist undertakings aim at increasing a state’s power status within the 
status quo and, in comparison to other states, thereby enhancing the relative 
security of the more powerful state in the international realm.45
3. The inTernaTionaL Par ame Ters of 19Th-cenTury   
 euroPe an imPeriaLism 
This section complements the previous theoretical review by providing a brief 
overview of the most important international parameters of 19th century 
European imperialism. In particular, it will look at the configuration of capital 
and trade flows during that era in order to assess the quantitative and qualita-
tive dimensions of that era’s imperial and colonial relations. That is, what sig-
nificance did capital exports and trade flows to the colonies have from the per-
spective of the home country? And what did the trade and investment policies 
of that time look like? The historical evidence on these questions allows us to 
derive a meaningful comparison with contemporary capital flows and foreign 
economic policies that—as this book argues—“land grabs” reflect. It also high-
lights their role in the context of home country development. 
Empirically, the time between 1870 and 1913 has been branded by histo-
rians as the “first wave of globalization,”46 due to the (largely rhetorical) credo of 
free trade and the laissez faire approach to capital mobility. Geopolitically, this 
time is referred to as “Pax-Britannica with London constituting the financial 
center of the world and the British pound the dominant currency in the context 
of the international gold standard.”47 At the same time, it was also a period 
that witnessed massive migration flows, reflecting the pressures of industrial 
development in the home countries and the hopes attached to moving to new 
lands.48 Between 1870 and 1914, approximately “60 million people emigrated 
from [...] Europe to [...] countries of the New World including Argentina, Aus-
45 | Morgenthau (2005). 
46 | Solimano and Watts (2005), 14.
47 | Solimano and Watts (2005), 14. It is against this background that Bairoch and 
Kozul-Wright (1996) argue that the myths about 19th century globalization are primarily 
built on experiences of the British empire, but even in this case they fail to capture the 
complex character of this era. 
48 | Solimano and Watts (2005), 14.
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tralia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.”49 A smaller share 
of migrants also targeted East Africa, Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, the 
Caribbean, and the West Coast of North America.50
The historical evidence on overseas investment during the 1870-1914 period 
stresses three important characteristics, namely the asymmetric significance of 
trade and investment for the countries involved; the complexity of the sectoral 
composition of investments that went beyond natural resources; and the inter-
relation of trade and investment activities with home country events and public 
policies rather than “free markets.” 
Firstly, the different significance of imperial/colonial relations for the 
home country and colony is reflected in the asymmetric regional distribution 
of investment and trade flows. Empirical data on the regional composition of 
European capital and trade flows demonstrates that trading and investing pri-
marily happened between the wealthiest countries, including the New World.51 
At the same time, and quite surprisingly, the so-called Scramble for Africa 
(1876-1914), which is often alluded to in the contemporary “land grab” debate, 
is not reflected in European investment trends in the form of any significant 
shifts.52 Available data on the main international lenders and borrowers shows 
that in 1913 the major capital exporters were Britain (with 41% of total overseas 
investments), followed by France (20%) and Germany (13%). Moreover, Europe, 
North America, and Latin America were the main recipients of the total overseas 
investment flows, receiving 27%, 24%, and 19%, respectively (Table 3-1). 
49 | The US was the main destination. Until 1920 about 26 million migrants arrived 
from “core Europe” (e.g., England, Germany, and France) and “peripheral Europe” (e.g. 
the relatively poorer Scandinavian countries; Spain, Italy and Portugal in the south; 
Poland, Russia, Romania to the east; and the former nations of the Austro-Hungarian 
empire). Also countries in Latin America, such as Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba, Mexico, and 
Chile absorbed a significant share of European migration. Solimano and Watts (2005), 
14.
50 | Solimano and Watts (2005), 16.
51 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 12-13. According to Cottrell (1975, 27), in the 
case of Britain, “temperate regions of recent settlement” such as Canada and the US 
received the largest share of the total capital exports, amounting to 68% of the total 
share between 1865 and 1914.
52 | Cottrell (1975), 27; Cain and Hopkins (1987), 14. 
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Table 3-1 – Main International Lenders and Borrowers, 1913 (Percentage shares, 
Bairoch and Kozul-Wright 1996)53
Lenders Borrowers
Total 
overseas 
invest-
ment
FDI Region Total 
overseas 
invest-
ment
FDI
Britain 41 45.5 Europe 27 17.71
France 20 12.2 Latin America 19 32.7
Germany 13 10.5 North America 24 16
United 
States
8 18.5 Asia 14 20.9
Others 18 13.3 Africa-Oceania 16 12.6
The picture of asymmetric significance that emerges for trade relations is 
closely related to the one seen above for overseas investment flows. Even in the 
case of Great Britain, the country with the most globalized economy at the time, 
trade with the “poor and precarious markets” from the seized tracts of terri-
tories lagged behind trade volumes with other great economic powers.54 The 
largest share of trading occurred between Northern countries, both in man-
ufacturing goods as well as primary commodities. As of 1913, approximately 
60% of total world trade took place among industrial economies, and 40% of 
total world trade was intra-European (see Table 3-2).55 
53 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 12.
54 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 9. It is important to note that the UK’s trading 
pattern during the late 19th century, characterized by exports of manufactured goods 
to, and imports of primary commodities from the South, which has become a defining 
criterion of imperial/colonial relations, was “the exception rather than the rule” at that 
time (see Table 3-2).
55 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 9.
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Table 3-2 – Commodity and Geographical Composition of Exports, 1913 
(Percentage shares, Bairoch and Kozul-Wright 1996)56
Countries Share of 
world exports
Trade with 
the North
Exports of 
manufactures 
as share of 
total exports
Exports to 
other industrial 
economies as 
share of total 
manufacturing 
exports
UK 22.8 37.9 76.6 31.8
France 12.1 68.2 57.9 63.8
Germany 21.4 53.4 71.7 53.5
Other 
Western 
European
15.0 70.3 49.4 62
United 
States
22.1 74.5 34.1 63.2
Secondly, the sectoral composition of colonial trade and investment relations 
points to the case-specific quality and overall complexity of colonial rela-
tions from a home country perspective. Empirical evidence from Britain and 
France shows that a large share of lending went to social overhead57 and related 
business rather than resources.58 Also, manufacturing enterprises were scarce, 
receiving “less than 4 per cent of total subscriptions to overseas issues” during 
the 1865-1914 timeframe.59 
Food processing (milling and meat-packaging), transport improvement, 
and public utilities were key sectors of interest. Particularly, railway bonds 
featured prominently: in 1914, approximately 70% of British and French long-
term foreign investment went into this area.60 Apparently, most investors were 
“rentiers” rather than providers of risk capital, and non-resource sectors under 
straightforward management, such as railway construction, appeared less 
risky, due to guaranteed returns. The risk aversion of European investors is 
56 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 10.
57 | Social overhead refers to “capital goods of types which are available to anybody, 
hence social; and are not tightly linked to any particular part of production, hence 
overhead. Because of their broad availability they often have to be provided by the 
government. Examples of social overhead capital include roads, schools, hospitals, and 
public parks.” See Black et al. (2009).
58 | See, for instance, Svedberg (1980), 29.
59 | Cottrell (1975), 40.
60 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996). 13.
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also reflected in the fact that FDI only accounted for one third of all interna-
tional capital flows between 1870 and 1914.61 Except for the UK, the majority of 
overseas investment took the form of portfolio investments (see also Table 3-1 
on the share of FDI of the total international investment).62 This dissimilarity 
in composition compared to contemporary capital exports has been largely 
attributed to the fact that the 19th century investment environment was riskier, 
which together with “[i]nformational problems made investments in debt safer 
than those in equity.”63 
It should be noted that in contrast to the widespread rhetoric of liberalism 
and free trade now associated with that era, financial mechanisms were not 
(only) “dominated by the market sentiment of private investors” during that 
period; neither were trade flows nor international relations.64 Instead, public 
actors and policies played a key role in setting incentives. As mentioned above, 
empirical data shows that “bond issues dominated other debt instruments 
(notably equities)” and prevailed over securities markets.65 This means that 
although private actors and banks from industrial countries invested overseas 
in long-term liabilities (such as railways), the borrowers were colonial and 
foreign governments in need of external capital to both address acute finan-
cial needs and finance infrastructure projects whose costs greatly exceeded the 
revenues.66 The associated obligation of the borrower to make fixed interest 
payments and/or to reimburse the investor made this formula appealing for 
foreign investors.67 While those guaranteed rates of return are not part of con-
temporary land-consuming investment projects, the accompanying rhetoric 
and provision of investor-friendly conditions (e.g., tax waiver) to attract foreign 
capital seem fairly similar to contemporary host governments’ strategies to 
attract foreign capital.68
61 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 11.
62 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 11. Interestingly, it was the FDI component of 
total capital exports that showed a sectoral bias towards projects in the primary sector 
from 1870 to 1914. To the extent that FDI was a part of a strategy of expanding compa-
nies to develop intra-firm trade and related intra-firm facilitated division of labor, these 
projects also clearly impacted on international development and reinforced uneven 
developments in the world economy, creating a three-tier world whose divisions are still 
felt. Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 20-21, 10-11.
63 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 3.
64 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 12.
65 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 12-13.
66 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 13; Cottrell (1975), 28.
67 | Cottrell (1975), 28.
68 | Cottrell (1975), 28.
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Also, trading activities were often regulated.69 In several independent Latin 
American countries, where “Western pressure had imposed [...] treaties [...] 
which entailed the elimination of customs and duties” at the beginning of the 
19th century, governments began to introduce protectionist trade policies in 
1870 to promote industrialization following independence.70 Simultaneously, 
policy preferences in industrial countries were characterized by great “divi-
sions of opinion and interest over the empire’s economic function.”71 A case 
in point is the British Imperial Federation League (IFL), which emerged in 
1884 to make recommendations on how to strengthen economic cooperation 
within the empire. This organization dissolved in 1893 due to an inability to 
find consensus on imperial economic policy, with a particular point of contesta-
tion being the promotion of “free trade” or imperial preference as the key norm 
of economic organization.72
Overall, however, it should be noted that, until 1913, free trade had a “doc-
trinal, quasi-religious status”73 in the British Empire, to the extent that “its 
rules of multilateralism and non-discrimination have shaped the post-World 
War Two international order.”74 It was widely supported by (British) civil society 
and “helped soften people’s earlier view of the state [...] as exploitative instru-
ment of the ruling class”75—as popular notions of “Free Trade envisaged the 
social as relatively autonomous from state and market.”76 Simultaneously, the 
free trade doctrine reflected the growing reliance on foreign farmers and the 
rise in consumption.77 At the same time, references to free trade always also 
had a strong rhetorical character, allowing the colonizers and imperial powers 
to unilaterally enter overseas markets and territories without having to fear 
retaliation back home, given the power asymmetries in place. 
With time, the rise of a group of strongly growing countries impacted inter-
national economic governance and led to the emergence of an international 
monetary and economic framework tailored to these countries’ investing and 
trading interests. However, this did not necessarily imply a more competitive 
organization of international and domestic economic, social and political rela-
69 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 8-9.
70 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 8-9.
71 | Green (1999), 47.
72 | Green (1999), 48.
73 | Trentmann (2008), 7.
74 | Trentmann (2008), 7.
75 | Trentmann(2008), 15.
76 | Trentmann (2008), 15.
77 | Trentmann (2008), 15.
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tions.78 Often, “imperial conflicts were related to and interconnected with the 
class struggles that characterized the expansion of industrial capitalism”79 at 
that time. They reflected “feudal forms of organization; [...] monopolism, pro-
tectionism, cartelization and corporatism; and [...] rural, pre-industrial, and 
autocratic structures of power and authority.”80
Against this background, it is not surprising to see that economic expansion 
by the great economic powers was largely an outcome of cooperation between 
the governments, financial institutions, and entrepreneurs. The countries that 
went down the industrialization path relatively late in comparison to the United 
Kingdom, such as Germany, were particularly characterized by close cooper-
ation between these seemingly different actor groups, with the result that “[f]
requently, interested bankers obtained government approval and support for 
the projects of others”81—not to mention diplomatic and military support. Yet, 
private sector capital exports were not necessarily embraced by most home 
country governments. Countries such as Germany and France tried to “dis-
courage such outflows or at least sought ways to tie them more closely to export 
orders.”82 They were concerned about structural unemployment and foreign 
debt.83 
4. findinG an “african eL dor ado”?    
 The scr ambLe for africa, 1870-1914
The African continent ranked comparatively low with regards to European 
trade and investment activities during the late 19th and early 20th century. 
During the 1870-1913 period, the continent received 9.1% of British capital 
exports, 7.3% of French, and 8.5% of German foreign investment.84 Neverthe-
less, the Scramble for Africa, i.e. the partition of and “run” onto the continent 
by European economic powers at the end of the 19th century has almost become 
synonymous with the popular notion of the “second wave”85 of European impe-
rialism. Since references to the Scramble are also common in the contemporary 
78 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 24. Key aspects of this framework, for instance, 
the protection of foreign property or the imposition of the “open door” principle, have 
become key pillars of the contemporary international economic constitution.
79 | Halperin (2004), 76.
80 | Halperin (2005), 4.
81 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 24
82 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 24.
83 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 24; and Raghavan (2000).
84 | Daudin et al. (2010), 12 (Table 1-4).
85 | Bowden (2009), 25-26.
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“land grab” debate that has emerged since 2000,86 a more detailed summary of 
how and why it occurred from the perspective of the European colonizers will 
be provided.
In the early 1870s, the African continent remained unexplored and “mys-
terious” from the perspective of Europeans, who considered the region to be 
“‘vacant’: legally res nullius, a no-man’s-land,” except for the trading hubs and 
a few strategic colonies (South Africa, Algeria) on the coastline.87 The African 
continent had never occupied an important spot on the European imaginary 
map prior to the Scramble, a “term [...] coined in 1884.”88 Therefore, it was sur-
prising then, and still is today, that within “half a generation, the Scramble 
gave Europe virtually the whole continent: including thirty new colonies and 
protectorates, 10 million square miles of new territory and 110 million dazed 
new subjects.”89 
What happened? The historical literature remains inconclusive over why the 
Scramble occurred from 1876 to 1913. However, there is broad agreement that 
monocausal explanations that point, for instance, to surplus capital are insuf-
ficient to capture the multiplicity of events and factors at work.90 Aside from 
mythical notions of an African El Dorado91 that were inspired by the diamonds 
and gold mines in South Africa, there was the “lure of the unknown,” which 
was stimulated by geographic sciences for which “Africa was still [...] one of 
those few great regions where cartographers still left white spaces in place of 
rivers lakes and mountains.”92 Moreover, the context of the economic crisis in 
Europe, which was experiencing its first Long Depression,93 as well as inter-
national power shifts, such as the rise of the US, and great power competition 
within Europe over markets and the positional status in the European system 
of states were important. These all have been influential factors in the imperial 
expansion onto, and the colonization of, the African continent.94 Technolog-
ical and scientific innovations that lowered the transport and health barriers 
to explore the interior of the continent sped up the Scramble.95 At the same 
86 | E.g., Biney (2009).
87 | Pakenham (1992), x xiii. Also see Duignan and Gann (1969a), 2-3.
88 | In this sub-chapter the term is used to “embrace the whole hectic phase of the 
partition, beginning with a prelude in 1876 and ending in 1912,” following the descrip-
tion of Pakenham (1992), x xvii.
89 | Pakenham (1992), x xiii.
90 | Pakenham (1992), x xiii-x xiv.
91 | See, for instance, Pearce (1984), 90.
92 | Duignan and Gann (1969a), 6-7.
93 | Hobsbawm (1989), 45. For a detailed explanation of this crisis, see Nelson (2008).
94 | See Pakenham (1992), x xiii-x xvi; Duignan and Gann (1969a); and Dumett (1999).
95 | Duignan and Gann (1969a), 2.
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time, the Scramble relied on institutions developed during the first half of the 
19th century, namely the international banking system, the reform of corporate 
governance, or strategic posts along the coastline that served as points of entry 
into the continent.
Historical research also points to the importance of country-specific factors 
and dynamics. In practice, different imperialisms of political and economic 
character were at play, and they depended on a country’s particular political 
economy, ideology, and development setting, in addition to the international 
context.96 For instance, British and French rationalizations of imperial expan-
sion were influenced by their investor legacy. Accordingly, the key drivers of 
British interest in the African continent were “first to safeguard their [trade] 
passage to India and secondly to profit from economic opportunities.” These 
interest priorities led Duignan and Gann to argue that the British participation 
in the Scramble occurred at the beginning out of “self-defense,” i.e. out of a 
fear of losing political control in the context of the French-British rivalry over 
positional status within Europe.97 The French expansion was pushed forward 
by diverse actor groups (e.g., “soldiers, merchants, geographic societies”) “to 
promote the idea of empire” as a form of political power that would spread 
French culture and the allegedly “universal ideals of the Enlightenment.”98 The 
core empirical characteristics of the Scramble and how it occurred from a home 
country perspective are reviewed next. 
To start, the Scramble timelines underline the procedural character of col-
onization and late 19th century imperial expansion. This process consisted of a 
gradual move from exploration and treaty-based forms of land acquisition and 
colonization, which were accompanied and often executed by imperial philan-
thropists (missionaries), to the use of force, the atrocities of which are well-doc-
umented.99 In fact, “paper imperialism,” such as the partition of Africa among 
European powers at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), proved insufficient in 
the process of acquisition: “When effective occupation became necessary to 
establish a good title, conflict became inevitable.”100 
An assessment of the colonization timelines also shows that the strategies 
for gaining or staying in control changed with time. While killings and violence 
were widely applied at the beginning of the occupation, some colonial admin-
istrations shifted their focus from direct to indirect forms of exploitation to 
96 | E.g. Duignan and Gann (1969a); Pakenham (1992); Dumett (1999); and Hobsbawm 
(1989). 
97 | Duignan and Gann (1969a), 8.
98 | See Jones (2014). 
99 | Take, for instance, the German extermination order against Hereros in Southwest 
Africa. Pakenham (1992), x xv. 
100 | Pakenham (1992), x xv.
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prevent further revolts (see, for instance, the governance of farmland below). 
Throughout, law constituted an important instrument of acquisition and col-
onization, as it “provided a far more comprehensive framework than did the 
others for recalibrating land and life on the colonizers’ terms and without ref-
erence to indigenous antecedents.”101 The central role of law as primary tool to 
access the best land and govern colonial territory led Fahrmeir and Steller to 
refer to these practices as “lawfare” instead of warfare.102 Interestingly, though, 
many aspects of “lawfare” had their origin in the commercial conflicts among 
European powers that they were meant to regulate—a point to consider when 
assessing contemporary legal approaches and voluntary initiatives in the 
context of governing land-consuming FDI.103
Importantly, the widespread narrative of primary-resources-driven colo-
nialism, which the previous overview of key imperial parameters called into 
question for the majority of imperial projects, does apply to the African case. 
The empirical evidence on the sectoral composition of capital imports from 1870 
to 1935 shows that the largest share of private foreign capital “went into mining 
and much colonial public investment was intended for developing mining.”104 
In practice, this led to the establishment of enclave economies that were char-
acterized by their export-orientation, as well as their strong reliance on foreign 
capital and the facilitating institutions in the form of colonial administration 
and law, infrastructures, and labor needed for the exploitation of resources.105 
In the process of acquisition and colonization, colonial governments made use 
of mining policies and marketing mechanisms to put African enterprises at 
a disadvantage compared to their foreign competitors, ultimately resulting in 
their elimination.106 This was also true for cases such as the gold industry in 
Southern Rhodesia, “where the geological conditions favored small-scale pro-
ducers and where African tradition and experience were considerable.”107 Also, 
following decolonization, foreign investments in Africa have remained biased 
towards the natural resource sector (agriculture, mining), which still made up 
50% to 80% of total FDI flows as of 2005. At the same time, the positional 
status of African countries has remained evocative of the continent’s colonial 
heritage: South Africa, which was a major, late 19th century target country of 
101 | Harris (2004), 179; Alden Wily (2012).
102 | Fahrmeir und Steller (2013), 172. 
103 | The Act of Berlin (1885), the “legislative vehicle for the Scramble for Africa,” was 
as much about the partition of the continent amongst the European powers as it was 
about guaranteeing free trade in spite of the partition. See Gardner (2012), 43.
104 | Economic Commission for Africa, Africa Union (2011), 12.
105 | Stuchtey (2010).
106 | Economic Commission for Africa, Africa Union (2011), 13.
107 | Economic Commission for Africa, Africa Union (2011), 13.
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foreign investments “with the other economies in its orbit,”108 continues to be a 
major trading and investment hub on the continent.109
A core component of these processes of colonization and capital transfers 
was that they consumed land in its multiple forms, as territory, resource, and 
cultural landscape; by multiple means, namely legal and violent, direct and/or 
indirect forms of dispossession; for multiple reasons. However, it is important 
to remember that land as a resource only became a core issue at a later stage 
of colonization. Historical evidence on the “Conference of Berlin” (1884-1885) 
indicates that in the beginning European economic powers met to negotiate the 
future of the African continent as a way to ease competition pressures and con-
flicts over commercial routes and (exclusive) markets. These issues had been 
building up amongst themselves. And then they gained further significance 
during the Great Depression, and in the context of the declining possibility of 
expansion on the European continent due to the formation of nation-states.110 
Contributing factors to the focus on commercial and strategic interests during 
this partition process might have been that “many African colonies were short 
of [...] known mineral deposits,”111 and that large parts of the continent were 
“terra incognita” and not intended for settlement.112 
Over time, land played an important role as a sphere of influence and stra-
tegic territory for the home countries’ commercial interests, as a resource, as 
a productive space of society, as an area of settlement, or as an asset (in cases 
where investors speculated on rising land values)113—a list that is similar to the 
functions of land in contemporary foreign investments. However, the initial 
neglect of, or ignorance about land resources on the African continent led to 
situations in which investors and colonial administrations had to realize that 
the acquired land (tropical soils) was not necessarily conducive to the colonial 
export economy they had envisioned. In addition, the colonized territories often 
faced a shortage of labor and lacked the infrastructure required for industrial 
export agriculture.114 
Similar to the varying role of land within and across colonies, the governance 
of land was characterized by plural, complex, and evolving modes and events 
rather than a single approach. In view of access, the “ability to dispossess rested 
primarily on physical power and the supporting infrastructure of the state.” 115 
108 | Economic Commission for Africa, Africa Union (2011), 12.
109 | Ezeoha and Cattaneo (2011), 2. 
110 | Pakenham (1992); Anghie (2007).
111 | Austin (2010), 9-10.
112 | Austin (2010), 9-10.
113 | Hobson (1965), 63, 357.
114 | Austin (2010), 10; Duignan and Gann (1969b), 102.
115 | Harris (2004), 179. 
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At a later stage of colonization, the threat of military intervention and/or legal 
punishment by the colonial administration or the chartered company was often 
sufficient to acquire land through dispossession.116 At the same time, the gov-
ernance of land was shaped by commercial interests; concerns over lacking 
wage labor—in this case land dispossession together with taxation provided a 
mechanism to force Africans to work in the mines and plantations of colonial 
governments and corporations;117 and the fiscal needs of the “colonial treasury.” 
Moreover, governance depended on how the respective colony was framed 
by the colonizer, namely whether it was deemed a “settler,” “plantation,” or 
“peasant” colony.118 The framing was based on the utility of the soils and infra-
structure for primary export production, and had significant consequences in 
view of the support that home country agents were receiving from the colonial 
government.119 In the case of (British) Ghana, a “peasant” colony, British farmers 
were, for instance, allowed to get involved in cocoa production. However, they 
did not succeed in the competition with African producers.120 A key factor for 
their failure was that these farmers did not receive the biased support from the 
colonial administration that British subjects were experiencing in “semi-set-
tler” colonies such as Kenya and Southern Africa. Instead, the colonial govern-
ment preferred to “rel[y] on the efforts of African small capitalists and peasants 
in growing and local marketing of export crops” for accommodating commer-
cial projects and generating state revenues. This strategy proved very profit-
able, “yielding a 20-fold rise of foreign trade (measured in real value) between 
1897 and 1960.”121 Another example is the case of Nigeria, also a “peasant” 
colony. Between 1906 and 1925, the colonial government turned down the 
advances of the soap manufacturer H.W. Lever (whose manufacturing com-
panies today form part of the Unilever Corporation122) who asked permission 
to develop large oil palm plantations.123 As a consequence, “African producers 
literally delivered the goods [...] through land-extensive methods well adapted 
to the factor endowment,” resulting in the “continued African occupation of 
virtually all agricultural land.”124 However, these examples do not mean that 
116 | Harris (2004), 179. 
117 | Austin (2010), 9.
118 | Austin (2010), 9, 13.
119 | Austin (2010), 9, 13.
120 | Austin (2010), 8.
121 | Austin (2010), 9.
122 | Unilever (http://www.unilever.co.uk/aboutus/ourhistory/).
123 | Austin (2010), 9.
124 | These choices by colonial governments were largely a function of giving in to the 
resilience of “African production for the market” and/or resistance, and not outcomes 
of a greater strategy for colonial development. Austin (2010), 9, 13.
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these farmers were free to grow what they wanted in the way they wanted. 
Instead, “the colonial administration completely discouraged the cultivation 
of food crops while encouraging cash crops production.”125 As a result of this 
economic policy, existing economic systems that ensured the food self-suffi-
ciency of families were destroyed, resulting in rural households’ starvation.126
More broadly, in the agricultural sector, three business models prevailed 
that are still popular today: plantations, contract farming,127 and commercial 
farming.128 In most colonies, preferential treatment was given to foreign-owned 
plantations, or farms owned by European emigrants.129 Plantations reflected 
European visions of establishing an export economy in the colonies. However, 
in practice, this production and governance model often struggled for economic 
viability, and it never became the most common mode of production or land 
use on the African continent.130 Until today, this model and related gover-
nance schemes are known for their detrimental social impacts in the form of 
slavery and indentured labor, violent expropriation, undervalued compensa-
tion for land; as well as their land-extensive and capital-intensive nature. In 
practice, plantations depended strongly on colonial administration to govern 
the economy and territory in a way that defeated the competition from African 
smallholder producers or facilitated the forced labor supply to meet their labor 
demands.131 Usually, plantations were set up close to ports by settlers or cor-
porations (like Del Monte, Firestone); and they had the widest application in 
settler colonies such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.132 In the case of 
settlers’ commercial farms, the other business model characteristic of the late 
19th/early 20th century on the continent, the colonial administration allocated 
specific land areas to settlers.133 In contrast to plantations, with their focus on 
monoculture and their operation by multinational corporations, these farms 
tend(ed) to be less integrated in the world economy, to plant multiple crops, and 
to raise livestock.134 
125 | Shokpeka and Nwaokocha (2009), 57.
126 | Shokpeka and Nwaokocha (2009), 57.
127 | This form has been promoted as a way to integrate small-scale farmers in the 
plantation economy by turning them into suppliers to estate structures. See Smalley 
(2013), 11.
128 | Smalley (2013).
129 | Smalley (2013), 3.
130 | Smalley (2013), 21.
131 | Smalley (2013), 9.
132 | Smalley (2013), 21, 9.
133 | Smalley (2013), 11.
134 | Smalley (2013), 11.
Chapter 3: Historical Perspectives on Overseas Land Acquisit ions in the South 99
The descriptions above highlight two things about the colonial adminis-
tration of land: colonial land governance did not necessarily displace African 
producers in every case; however, colonial administration used other means of 
control, such as economic policies, to steer what was being produced and it also 
used biased agricultural marketing methods that treated European producers 
with partiality.135 These subtleties have to be kept in mind when assessing con-
temporary land-consuming FDI projects. At the same time, land governance 
depended strongly on the respective administration’s perception of local reali-
ties—from the framing of a colony as peasant, settler, or plantation colony, to 
the establishing of land markets for African land-owners. Moreover, land gover-
nance changed with time. Kenya is a case in point. Colonial administration had 
prevented “the emergence of land markets in areas controlled by Africans.”136 
However, much later, in the post-WWII period and more than a decade prior 
to Kenya gaining independence (in 1962), there were controlled cases of land 
registration “in response to the de facto emergence of land sales and individual 
proprietorship.”137 An important reason was that the colonial government saw 
this as a way to strengthen its control by empowering conservative African 
land-owners.138 More broadly, historical records show that public colonial 
spending “was concentrated on a combination of administration, defense, and 
infrastructure,” and governed to both “promote expansion of primary export 
industry” and service debt.139 Hardly any of the state budget was made available 
for social investments in schools, hospitals, pension, or other welfare areas of 
state action that were rapidly expanding in Europe at the time.140 
While the governance of lands and colonies focused strongly on favoring 
Europeans and installing a primary export industry, it would be wrong to think 
of actors and institutions in the target regions as passive objects in this process. 
In practice, their responses lay somewhere between the two poles: strategized 
cooperation as a means to exert their own influence on the ground and resis-
tance.141 Consequently, the particular response on the ground, together with 
135 | Austin (2010), 12.
136 | Austin (2010), 12-13.
137 | Austin (2010), 12-13.
138 | Austin (2010), 12-13.
139 | Gardner (2012), 36-40.
140 | Gardner (2012), 34, 234.
141 | For instance, anglicized Africans in Nigeria “possess[ed] a sense of the British 
‘imperial mission’” from their religious point of view; while some traders in Senegal 
hoped to protect their trade against competitors under French rule. In some cases, “[l]
iterate Africans looked for promotion in the local public services.” At the same time, 
some groups of the African aristocracy, whose cooperation imperial control depended 
on, established a kind of ‘sub-imperialism,’ securing and even expanding their influence 
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the political institutions in place in African regions, which ranged “from state-
less societies [...] to city states and extensive kingdoms” with monarchies,142 
partly shaped the interaction between European and African actors.143 
From a home country perspective, the Scramble involved a wide range 
of actors and institutions, such as state officials, adventurers, missionaries, 
and entrepreneurs, but also landed elites and bankers. Moreover, it relied on 
important institutions that emerged during that time of great power compe-
tition, including the forms of international law mentioned above,144 commer-
cial treaty standards,145 and/or principles of the international economic system, 
particularly the Most Favored Nation principle. A particularly prominent insti-
tution of that time, which could be traced back to the 16th century, was the 
chartered company with its “dual roles of entrepreneur and representative” of 
the respective home government.146 It allowed merchants to pool resources in 
order to invest and trade overseas, sometimes to the extent of administering 
the colonies as proxies of the home country state politically, economically, and 
over and control of the territory and the population within the colonial framework (e.g., 
Lozi in Gambia, Ganda in Uganda). See Duignan and Gann (1969a), 4, 13, 16; Duignan 
and Gann (1969b), 109, 122; and Boamah (2014).
142 | Duignan and Gann (1969a), 11.
143 | Austin (2010), 15. Also see Halperin (2005).
144 | Anghie (2006, 739-742) describes the “evolution of international law from the 
16th century” as a discipline of European origin, “consist[ing] of a series of doctrines 
and principles that were developed in Europe, that emerged out of European history and 
experience, and that were extended to the non-European world which existed outside 
the realm of European international law.” Accordingly, law was an institutional mecha-
nism in facilitating imperial expansion, but it was at the same time shaped by it, with 
colonialism being “central to its formation,” and thus making it “universal.” Key for 
this process of international law facilitating and legitimizing colonial enterprises was 
the “dynamic of dif ference.” The assumed universality of the norms and principles of 
international law “posit[ed] a gap, a dif ference between European and non-European 
cultures and peoples.” That gap then needed closing, and this legitimated the framings 
of imperialism as a “civilizing mission.” To a cer tain degree, this was reflected also in 
“an aggressive variety of imperial philanthropy,” that tried to “help [...] the unbelievers 
in the African bush.” Also see Duignan and Gann (1969a), 9, 6-7.
145 | The incorporation of commercial treaty standards on the protection of alien 
property and the obligation of full compensation in case of expropriation into inter-
national law in the 19th century reduced the risk for internationally operating firms. 
As a result of property standards, “[u]ncompensated seizure [of alien property] was 
considered robbery, and the use of unilateral force was considered a legal and legiti-
mate response.” See Jones (2005a), 24-25.
146 | Moss et al. (2004), 6.
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by means of military force. Usually, these companies were given a contract by 
the home country government, which in return expected to profit from the 
annual revenues in the form of royalties or intensified trade (exports), and/or 
hoped to maintain or gain a favorable positional status at the international level 
at relatively low cost.147 
Institutionally, colonial undertakings also profited from the internation-
alization of the banking sector.148 The British government, for instance, sup-
ported overseas investments and colonial administrations through loans and 
public spending in the form of grants-in-aid. These financial schemes needed 
the approval of the British Treasury, the main guarantor in most cases, which 
provided the colonies with lower interest rates.149 Loans were granted in cases 
where the local colonial state revenue did not manage to cover the expenditures, 
even though the stated goal was for colonial governments to become self-suf-
ficient and produce balanced budgets in the medium term.150 While the col-
onized had to pay for their own subjugation, in practice, the case of Britain 
highlights that few colonies became financially independent.151 Repeatedly, the 
already volatile financial situation of the colonies deteriorated with slowdowns 
in world trade and/or falls in commodity prices.152 As a result, the colonial gov-
ernments tried to build up financial reserves for these incidents of revenue 
declines through export trade, and they cut down on the size of their adminis-
trations to reduce costs. The interrelation of colonial governance and financial 
administration has been highlighted by Gardner, who argues that the British 
approach to “indirect rule” was less the outcome of an ideological choice than 
of financial constraints in view of limited revenues available to the colonial state 
in spite of their violent collection from the colonized in the process of conquest 
and colonization (e.g., taxes).153 
With time, the support of home country governments for capital exports 
changed, as did the approach to colonial administration. While the govern-
ments had originally framed capital exports as beneficial (at least to a certain 
degree), suggesting them as a way to expedite the import of food and raw mate-
147 | Duignan and Gann (1969a), 17.
148 | Jones (2005a), 25.
149 | Gardner (2012), 40-41.
150 | Gardner (2012), 37-40.
151 | Gardner (2012), 32. It is important to note, however, that India, the largest and 
most important colony of the British empire, appears to have been financially profitable 
for Great Britain, which kept “draining Indian revenues to pay for an expensive bureau-
cracy (including in London) and an army beyond India‘s own defence needs” and to meet 
other financial interests in London. See, for instance, Kaul (3 March 2011).
152 | Gardner (2012), 6.
153 | Gardner (2012), 5-6.
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rials, to promote exports and thus create jobs, and to ensure an annual state 
income in the form of commission fees and remittances, this “laissez-faire” 
attitude changed during World War I.154 Even the British government began to 
fear that outward investments could have negative repercussions on the foreign 
exchange position of the motherland and pressure the internal capital markets. 
This resulted in tighter regulation designed to ensure the availability of capital 
for domestic development or the development of the colonies.155 
In conclusion, the material presented above begs the question of utility, i.e. 
was the violent colonization of, and imperial expansion into African, but also 
Asian and Latin American lands, actually rewarded with the finding of an “El 
Dorado?” Historical evidence suggests that outcomes were complex, and not 
necessarily a success story. Contrary to the claims that outward investments 
would increase exports, create jobs, secure resources, and provide a stable 
source of annual state revenues in the form of commissions from issuing loans 
or remittances on profits, in practice, the impact was less obvious.156 Particu-
larly regarding the colonization of tropical Africa, the effects of overseas trade, 
migration, and investment were ambiguous, and “capital exports to colonies 
were important, but not dominant” for economic development back home.157 
For instance, it remains unclear whether overseas investment in the primary 
resource sector in the colonies or (in the case of Britain) the Empire was even 
necessary from the home country perspective. Europe was resource abundant 
with regard to major energy sources (coal), “and nearly self-sufficient in iron 
ore and other minerals.”158 Only industrial crops such as cotton constituted an 
important commodity, and they were largely supplied to European countries 
by the United States. Also, the acquired colonial territories that supposedly 
served as outlets for European capital and trade accounted for less than 15% of 
European countries’ exports.159 At the same time, there is an ongoing debate 
over the extent to which colonial tax and trade revenues from major colonies 
(e.g., India in the case of Britain) constituted vital inputs for the home country’s 
154 | Atkin (1970), 324-328 
155 | Atkin (1970), 324-328.
156 | Colonial India, which is not covered in this chapter, seems to be an exception in 
this regard. Historical research suggests that it might have played an important role in 
British development and expansion. For instance, colonial tax and opium trade revenues 
were used to service the debt and facilitate the fur ther expansion and maintenance of 
the British empire; and the colonization of India brought prestige to Great Britain. See 
Cain and Hopkins (1987); and Deming (2011).
157 | Daudin et al. (2010), 17.
158 | Daudin et al. (2010), 17.
159 | Daudin et al. (2010), 17.
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development and imperial expansion.160 While Cain and Hopkins have shown 
that colonization was a relevant factor, subsequent historical research under-
lines that the benefits are not straightforward.161
These basic colonial trade and investment figures, however, raise doubts 
about the usefulness of many of these undertakings from the home country 
perspective, particularly regarding resource security. They also highlight that 
other interests, be they commercial or geopolitical in nature, were equally 
relevant. At the same time, the project details emphasize that capital exports 
were not necessarily profitable. In fact, the “tropical treasure house myth”162 
that underpinned and legitimized colonial expansion in the home countries 
neither reflected the reality of mining projects nor that of agricultural projects. 
Instead, many enterprises, such as the chartered companies, turned out to be 
highly unprofitable, leading to their ultimate failure—in spite of the monop-
olistic concessions and coercive means at their disposal. Prominent cases in 
point were the British South Africa Company in Southern Rhodesia, as well 
as French activities in Equatorial Africa.163 To attract foreign capital, these 
companies facilitated the “granting of large scale territorial concessions on 
easy terms” to foreign investors.164 Since their business model relied heavily 
on foreign funding, these concessionary companies faced the problem that 
their “grantees usually failed to invest sufficient funds or to do much serious 
development work.”165 The shareholders often did not profit either. The British 
South Africa Company, for instance, which was active in mining, landholding, 
and railway construction, and was basically a chartered company constructed 
on the example of the infamous British East India Company,166 “never paid a 
single penny to its shareholders and was generally unprofitable” (between 1890 
and 1923).167 
Contrary to the rhetoric of progress and efficiency, it also turned out that 
insufficient ‘on the ground’ knowledge and shortages of labor “did not make for 
efficient agriculture.”168 In the African colonies, European farming enterprises 
faced the same challenges as local farmers, namely “plant disease, floods, 
droughts and sickness,” as well as poorly developed communication and trans-
160 | Cain and Hopkins (1987). See, also, footnote 376.
161 | E.g., Cain and Hopkins (1987); Gardner (2012); Dumett (1999).
162 | Duignan and Gann (1969a), 10.
163 | Duignan and Gann (1969a), 20.
164 | Duignan and Gann (1969a), 20.
165 | Duignan and Gann (1969a), 20.
166 | Regarding the East India Company, see for instance Britannica.com (http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/176643/East-India-Company).
167 | Duignan and Gann (1969b), 102. 
168 | Pearce (1984), 90.
Land Grabbing and Home Countr y Development104
port routes, which made their projects relatively expensive and economically 
unviable.169 At the same time, imported animals and plants often did not suit 
the climate, and the European farmers also “had to cope with the unfamiliar 
properties of African soils”—a fact that seems as pertinent today as it was back 
then. Often, this unfamiliarity with local conditions resulted in detrimental 
impacts in the form of declining soil fertility and rising soil degradation.170 
Even ventures in the mining sector (e.g., diamond and gold) that generated 
returns, nourished the public imagination on colonialism and imperialism, 
and came closest to the “concept of colonial super-profits” were encountering 
difficulties, and “large dividends in some mines were balanced by low profits 
or losses in others.”171
Regarding job creation, it is impossible to clearly judge the impact of these 
undertakings. On the one hand, empirical evidence suggests an inverse relation 
between overseas investments and jobs available in the home countries.172 On 
the other hand, the overseas territories, particularly those in the New World, 
created (even if they were moderate in most cases) some outlets for surplus 
production, capital, and labor. Cottrell argues that this allowed the ruling elite 
to uphold regime stability by opening new sources of profit to landed elites back 
home while offering avenues for social mobility through a military career or 
migration. Moreover, Daudin et al. highlight that “[m]igration was the dimen-
sion of globalization that had the greatest impact on European workers’ living 
standards during this period” through its prompting of real wage rises in 
poor economies back home and provision of a way to bypass or leave behind 
domestic barriers.173 In this latter sense, it provided an option to earn a higher 
income and/or evade religious or political oppression or persecution in the 
home countries.174 In most cases, European migrants came from rural popula-
tions, but increasingly they also came from cities and industrial (i.e. deskilled, 
unschooled worker) backgrounds.175 
At the same time, these very same elements that sustained stability also 
prevented domestic reform processes. Politically, the old elites were able to 
169 | Duignan and Gann (1969b), 102.
170 | Duignan and Gann (1969b), 102; also see Kotschi and AGRECOL (2013); Gold-
smith (1993), 2. 
171 | Duignan and Gann (1969b), 108.
172 | Cottrell (1975), 53.
173 | Daudin et al. (2010), 21-23.
174 | Daudin et al. (2010), 21-23. See, for instance, the case of European migrant 
farmers in Argentina, Solberg (1974), 127; and Solimano and Watts (2005) for an 
overview of migration flows during the late 19th century. 
175 | See, for instance, the description of the political economy of core countries by 
Halperin (2005); and Solimano and Watts (2005), 16.
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secure their positional status, while economically, many overseas investments 
turned out to be harmful due to their wasteful and fraudulent quality176 or the 
fact that their focus on primary resources abroad led to the neglect of domestic 
agricultural production back home.177 More broadly, capital exports resulted 
in the stagnation of domestic industry productivity and export growth since 
“the bulk of the savings generated in the non-industrial sectors of the economy 
had been directed not into industry but into [...] secure investments” such as 
“government stocks, [...] agricultural mortgages, or after 1840, the railways.”178 
Moreover, from 1880 onwards until 1914, the marginal returns of Britain’s 
colonial investments were below those from (less risky) investments in industry 
back home. However, when taking a broader view of what the benefits might 
have been for the home country, research suggests that overseas investment 
facilitated an elite strata continuation at a time of economic transformation 
back home. Tax and trade revenues of key colonies also seem to have mitigated 
financial volatility and serviced debt in the British Empire.179 This underlines 
the importance of looking at the nuances and the political economy of the home 
country’s colonial undertakings for a meaningful understanding of how and 
why overseas investments occur when assessing contemporary acquisitions, 
rather than adopting the investor’s framing or the rhetoric of efficiency and 
profit.
From the viewpoint of the colonies and/or the countries in the South that 
received FDI and other capital flows, these foreign funds were part of very 
violent processes of dispossession, suppression, and acquisition. Economically, 
they proved harmful for the host countries, because they destroyed local socio-
economic institutions180 and were mostly “unable to establish [...] a cumula-
tive growth dynamic.”181 In particular, “speculative capital flows were [...] likely 
to become a destabilizing element,” resulting in “deflationary pressures, debt 
crisis, reduction[s] in [capital] imports.”182 As a result, non-colonies also grew 
increasingly dependent on the orders of their European lenders, namely banks 
and governments, which cooperated with industry in this context to further 
joint interests at the cost of the borrowing countries.183 The imported funds 
176 | Cottrell (1975), 47.
177 | See Potter (2002), 124.
178 | Cain and Hopkins (1987), 4. Regarding the explanation of major investment 
trends during 1855-1914, see Cottrell (1975), 35.
179 | Cain and Hopkins (1987); Deming (2011).
180 | Shokpeka and Nwaokocha (2009); Davis (2002).
181 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 25.
182 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 25.
183 | Argentina is a case in point: following a crisis of “excess borrowing” in 1890, 
the State had to fulfill the “dictates of the international banks that imposed severe 
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extended the asymmetric export-import trading relationship, establishing a 
specialized economic structure that was not conducive to the debtor countries’ 
economic development in the medium term, yet very difficult to overcome.184
The forming of an uneven development geography, which was character-
istic of the Scramble, often went along with environmental degradation due 
to the concentration of land ownership and control. This concentration led to 
overcrowding and the use of less valuable land by dispossessed and/or relocated 
rural populations, and exceeding domestic biocapacity became a problem due 
to the focus on primary exports.185 While “[d]e-industrialisation in colonies and 
developing countries predated the era of global integration,” the process was 
“accelerated, during much of the period of global integration.”186 This process 
is evidenced by the low share of imperial borrowing in manufacturing:187 
between 1860 and 1913, “the developing country share of world manufacturing 
production declined from over one-third to under a tenth,” a fact that has been 
closely linked to the dramatic rise of imports of European manufactured goods 
in the South.188
On the individual level, a large share of the local population, particularly in 
Africa, Latin America, and Asia did not benefit from these forms of “coercive 
development.”189 Instead, populations were evicted from their lands and then 
confronted with hunger and starvation190 while concurrently being framed by 
colonial administrations as cheap “labour reservoir[s].”191 Even farmers who 
produced for multinational corporations through new forms of outgrower 
schemes did not profit from integration of the agricultural sector in the inter-
national markets. To the contrary, they were confronted with dramatic declines 
in agricultural prices, had to bear all the risks such as currency fluctuations 
financial conditions on both the national and the provincial governments in order to 
guarantee that they would recoup their loans and to assure the profitability of allied 
enterprises, such as British railways firms.” At the same time, European banks turned 
the crisis into an opportunity, buying up Argentinean enterprises from the private and 
public sector and thereby fur thering their economic position within the Argentinean 
economy. Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 25.
184 | Cottrell (1975), 41.
185 | Compare Andersson and Lindroth (2001); and Clover and Eriksen (2009).
186 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 16.
187 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 16.
188 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 16.
189 | See Bessant (1992), 39-50.
190 | Davis (2002).
191 | Bessant (1992).
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and weather events, and lacked any political privileges under colonial admin-
istration.192
In retrospect, the legacy of the three-tier world that emerged during this era 
is still felt today. Its three tiers were, firstly, the “small group of rapidly indus-
trializing economies” that is seen as having most profited from the interna-
tional capital dynamics, while also playing the central role in the emergence of 
economic standards (gold standard); secondly, the few settler countries which 
managed to profit from primary resource exports and, over time, to begin to 
industrialize; and, thirdly, the large group of countries that “shared a tenuous 
position in the new international division of labour,” and did not manage to 
industrialize sustainably, or—in the case of the colonies—were discouraged or 
even prevented from doing so.193
5. decoLoniz aTion and GLobaLiz aTion
For the assessment of the novel character of contemporary “land grabs” (or, in 
the terminology of this book: land-consuming investments), it is important to 
account for international structures as well as domestic developments in the 
home and host countries in the post-WWII period. The underpinning question 
is whether fundamental changes in agencies, structures, and ideologies are 
observable in the context of foreign land acquisitions after decolonization. 
Regarding the situation in recipient and home countries, decolonization 
has not led to a radical break with colonial economic structures, ideas, policies, 
or legislation in the form of a zero hour: 
Many of the ideas, policies, and priorities of postcolonial development can trace their 
genealogies to the colonial era, where they were shaped through metropolitan concerns 
to maintain and modernise colonies, and through contact with the local people, knowl-
edge, and conditions.194 
Instead, most African countries show a mix of path-dependent195, as well as 
new, elements in areas relevant to land-consuming OFDI. As of 2016, it seems 
to be a combination of colonial-state legacy (state as nominal land rights 
192 | See Hobson (1965), 113-116; Smalley (2013), 18, 30-52; and Clapp (1988).
193 | Bairoch and Kozul-Wright (1996), 19.
194 | Craggs (2014), 9.
195 | Path dependency is an analytical concept of social sciences. It basically assumes 
that history matters when trying to understand contemporary institutional develop-
ments, collective action, power asymmetries, and perceptions. See, for instance, the 
work of North (1990).
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holder), the persistence of modernization ideas informing domestic and inter-
national development programs,196 and the postcolonial history of Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs)197 that lays the institutional, ideological, and legal 
ground for these investments to take place. 
A closer look at natural resource governance also shows that many coun-
tries’ governments (North and South) have moved away from “state-led large-
scale development” conceptions and the related “interventionist development 
policies” that were characteristic of colonial policies in the 1930s and con-
tinued for a certain period of time post-independence.198 Today, many govern-
ments have adopted a neoclassical outlook on development characterized by 
the preference of private ownership of means of production, the promotion of 
minimum state intervention in sectoral governance, the assumption of rational 
actors, and the reduction of socioeconomic development to issues of efficiency 
and productivity.199 
Consequently, many countries’ national development plans put an emphasis 
on foreign capital attraction and liberalization, and reflect an ideology of devel-
opment as a process of unlimited growth rather than a zero-sum process of 
resource allocation that was characteristic of rival systems and orders 200 in the 
196 | Craggs (2014), 5-9. This particularly applies to large-scale agricultural invest-
ment projects by multilateral or bilateral development programs that focus on infra-
structure, yield, and productivity improvement.
197 | See Chang (2003) for a detailed discussion of the track record of these policies 
in the form of an under-provision of public goods and services, or the failure to live up to 
their own standards (e.g., declining rather than rising growth levels during the 1990s). 
In practice, related development strategies resulted in a drop in public investment in 
the agricultural sector, the preference of private sector investment, and/or the liber-
alization of the primary sector. The country data on public expenditure on agriculture 
from 1980 to 2007 highlights that the total amount, as well as the share of agriculture 
in African governments’ expenditures, dropped significantly from 1980 to 2007 (FAO 
(2012a), 4, 134-135).
198 | In fact, the plantation project that Unilever Ghana invested in during the 1990s is 
a perfect example of a formerly aid-funded, state-led, large-scale plantation program. 
Following the divestiture program in the 1990s, Unilever exploited this opportunity by 
buying the shares of this plantation on the Stock Market.
199 | Thomas (1994), 75-77; Kotz (2002), 64-66. For a critical discussion of main-
stream economic theories that the neoclassical outlook on development is part of, see 
the publications by the heterodox economists Lavoie (2014, 1-30) and Cohn (2003). 
200 | NIEO, short for New International Economic Order, was promoted during the 
1970s, following decolonization. It aimed to replace the post-colonial order and estab-
lish an order that would be “based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, 
common interest, and cooperation among all States.” See NIEO Declaration (1974), 1.
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past.201 In the governance of FDI, the ideological contestation of foreign invest-
ment by the recipient governments, which characterized the years during col-
onization and after decolonization, has largely disappeared.202 Most countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa have adopted a very liberal legal framework (as of 2010) 
that allows close to full foreign equity ownership in the agricultural, mining, 
or forestry sectors: “whereas countries used to list those specific sectors open 
to foreigner investment, the norm is now to assume a legally open regime 
with restricted sectors listed as exceptions” (see Table 3-3).203 Moreover, several 
African governments have created investment promotion agencies and intro-
duced favorable policies to attract investors, in the form of long lease terms, tax 
exemptions, and the promise of low labor costs.204
The trend towards deregulation and economic liberalization since the 1980s 
has increased the discretionary power of the private sector vis-à-vis the state. 
Regarding host countries, multinational companies have profited from the fact 
that “regional blocs and countries compete against each other for investments 
[...] by offering them best investment and climate conditions.”205 In addition, 
existing national and international laws are “not precise enough to account for 
diffused responsibility in multinational corporations between local subsidiaries 
and headquarters,” enabling, for instance, practices of trade mispricing and tax 
evasion, both of which reflect and further reduce the decreased control and 
benefits available to state authorities. However, this tendency is not limited to 
the realm of host countries. The economic importance of multinational compa-
nies for job creation, supply sourcing, and trading activities has also expanded 
their power in negotiations with state authorities in home countries.206
201 | Informal interview with staff from the WB Inspection Panel, November 2011.
202 | Moss et al. (2004), 1.
203 | Moss et al. (2004), 3.
204 | Moss et al. (2004), 3. Also see Chapters 4 and 6.
205 | Kumar and Graf (1998), 133.
206 | Kumar and Graf (1998), 133.
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207
207 | This table shows statutory restrictions on foreign ownership of equity in new 
investment projects (greenfield FDI) and on the acquisition of shares in existing compa-
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At the same time, foreign land-consuming FDI continues to face other 
administrative barriers, such as limits “on the amount of equity owned by 
non-resident foreigners,”208 or political interventions in the economies.209 
Importantly, public actors and interventions (in the form of state-owned enter-
prises and/or public approval processes) remain a key characteristic in many 
host economies characterized by high inequality.210 While post-independence 
land reforms aimed to achieve greater equality through land redistribution, 
these have not overcome the legacy of the colonial period in the form of the 
concentration of land ownership and socioeconomic marginalization.211 This 
means that “land grabbing” in SSA occurs in countries with a land crisis and a 
political economy characterized by highly unequal ownership structures, high 
socioeconomic inequality, and discriminatory legislation.212
A coexistence of novel and path-dependent elements also characterizes the 
international level. Core principles of imperial law, namely the most favored 
nation norm and the non-discrimination principle, have become key pillars 
of the post-WWII trade governance and legal structures that also govern FDI 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), then WTO).213 At the same 
time, the institutional framework regulating FDI in general, and agriculture in 
particular, has changed—due to the extension of liberal principles and frames 
to this activity and sector. Under the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), 
for instance, the approach towards agriculture has shifted from the notion of 
agriculture to agribusiness.214 
In the home countries, many governments had shifted towards restric-
tive OFDI regulations after WWII to ensure that capital would be available 
for domestic reconstruction purposes (also see Chapter 7). However, since the 
1980s, capital exports and trade activities have been deregulated again, and in 
some cases even pro-actively supported by policy makers. As a result of these 
nies (mergers and acquisitions). One hundred equals full foreign equity ownership. The 
table is from the online database of the WB (2010) report (http://iab.worldbank.org/
Data/Explore%20Topics/Investing-across-sectors).
208 | Moss et al. (2004), 9.
209 | Moss et al. (2004), 9.
210 | WB (2010); and Moss et al. (2004).
211 | Home (2012), 19.
212 | For a discussion of land reform problems, see Home (2012); and Borras and 
McKinley (2006).
213 | See collection of clauses in GAT T and WTO in the database of the Japanese 
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/
gCT9901e.html). Also see Anghie (2007) on the role of imperialism in realizing the 
universality of international law.
214 | Weis (2007). 
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processes of economic liberalization and deregulation, which have occurred 
almost worldwide since the 1990s, the most recent decades have often been 
characterized by an increasing corporate concentration, intra-firm division of 
labor, and market internationalization by TNCs, particularly in the food and 
energy sectors.215 Against this background, Clapp and Fuchs have stressed the 
significant structural and discursive power of contemporary TNCs relative to 
the state and civil society.216 Others, such as Murphy, have pointed to the impor-
tance of nation-states and governments in this process of private sector expan-
sion.217 From a historical perspective, it has become clear that these two seem-
ingly contradictory observations might as well be complementary phenomena. 
At the same time, it seems that what is at least partly fueling the contemporary 
debate on “land grabbing” is the discontent with the social, economic, political, 
and ecological repercussions of this development trajectory, combined with a 
fundamental concern about how the state will be able to deliver core welfare 
functions in the future, considering the rapidly progressing privatization of 
access to, and governance of land and its multiple functions. 
6. concLusion
The review presented above outlined particular mechanisms that could be 
labeled as imperialist “best practices,” such as the exertion of diplomatic 
pressure, use of military force, facilitation through legal instruments and 
corporate actors, or the provision of financial support by the state. Together, 
they showcase the strong role that was taken by the public sector in facilitating 
private sector expansion. Public actors promoted overseas investments, stating 
that these operations would provide the home country with revenues, jobs, and 
access to markets. Moreover, overseas investments were defined from a mer-
cantilist viewpoint as a means to improve the home country’s positional status 
in the system of states. Obviously, multiple imperialisms were at play; they 
were made unique by their particular country settings, actor constellations, 
and specific motivations.
References to (neo)colonialism and imperialism in contemporary expla-
nations of “land grabs” since 2000 do not often match this diverse historical 
evidence on colonialism and imperialism; nor are they particularly mean-
ingful. Rather than being solely about land, natural resources, or labor, colonial 
and imperial expansion was driven by a multitude of factors, including the 
protection of commercial interests; personal desire to achieve “self-aggrandize-
215 | See Clapp and Fuchs (2009); and Goldthau and Witte (2010).
216 | Clapp and Fuchs (2009).
217 | Dunning and Narula (1996); and Murphy (1994).
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ment;” state desire to expand political influence as part of the European power 
game; or other events that resonated in the home countries, such as the Long 
Depression and processes of economic restructuring. Thus, both economic and 
non-economic aspects mattered, and “grabbed” land was important as natural 
resource, as well as territory, market space, strategic hub, or place of settlement. 
The review also emphasizes the importance of accounting for the subtle 
changes that have occurred in political agendas, actor constellations, and cor-
porate and resource governance post-World War II. Processes of economic lib-
eralization and deregulation have yielded corporate concentration, intra-firm 
division of labor, and market internationalization by TNCs. Moreover, economic 
liberalization and deregulation has increased the discretionary power of cor-
porate actors vis-à-vis the state. At the same time, governments in the host 
and home countries seem to embrace land-consuming overseas investments 
from the private sector and/or development agencies as a way to realize specific 
development agendas, even in sectors such as agriculture, where foreign access 
and ownership had been restricted in the past (also see Chapter 4-8).218 
Importantly, the official support for land-consuming FDI raises questions 
about the accuracy of references to imperialism and (neo)colonialism in the lit-
erature and media, particularly in those cases where land-consuming OFDI is 
proactively sought after by the host countries. Do these concepts help to further 
our analysis and empirical understanding of what is happening in a partic-
ular “land grab” context, or to find effective ways to address the phenomenon? 
To highlight this problem, take, for example, the Oakland Institute’s defini-
tion of “land grabbing” as “a neo-colonialism concept that has arisen in the 
midst of a severe food and economic crisis in the world in 2008.”219 Accord-
ingly, it describes the “purchase of vast tracts of land by wealthier food-insecure 
nations and private investors from mostly poor, developing countries in order 
to produce crop for export.”220 
An article in the Somaliland Press rightly notes that such a “description 
is based on the assumption that the term of neo-colonialism is defined as a 
system that has been invented in place of colonialism, as a main instrument 
of oppression.”221 Accordingly, “the essence of neo-colonialism is that the state 
which is subjected to it, at least in theory, is an independent and has all outward 
features of international sovereignty [...]. However, in reality both its economic 
system and political policy are directed from outside.”222 Such references to 
(neo)colonialist traits of Chinese and British land-consuming OFDI have been 
218 | See, for instance, Lavers (2011).
219 | Somaliland Press (19 May 2013).
220 | Somaliland Press (19 May 2013).
221 | Somaliland Press (19 May 2013). 
222 | Somaliland Press (19 May 2013). 
Land Grabbing and Home Countr y Development114
popular in the media. The National Post, for instance, writes the following 
about recent Chinese investment negotiations in the Ukraine: 
Ukraine has agreed a deal with a Chinese company to lease 5% of its land to feed 
China’s burgeoning population, it was reported on Tuesday. 
It would be the biggest so called “land grab” agreement, where one country leases or 
sells land to another, in a trend that has been compared with the 19th century “scramble 
for Africa”, but which is now spreading to eastern Europe.
Under the 50-year plan, China would eventually control 7.5 million acres, an area equiv-
alent to the size of Belgium or Massachusetts, which represents 9% of Ukraine’s arable 
land.
Initially 250.000 acres would be leased. The farmland in the eastern Dnipropetrovsk 
region would be cultivated principally for growing crops and raising pigs. The produce 
would be sold at preferential prices to Chinese state-owned conglomerates, said the 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corp (XPCC), a quasi-military organisation also 
known as Bingtuan.
But KSG Agro denied reports that it had sold land to the Chinese, saying it had reached 
agreement for the Chinese only to modernize 7,500 acres and “may in the future gradu-
ally expand to cover more areas”.
Any sort of “land-grab” deal can be sensitive politically. Madagascar was forced to 
scrap a plan to lease 2.5 million acres to South Korea in 2009 after protests against 
“neo-colonialism”. The Philippines has also blocked a China deal.
“This reminds us of a colonial process even when there is no colonial link between the 
two countries involved,” said Christina Plank, the co-author of a report by the Transna-
tional Institute on “land-grabbing”.223
However, this news article highlights two problems that apply to most descrip-
tions of “land grabbing” as (neo)colonial. First, it seems that the concept of 
(neo)colonialism is used to weave a seemingly clear and coherent “land grab” 
story, rather than contribute to better data and an actual understanding of 
what is going on—in Ukraine, in China, or elsewhere. Second, as highlighted 
before, it remains unclear under what conditions such an investment transac-
tion between two unequal partners would not be considered “land grabbing,” 
nor qualify as a (neo)colonial relationship.
223 | Spillius (25 September 2013).
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Concerning the subsequent assessment of Chinese and British land-con-
suming OFDI in SSA, all of the above stresses the need to generate rich empir-
ical data and to account for the mix of structural and individual, strategic and 
contingent dynamics at work. At the same time, the case findings of this book 
suggest that contemporary references to imperialism and (neo)colonialism do 
not adequately capture the diversity of agency and political economies. In par-
ticular, these references seem to exaggerate the purposeful agency and stra-
tegic mastermind qualities of home countries, and to underestimate the agency 
of host countries regarding “land grabs.”

Chapter 4: Chinese Investments in Africa 
“Create Infinity, Benefit Mankind”
The Chinese government encourages and supports 
Chinese enterprises with strength and good reputation 
to expand their investment in Africa, and has adopted 
necessary measures to guide them in this respect. The 
result is satisfactory.1
(State Council 2010)
1. inTroducTion
The Yuan Long Ping High-Tech Agriculture Company, a seed company 
which is named after the “father of hybrid rice” and involved in investments 
in Africa, describes its managerial approach with the slogan “Create infinity, 
benefit mankind.”2 The company associates three aspects with this motto: to 
abide by the government strategy to upgrade and improve the sector’s industry 
operations; to push ecological limits through technological innovation; and 
to expand business operations to profit from economies of scale. With regard 
to Chinese overseas investments in Sub-Saharan Africa, the motto seems to 
stretch beyond this originally operational context to capture major findings 
about these investments. 
This chapter represents the first part of the two-part case study on China. 
It will present the core empirical characteristics of how (and partially why) 
Chinese land-consuming investments in Sub-Saharan Africa take place, in and 
over time. It proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the history of Chinese-Af-
rican relations. These relations reach far back in time, but they have intensified 
since the 1990s. Section 3 then discusses the details of how these investments 
1 | State Council (2010).
2 | Yuan Long Ping High-Tech Agriculture Company (2014), corporate website (http://
www.lpht.com.cn/eng/company/Company.htm).
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occur. In particular, it will focus on land-consuming FDI’s sectoral composi-
tion and timelines, the role of land, the recipient context, and key actors and 
institutions. Section 4 briefly highlights the recipient context in which these 
investments occur, and Section 5 reviews the issue of Chinese labor exports 
that has attracted international attention. The chapter will conclude by sum-
marizing the key empirical findings about Chinese land-consuming FDI in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Section 6). 
Core findings underline that the empirical characteristics of Chinese 
land-consuming investments in Sub-Saharan Africa are more multifaceted 
than standard explanations acknowledge. Despite a strong focus on resources, 
and the predominance of public actors, they involve a diverse range agencies 
and interests from the private and public sectors, home and recipient coun-
tries, and multilateral agencies; and they comprise investments in multiple 
sectors, from construction and mining to farming. Many projects predate the 
2007/2008 crises, and some build on a long history of China-Africa coopera-
tion. Distinct from orthodox explanations, investments in food production only 
made up a minor share of Chinese land-consuming FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa 
until 2015, and largely produced for regional consumption. Most projects apply 
market principles and mainstream managerial economics in their operations. 
Regarding the role of land, it is used in these projects as resource as well as 
productive space.
2. bacKGround on china in africa
While China-Africa cooperation began attracting international attention rela-
tively recently, modern Chinese relations with the African continent trace back 
to the 1950s. However, China’s engagement with African countries has only 
intensified dramatically in the last two decades. In 2010, China became the 
continent’s third largest trading partner.3 Additionally, Chinese OFDI activities 
in African countries rose from USD 317.43 million in 2004 to USD 2,111.99 
million in 2010.4 In 2016, China became the largest source of FDI in Sub-Sa-
haran Africa, “totalling an investment outlay of 66.4 billion USD.”5 Moreover, 
Africa was receiving 46.7 % of all Chinese Official Development Aid (ODA) as 
of 2008, making the continent the primary focus of Chinese aid and economic 
cooperation.6 
3 | State Council (2010).
4 | Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) (2011a), 81-87. Note: Data for 2004-2006 
includes only non-financial OFDI flows.
5 | Bo (May 3, 2017).
6 | State Council (2011); and Li (2006).
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The nature of the relations between China and Africa has also changed sig-
nificantly: from the 1950s up to the 1970s they were characterized primarily by 
“unilateral economic assistance from China to Africa” to improve the “self-re-
liance” and “self-development abilities” of recipient countries, but these rela-
tions have grown more complex.7 In the 1980s, the focus shifted from unilat-
eral economic assistance in the form of aid towards “carrying out mutually 
beneficial cooperation with Africa.”8 The latter was supposed to benefit China’s 
interests as much as Africa’s (see below).9 
Increasingly, aid came to resemble economic cooperation projects with the 
medium-term objective of profitability, whereas the focus on self-reliance and 
self-development was disbanded. While the eligibility to receive aid remained 
linked to the One China principle10 of the past, at the same time, aid and 
economic cooperation became part of China’s resources and, as this chapter 
argues, expansion diplomacy, in the search for export markets, business oppor-
tunities, and allies in international politics. In an interview in 2011, Lu Shaye, 
the Director-General of the Department of African Affairs in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs from 2009-201411, describes the driver for, and nature of these 
changing relations as follows:
With China’s rapid economic development, there is a growing demand from China for 
Africa’s market and resources. China’s investment in Africa also grew rapidly. While 
taking away resources from Africa, we also give back to African countries. We helped 
African countries put in place a large number of infrastructure projects according to 
their economic development needs. It’s all about each taking what he needs.12
Along these lines, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the intensification 
of China-Africa relations has allowed China and African countries to satisfy 
their rising demand “for products and technologies from each other during 
the process of industrialization and urbanization.” Moreover, Zhong Manying, 
then-chief of the Department of Western Asian and African Affairs in the 
7 | See interview with Lu Shaye, then-Director-General of the Department of African 
Affairs, conducted by Gouraud (18 October 2011). Lu Shaye was Director-General from 
2009-2014 (http://ca.china-embassy.org/eng/dsx x/dsjl/t1442216.htm).
8 | Gouraud (18 October 2011).
9 | Gouraud (18 October 2011).
10 | The One China policy is about the rejection of Taiwan as a sovereign state and the 
acceptance of Beijing as the sole legitimate representative of China. It is a precondition 
for entering into diplomatic relations with China. See, for instance, Winkler (June 2012).
11 | See the website of the Embassy of the People‘s Republic of China in Canada for Lu 
Shaye’s biography (http://ca.china-embassy.org/eng/dsx x/dsjl/t1442216.htm).
12 | Gouraud (18 October 2011).
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Ministry of Commerce, has been quoted as saying that “[t]here is [still] tremen-
dous potential for economic cooperation.”13
In practice, this mutual demand model has resulted in Chinese-African 
trade flows that largely follow the Western pattern. China imports primary 
commodities relevant for its economy, such as cotton, phosphates, energy, and 
mineral products, and exports value-added products, such as machinery, chem-
icals, food, and textiles.14 To expand imports and moderate the negative trade 
balance of African countries, China has offered zero tariff treatment to some 
countries. Moreover, freight charges were reduced or annulled, and Chinese 
trade missions were sent to African countries “to help increase the conti-
nent’s exports to China,” particularly regarding primary commodities.15 Still, 
data from 2011-2014 shows that the terms of trade have been deteriorating for 
Sub-Saharan African countries, particularly for China’s key trading partners 
Angola, South Africa, Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Equatorial Guinea, as a 
result of increasing imports from China and declining exports to China due to 
“reduced external demand and lower commodity prices.”16 On the investment 
side, mining and manufacturing projects made up 51 % of Chinese OFDI in 
Africa in 2010, reflecting the country’s industrial make-up and policy orienta-
tion, while hinting at the importance of looking more closely at the potential 
pull and push factors for these investments. 
At the same time, it is essential to consider that even though Africa seems 
to have gained importance in China’s development ambitions, by regional com-
parison, the continent still only ranks fifth as a destination of Chinese OFDI. 
It is preceded by Asia (Hong Kong in particular), Latin America, Europe, and 
North America.17 The same kind of asymmetric significance holds true for 
China’s top trading partners, the top five of which are the US, Japan, Hong 
Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan.18 Yet, the details of these investments are 
much more complex than such a broad comparison suggests. On the bilateral 
level, for instance, Angola has become the second largest oil supplier to China 
after Saudi Arabia,19 and China has become the primary export destination for 
Angola, followed by the US, with the greatest share of exports being crude oil 
(in 2009).20 
13 | Ministry of Foreign Affairs (15 October 2010).
14 | See, for instance, Romei and Jopson (14 December 2010). The figures are from 
UNCTAD.
15 | CAITEC (2010), 3.
16 | Romei (December 3, 2015).
17 | State Council (2010).
18 | Dutta (2005), 222. Data from 2003.
19 | Salvaterra (13 May 2013).
20 | Sandrey (2009), 15, 17; Chinafrica.asia (2009).
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3. Ke y char acTerisTics of chinese L and-consuminG   
 ofdi in sub-sahar an africa 
Clearly, the empirical evidence on China-Africa relations suggests that the 
common narrative, according to which Chinese land-consuming investments 
are relatively new and meant to address energy and/or food security concerns 
back home following the 2007/2008 crises, might fall short of apprehending 
the diversity of factors and events at play. To facilitate a meaningful under-
standing of how Chinese investments in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) actually 
happen, this section will highlight their primary empirical characteristics, 
accounting for sector distribution and project timelines, and the role of land, 
stated goals, the issue of labor migration, and key actors and institutions. 
The major findings of this section are as follows: Firstly, the investments 
include different sectors, and the agricultural sector makes up the smallest per-
centage of land-consuming investment projects in SSA. Secondly, most invest-
ment projects pre-date the 2008 crisis, and they have undergone an economic 
shift over time. Thirdly, the role of land in these projects is often secondary, as 
these investments are mostly about expanding business operations overseas 
rather than acquiring land. Still, what characterizes these investment projects 
is that they consume land in their operations. Fourthly, only a few incidents in 
which the Chinese government proactively tried to acquire land for agricultural 
or resettlement purposes have been reported. Fifthly, most investments are 
embedded in the respective recipient countries’ national development plans.
Sectors
The investigated investment activities comprise multiple sectors, such as 
farming, attempted resettlement projects, mining, manufacturing, and con-
struction. Some of these projects have failed while others have already been 
implemented. Looking at them in more detail, these investment projects aim 
to grow and process food, biofuels, cotton, or sugar; restore so-called farm 
wasteland; resettle Chinese farmers; produce cement; construct public infra-
structure and irrigation systems; train farmers in particular agricultural tech-
nologies; or construct Special Economic Zones that serve as manufacturing, 
agribusiness, or IT hubs for Chinese and/or other foreign companies.21 
21 | It is important to note that agricultural projects prevail in this research project’s 
list of investigated projects (see Appendix A). However, compared to other assessments 
and official data by the Chinese government, this does not seem to be representative of 
the actual sectoral composition. Instead, it appears to be the result of biased reporting, 
and the research project has relied on related “land grab” reports to star t investigating 
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While the international debate on Chinese investments in Africa focuses 
largely on investments in agriculture in the context of food security, a report 
by the State Council suggests that this sector only accounted for 3.1 % of total 
Chinese direct investments in Africa in 2009 (measured by value).22 The 
predominant investment sectors were the mining industry (29.2 %) and the 
manufacturing sector (22.0 %), followed by construction (15.8 %) and finance 
(13.9 %) (see Figure 41).23 It has been noted by Brautigam that the small per-
centage of OFDI going into agricultural projects is not as a result of a lack of 
opportunities. In fact, Chinese actors have continuously been offered land to 
invest in by African governments:
If Chinese investors wanted large land leases, they clearly could have signed some. 
After all, as a 2012 Oakland Institute study24 showed, “Mozambique granted conces-
sions to investors for more than 2.5 million hectares (ha) of land between 2004 and the 
end of 2009” almost entirely to European and South African investors—there were no 
Chinese investors in their list.25
Rather, the small percentage of agricultural projects reflects the low priority 
assigned to them by the Chinese government, as well as investors, in the past. 
In fact, agricultural investments since the 1990s have largely been undertaken 
as part of Chinese resource diplomacy, and upon the request of African gov-
ernments.26 
However, in the medium-term, it seems that the sectoral composition of 
Chinese land-consuming investments is likely to change. A declaration of the 
China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2009,27 a political platform that facilitates 
dialogue between China and African countries on matters of trade, aid, and 
investment, announced that the countries would explore new areas of invest-
ment, such as tourism, which might involve different kinds of land develop-
ment.28 Moreover, the previous marginalization of the commercial agricultural 
sector might be ending. In 2011, China’s Ministry of Finance and Ministry 
of Commerce issued a joint notice29 outlining their financial support for the 
Chinese projects. In fact, the discussion about Chinese land-consuming FDI in the “land 
grab” literature has largely focused on food production and farming.
22 | State Council (2010). Also see remark in previous footnote 464.
23 | State Council (2010).
24 | Home and Mittal (2011), 2.
25 | Brautigam (12 January 2012). 
26 | Alden (2007); Brautigam (2009).
27 | Shelton (22 December 2009).
28 | State Council (2010). 
29 | MOFCOM (2011c). 
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overseas expansion of Chinese agribusiness.30 Accordingly, special funds of a 
maximum of RMB 30 million (per annum and enterprise) were made available 
for investment projects in mining, agriculture, forestry, or fisheries.31 However, 
this general financial support for overseas farming is not necessarily intended 
for investments in Africa. Therefore, it is difficult to assess what impact it 
might have for African countries and farmers.32
Figure 4-1 – Distribution of China’s Direct Investment in African Industries (end 
of 2009, State Council 2010, measured by value)33
Timelines
The Chinese land-consuming investments that this research investigated (see 
Appendix A) often go far back in time, thereby questioning the widespread nar-
rative of a “land rush” that began as a result of the ‘international financial, food, 
and energy crises in 2007/2008’. Interestingly, this holds true especially for 
investments in agriculture, many of which are either a continuation of Chinese 
agricultural aid programs in Africa, the rehabilitation of former Chinese agri-
cultural Friendship Farms, or related to other events pre-dating the 2007/2008 
crises.34 For instance, the project by SINO CAM IKO in Cameroon builds on the 
remnants of a formerly Taiwanese Cooperation Farm that was set up in 1972. 
After bilateral negotiations in 2005, the project officially began in 2006.35 Also, 
the ZTE energy project in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) would 
have been part of an attempt to rehabilitate a plantation-based Sino-Congolese 
30 | MOFCOM (2011c). Also see English.news.cn (18 August 2010). 
31 | MOFCOM (2011c). 
32 | For a list of MOFCOM-approved Chinese agricultural projects in African countries 
until 2013, see Brautigam and Zhang (2013), 1680.
33 | State Council (2010).
34 | See, for instance, Li (2006).
35 | Brautigam and Zhang (2013), 1684-1685.
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cooperation project from 1972.36 However, as of 2013, this palm oil project, 
which would have consumed up to 100.000 ha, and intended to convert palm 
oil into biofuels, has not materialized. Instead, the company operates a farm 
on 256 ha that produces maize, soy, meat, chicken, and eggs.37 Meanwhile, the 
failed resettlement project in Mozambique, which is one of most frequently 
cited projects in the “land grab” literature, dates back to 1997 and the time of 
the Asian financial crisis.38 
Similar to these agricultural investments, land-consuming projects in the 
manufacturing, construction, energy, and/or mining sectors also have histo-
ries that predate the crises in 2007/2008. For example, investments in the con-
struction and mining sectors started to pick up speed in the 1950s and 1990s, 
respectively. While the rise in construction projects was associated with Chinese 
aid projects, the mining projects reflect China’s rising external resource depen-
dency. Even in the manufacturing sector, overseas investments date back to 
the 1980s, with approximately 200 investments taking place between 1979 and 
2001.39 However, investments in most sectors have only increased significantly 
in number and size since China’s opening up in the 1990s, and particularly 
with the adoption of the “Go Abroad” (zou chuqu) policies in 2000 (also see 
Chapter 5 on home country measures).
Even though many projects have long histories, their conduct and purpose 
have changed with time in ways that are key to understanding the core features 
of contemporary Chinese land-consuming OFDI. Projects with a long history 
bear especially strong witness to the altered nature of the Chinese presence 
in African countries. Take, for example, the SUKALA S.A. project, a joint 
venture between the Chinese state-owned company CLETC and the Malian 
government.40 In its current form, the project began in 1996, when the Chinese 
company—following a request made by the Malian government—bought a 
majority share in the Mali state company SUKALA S.A. through a debt-for-eq-
uity-swap. Tracing the project back to its beginnings in the 1960s reveals that 
it had started out as an aid and technical cooperation project under cooperative 
management. It then went through a phase of transitional management before 
becoming a joint venture.41 This project’s shifting character is in fact repre-
36 | See Putzel and Kabuyaya (2011), 34; and Brautigam and Zhang (2013), 1686. 
37 | Officially, the company has said that high transport costs made the palm oil 
project unprofitable. See Brautigam and Zhang (2013), 1686.
38 | Brautigam and Ekman (2012), 5; and Ekman (2010), 30-31.
39 | Rosen and Hanemann (2009).
40 | Diaz-Chavez et al. (2010), 50; Aiddata.org (n.d.c); Feng (2010); and Baxter and 
Mousseau (2011), 19, 22.
41 | Moreover, the precursor factories date back even far ther, having been built in the 
1960s and renovated in the 1980s with Chinese government involvement. 
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sentative of the overarching trend in Chinese investments: most have changed 
from an aid basis to an economic (for-profit) rationale. 
This change in the rationale of long-term projects in the context of 
home country reform is also characteristic of the construction sector. Until 
1978, Chinese construction companies were part of unilateral technical aid 
programs, along with agricultural projects. Thereafter, following domestic gov-
ernance reforms in China, construction companies were turned into sub-con-
tractors and began bidding for contracts and financing from multilateral 
development programs, domestic development budgets, and bilateral “barter 
exchange deals” through which construction was undertaken in exchange for 
resources (to be exploited in the future).42 These “barter exchange deals” were 
pre-financed by the China EXIM Bank following approval by China’s Ministry 
of Commerce.43 Africa is the second largest market after Asia for Chinese con-
struction companies, while the percentage of turnover in Africa has more than 
doubled since 2001, rising from 14.1 % to 30.9 % (in 2011).44 This story is again 
linked with, but not exclusive to, home country support, reforms, and resource 
diplomacy. According to a WB study, China has become a major financier of 
African infrastructure construction, covering a wide range of projects from 
dams, irrigation, and roads to schools, hospitals, and power stations.45 Aside 
from their predominance in the construction sector across Africa, these com-
panies fulfill multiple functions of significance for China-Africa cooperation. 
For instance, they are important agents in the export promotion of Chinese 
manufactured products and Chinese labor services.46 
While this trend towards a market rationale seems to apply to land-con-
suming OFDI activities across sectors, the focus on timelines highlights that 
there are also peculiarities observable in each of the sectors over time. The 
recent renewal of agricultural (aid) projects, for instance, is often seen as an 
outcome of bilateral resource diplomacy and the proactive lobbying of African 
governments.47 As a result, there are 20 so-called agricultural demonstration 
centers being established across Africa, as announced at the 2009 high level 
summit of the Forum of China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Sharm-El-
Sheik.48 In 2012, at the fifth FOCAC meeting, it was agreed that China would 
build more agricultural demonstration centers in the future.49 These demon-
42 | Asche and Schueller (2008); Yi and Yong 2011, 7-8.
43 | Asche and Schueller (2008).
44 | Yi and Yong (2011), 7-8.
45 | Foster et al. (2008).
46 | Sheng jin (1995).
47 | Brautigam (2009); Alden (2007).
48 | See Li (2010).
49 | FOCAC (2012).
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stration centers were initiated “all at the request of local governments [...] for 
their own agricultural purposes,” with the aim of rehabilitating former aid 
projects. The estimated investment value is RMB 40-55 million per center.50 
Some of these centers have been listed in “land grab” databases.51 The other 
category of agricultural investment projects, so-called “commercial agricul-
tural enterprises investing in land and agriculture in Africa,” is a rather recent 
one. The precursors, however, were again former agricultural aid projects that 
had been strategically re-orientated in the 1990s to run profitably and sustain-
ably under market-oriented management.
Given the growing intensity and changing quality of China-Africa 
exchanges, how successful they will be remains to be seen. Looking at the time 
that passes from a company’s first relevant statement until project completion, 
particularly in the agricultural sector, there often seems to be a great difference 
between announced project deadlines and what has actually been implemented 
by the time that deadline arrives.52 This observation, which also holds true for 
many British land-consuming FDI projects,53 is usually related to difficulties 
with administrative processes, funding problems, or other unexpected events. 
At the same time, it is hard to evaluate such projects given the lack of data on 
investment deadlines and the absence of follow-up reports on project outcomes. 
On a general note, statements made by representatives from various sectors 
suggest that it is possible to work profitably, but that it would be unrealistic to 
expect extremely high returns on investment. This is a feature to keep in mind 
when researching the projects of investment funds that promise above-average 
returns on their land-consuming investments in Sub-Saharan Africa.54
What can be said about the roles of the 2007/2008 food, energy, and finance 
crises that the orthodox explanations rely on? Regarding the financial crisis, it 
has so far had an ambiguous impact on Chinese overseas investments. On the 
one hand, it allowed some companies to ‘go out’ and get ‘cheap bargains,’ prof-
iting from price sensitivity and declining asset prices. At the same time, the 
50 | Brautigam (12 January 2012). Also see Ekman (2010), 33-35; and Li (2010), who 
support this assessment. 
51 | Projects that appear in“land grab”listings have entered the database via crowd-
sourcing. This means they have been reported by NGOs or the media. This fact explains 
the relatively random (incomplete) listing of projects, such as the agricultural demon-
stration centers; and it warns to automatically equate a listed project with“land grab-
bing.”Instead, it is necessary to review the individual cases and evaluate what is 
happening.
52 | See Brautigam and Zhang (2013) for a review of major Chinese agricultural 
projects, their timelines, and actual implementation status.
53 | See Chapter 6.
54 | See example in Table 4-1.
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global economic crisis presented a challenge for potential Chinese investors.55 
In 2009, the total value of approved non-financial OFDI projects declined by 
nearly two thirds (USD 3.7 billion) from the value of the previous year (USD 
10 billion); however, it has since been recovering.56 Regarding the food crisis, 
China was largely food self-sufficient as of 2007,57 when the crisis hit. Finally, 
external energy dependency has been a government concern since the mid-
1990s. It is not a recent phenomenon.
Land: Its Role and Use in the Investments
The multiplicity of investment sectors and their changing character over time 
raises questions with regard to the role played by land in these investments. 
The following section will therefore briefly outline the extent and use of land 
in these investments. It will also highlight the major strategies of access and 
aspects of land governance observed in the projects under study.
E xtent 
In a 2011 interview, Lu Shaye, the Director-General of the Department of African 
Affairs within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2009 to 2014, stated 
that Chinese investments in agriculture are small in scale and do not enclose 
land, contrary to “western countries [which] have enclosed a total of 30 million 
hectares of land, equivalent to the half of France.”58 This research’s assessment 
of projects (see Appendix A), as well as reports59 on more recent projects men-
tioned in the “land grab” literature, indicates that the Chinese land-consuming 
projects in Sub-Saharan Africa seem to range from 100 ha to 100.000 ha, with 
the majority using less than 10.000 ha. This means that compared to Chinese 
land-consuming FDI in other regions (e.g., Latin America and Eastern Europe), 
but also in comparison with British land-consuming OFDI in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the average size of Chinese land-consuming OFDI projects in Sub-Sa-
haran Africa seems to be smaller. Then again, it is all a matter of perspective: 
when, for instance, the 100 ha project size is compared to the average farm size 
in major investor countries, such as China, where the average amount of land 
available to farmers is 0.47 ha (in 2005),60 or seen against the background of the 
55 | Rosen and Hanemann (2009). 1.
56 | Rosen and Hanemann (2009), 1.
57 | FAO (2009), 33-35.
58 | Gouraud (18 October 2011).
59 | Brautigam and Zhang (2013); ILC (2012); Smaller et al. (2012).
60 | Kahrl et al. (2005), 11.
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land crisis61 and small-scale farming in the recipient countries, the amount of 
land claimed by some investments seems enormous.62
Overall, it is impossible to assess the total extent of land used by Chinese 
overseas investments, partially due to the lack of comprehensive data, and par-
tially due to the great discrepancy between the announced or envisioned size 
of a project and the actual land under operation. The discrepancy seems to 
be particularly characteristic of land-consuming projects in agriculture. To 
provide several examples: even though negotiations had been completed in 
2006, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) had been signed between 
the Chinese SOE Shaanxi Agricultural Group and the Ministry of Agriculture 
(Cameroon), the Chinese subsidiary in Cameroon, SINO CAM IKO, was oper-
ating only 100-150 ha of the announced 10.000 ha five years later (in 2011).63 
In fact, the company was only able to build a rice demonstration center on the 
land of a formerly Taiwanese-aided farm that had been closed when Cameroon 
decided to engage in diplomatic relations with China instead.64 As of 2010, 
operations were still being held back by the Cameroonian government, which 
had not approved the further expansion of this and other projects, contrary to 
the original investment agreement in the form of the MoU.65 Also, the Chipata 
Cotton Company (now the China Africa Cotton Company),66 which is a sub-
sidiary of Qingdao New Textiles Ltd., operating in Zambia since 2004, orig-
inally only had 2,500 contract farmers out of the envisioned 20.000.67 And 
the Hebei Hanhe Investment Company, a state-owned provincial company that 
has started in Uganda in 2009, and is targeting the development of around 
61 | The land crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by the highly unequal distri-
bution of land, insecure tenure relationships, and rising land use competition (amongst 
other problems) that the respective host governments have not been able to resolve 
since independence in spite of the fact that land reforms have been a core component 
of political programs.
62 | See, for instance, Eastwood et al. (2004); or Agriculture Council of America. 
(2014).
63 | Li 2010; and Brautigam and Zhang (2013), 1684-1685.
64 | Putzel et al. (2011), 31.
65 | Brautigam and Zhang (2013), 1685; and Putzel and Kabuyaya (2011), 31.
66 | It seems that Chipata Cotton Company experienced profitability problems, leading 
to its temporary closure in 2007. It changed its name and re-opened in 2008 with the 
financial support of the China-Africa Development Fund of the China Development 
Bank, which invests in African companies. See Schoneveld et al. (2014), 25-27; and 
China Development Bank (31 May 2012).
67 | Tschirley and Kabwe (2009); Times of Zambia (14 June 2004); Chinese Embassy 
in the Republic of Zambia (10 September 2013); Phiri (11 September 2013); Wang (30 
June 2014); and China Development Bank (31 May 2012).
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17.000 ha in 10 years, had a total of 173 ha under operation as of 2011, growing 
maize, vegetables, and trees.68 
These discrepancies point to the difficult and time-consuming nature of 
large-scale investment projects, particularly in the agricultural sector, where 
investors can run into political, ecological, social, and operative problems. At 
the same time, the discrepancy between the announced investment scales and 
the actual amount of land under operation underlines that in the near future 
an expansion of Chinese land-consuming investments in Sub-Saharan Africa 
is to be expected. This seems even more likely given the aforementioned (2011) 
policy turn and the new funds that were made available to Chinese agribusi-
ness by the Ministries of Agriculture and Finance.69 
Use and Purpose 
There exist two main types of land use in these investments: its use as a 
resource with particular qualities such as limestone or arable land, and its use 
as a productive space for industrial or modernization projects. One observation 
is that the purpose differs across regions, at least with regard to investments in 
agriculture. In the case of Latin America and Eastern Europe, reports indicate 
that Chinese land-consuming OFDI projects might be producing for export to 
China in order to “circumvent the Chicago commodities exchange and secure 
direct grain and oil supply.”70 However, this does not seem applicable to most 
agricultural investment projects in African countries.71 Instead, most of the 
investment projects in SSA that this research project has looked at seem to 
produce products that are intended for local and/or regional consumption. 
In the area of food production in particular, there is no evidence that these 
projects are intended to meet Chinese food demands.72 However, the outputs of 
farming projects that produce biofuels or industrial crops such as cotton seem 
to be intended for export to international markets or China.73 Moreover, some 
projects might affect food security not because they export food crops, but as a 
result of land-use competition, (de facto) ownership changes, and/or the diver-
sion of food resources such as cassava to the production of biofuels.74 
68 | Wang (10 October 2011); and Aiddata.org (n.d.b).
69 | Macquarie University and Free University Amsterdam Project (15 May 2011).
70 | Rasmussen et al. (2011); Finance.jrj.com.cn (May 2011). 
71 | Rasmussen et al. (2011); Finance.jrj.com.cn (May 2011). 
72 | Brautigam (2009); Ekman (2010).
73 | One example is the Chipata Cotton Company. It exports the surplus cotton that 
exceeds the capacity of its ginning factory to international markets and China. Schon-
eveld et al. (2014), 25-27; and China Development Bank (31 May 2012).
74 | The latter case has been reported from Benin. See details and organogram in 
Nonfodji (2011).
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At the same time, other factors that relate to the use of land have to be 
accounted for when assessing the utility derived from these investments. This 
clearly extends beyond the question of production for local or international con-
sumption. In the case of the agricultural demonstration centers, for instance, 
these projects support the internationalization of Chinese agribusinesses, allow 
for economies of scale, and create new markets for their services in the form 
of proprietary seeds and machinery. In the case of infrastructure or mining 
projects, these projects often support Chinese efforts to access resources and/or 
promote exports. This means that in many cases, the additional utility derived 
from the use of land overseas perfectly matches China’s official development 
objectives, as outlined in its OFDI policy, the country’s 11th and 12th Five Year 
Plans,75 and/or Africa-relevant policies. A closer assessment of the question of 
how these investments relate to the interests of influential Chinese actors and 
broader development agenda will be provided in Chapter 5, where the country’s 
political economy, ideology, policy, and development trajectory are considered.
Strategies of Access
Land for agricultural investments is usually acquired through leasing con-
tracts, contract farming schemes, or through joint ventures with domestic com-
panies that have direct or indirect access to land. The method used depends on 
domestic legislation and context. Ordinarily, the suitability of the land area has 
been identified through exploratory visits. Interestingly, there are hardly any 
known cases in which Chinese investors or officials explicitly tried to request 
large-scale land leases.76 One such case has been reported from Mozambique, 
where the Chinese government negotiated a resettlement project of Chinese 
farmers that was first proposed in 1997. However, the project negotiations never 
left parliament and were discontinued due to political sensitivities.77Another 
case is the ZTE biofuel project in the DRC, where the company negotiated at 
least 100.000 ha for palm oil plantations with the DRC Ministry of Agriculture 
in 2007.78 As of 2013, the palm oil project had not been implemented. Instead, 
the company was farming 256 ha as previously mentioned. The fact that a case 
which has been widely reported as the “land grabbing” case—a Chinese compa-
ny’s acquisition of 2.800.000 ha of land for the production of biofuels79—does 
not exist highlights the unsound quality of many “land grab” reports.80 
75 | Chinese Government (2006); Chinese Government (2011).
76 | Brautigam and Zhang (2013).
77 | Ekman (2010), 30-31.
78 | Brautigam and Zhang (2013), 1686.
79 | E.g., GTZ (2009), 66; GLP (2010), 24.
80 | For comparison of dif ferent reports and their use of data, also see Giovanetti and 
Ticci (2011), 44 (Table A 1). 
Chapter 4: Chinese Investments in Afr ica 131
In many cases, the recipient governments’ agencies have offered land for 
agriculture to Chinese investors. In Cameroon, for instance, the government 
presented the Chinese businessman Wang Jianjun (who manages the SINO 
IKO CAM company) with a long-term land lease option for 10.000 ha for the 
production of hybrid rice.81 In Mozambique, several agricultural projects in 
the Zambezi valley, mostly in processing, were chosen and lobbied for by the 
Mozambique government.82 In Mali, the SUKALA S.A. project, which owns an 
approximately 5.000 ha sugarcane plantation, was requested by the Mali gov-
ernment. This last investment took the form of a debt-equity swap that led to 
a joint venture between the Chinese SOE CLETC and the Malian government. 
The arrangement gave the Chinese side indirect control due to its majority 
stake (70 %) in the project.83 The proactive attraction of Chinese investors also 
seems to be the case with regard to the agricultural demonstration centers 
mentioned earlier. 84 To obtain this type of cooperation project the recipient 
country has to submit an application. The agricultural demonstration center in 
Tanzania, for instance, comprises between 62 ha and 300 ha (depending on the 
estimate), and is run by the Chongqing Seed Corporation, a Chinese municipal 
state-owned enterprise. The land is used both to produce a hybrid rice variant 
that has the Chinese company’s identifiable intellectual property and to train 
others in its cultivation. Apart from the demonstration site, the center grows 
rice through centralized outgrower schemes with local farmers, and expects to 
modernize Tanzanian agricultural production.85 
The phenomenon of African governments offering land to investors for lease 
is far from unique to the Chinese case. An informal interview with two repre-
sentatives of Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Agriculture in 2011,86 as well as the very 
straightforward website announcements and, in some cases, overseas presence 
of Investment Promotion Agencies from host countries (e.g., Zambia), all reveal 
that this phenomenon seems to be common practice. At the same time, land 
lease processes remain tricky: the SINO CAM IKO project in Cameroon, for 
instance, was still awaiting approval of the land contract from the recipient gov-
ernment’s presidential office, even though the China EXIM Bank had already 
transferred two thirds of the total (USD 62 million) announced in the signed 
81 | Putzel et al. (2011), 31.
82 | Ekman (2010), 29-30.
83 | Diaz-Chavez et al (2010), 41; and Nolte and Voget-Kleschin (2013). 16-17.
84 | Li (2010). 
85 | Tanzanian Affairs (1 January 2013); Brautigam and Tang (2012), 9-10; and China-
Daily.com.cn (17 May 2008). 
86 | Informal interview, Berlin, November (2011).
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investment agreement.87 In another case, reported by the China State Farm and 
Agribusiness Corporation, the Mauritanian government suddenly decided to 
raise the annual land rent by 20 %, which, together with other events, namely 
the fuel price rise and a host government induced price ceiling on agricultural 
products, led to a failure of the investment project (see Table 4-1).88
Table 4-1 – The Case of the China State Farm and Agribusiness Corporation 
(China.org.cn)89
The China State Farm and Agribusiness Corporation (CSFAC)
“Decades ago we were at the forefront of China’s campaign to reclaim waste-
land. Now we apply our skills in African countries.”—Han Xiangshan, Vice 
President of the China State Farm and Agribusiness Corporation, and leader 
of its agricultural projects in Africa.
Currently, CSFAC operates on a total of 16.000 hectares in different countries 
in SSA, growing cash and food crops, and engaging in the whole range of 
agricultural production, processing and sales.
Success factors mentioned are (1) the political and policy support by African 
governments (e.g., preferential policies for expansion of the agricultural sector; 
tax exemptions on agricultural machinery and production material imports; 
tax rebates on fuel for agricultural use; reduction of annual land rent); (2) 
natural conditions such as the availability of fertile soil, favourable climate; (3) 
China’s capability to provide adequate agricultural technology, management, 
machinery and other inputs.
Yet, political and natural risks remain, together with varying market potential, 
ideology gaps and differences in work efficiency. Han Xianshan refers to a for-
mer CSFAC project in Mauretania [sic], which had to close after three years de-
spite a successful process of reclamation, experimentation and cultivation on 
the rented farm. However, the government raised the annual land rent by 20 
%, and together with the domestic fuel price inflation, the annual expenditure 
rose by USD 100.000. When the local government then put a price ceiling on 
agricultural products, the state farm project ran high losses, and had to close.”
For reasons of risk minimization and/or domestic legislation, most investment 
projects rely on indirect forms of access to farmland, including joint ventures, 
contract farming, and/or purchase agreements. If the data on the number of 
farmers under contract is correct, contract farming as a form of land access 
seems to be very common and must be affecting many rural households. Take, 
for example, the Malawi Cotton Company, a joint venture of the China-Africa 
87 | See Khan and Baye 2008; Jansson (2009), 10; Brautigam and Zhang (2013), 
1685; and Li (2010).
88 | China.org.cn (10 December 2003).
89 | China.org.cn (10 December 2003).
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Development Fund90 and the Qingdao Ruichang Cotton Cooperation. It is 
active in cotton production from farming to processing, and reportedly involves 
110.000 rural households under a central farming contract scheme (“company 
+ rural household”). This means that the farmers grow the cotton, whereas the 
company controls and provides inputs and reaps value-added margins by pro-
cessing the harvest at the new spinning and ginning plant in Balaka for export 
to China.91 Through the scheme, the company was harvesting close to 40.000 
tons of cotton as of 2011.92 In another project, a Chinese company appears to 
deliver fertilizer and other assistance to a peanut growing project in Senegal. 
There, the recipient country’s farmer association organizes the production 
of the peanuts on 100.000 ha. It is envisioned that 30 % of the yield will be 
shipped to China, while the rest will be processed at local factories.93 Finally, 
there are projects which mix direct and indirect forms of access as a strategy 
to ensure sufficient supplies for plant operation in the context of supply scarci-
ties. For instance, the SUCOBE Company in Benin, which is an affiliate of the 
Chinese SOE COMPLANT, relies on external harvests to complement its own 
agricultural output. In addition to sugar cane production on 4,800 ha of land, 
which the company is leasing for 99 years (renewable), it buys cassava from 
local farmers for its plant operation.94 As a result, there has been a cassava price 
hike in Benin.95
Aside from investments by agribusiness or mining corporations, the use of 
land usually plays out more indirectly in its function as a space where productive 
activities can take place. In the case of construction and infrastructure projects, 
for instance, the land is appropriated by the respective government and only of 
profit for Chinese companies in its use as a construction or rehabilitation site. 
And with regard to Chinese Special Economic Zones (SEZs), seven of which are 
currently operating across Africa, the land is leased and becomes the basis of a 
quasi-extraterritorial zone. Though special regulations apply within the zone, it 
remains under the control of the respective recipient government (see Table 4-2). 
China itself has used SEZs to serve as controlled areas of economic reform while 
retaining the old political system and it now seems to export its development 
experiences to countries that are officially striving to become emerging econo-
90 | See Chapter 5 for a more detailed description of this fund in the home country 
context.
91 | CDB (31 May 2012); and Chirombo (29 December 2009).
92 | See CDB (31 May 2012); and Chirombo (29 December 2009). 
93 | Smaller et al. (2012), 16 (Note: While China imports significant amounts of 
peanuts from Senegal (e.g., China DSIC International Trade Co. Ltd 2014), this partic-
ular case has so far remained unconfirmed.)
94 | See Nonfodji (2011).
95 | Nonfodji (2011), 12.
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mies.96 In Mauritius, for instance, Chinese companies are establishing an SEZ 
which is intended to become a major manufacturing hub for Chinese light indus-
trial products, medicines, textiles, and electronics. Built on an area of 200-500 
ha, this SEZ is headed by Chinese companies, and it is expected to accommo-
date 40 Chinese companies and create 34.000 jobs, of which 8.000 shall go to 
Chinese contractors. It is claimed to generate USD 220 million through exports 
and attract an inflow of USD 750 million worth of investments.97
Table 4-2 – Chinese Special Economic Zones in Africa (Brautigam and Tang 2011; 
Brautigam [February] 2011)
Aspects of Governance
A closer look at issues of land governance also highlights the importance of 
taking note of agency in host countries. In most recipient countries, land is 
owned by the state. Key ministries or government agencies are involved in these 
investments, often depending on the land’s function. Arable land, for instance, 
frequently falls within the competency of the respective Ministry of Agricul-
ture, whereas land suitable for mining is overseen by the respective Ministry 
of Land and Resources. At the same time, investments often take place under 
the guidance of Investment Promotion Agencies. The negotiation and approval 
process has sometimes included parliamentary consultations, while in other 
cases the investment has been approved by a single office within a Ministry 
96 | See, for instance, Konijin (2013), 3 (Box 3).
97 | Brautigam and Tang (2011). For a more detailed story of the JinFei Special 
Economic Zone, see Alves (2011).
Nr. Special Economic Zone
1 Chambishi, Zambia: copper and copper related industries.
2 Lusaka, Zambia: garments, food, appliances, tobacco and electronics. 
This zone is classified as a subzone of the Chambishi zone.
3 Jinfei, Mauritius: manufacturing (textiles, garments, machinery, high-
tech), trade, tourism, and finance.
4 Ethiopia: electrical machinery, construction materials, steel, and metall-
urgy.
5 Ogun, Nigeria: construction materials, ceramics, ironware, furniture, 
wood processing, medicine, and computers.
6 Lekki, Nigeria: transportation equipment, textiles, home appliances, 
telecommunications, and light industry.
7 Suez, Egypt: petroleum equipment, electrical appliance, textile, and 
automobile manufacturers. (completed in October 2010)
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vested with extensive powers to decide over land leases, as, for instance, a report 
about the Office du Niger in Mali underlines.98 
Many cases show an overlap of competencies, as well as an absence of effec-
tive governance structures, clear objectives, or a country-wide land-use or devel-
opment plan. Often, the respective agencies do not know how much arable 
land is available in total and earmark territory for foreign investments based 
on assumptions which differ across agencies.99 In some cases, the political elite 
seem divided on matters of land-consuming FDI.100 From a more historical 
perspective that accounts for the context of the SSA land crisis in which these 
investments take place, these failures to effectively govern the land used by the 
investments are not surprising. Rather, they are closely related to the political 
economy of land in the respective host countries.101 In this regard, a reporter 
commenting on the weak governance structures in Angola concluded that 
the foreign investments were the outcome of “a global alliance between the 
well-connected in Angola and get-rich forces in China, Brazil and Portugal,” 
which in the case of Angola have come to form an alliance that is even “a threat 
to the former colonial forces in Europe and the speculators in Wall Street.”102
Actors and Institutions
Obviously, on the recipient side, these investments involve various ministries 
and agencies from different levels of government, and that host country agency 
matters. Civil society groups and local community members remain largely on 
the sidelines in the ongoing negotiations. Being embedded in national devel-
opment plans, some projects gain access to funding from national banks or 
multilateral programs, or are part of inter-governmental credit agreements or 
cooperation programs.
From the Chinese side, representatives of different levels of government 
and embassy personnel, as well as private or state-owned entrepreneurs 
98 | See a detailed description of the Office du Niger, Mali, in Baxter and Mousseau 
(2011), 18-58.
99 | See, for instance, Baxter and Mousseau (2011), 1-3.
100 | The latter became obvious in the case of Ethiopia where Girma Woldegirogis, the 
Prime Minister from 2001 to 2013, wrote a public letter to the then Minister of Agri-
culture, Mr. Tafera Derbew, to stop a USD 4.4 billion investment deal in the Western 
Region by an Indian company intending to grow pulses and edible oil crops for export 
to India. The deal was likely to negatively impact the region’s fragile microclimate, yet 
the Minister of Agriculture refused to react to the Prime Minister’s request. See, for 
instance, Ethiopian Review.com (2 February 2011). 
101 | Mosley (2012); Besada and Goetz (2012).
102 | Campbell (1 December 2011). 
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(central, provincial, municipal), are involved in these investment projects (see 
Table 4-4). Among the more unique public actors are the SOEs that belong to 
the so-called state farm system103 and are subordinate to the Ministry of Agri-
culture’s State Farm Bureaus at the central or provincial level. In the past, these 
SOEs have been used as “a mechanism for leading the way and for gauging 
the effect of national agricultural/rural policies.”104 At the same time, they rep-
resented the ‘first wave’ of Chinese agribusiness going global.105 As of 2014, 
these companies run the agricultural technology demonstration centers on a 
for-profit basis. In fact, the previously mentioned example of SINO CAM IKO in 
Cameroon belongs to this system. The company is a subsidiary of a provincially 
managed Chinese state farm (Shaanxi Land Reclamation) that is currently 
engaged in the rehabilitation and operation of such a center in Cameroon, in 
collaboration with IRAD,106 a national agricultural research center. These kinds 
of state farms highlight the important linkages between processes of home 
country development ambitions, the international context, and “land deals.”
Unfortunately, there is hardly any information about the wide range of 
Chinese private actors and their projects in Africa. Among the few that have 
been assessed in great detail is the China International Fund Limited (CIF), 
which was established in Hong Kong in 2003, and has since begun investing in 
various construction projects in Angola.107 The fund, which has a bad reputation 
as a “murky Hong Kong real estate, construction and investment company,” has 
no reported connection to the Chinese government. However, it has pretended 
to act on behalf of the Chinese government to gain access to certain projects 
in the past.108 The company is also involved in a joint venture with a company 
named SPI that is the business arm of the Liberation Front of Mozambique 
Party (Frelimo). This mining and cement production project began in 2012 (see 
Table 4-3). On several occasions, the Chinese government has distanced itself 
103 | Established in 1947, China’s “state-owned farming system today has expanded 
considerably—a sharp contrast to the decline of state-owned enterprises in the urban 
sector.” State farms are a vital element in China’s agricultural system, “operating in 30 
provinces […], occupying 39 million hectares of land [...], employing over 3.5 million 
people, [...] and contributing to 3.4 % of the country’s total output” (Zhang [2010], 
365). For a detailed description, see Zhang (2010). Also, see WB (1998), 55.
104 | WB (1998), 55.
105 | Brautigam (2009), 255-257.
106 | IRAD is the abbreviation for Institut de Recherche Agricole pour le Développe-
ment. The Institute conducts multi-disciplinary research on how to improve agricultural 
production. Its history traces back to the year 1889; however, it has been reformed 
since (http://iradcameroun.org/en).
107 | See the company’s website (http://www.chinainternationalfund.com/).
108 | Brautigam (2 June 2010). 
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from the fund’s activities, hinting at the conflict of interests of the different 
actors involved in Chinese land-consuming OFDI activities (see Chapter 5).109
Table 4-3 – Project Projections from the CIF’s Website (CIF)110
In addition to such diverse individual interests that play a role in Chinese 
land-consuming OFDI, several institutions structure the political realm. 
The Chinese government has used the Forum of China Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC), a high-level summit established in 2000 that is modeled after the 
French Summit,111 to institutionalize relations with African countries and push 
for the implementation of projects on a bilateral basis. Similar forums, such 
as the Forum on Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and Portu-
guese Countries (FCECCPLP), have also been put in place for other regions in 
order to re-establish economic and political ties.112
Also, several financial institutions support these investments. Specifically, 
the two Chinese policy banks created in the 1990s, the China EXIM Bank and 
the China Development Bank (CDB), play an important role. For instance, the 
CDB supervises the newly created (in 2006) China-Africa Development Fund 
(CADFund), a stock equity fund that targets Chinese companies whose trade 
and economic activities will reach or take place in Africa.113 Further, the Chipata 
Cotton Company in Zambia (now the China Africa Cotton Company) received 
financial support—in the form of equity investment through the CADFund – in 
2008 after its temporary closure due to financial problems the previous year.114 
109 | Shih (18 January 2010).
110 | See CIF website (http://www.chinainternationalfund.com/projects1.asp?Id=2 86).
111 | On the role and constitution of annual Franco-African Summits since 1974, see 
Chafer (2002), 3.
112 | Jansson and Kiala (2009), 3.
113 | CADF (2014).
114 | Schoneveld et al. (2014), 25-27; and China Development Bank (31 May 2012).
Original Condition of the 
Construction Site
Future Condition of the Construction Site
Land Grabbing and Home Countr y Development138
Importantly, the regulations of the CADFund ensure that African companies are 
able to acquire funding only through a joint venture with a Chinese company.115 
In many cases, however, investments take place without official funding. 
Some SOE subsidiaries seem to profit from preferential loan access through 
their headquarters, while other projects receive national bank credit in the 
recipient country or multilateral funding, in particular in the construction 
area. In addition, some projects profit from the tripartite cooperation structure 
of FAO projects under the “South South Cooperation” umbrella program on 
food security.116 Furthermore, in 2011, the Africa Development Bank (AfDB) 
signed a memorandum of understanding with the Agricultural Bank of China 
on “collaborative ventures in co-financing, technical cooperation for capacity 
building and knowledge partnership” in the areas of trade finance, infrastruc-
ture, agriculture and agribusiness, clean energy projects, energy conservation, 
non-traditional lending business (e.g., investment banking, consultancy, and 
advisory business), knowledge sharing and technical assistance, and, if neces-
sary, other areas.117 Moreover, the company ZTE was accredited as a UN World 
Food Programme supplier for an experimental plot of 10 ha near Kinshasa, 
where it has been growing food since 2008 in cooperation with the DRC 
Ministry of Agriculture.118
With regard to investments that are part of aid projects, the choice of aid 
instruments is largely context specific. While grants and zero-interest loans 
are spread across the continent, concessional loans are linked to the receiving 
country’s capacity, which depends on its economic status, or the condition 
that the loan goes into a productive project whose generated income allows for 
repayment over time.119 Brautigam has shown that basically all SSA countries 
115 | Basically, the fund dif fers from aid because it provides market based funds, 
and it dif fers from credit because it invests together with the enterprise, increasing 
the latter’s financial capacity. Since 2009, the CDB has an additional special fund for 
African SMEs, which will be made available on the basis of lending and tending. See 
CADFund website (http://www.cadfund.com/en/).
116 | Brautigam (2010), 31-33. Under the FAO Special Programme for Food Security, 
Chinese projects were implemented in Gabon, Sierra Leone, Caribbean Islands, 
Ethiopia, Bangladesh, and Ghana, among others. Projects have included the sending 
of agricultural technicians, training of local agricultural technicians, construction of 
agricultural schools, and building of general infrastructure, such as irrigation and road 
projects. In Angola, for example, over 120.000 farmers from 60 farming associations 
and cooperatives are benefiting from the construction of a dam and irrigation channel 
and training of agricultural technicians. See InSouth.org (2014). 
117 | See AfDB (9 June 2011).
118 | ZTE Energy (n.d.b). The current status of this project remains unclear.
119 | Brautigam (2011b), 212. State Council (2011a).
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that have diplomatic ties with Beijing (China) receive foreign aid to various 
degrees.120 A precondition for diplomatic ties is adherence to the previously 
mentioned ‘one China principle.’ At the same time, there is no indication that 
resource rich countries, namely Nigeria and the DRC, are the recipients of 
larger amounts of aid.121
Table 4-4 – China in Africa: Actors involved in Land-Consuming OFDI (selected)
Actors Involved at Different 
Levels of Governance
Public Private Hybrid
INTERNA-
TIONAL/ 
OTHER
International
agents
• FAO South-South  
Cooperation Pro-
gram
• United Nations’ 
World Food 
Program (WFP) 
Supplier Program
• WB
• AfDB
• Earth Rights  
Institute (NGO)
CHINA 
AND 
HONG-
KONG (HK)
National • China EXIM Bank
• SINOSURE
• State Council
• Ministry of Com-
merce
• MoFTEC122 and 
MoL
• Ministry of Agri-
culture
• China Develop-
ment Bank -(CAD-
Fund)
• SOEs from central 
state
• SUCOBE (Benin) 
is a subsidiary of 
China National 
Complete Plant 
I/E Corporation 
(Group) (COM-
PLANT) under 
supervision of State 
Council
• “Snakeheads”123
• Private owned 
enterprises (POEs) 
(only a few are 
known)
• China Africa Cot-
ton Company (lis-
ted at Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange)
120 | Brautigam (2011b), 212.
121 | See Gouraud (18 October 2011).
122 | The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MoF TEC) preceded the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM).
123 | This term describes criminal organizations that smuggle people and drugs. See 
African Labour Research Network (2009), 27.
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Actors Involved at Diffe-
rent Levels of Governance
Public Private Hybrid
CHINA 
AND 
HONG-
KONG (HK)
Sub-
national
• SOEs from provinces or 
municipality,
• bureaucratic agents and 
agencies: 
• Chongqing Sino- 
Tanzania Agriculture 
Development Company, 
subsidiary of Chongqing 
Zhong Yi Seed Ltd. in 
Tanzania (outgrower 
scheme, hybrid rice)
• Shaanxi Land  
Reclamation General Cor-
poration (state-owned  
conglomerate) 
• Hebei Province Bureau of 
Foreign Trade Promotion
• Shandong Province 
(Cement Factory)
• Fuzhou Province Fishery 
Coop
• Shaanxi State Farm 
(provincial actor), has a 
subsidiary (SINO IKO) in 
Cameroon
• Guangdong Agribusiness 
Group
• AOCABFE (umbrella 
organization)124
• China International 
Investment (investor 
umbrella organiza-
tion for 260 Chinese 
organizations)
• ZTE Energy,  
subsidiary of ZTE 
corporation125
• China International 
Fund (Hong Kong)
• Farmers
• Workers
• Labor Export Com-
panies
• Daitong (POE)
• Malawi 
Cotton 
Company 
(joint ven- 
ture between 
CADFund 
and Qingdao 
Ruichang 
Cotton 
Company)
BILATERAL • SUKALA (China- 
Mali)
• Inter-provincial  
cooperation between 
Gaza Province (MOZ) and 
Hubei Province 
• CADFund office in 
Zambia 
• Friendship Farms
China International 
Fund (HK) and Frelimo’s 
investment arm, SPI-
Gestão e Investimentos 
(JV on cement in MOZ)
• Viscount 
Energy 
Limited 
• Nigeria’s 
Ebony State 
government
• Zambia De-
velopment 
Agency
• China 
LongPing 
High Tec 
Company
124 | AOCABFE stands for Association of Overseas Chinese Agricultural, Biological, 
and Food Engineers.
125 | Formerly a state owned enterprise, ZTE Corporation has been turned into a private 
company (shareholding). See testimony in front of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the US Congress by ZTE’s Senior Vice President for North America and 
Europe, Zhu (2012); and the report by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Rogers and Ruppersberger (2012).
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In order to further elaborate on the official perspective on land-consuming FDI 
in the recipient country context, the following section will briefly outline the 
stated goals of the investment projects on the project and country levels.
4. The invesTmenTs in The reciPienT conTe x T:    
 sTaTed GoaLs and muLTiface Ted re aLiT y
Host country agency and public policy are often ignored by orthodox expla-
nations of land-consuming OFDI from an investor country perspective. Yet, 
overall, Chinese investments are embedded in the national (and international) 
development programs and rhetoric. Therefore, the next sections provide 
several examples that I have encountered during process tracing, focusing on 
the stated goals, development policies, and actual impact of Chinese land-con-
suming investments. The insights gained contribute to the exploration of alter-
native explanations of how (and why) Chinese OFDI projects take place, and 
they show that so-called pull and push factors coexist. 
The stated goals of the investigated investments vary slightly across dif-
ferent levels of analysis. On the project level, the stated goal of many invest-
ments in both the agricultural and mining sectors is often to reduce imports 
and boost production of the respective product in order to promote food security 
and/or the industrialization goals of the recipient country. For instance, SINO 
CAM IKO in Cameroon envisioned reducing rice imports by increasing output 
Actors Involved at Diffe-
rent Levels of Governance
Public Private Hybrid
RECI-
PIENT 
COUNT-
RIES
National • Senegal National 
Bank
• Zambia Develop-
ment Agency
• IRAD (Institute de 
Recherche Agricole 
pour le Developpe-
ment, Cameroon)
• (Cameroon) Office 
of the Prime Mi-
nister 
• Inter-Ministerial 
Committee 
• local authorities at 
Ndjoré
• Tanzanian  
government
• Mali National  
Assembly
• DRC Ministry of 
Agriculture
• African Finance 
Corporation (Ni-
geria)
• Nigerian Banks
Subnational • Chief of Ndore (in 
Nigeria)
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from 50.000 tons to 400.000 tons per year,126 and the CIF-SPI joint venture 
in Mozambique (called CIF-MOZ) allegedly aims to increase cement produc-
tion and thereby support industrialization and modernization plans through 
reduced cement prices.127 In the case of Nigeria, VISCOUNT Energy, the “Chi-
nese-supported Nigerian firm” active in the biofuels sector claims that the 
project is intended to improve domestic energy security.128
On the recipient country level, many investment projects are embedded in 
national development plans that the respective government wishes to imple-
ment with the help and capital of foreign investors.129 For instance, the detailed 
case study by Ekman on Chinese investments in Mozambique shows that the 
agricultural investment projects have been determined by the Mozambican 
government.130 The same applies to other countries and projects. The previ-
ously mentioned VISCOUNT Energy project in Nigeria matches the Nigerian 
National Biofuel Development Policy.131 The ZTE Energy investment in the 
DRC (status unclear) would be part of a project to restitute a former agricul-
ture cooperation farm (DAIPN); it would involve Chinese investors as well as 
the African Development Bank and other foreign companies.132 Moreover, the 
extension of the SUKALA S.A. project in Mali is part of the Malian government’s 
acclaimed goal to turn the country into an “agricultural powerhouse.”133 Sim-
ilarly, agricultural investments in Senegal are part of the Senegalese Growth 
Plan (“Grand Agricultural Offensive for Food and Abundance (GOANA)”) that 
has come about as a result of the food crisis. It favors foreign investors through 
free repatriation of profit, tax breaks, or the provision of public subsidies134 and 
the SUCOBE project in Benin matches the government’s proclaimed goal of 
stepping up agricultural production and mechanization.135 
These project level statements and domestic development programs are 
matched by programs and institutions at the regional level, such as the African 
126 | Khan and Baye (2008), 7, 15; Wikileaks (2010a).
127 | Cementchina.net (27 August 2010); Cementchina.net (31 May 2011); Duran 
(2012), 20-22.
128 | Rothkopf (2007), 336.
129 | See, for instance, Baxter and Mousseau (2011) on Mali; and Lavers (2011, 2012) 
on Ethiopia.
130 | Ekman (2010).
131 | Shaad and Wilson (2009), 10; Galadima et al. (2011), 22-24; and This Day (28 
August 2006).
132 | Baende (29 March 2010); and Braeckmann (September 2009).
133 | Xue (2010). See also Baxter and Mousseau (2011), 19, 24; Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Republic of Mali (2009), 14.
134 | See, for instance, Stads and Sène (2011), 3.
135 | See Nonfodji (2011).
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Union Commission (AUC), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) Secretariat, or the African Development Bank (AfDB). These orga-
nizations have, for example, started an initiative for the development of infra-
structure in Africa, which is framed as a prerequisite for economic develop-
ment and growth on the continent.136 They are also promoting FDI projects 
in agriculture to boost food security and improve drought resilience. In fact, 
the AfDB’s regional strategy for 2012 refers explicitly to “the mobilization of 
resources from China, India, Brazil and Argentina” as a means to address 
related challenges through modernization.137
Despite such claims about the developmental offerings of land-consuming 
FDI projects made by people and institutions involved in the relevant processes, 
empirical evidence underlines that for the host countries, as well as the home 
countries, the implications are ambiguous. For instance, from a social view-
point, these investments are not necessarily a developmental success story: 
while they can create jobs and generate revenue, in many cases few jobs are 
generated, and these are characterized by poor labor relations and/or wage 
discrimination between Chinese and local labor.138 Wages in some cases are 
reported to be below the domestic minimum wage, and in most cases, jobs are 
offered on a daily wage basis without social insurance. Employees earn about 
USD 1.5-2 per day.139 Unfortunately, these unfavorable social conditions seem to 
be common to most foreign projects rather than being unique to Chinese ven-
tures.140 With regard to rural development, the large-scale implementation of 
central contract farming schemes seems unlikely to improve rural livelihoods 
given the weak legal environment, lack of risk insurance, and official corrup-
tion present in many host countries. Indeed, historical evidence about the 
developmental implications of such schemes suggests that they tend to reduce 
rather than strengthen the multiple positive impacts that agricultural work can 
have with regards to social, economic, political, or environmental aspects of 
society.141 
Empirical (albeit anecdotal) evidence also suggests that the development 
policies in many recipient countries pose challenges for national economic 
development, for instance, by disadvantaging otherwise competitive indige-
nous enterprises that suffer from limited access to capital, technology, or global 
markets. The crowding out of such enterprises by these investments has been 
observed to a certain degree in the textile industry, though mainly through the 
136 | See AfDB (2014).
137 | AfDB (8 February 2012).
138 | Baah and Jauch (2009), 330.
139 | Baah and Jauch (2009).
140 | See, for instance, Baah and Jauch (2009), 108.
141 | See, for instance, Smalley (2013); and IAASTD (2008).
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intensified trade and import of textiles. Also, the strong presence of Chinese 
construction companies that manage to profit from government-facilitated 
‘resource for infrastructure’ deals, seems to squeeze the operating space for 
local or regional firms.142 Plus, the influx of Chinese small-scale entrepreneurs, 
a side effect of intensifying Chinese-African trade and investment relations, 
has proved challenging for local shop owners. Another concern raised in the 
context of national economic development is the issue of financial debt. It is 
true that “barter exchange deals” consider issues such as the “manageability 
of debt,” often by requiring recipient country governments to repay it with the 
investment returns that are anticipated from the benefits of industrialization.143 
Yet, the high degree of corruption and poor governance record in most coun-
tries, together with the generally long period before repayment is due, provide 
valid reasons for concern over the sustainable management of debt.144 
Aside from these economic and social challenges, some reports highlight 
the negative environmental impacts of some large-scale farming projects, spe-
cifically regarding regional microclimates or water security. Take, for example, 
the SINO CAM IKO’s farming project in Cameroon that was mentioned above. 
In order to gain access to fertile ground in a moderate climate zone, the investor 
cut down trees, which might result in problematic changes to the regional 
microclimate. Another example is the sugar cane production project in Mali. 
A case study by the Oakland Institute mentions the problem of water diversion 
and the declining level of the Niger River as a project related challenge that is 
likely to intensify water insecurity and affect neighboring countries that depend 
on this river.145 Also, Bosshard has pointed to the fact that key development 
finance institutions, such as the China EXIM Bank, have financed projects, 
including dam construction, for which the environmental pre-assessment did 
not meet international standards, yielding problematic results for the affected 
population and environment on the ground (Sudan).146 Finally, the water-inten-
sive character of Chinese agricultural projects in African countries has been 
highlighted as worrisome, since rice, sugar cane, and cotton rank among the 
‘thirstiest’ crops.147 
Regarding the public perception about Chinese investments within recip-
ient countries it is interesting to note that this does not seem to differ from 
that about Western countries, according to a study by Gadzala and Hanusch (in 
142 | Brautigam (2011a), 7; Chen et al. (2009).
143 | See Brautigam (2011a), 7.
144 | Brautigam (2011a), 7-8.
145 | Baxter and Mousseau (2011), 15-26.
146 | Bosshard (2008), 3-5. Also, see Tan-Mullins et al. (2017).
147 | See Davis’ (2003) study on the water-intensity of the crops rice, wheat, cotton, 
and sugar cane.
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2010).148 These authors write that the “negative rhetoric emanating from much 
of the surrounding literature tells only part of the story, as African perceptions 
of China are found to be near equivalent to those held vis-à-vis Western coun-
tries.”149 Nevertheless, the Chinese presence in African economies has become 
politicized and entered the political discourse during electoral campaigning in 
some countries as the case of Zambia highlights (see below). 
In some cases, rising and vocal discontent has emerged among third parties 
affected by Chinese investments through increased competition. A cable by 
the US Embassy in Mali, for example, reported that the US company Schaffer 
had complained about the strong Chinese presence in the country.150 This was 
likely in relation to the SUKALA S.A. (Sino-Mali joint venture) expansion plans, 
which pertain to areas of land that had originally been promised to Schaffer by 
the host government. According to statements made by Schaffer, the expansion 
is part of a broader strategy to prevent other companies from entering the sugar 
market, thereby preserving the joint venture’s quasi-monopoly position within 
this sector.151 In this context, it is interesting to note that since 2008 there has 
been a proliferation of Western funds set up by the development agencies of 
OECD countries to support Western agribusinesses in Sub-Saharan Africa.152 
While difficult to prove, these funds seem to be inspired by the basic model of 
the China-Africa Development Fund, which was put in place by China in 2006. 
The Western funds are clearly aimed at strengthening the OECD economic 
presence on the continent. The impact of heightened competition through new-
comers such as China is also well documented in the context of the Chipata 
Cotton Company in Zambia. Due to the company’s presence, the previous 
informal pricing regime led by quasi-monopolists from France and Britain has 
been challenged.153
5. The issue of L abor
One phenomenon that has received widespread international attention is the 
issue of Chinese labor exports in these investments to SSA. The following 
section will provide a brief overview of the core issues to discern myths while 
deliberating on the dimension and background of this phenomenon. This step 
seems necessary for a meaningful understanding of the Chinese presence in 
148 | Gadzala and Hanusch (2010).
149 | Gadzala and Hanusch (2010), 4.
150 | Wikileaks (2009a).
151 | Wikileaks (2009a).
152 | Miller et al. (2010), 146-165. 
153 | Tschirley and Kabwe (2009).
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SSA. Moreover, given the historical roles of migration and labor exports in 
political regime stability and social mobility, which were described in Chapter 
3, this overview of the contemporary situation will provide valuable insights for 
comparison. 
A study by Yoon Jung Park reveals that the number of Chinese migrants 
in Africa rose constantly over the 10-year period ending in 2012 and probably 
reached one million that year. It also reports that many of these migrants live 
in segregated communities:
In 2009, the Chinese population in Africa was estimated at between 580.000 to 
820.000. Today, that number is likely closer to (or even over) 1 million, although exact 
counts are vir tually impossible to ascertain due to the mobility of Chinese migrants as 
well as highly porous borders within Africa, high levels of corruption within some African 
government agencies, and inefficiencies within agencies tasked with immigration and 
border control. 
While most Chinese in Africa are there only temporarily — as contract laborers and pro-
fessionals — there are a growing number of Chinese migrants choosing to remain in 
Africa to explore greater economic opportunities. Recent research in southern Africa 
indicates that, although many Chinese migrants plan to eventually return to China, many 
in South Africa and Lesotho have already stayed years beyond their original plans.154
While it appears that China has no grand strategy of labor export in place, 
several factors in the home country do encourage it. These include official pro-
paganda portraying Africa as the continent of opportunity,155 the absence of 
sufficient unemployment protection in China,156 widespread corruption, devel-
opment and climate change related land loss, the problematic hukou system157 
which discriminates against rural workers wishing to migrate to urban areas, 
lax migration controls, and the negotiation of work visas for Chinese staff 
overseas by the Chinese government. The confluence of all of these features 
in the Chinese context definitely creates an environment of high migration 
pressure. This could be seen as the silent promotion of labor export, so long 
as conditions back home do not improve significantly for the rural population.
154 | Park (4 January 2012); also see Park (2009).
155 | Park (4 January 2012). 
156 | Lee (2000), executive summary.
157 | Hukou refers to a household registration system that restricts rural to urban 
migration. In its current form it “discriminate[s] against poor migrant workers in favor of 
the wealthy and educated.” For more details, see, for instance, Congressional-Execu-
tive Commission on China (2005), 1; also see Murphy and Tao (2006).
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Moreover, Chinese companies continue to gain a competitive advantage 
over Northern competitors when using comparatively cheap but skilled Chinese 
labor.158 One of the striking aspects of Chinese labor export is that it highlights 
the shortfalls of the country’s economic development in view of social develop-
ment. Research about Chinese construction projects shows that even in current 
times, (skilled) Chinese workers (in China) often do not earn significantly more 
than their African counterparts (in Africa) while working under harsh condi-
tions and being denied basic social rights.159 Brautigam argues that the use of 
Chinese workers in investments in agriculture is especially common in oil-rich 
countries with higher wage levels. In such places, Chinese labor provides com-
panies with a competitive edge in contract bidding.160 At the same time, the 
wages paid to Chinese staff in overseas projects can be higher than those paid 
in China, which explains why many workers decide to go overseas and work in 
projects in Africa to improve their family’s welfare back home. 
Overall, however, the cost competitiveness of skilled Chinese labor is only (a 
minor) one of several considerations that influence Chinese companies’ choice 
of hiring Chinese rather than local staff. Equally important are cultural and 
social aspects. Hiring Chinese staff, particularly for managerial positions, 
allows the company to circumvent language barriers that arise from the lack 
of knowledge of foreign languages among Chinese technical experts, and 
makes it easier to implement Chinese work modes: “Using Chinese workers 
ensured fast communication within project teams and prompt completion 
of the work.”161 A contributing factor seems to be the (alleged) lack of skilled 
African workers, particularly in the construction sector. The resultant rise of 
skilled African workers’ wages close to the level of skilled Chinese workers’ 
wages, together with the perception that skilled African labor is less productive, 
has also motivated Chinese companies to import slightly more costly Chinese 
workers in the implementation of projects.162
Even though labor export is not a primary concern of the central govern-
ment in China, the internationalization of the labor market is promoted for 
different reasons by different actors. The central government has endorsed 
it as a way for its companies to succeed in contract bidding by taking on the 
comparatively ‘cheap (skilled) labor.’ There are other voices, particularly at the 
provincial and municipal government levels (e.g., websites of provincial gov-
ernments), that promote labor export as a way to address the social costs of the 
chosen development path, such as the problems of structural unemployment, 
158 | See Alden (2007).
159 | Chen et al. (2009), 83-84.
160 | Brautigam (2011a), 7-8.
161 | Chen et al. (2009), 83.
162 | Chen et al. (2009), 83.
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poverty, low social mobility, and land-loss-related displacement. In an interview 
in 2008, for instance, Li Ruguo, President of the China EXIM Bank, is quoted 
as saying that his Bank would assist 12 million workers who were to lose their 
land through modernization, industrialization, and urbanization to find work 
abroad.163 Former President Hu Jintao has been quoted as saying that emigra-
tion was “a good way to lower demographic pressure, economic overheating, 
and pollution in mainland China.”164 Also, as mentioned above, wages can be 
from 30 % to 400 % higher in Africa for skilled workers in managerial posi-
tions.165 
In practice, the increasing number of (un)skilled Chinese laborers, who 
often live in segregated communities, is perceived as a threat in recipient 
countries with high unemployment levels. The concerns of the host popula-
tions over these social aspects of Chinese investments have been politicized 
by some political actors during electoral campaigns, such as the former oppo-
sition leader and then elected President Michael Sata in Zambia (who was in 
office from 2011 until his death in October 2014). However, the case of Zambia 
also reveals that it might be too easy to blame these unfavorable conditions 
on foreign investors such as the Chinese. Undeniably, the previous Zambian 
governments actually abstained from governing whole sectors (e.g., cotton) and 
from negotiating local content requirements in the context of IFDI.166 And the 
newly-elected President (and suddenly deceased), Michael Sata, has not under-
taken reforms that will provide a better framework for the Zambian population 
to profit from these and other investments during his time in office.167 Several 
case studies document that national policy and politics in recipient countries 
matter greatly in shaping how these investments take place. The labor report 
by Baah and Jauch, for instance, cites numerous incidents where the response 
by government agencies or trade unions improved conditions on the ground.168 
At the same time, the increasing risk awareness among Chinese government 
officials and the fear of huge investment losses overseas have led the govern-
ment to offer CSR training to the corporate management staff of SOEs, and to 
implement the Equator Principles as evaluation criteria for public funding.169
From the official angle, the global repercussion of this trend towards inter-
nationalizing the Chinese labor market and its specific characteristics (e.g., 
segregated overseas communities) have been downplayed and/or explained in 
163 | Coonan (28 December 2008); Patton (7 April 2008); Murphy and Tao (2006).
164 | Sege and Beuret (2009), 5.
165 | Park (2009).
166 | Tschirley and Kabwe (2009). 
167 | Spilsbury (2012/2013).
168 | Baah and Jauch (2009).
169 | Leung (2010).
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the context of China’s development trajectory. Lu Shaye, Director General of 
the Department of African Affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 
2009 to 2014, partially dismisses labor related problems of Chinese invest-
ments to Africa by arguing that it is all a matter of perspective.170 His point 
is that the low wage levels associated with the investments in Africa are high 
when compared to wage levels in the same sectors in China. The overseas wage 
levels result from the fact that Chinese companies’ competitive edge is their 
low cost. Moreover, the segregation of Chinese workers from local communi-
ties is due to “a problem of cultural gap and language barrier” that leads the 
workers to “[...] build up their own social circle.”171 In his opinion, this trend 
is intensified by the fact that Chinese employees abroad work in harsh condi-
tions to ensure a better life at home: “The Chinese employees work in tougher 
conditions than the employees of western companies. [...] They live a hard life, 
eat simple food and live in simple domiciles so that they can send home the 
money they earned to raise their families and improve their living conditions.” 
Notably, all of this bears a strong resemblance to migratory patterns in the late 
19th century.172 At the same time, the number of Chinese labor disputes has 
increased, reflecting “attempts by China-based labor export agents to get extra 
income from the Chinese workers.”173
6. concLusion
This chapter has presented the main empirical characteristics of what is hap-
pening regarding Chinese land-consuming OFDI since 2000. The chapter has 
reported in great detail on agricultural projects. These were the most common 
in the “land grab” reports that served as a starting point of my research.174 
However, official data shows that agricultural investments only make up a 
minor share of total on Chinese (land-consuming) OFDI in SSA. 
Importantly, the empirical findings point to the complexity of (f)actors at 
play and/or the different timelines involved. The following paragraphs will 
170 | Gouraud (18 October 2011). Also see Buckley (2011) for an ethnographic descrip-
tion of the dif ferent perspectives involved in Chinese-Senegalese agricultural projects.
171 | Gouraud (18 October 2011).
172 | Gouraud (18 October 2011).
173 | Chen et al. (2009), 83.
174 | It is important to remember that the strong focus on Chinese agricultural projects 
that characterized early publications and project listings of the “land grab” debate is 
a result of two things: biased reporting; and the initial focus on farmland grabs. In the 
UK case, similar data problems led to an over-reporting of investments in biofuels. See 
Chapter 1 (Section 5). 
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summarize the core empirical findings for each of the categories that have 
guided this chapter (see Table 4-5). This implies a reduction of the complexity 
that has been characteristic of the main empirical traits identified, and it clearly 
means that certain features which are also part of Chinese land-consuming 
OFDI in SSA will be excluded. However, it is a necessary step to guide the 
reader and refresh the core results that the Chapter 5 will go on to explain.
The findings highlight that multiple actors are involved in Chinese 
land-consuming OFDI in SSA. However, they also show that public actors and 
agencies are predominant in (large-scale) Chinese land-consuming OFDI in 
SSA. SOEs, for example, run economic cooperation projects, regardless of the 
sector, and also search for profitable investment operations on their own. They 
are often involved—usually with a majority position—in joint ventures with 
host country companies or SOEs. Government officials of the home and host 
country are also active in these joint ventures, particularly in negotiating the 
terms of economic cooperation, which they frequently do at political forums 
(such as FOCAC) or through other (bilateral) exchange channels. 
Importantly, these forms of state agency are composed of diverse “land 
grab” interests and strategies. Chinese official actors often pursue their own 
agenda rather than that of the central state. Moreover, Chinese SOEs rely on 
multiple institutions and financial sources (e.g., headquarters, host country 
national banks, and multilateral funding) in their operations, aside from 
Chinese development finance. They also apply mainstream managerial eco-
nomics in their operations and are characterized by a profit orientation, even 
in cases where Chinese development finance is involved, or where resources 
are being exploited. The previous assessment also highlighted that Chinese 
land-consuming FDI projects are often pro-actively sought by African govern-
ments, and reflective of recipient countries’ development policies.
Most companies produce for domestic and regional markets in SSA, par-
ticularly in the agricultural sector. However, the latter makes up only a minor 
share of total Chinese OFDI activities of which land-consuming investments 
form a part. The majority of investments go into mining, manufacturing, and 
financial services. With regard to the role of land, this means that land is used 
as a natural resource, but also as a space to open up profitable business oppor-
tunities in construction, manufacturing, and/or through SEZs. 
The timelines of most of these investment projects can be traced far back. 
While China is a newcomer to the role of capital exporter, it shares a long history 
of cooperating with and providing aid to many African countries. Several 
actors, such as construction companies, have previously run aid projects on the 
ground, and have more recently turned into successful contract bidders due to 
their experience and cost advantage. The multiple crises of 2007/2008 have 
not been critical for what has been happening since 2000. Instead, their role in 
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Chinese OFDI activities has been ambiguous—preventing as well as enabling 
Chinese overseas investments. 
In the case of China, Section 5 addressed the issue of labor migration and 
related claims of strategic labor export. These claims have regularly appeared 
in the media and led to political tensions in host countries, many of which 
suffer from high unemployment. It showed that while the central government 
has no pro-active strategy in place to promote labor export, it also does not have 
a strategy to curb the phenomenon, nor are the origins of the pressure to work 
abroad adequately dealt with by the home government. 
In conclusion, several tendencies of Chinese land-consuming OFDI seem 
noteworthy and demand an explanation that assesses them in the home country 
context. In particular, the empirical findings show that Chinese investment 
projects in SSA establish new markets, access and secure resources, engage in 
profitable business undertakings, internationalize the operations of particular 
companies, and/or strengthen and expand the home country’s political ties and 
powerful economic presence in African countries. 
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Table 4-5 – Review of the Empirical Characteristics of Chinese OFDI175
Category Core Empirical Characteristics
Actors Projects involve public actors from the recipient country and China; they 
are usually operated by Chinese SOEs, often in cooperation with host 
country SOEs; some actors have a long history on the continent (e.g., 
construction companies) because they began implementing Chinese aid 
projects in the 1950s; Chinese workers and experts are an integral part 
of Chinese investment projects: the experts are part of agricultural trai-
ning centers that Chinese companies are rehabilitating and the workers 
are often employed by construction and energy companies in order to 
keep costs low.
Institutions The main cooperation strategies are negotiated at FOCAC; regarding 
finances, companies rely on multiple sources, ranging from headquar-
ter support and Chinese development finance to multilateral and host 
country funding.
Sectors The majority of investments go into mining and manufacturing, follo-
wed by financial services; according to government data, agricultural 
investments make up only a minor share of total Chinese OFDI in SSA.
Timelines Projects predate the 2007/2008 crises, often they can be traced back 
to Mao-Era cooperation with African countries; however, the way they 
are run has changed significantly over time; today, they are for-profit 
enterprises.
Role of land Land is used as a natural resource, but also as a space in which to open 
profitable business opportunities (e.g., construction and manufactu-
ring); in both cases, projects have a strong profit orientation, and are not 
necessarily producing for export to China.
Recipient 
context
Projects, particularly in the agricultural sector, have been requested by 
African host country governments; mostly, they seem to be the result of 
inter-governmental cooperation at different levels of government; the 
actors involved can have very different interests.
175 | This summary substantially reduces the complexity that has characterized the 
empirical findings of this chapter. However, it is intended to guide the reader by high-
lighting the core traits of Chinese investment projects that will be explained from a 
home country perspective in Chapter 5 and compared with British empirical character-
istics in Chapter 8.
Chapter 5: The Chinese Context  
Investments from a Home Country Perspective
1. inTroducTion
The empirical evidence casts doubt upon the widespread claims according to 
which Chinese land-consuming OFDI is for the country’s food security. In 
practice, the comparatively small share of agricultural projects produces for 
domestic or regional consumption, and many projects can be traced back before 
the 2007/2008 crises. Moreover, Chinese projects target multiple sectors that 
use land not only as a resource, but also as a productive space for industrial 
and modernization activities. At the same time, the agency of the state is very 
diverse. And, a wide range of non-state actors, Chinese and other are involved. 
This chapter looks at the how and why of Chinese land-consuming OFDI 
activities against the background of the investor country itself. In particular, 
it will discuss these activities in view of China’s OFDI policy (Section 2), the 
guiding ideology of China-Africa relations (Section 3), and, finally, the coun-
try’s political economy (Section 4) and development trajectory (Section 5). The 
multiple threads emerging from this discussion will be summarized in the con-
clusion (Section 6), which will be guided by the question of why these invest-
ments occur as they do in and over time. In addition to domestic dynamics 
and international contexts, this section will also briefly assess the investments’ 
likely welfare implications.
It is argued that the following features are significant in explaining Chinese 
OFDI from a home country perspective: (1) these investments are embedded 
in an increasingly supportive OFDI framework that emerged as a result of the 
country’s resource-intensive and export-oriented industrial set-up; (2) they are 
guided by a foreign policy ideology that is affected by the neoliberal termi-
nology of “win-win” and embedded in the analytical frame of today’s main-
stream economics—representing a major shift away from previous concepts 
of autarky and self-reliance that informed China-Africa relations; (3) the very 
actors and institutions involved are reflective of a system of “neoliberal govern-
mentality” that has emerged since 1978, and whose state-market relations are 
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more complex than the concept of state capitalism usually assumes; and (4) the 
investments reflect the rising resource pressures, external dependencies, high 
international competition, and social costs of China’s development trajectory 
since the 1990s.
More broadly, four drivers explain why Chinese land-consuming OFDI 
in SSA happens from the home country perspective. Accordingly, Chinese 
land-consuming OFDI projects are part of a long-term strategy to diver-
sify supply and access to resources (mineral products), even if these are not 
consumed back home; a diplomatic strategy to foster political alliances and 
expand the country’s soft power in international relations, through economic 
presence as well as commitment to host country requests; a commercial 
strategy to develop and open new markets for Chinese products; and a strategy 
to internationalize China’s industrial base to address the competitive pressures 
back home, as well as the ecological and social challenges.  
2. home counTry me asures
Institutionally, the investments in Africa reflect the full range of home country 
measures that have been implemented in China since the mid-1980s. This 
section will assess key timelines of the emerging policy framework underpin-
ning Chinese overseas investments; deliberate on the framework’s changing 
objectives in and over time; and introduce its key components that pertain 
to Chinese engagement with African countries. The discussion of Chinese 
land-consuming investments in the context of policy will be complemented by 
consecutive sections addressing the ideological and politico-economic specific-
ities of Chinese “land acquisitions” from a home country perspective. 
From a historical perspective, the increasingly supportive stance on OFDI 
flows and the related policy framework emerged in the 1990s. They then gained 
momentum in 2001 with the adoption of the “Go Out” (zou chuqu) policy 
framework.1 While it built on existing aid projects and bilateral diplomatic rela-
tions, this framework also reflects the fundamental changes that the Chinese 
government has made towards its OFDI policy preferences since 1978. Outward 
investments had long been referred to as “poisonous grass”2 in the domestic 
debate. They were portrayed as unfavorable for a domestic development strategy 
prioritizing the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. 
The transition from this OFDI-restrictive policy regime towards a supportive 
one has happened over several periods, stretching from China’s opening up 
1 | Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. (2013).
2 | Xue and Han (2010), 310-320.
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in 1984 until the present.3 Firstly, during the 1980s, the Chinese government 
prioritized the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, and maintained a 
prohibitive stance towards OFDI. Capital exports needed the approval of the 
National People’s Congress; foreign exchange earnings were only applicable for 
licensed companies in the export sector; and requirements established a USD 
10 million limit, together with the obligation to remit all profits made overseas.4 
Secondly, from 1991 until 2000, and particularly after Deng Xiaoping’s 
famous trip to the South in 1992 and the victory of the economically liberal 
faction within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the socialist faction, 
OFDI provisions and related regulations began to undergo far-reaching reforms. 
SOEs took on the status of monopolistic enterprises, which gave their man-
agement more leeway in operational decisions;5 foreign exchange regulations 
“changed from the previous ‘earn to use’ mode into a ‘buy and use’ mode;” and 
OFDI was framed in an official document (“opinion”) by the National Planning 
Commission (NPC) as a strategic instrument for overseas expansion.6 
Thirdly, since 2001, the Chinese government started implementing the “go 
out” framework, reflecting a more technical and increasingly supportive stance 
on Chinese OFDI (see below for a more detailed description of the framework). 
As a result, the overseas expansion of Chinese companies was supported by 
financial mechanisms and/or the provision of information about the host coun-
tries to the companies. 
Since 2009, the regulatory framework has “further eased and decentral-
ized the approval procedures,” thereby encouraging the overseas activities of 
Chinese companies.7 Moreover, “[i]n July 2009, the PRC government launched 
a small pilot program to permit selected Chinese companies to settle their 
cross-border trades in select offshore jurisdictions in RMB.”8 In this context, 
China’s Central Bank has also begun to push the internationalization of the 
renminbi, for instance, in the form of an agreement with the trade hub Nigeria 
3 | Xue and Han (2010), 310-320.
4 | Xue and Han (2010), 310-320.
5 | Wang (2002), 201-205.
6 | The NPC document was titled, “Opinion of the State Planning Commission on the 
Strengthening of the Administration of Overseas Investment Projects.” (The NPC is now 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)). See Xue and Han (2010), 
316-317.
7 | Rosen and Hanemann (2009). Of particular interest is Table 1 (p. 20) on “China’s 
OFDI Policy Framework.”
8 | King and Wood Mallesons (May 2014).
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in Africa to include the RMB as part of its foreign exchange reserves from 
January 2011.9 
OFDI: Development, Contexts, and Objectives 
A closer look at the official OFDI documentation helps to break down the 
sequence of events and identify the objectives that led the government (under 
the given political economy) to perceive overseas investment as a useful instru-
ment to realize particular interests. The following paragraphs will show that 
OFDI has been framed as a tool to facilitate the acquisition of resources, tech-
nology, and knowhow, promote exports, and create new markets. Specifically, 
OFDI is said to support the country’s efforts to upgrade its industrial struc-
ture to reduce the negative environmental, ecological, and social impacts of 
the economic development strategy; enhance resource security through the 
diversification of supply; counter the negative impacts of the economic crisis in 
Asia (and Europe) on the Chinese export industry; strengthen and support the 
emergence of national champions (enterprises) in the context of liberalization 
and WTO accession; and, thereby, ensure the stability of the political regime 
whose legitimacy is seen to rely on economic growth (see Sections 3 and 4). 
Historically, two events explain the changing attitude of the Chinese gov-
ernment in view of OFDI in the mid-1990s: firstly, the rise to power of the 
economically liberal faction within the CCP; and, secondly, the rising external 
resource dependency in the 1990s and the increasing inability of the domestic 
resource base to keep up with industrial demand. Consequently, in 1992, OFDI 
became part of the country’s economic development plan, primarily in the 
context of encouraging the national oil companies to go abroad and diversify 
supply.10 The official document of the National Planning Committee also stated 
that OFDI should be endorsed to “acquire resources, technologies and markets 
overseas.”11 These were all crucial elements that the formerly closed-off country 
was missing in its industrial set-up, which did not have a global production 
9 | See Payi (September 2011) according to which “Nigeria diversif[ies] reserves 
into Renminbi” to moderate the currency volatility and inflation experienced between 
US and Naira (Nigerian currency). The negative US sovereign rating and the ongoing 
economic crisis in Europe have been influencing the decision by Nigeria to diversify its 
foreign exchange reserves as a strategy to improve security, liquidity, and returns. Also 
see the case of Zimbabwe, which has adopted the renminbi as legal currency under 
BusinessDaylive.co.za (30 January 2014). 
10 | Adapted from Xue and Han (2010), 317. And Rosen and Hanemann (2009), 20.
11 | The NPC document was titled “Opinion of the State Planning Commission on the 
Strengthening of the Administration of Overseas Investment Projects.” See Xue and Han 
(2010), 316-317.
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network dimension. Consequently, changes in foreign exchange management 
made it easier for a greater variety of (SOE) enterprises to invest overseas.12 
With time, additional dynamics played an important role. In 1999, the 
Asian financial crisis gave impetus to further reform of the existing OFDI reg-
ulations. The crisis had led to a huge decline in exports due to the relative 
appreciation of the renminbi, and this decline was negatively affecting the man-
ufacturing industry, a major source of jobs and state revenues. In response, a 
first reference to the “Go Out” strategy appeared in the 1999 State Council 
document titled “Opinion on encouraging companies to carry out overseas 
material processing and assembly.”13 This document affirmed the use of OFDI 
to address the problem of a massive decline in regional export demand, and it 
encouraged overseas assembly and processing activities to profit from cheap 
labor and resources in the context of the rising international competition for 
markets. In this reform step, the economic emphasis was on export promotion 
and industrial restructuring. 
Another event that impacted OFDI regulation was China’s WTO acces-
sion in 2001. In anticipation of this event, the 5th Plenary Session of the 15th 
Congress of the CCP issued a “suggestion” for economic and social development 
in 2000, which mentioned four investment types that would be supported, 
namely “processing, trade, resources extraction, project contracting.”14 Among 
the policy support measures mentioned were credit and insurance services.15 
This “suggestion,” which forms the basis of today’s “Go Out” Strategy, was 
then embedded in the “Outline of the 11th Five Year Plan for national economic 
and social development.”16 It has become the foundation of ongoing reforms, 
such as the further simplification and decentralization of approval procedures 
regarding overseas investment,17 particularly with regard to foreign exchange 
management and the provision of funds for market development and interna-
tionalization. 
The underpinning story of this reform process, namely the association of 
overseas investment with domestic economic interests (framed as “needs” in 
the respective official documentation), has since become a common pattern 
of official rhetoric and action. For instance, at the 16th National Congress of 
the CCP in 2002, the then President Jiang Zemin stressed the importance of 
overseas investments for facilitating domestic reforms and liberalization in the 
context of WTO accession, and for creating competitive TNCs and brands with 
12 | Xue and Han (2010), 316-317.
13 | Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9.
14 | Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9.
15 | Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9.
16 | Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9.
17 | Rosen and Hannemann (2009), 20; Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9.
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the help of the export of commodities and labor services.18 Ongoing reforms 
of OFDI management continue to simplify approval structures while freeing 
more financial resources in support of OFDI activities.19 
Together, these multiple objectives, which have come to be associated with 
the Chinese perspective on OFDI projects and embedded in the contemporary 
policy framework, provide important parameters of Chinese development chal-
lenges, economic interests and paradigms that any assessment and explanation 
of Chinese land-consuming FDI has to take into consideration. The key insti-
tutional features of this framework in which Chinese OFDI in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is embedded will be outlined in the following section. At the same time, 
this positive framing of OFDI mirrors shifts in the country’s guiding ideology 
and political economy that will be explained subsequently.
The “Go Out” Framework
Today, the set of home country measures that supports Chinese OFDI is 
cross-cutting in view of both sectors and policy fields (aid, trade, and invest-
ment). It incorporates a large range of encouragement policies in the form of 
tax relief, loans support, foreign exchange policy, expat insurance, bilateral 
investment treaty (BIT) agreements, and information services, as well as sim-
plified approval processes, and regularized supervision.20 While this OFDI 
policy framework is among the most elaborate when compared to those of 
the other BRICS countries21, it still lags behind those of the OECD countries, 
and Chinese entrepreneurs will remain at a disadvantage compared to their 
Western counterparts as long as government and governance “largely function 
by way of the ‘unwritten rules’ of political life.”22 The framework also suffers 
from the overlapping responsibilities of the agencies involved, especially the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)23 and the NDRC, which coordinate the host 
country catalogue. That catalogue lists the countries in which Chinese inves-
18 | Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9-10.
19 | Xue and Han (2010).
20 | Xue and Han (2010), 305-323.
21 | BRICS refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
22 | Yu (2008), 23.
23 | MOFCOM, the Ministry of Commerce of the Government of the People‘s Republic 
of China, was established in its current form in 2003. It focuses on trade policies, 
consumer regulations, FDI, and foreign economic policies/agreements (e.g., bilateral 
and multilateral trade agreements).
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tors are eligible for subsidies from their government.24 Moreover, the transfer 
of approval authority over foreign investments of less than USD 3 million from 
central government agencies, namely SAFE25 and MOFCOM, to the provin-
cial level in 2003 resulted in what has been described as “an alphabet soup 
of agencies, bureaucrats, and businesses looking to regulate or profit from 
Chinese firms’ overseas investments.”26 
With regard to Africa, the Chinese government has negotiated 26 bilateral 
investment agreements with African countries in recent years.27 It has also put 
in place an information service platform, through which companies can report 
difficulties they are facing in different countries and learn from each other’s 
experiences while retrieving legal and resource-related data on a given country. 
At the same time, formalized supervision has been introduced in the form of 
annual reporting by the investing company. All of these measures not only 
support OFDI, but also allow for the steering it. 
In addition to the regulatory institutions, several political and financial 
instruments specifically directed towards investments in SSA are part of this 
framework of home country measures that play an important role in the facil-
itation of Chinese land-consuming investments. In the political realm, the 
Forum of China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC, Zhong Fei hezuo luntan) has 
become a central platform for inter-governmental exchange, coordination, and 
cooperation. Since its establishment in 2000, high level summits have taken 
place on a triennial basis. 
Activities at FOCAC include the announcement of major economic and aid 
cooperation projects between China and Africa, such as the agricultural tech-
nology development centers, and the release of important white papers about 
the terms and principles of cooperation. Many heads of state and high level 
ministry personnel have attended the summits. For instance, the 4th FOCAC 
meeting in 2009 attracted heads of states and government officials from 49 
African countries in addition to a big Chinese entourage. In his opening speech, 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized the significance of the forum:
Since its founding nine years ago, FOCAC has played a major role in guiding and pro-
moting the development of China-Africa relations and become a bridge of friendship 
24 | For a detailed description of responsible agencies, their competencies, and 
issued policies concerning OFDI management, see Wilkes and Huang (2011); and Han 
and Xue (2010).
25 | SAFE, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange established in 1978, is a 
government agency that administers the rules and regulations of foreign exchange 
market activities. It also manages foreign exchange reserves.
26 | Salidjanova (2011), 13; Xue and Han (2010).
27 | Takman (2004). 
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and a platform of cooperation between China and Africa. In the three years since the 
Beijing Summit in particular, the two sides have worked together to build the new type 
of strategic partnership featuring political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win 
cooperation and cultural exchanges. Together, we have opened a new chapter in Chi-
na-Africa cooperation.28
Accompanying this form of strategic political cooperation are new forms of 
so-called development finance for overseas projects. In the case of Chinese 
investments in Africa, several financing sources which are embedded in the 
“Go Out” framework and located in the aid, trade, or investment policy fields 
are essential and will be highlighted in the following paragraphs.
Firstly, grants, zero-interest loans, and concessional loans support Chinese 
aid projects, which have been aligned to trade and investment objectives since 
a reform in the 1990s. Zero-interest loans and grants are taken from China’s 
aid budget and overseen by MOFCOM and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.29 
The China Development Bank (CDB) and the China EXIM Bank, created in 
1994, provide most of this finance under MOFCOM supervision. Moreover, 
concessional loans were introduced as a new aid instrument in 1995 under the 
management of the China EXIM Bank. These loans have a long-term repay-
ment period of 20 years, a fixed interest rate (2-3%), and a five-year grace period. 
Importantly, the aid funds are only used to cover the difference between the 
China EXIM Bank’s rate and the fixed interest rate.30 Using these new instru-
ments to deliver development finance, the Chinese government could increase 
the total number of development assistance activities.31
Another financial mechanism is the Special Fund for Foreign Economic 
and Technical Cooperation (hereafter ‘the Special Fund’), one of several under 
the supervision of MOFCOM that are meant to support Chinese companies 
“carrying out the needs of China’s economic diplomacy.”32 It has, for instance, 
been used to back Chinese companies involved in the establishment of the 
Special Economic Zones mentioned in Chapter 4.33 The Special Fund repays to 
companies active in African countries a share of their pre-investment costs and 
provides interest rate subsidies for bank loans. Importantly, the Special Fund is 
not part of the official aid budget.34
28 | Wen (2009). 
29 | Brautigam (2011a), 3; State Council (2011a).
30 | Brautigam (2011a), 4. 
31 | Brautigam (2011a), 4.
32 | Brautigam (2011a), 4.
33 | State Council (2010).
34 | Brautigam (2011a), 4.
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Loans made by the two major policy banks, the CDB and the China EXIM 
Bank, are also important for Chinese land-consuming investments. While these 
loans are “heavily influenced by government policies and are not to operate in 
full compliance with market rules,” they have to meet criteria of profitability.35 
Since these banks get the same credit-rating as the Chinese government, they 
can increase funds by issuing bonds with that favorable rating; and they can 
take a long-term perspective.36
In addition, export buyer’s credits, a long-time feature of the OECD coun-
tries’ OFDI frameworks, were introduced in 1998. They were initially for firms 
with projects in the construction sector overseas (Asia). Since 2005, the China 
EXIM Bank has offered such credits for investments in Africa. These export 
buyers’ credits, which make up the majority of lending done by the China 
EXIM Bank, are not part of the foreign aid regime. Instead, they are issued 
in United States dollars using international standard rates like the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) or the Commercial Interest Rate of Reference 
(CIRR).37 Moreover, preferential export buyer’s credits are issued.
Aside from the aforementioned activities conducted by the so-called policy 
banks, financial activities in Africa also involve Chinese commercial bank activ-
ities, such as the China Construction Bank, the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC), the Agricultural Bank of China, and the Bank of China. 
These banks have recently set up branches in African countries with the aim of 
supporting Chinese companies overseas. Take, for example, the ICBC, which 
purchased a 20% share in the South Africa’s Standard Bank. The latter is active 
in 18 African countries, and it is a major financial actor with regard to loan 
services in Africa.38 This means that increasingly, Chinese financial actors, 
both private and state-owned, are becoming influential actors in the financial 
sectors of key African countries and gaining the ability to facilitate investments 
through bilateral arrangements and beyond. This is also evidenced by the inter-
nationalization of the renminbi and its previously noted recognition as foreign 
exchange currency in some host countries (e.g., Nigeria, Zambia).
On the inter-governmental level, the China-Africa Development Fund, 
an equity fund established in 2006 at FOCAC, supports Chinese companies 
whose trade and economic activities concentrate on Africa. Rather than pro-
viding credits, this fund invests in these companies in order to raise their finan-
cial capacities. It also provides consulting services. It is overseen by the China 
Development Bank, and projects are chosen on the basis of China’s diplomatic 
35 | Brautigam (2011a), 4.
36 | Brautigam (2011a), 4.
37 | Brautigam (2011a), 4.
38 | See the report on China’s financial institutions by Executive Research Associates 
Ltd. (2009), 77-91.
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and economic policies towards the continent. In addition, in 2009, the China 
Development Bank announced a Special Loan for African SMEs in selected 
sectors (export orientation, agriculture), using the mode of direct lending and 
tending.39 
In Hong Kong, the “Go Out” strategy was mirrored by the creation of the 
China-Africa Business Council on 21 April, 2007. The Council, at that time 
under the presidency of Mr. Hu Deping, was established by the China Society 
for Promotion of the Guangcai Program, together with the United Nations 
Development Program and the Ministry of Commerce/China International 
Centre for Economic and Technical Exchanges.40 It seeks to explore business 
opportunities among Hong Kong, the Mainland, and African businesses.
Summar y
Five observations regarding Chinese land-consuming investments in SSA can 
be derived from the OFDI policy framework and its emergence. Firstly, these 
investments are part of a general trend of growth in Chinese overseas invest-
ments that is related to the adoption of a supportive OFDI policy over time, 
particularly since 2000. According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, at the 
end of 2010, 13.000 Chinese investors or institutions were operating 16.000 
overseas enterprises in 178 countries.41 By that year, China had become a major 
source of global OFDI flows, moving into fifth place among all investor coun-
tries (preceded only by the US, Germany, France, and Hong Kong).42 
Secondly, the comparatively low levels of OFDI stock nonetheless reveal that 
China has just begun to catch up with the international standards represented 
by the OECD countries.43 The ratio of Chinese IFDI-to-OFDI, which in 2011 
39 | Definition of “African SME:” solely African owned small and medium-sized enter-
prise (SME); Chinese owned SME in Africa; Joint African-Chinese private equity SMEs; 
contractual joint venture SMEs. Sectors supported: infrastructure, agriculture, ter tiary 
industry. In 2009, the CDB developed and recorded 34 projects in Africa. These have a 
total value of USD 961 million in commercial or preferential loans, which does not count 
as aid but as market based financial support. See MOFCOM (2011b); and MOFCOM, 
Department of Western Asian and African Affairs (2010).
40 | See China-Africa Business Council (Hong Kong) website (http://cabc.hkbu.edu.
hk/news6.html); and Africa Confidential (2014).
41 | MOFCOM (2011a), 79, 80. 
42 | See MOFCOM (2011a), 79, 80. 
43 | MOFCOM (2011a); 81. On the limitations of OFDI data from MOFCOM, see, for 
instance, Korniyenko and Sakatsume (2009), 3. 
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stood at a level of 1:0.09, was still below the world average of 1:1.11. In compar-
ison, OECD countries have an average ratio of 1:1.14.44 
Thirdly, despite being part of a general trend, the instruments summarized 
above apply particularly to the Chinese investments in African countries. Yet, it 
is important to note that it remains unclear to which extent Chinese land-con-
suming FDI projects have actually accessed or profited from these political and 
financial support mechanisms. 
Fourthly, while these investments are unique within the Chinese country 
context, they are not exceptional in comparison to other countries’ prac-
tices. Comparative research on FDI regulations shows that the home country 
measures implemented in China are rather common worldwide, particularly 
among the highly industrialized countries.45 Also, Chinese development 
finance is far from being extraordinary in international comparison.46 
Fifthly, the timeline of the emergence of China’s OFDI framework under-
scores that it was a response to country specific developments and politico-eco-
nomic constellations at certain points in time. These include the rise to power 
of the economically liberal faction within the CCP; the industrial demand 
surpassing the country’s resource base; the increasing dependence on export 
markets; and the enhanced competition at home due to the IFDI-led growth 
strategy as well as WTO accession. 
In summary, the above overview of frameworks, timelines, and objectives 
supports this research project’s argument that it is crucial to account for the 
specificities of home country context and development in explaining why 
these investments are occurring. This section has done so by comparatively 
introducing the key features and events that have constituted and shaped the 
contemporary policy framework that supports Chinese OFDI in general and 
Chinese OFDI in Africa in particular. Such a detailed contextualization of the 
investments in country frameworks, timelines, and objectives also points to the 
importance of taking the structural (i.e. export dependency, limited resource 
base, or WTO accession) and contingent (i.e. Asian crisis or the victory of the 
liberal faction within the CCP) factors of a home country’s development trajec-
tory into account when assessing and analyzing land-consuming investments. 
As Marks so pointedly highlighted in his history of the modern world, in many 
cases events not plans shape great powers.47 This insight emphasizes the limits 
of using highly functional theoretical approaches to capture why “land grabs” 
occur.
44 | Sun (2011), 8.
45 | Sauvant et al. (2010).
46 | See, for instance, Brautigam (2011a).
47 | Marks (2007)
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3. GuidinG ideoLoGy
Chinese land-consuming OFDI projects do not transpire in an ideological 
vacuum. Rather, their facilitation and legitimation is embedded in an overar-
ching and guiding set of ideas that is prone to shifts over time. This guiding 
ideology, basically a cluster of ideas that perform ideological functions, ranges 
over several policy sectors, taking the form of white papers, significant govern-
ment speeches, or declarations at the end of FOCAC conferences. A closer look 
at the discourse surrounding these investments reveals the profound changes 
that have taken place in China’s political landscape and development orienta-
tion since 1978. Instead of portraying the anti-capitalist and self-dependence 
dogma of Mao-era foreign policy, the new discourse is affected by the neolib-
eral terminology of “win-win” and embedded in the analytical frame of today’s 
mainstream economics.48 The latter has become entrenched in the thoughts 
of the different factions in the CCP,49 and it is visible in official reports on Chi-
na-Africa relations, such as the one by the Chinese Academy of International 
Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC), which argues that the “sustained, 
rapid growth of China’s economy has provided a broad and stable market for 
African products.”50 Phenomena that under Mao-era rhetoric would have been 
attributed to “imperialism” are now framed as “opportunities,” and the explo-
ration of resources is now referred to as serving both parties’ “development 
needs” rather than representing unilateral “exploitation” and “plunder.”51 
However, this rhetoric is not confined to the realm of international economic 
relations. Instead, it reflects the ‘trickle down’ ideology that has been embraced 
by the political elite since the 1990s in national development programs. The 
strengthening of the (economically) liberal faction within the CCP led to 
the adoption of a development strategy that has become known as “playing 
two hands hard.”52 While one hand represents the ultimate power and polit-
ical control by the party, the other hand has been used “to achieve economic 
growth by any and all means possible and available.”53 Under this development 
paradigm, economic growth has come to be seen as a guarantee of political 
regime stability, (allegedly) providing jobs and state revenues. Accordingly, it 
48 | Compare, for instance, Deng (1974) and the whitepaper on peaceful development 
by the State Council (2011b).
49 | Cheng (2001).
50 | CAITEC (2010).
51 | The comparison is based on Deng Xiaoping’s speech at the UN General Assembly 
(Deng (1974)) and contemporary government rhetoric of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) (MOFA (2006)).
52 | Oman (1 July 2011). 
53 | Oman (1 July 2011). 
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is at the center of political agendas across all levels of government. In 2011, the 
mounting social unrest related to the high costs of this development approach 
led the Chinese government to change the principle of “strong state, wealthy 
people” into “wealthy people, strong state” (12th Five Year Plan),54 indicating 
a new emphasis on social, environmental, and ecological aspects of develop-
ment. Yet, in practice, the political control of the party still comes before the 
well-being of the people or the environment (see Table 5-1 for relevant publica-
tions articulating China’s development ambitions and strategies). 
Against this background, China’s outreach to Africa since 2000 is seen in 
relation to China’s construction of a “socialist market economy”55 and is argued 
to be of “mutual benefit”56 for the parties involved. While the first notion 
clearly establishes a linkage between domestic economic interests and devel-
opment plans and overseas investments, the latter exposes the fundamental 
shift in China-Africa relations, from unilateral aid provision by China to 
Africa towards “mutually beneficial” cooperation, which is supposed to benefit 
Chinese economic interests as much as it does African countries (see Table 5-1 
for key documents establishing this linkage).57 
54 | Chinese Government (2011).
55 | State Council (2011a).
56 | State Council (2011b).
57 | Li (2006).
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Table 5-1 – Key Documents Outlining China’s Development in Relation to the 
Chinese Presence in Africa (selected)58
Speeches
1974 – Deng Xiaoping, Speech at the UN General Assembly
Government (White) Papers
2005 – White paper, “Peaceful Development Road
2006 – White paper, “China’s Africa Policy”
2006 – Strategy paper, “11th Five Year Plan, 2006-2010”
2010 – White paper, “China-Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation”
2011 – White paper “Peaceful Development”
2011 – White paper “Foreign Aid”
2011 – Strategy paper, “12th Five Year Plan, 2011-2015” 
Official Notice and Frameworks
1991 – National Planning Committee “Opinion”59
1999– State Council “Opinion”60
2000 – CCP “Suggestion”61
Since 2001– Emerging “Go Out” Framework for Overseas FDI62
Reports
2010 – China-Africa Trade and Economic Relationship
2011 – Statistical Bulletin of China’s OFDI 2010
58 | The documents can be found in the bibliography section as follows: Deng (1974); 
State Council (2005); MOFA (2006); National People’s Congress (2006); Chinese 
Government (2006); State Council (2011b), State Council (2011a); National People’s 
Congress (2011); Wilkes and Huang (2011); Chinese Government (2011); CAITEC 
(2010); Ministry of Commerce (2011a).
59 | See description in Xue and Han (2010), 316-317.
60 | See description in Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9.
61 | Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9.
62 | See description of major reforms and notices under Xue and Han (2010); Wilkes 
and Huang (2011); Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. (2013).
Chapter 5: The Chinese Contex t 167
China’s Africa Policy
In 2006, for the first time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published “China’s 
Africa Policy” (January 2006),63 a white paper that “present[ed] to the world the 
objectives of China’s policy towards Africa and the measures to achieve them, 
and its proposals for cooperation in various fields in the coming years, with a 
view to promoting the steady growth of China-Africa relations in the long term 
and bringing the mutually-beneficial cooperation to a new stage.”64
The document starts out by portraying Africa as a post-colonial continent 
with a “long history, vast expanse of land, rich natural resources and huge 
potential for development,” and continues by identifying the guiding princi-
ples of China-Africa relations as “equality and mutual benefit, solidarity and 
common development.”65 At the same time, the Ministry describes China as the 
“largest developing country in the world, [which] follows the path of peaceful 
development and pursues an independent foreign policy of peace.”66
With regard to the guiding ideology, the complementary concepts of 
“peaceful development” and “common development” are of special impor-
tance. Already in 2004 (and again in 2011), a foreign policy whitepaper titled 
“Peaceful Development” outlined this concept against the background of rising 
international concerns over Chinese investment activities abroad. Basically, the 
concept of peaceful development claims that China’s development trajectory is 
different from that of Western countries in the past, particularly regarding its 
foreign economic policy. Contrary to Western countries’ episodes of economic 
expansion and industrial restructuring, which were characterized by violence, 
domination, and colonization, China is framed as a responsible “big country,” 
managing its current industrial ‘need’ to expand overseas in a peaceful 
manner that allows for the realization of the development goals of all parties 
involved. Therefore, it allows for “common development,” which again matches 
the guiding principles of China-Africa relations, namely “mutual benefits,” 
“equality” and “solidarity,” as mentioned in “China’s Africa Policy” (see Table 
5-2). Multiple statements made by government officials apply this narrative, 
including the earlier quote from 2011 by Lu Shaye, then Director General of the 
Department of African Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the nature 
and driver of Chinese-African relations.67 China-Africa relations are said to be 
complementary in nature, meeting China’s interest in new markets, resources, 
and business opportunities, and African countries’ interest to increase their 
63 | MOFA (2006).
64 | MOFA (2006).
65 | MOFA (2006). 
66 | MOFA (2006).
67 | Gouraud (18 October 2011).
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primary commodity exports, import technology to improve their economies’ 
productivity, and improve their representation in international fora.68
It is worth noting that the 2006 “China’s Africa Policy” also provides a 
detailed account of measures to be implemented to realize the “mutually ben-
eficial” cooperation. Measures named in the political realm include enhanced 
governmental cooperation at all levels of government between the African con-
tinent and China, as well as cooperation in international affairs, with China 
speaking up for African interests in international institutions. Objectives in 
the economic field are to establish a China Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (CAJCCI),69 stimulate trade, facilitate investment, enhance agri-
cultural cooperation, boost infrastructure projects, and foster “resource coop-
eration” while continuing with FOCAC ministerial conferences, amongst other 
projects. In the case of Chinese land-consuming investments in agriculture, the 
document states that the “focus will be laid on the cooperation in land develop-
ment, agricultural plantation, breeding technologies, food security, agricultural 
machinery and the processing of agricultural and side-line products.”70
68 | Gouraud (18 October 2011).
69 | See the website of the China Africa Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(http://www.china-africajcci.org/english/about_us.asp) for more information. 
70 | MOFA (2006).
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Table 5-2 – Guiding Principles and Objectives of “China’s Africa Policy” (MOFA 
2006)71
Sincerity, friendship and equality. China adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, respects African countries’ independent choice of the road of development 
and supports African countries’ efforts to grow stronger through unity.
Mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity. China supports African count-
ries’ endeavor for economic development and nation building, carries out cooperation in 
various forms in the economic and social development, and promotes common prosperi-
ty of China and Africa.
Mutual support and close coordination. China will strengthen cooperation with Afri-
ca in the UN and other multilateral systems by supporting each other’s just demand and 
reasonable propositions and continue to appeal to the international community to give 
more attention to questions concerning peace and development in Africa.
Learning from each other and seeking common development. China and Africa 
will learn from and draw upon each other’s experience in governance and development, 
strengthen exchange and cooperation in education, science, culture and health. Suppor-
ting African countries’ efforts to enhance capacity building, China will work together 
with Africa in the exploration of the road of sustainable development.
The one China principle is the political foundation for the establishment and develop-
ment of China’s relations with African countries and regional organizations.
In many cases, this rhetoric of mutual benefit, learning, solidarity, and common 
development is replicated when outlining inter-governmental project goals (see 
Chapter 4), but it is also present on the private firm level. For example, the 
“murky” China International Fund Ltd. (CIF) uses a Chinese allegory tracing 
back to the philosopher Laozi to show how its investments in Africa will serve 
the goal of “common development” and “mutual benefit” by transferring tech-
nology and know-how on the one side, and creating new business opportunities 
on the other: “Give a Man a Fish and you Feed him for a Day. Teach a Man to 
Fish and You Feed Him for a Lifetime” (see Figure 51).72 
71 | MOFA (2006), part III.
72 | To learn more about the dubious reputation of this Fund, see a summary of critical 
reports on the blog by Brautigam (19 October 2011).
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Figure 5-1 – China International Fund Information Material (CIF 2011)73
Summar y 
China’s changing ideological orientation clearly correlates with the shifting 
interests of its growth and export-oriented and resource-intensive (political) 
economy. Undoubtedly, such an economy cannot function along the lines of 
an anti-capitalist ethics framework. That old framework, focusing on “self-de-
pendence” and “autonomy” and assuming a zero-sum nature of international 
economic and ecological exchanges conducted on a capitalist basis, was the 
common Chinese standpoint prior to the opening up of the country. To the 
degree that the current ideology basically denies that there are zero-sum 
aspects in the above outlined bilateral relations that might make one of the 
two partners worse off—from an ecological, economic, and/or social point of 
view—the ideological discourse reveals an affinity with mainstream economics 
framings of development and cooperation that are embedded at the level of 
international economic and aid governance.
At the same time, the above presented information/publicity brochure of 
the China International Fund Ltd. (Figure 5– 1) reflects the slightly asymmetric 
conception of this “mutual benefit” relationship that is outlined in “China’s 
Africa Policy” and other significant publications mentioned before. It antic-
ipates the exchange of resources from African countries for technology and 
73 | “Give a Man a Fish and You Feed Him for a Day. Teach a Man to Fish and You Feed 
Him for a Lifetime.” This saying is reported to date back to Laozi, a philosopher of ancient 
China who developed the strain of Taoism (dao-ism). Chinese characters displayed are 
as follows: 非洲 (feizhou) = Africa; 中国 (zhongguo) = China; 鱼 (yu) = Fishery; 渔(yu) = 
Fish. The sentence plays with the multiple meanings of the word “yu” ( jade alias wealth; 
fish; fishery). The comic is taken from the information brochure of the China Interna-
tional Fund (2011), 27-28.
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know-how from China. For the moment, this is largely a reflection of the 
economic set-up of the partnering countries, but historical evidence highlights 
that such asymmetric exchanges carry the danger of becoming permanent. At 
the least, they are hard to overcome, especially once they are locked into existing 
societal and economic structures. The following section will expand on the 
key characteristics of Chinese political economy because they are important to 
understanding the core traits of this shift towards liberalism presented above 
from the viewpoint of interests involved.
4. PoLiTicaL economy
Given the complexity of actor constellations in the context of land-consuming 
investments, but also in view of the previously described discursive shift since 
the 1990s, it seems vital to outline the key characteristics of the investor coun-
try’s political economy that might explain both phenomena in the larger context 
of home country development. Evidently, referring to the dominant role of the 
state in China’s economy falls short of capturing the specificities and/or fails to 
account for conflicting interests. 
In this section, the argument is made that three aspects of the political 
economy are of particular relevance when contextualizing and explaining—in 
the home country context—the guiding ideology, as well as the multitude of 
Chinese agents, involved in overseas investments in SSA. These aspects will be 
discussed under the headings of state fragmentation; the rise of bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs; and shifting state-market relations. The characteristic mixture 
of these three aspects has been summarized by Feng Xu under the concept of 
“neoliberal governmentality.”74
State Fragmentation 
Though this is often overlooked, the emergence of the OFDI framework has 
been the outcome of a process of political reform. That is, despite the absence 
of a reform in China towards a “multiparty system and the separation of 
powers,”75 it was a political reform process which created the foundation for the 
economic transition outlined above. This reform process, which has yielded an 
increasing “fragmentation of the central government,”76 as well as the “rise of 
sub[-]state actors,” has taken place in the areas of “state governance and of the 
74 | Feng (2009), 432.
75 | Yu (2008), 23.
76 | Bo (2011).
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administrative systems of the state.”77 As a result, Feng Xu argues that a system 
of “neoliberal governmentality” has emerged:
Although China is in broad terms an illiberal polity, the Chinese state is increasingly 
adopting a neo-liberal way of governing or neo-liberal governmentality. Following Michel 
Foucault, “governmentality” refers to forms of governance that utilize a network of state 
and non-state actors, with the specific aim of steering individuals (both individual 
persons and individual institutions) to govern themselves in the market economy.78
Increasingly, governance of areas such as energy, agriculture, investment, and 
labor, all of which are related to Chinese land-consuming OFDI, reveals forms 
of neoliberal governmentality in the way it is organized. Particular characteris-
tics are the engagement of multiple actors from the public and private sectors, 
the decentralization of approval processes to lower levels of government, and 
the rising degree of “rule by regulation” in the governing of these policy areas. 
Importantly, Foucault coined the term “neoliberal governmentality” to 
describe a middle ground of economic governance between laissez faire and 
state collectivism.79 In addition, Lemke highlighted that the term defines the 
fundamental change in how a particular socioeconomic and political order is 
legitimized: “Collective wealth produced a social consensus on a state that was 
no longer defined in terms of a historical mission but legitimated itself with ref-
erence to economic growth. Economic prosperity revealed the legitimacy of the 
state for all to see [...].”80 Moreover, from the perspective of liberal and neoliberal 
political and economic theories, the term ‘neoliberal governmentality’ seems to 
capture elements of both definitions. On the one hand, the economic liberaliza-
tion processes underway since the 1980s have led to greater importance being 
placed on the rule of law and markets in the governance of China’s economy; 
however, the (altered) state remains central in establishing these institutions and 
governing this process.81 On the other hand, some areas have become increas-
ingly deregulated, and (central) state control has been significantly reduced. 
This transformation is reflected in the increasingly elaborate “Go Out” frame-
work as well as in the composition of OFDI. Not only have approval processes 
been transferred to the provincial level, but provincial actors have also begun to 
act as foreign policy entrepreneurs and investors. For instance, a pilot farm in 
77 | Yu (2008), 23.
78 | Feng (2009), 432.
79 | He attributed this form of governmentality to Germany, and acknowledged that 
dif ferent countries have dif ferent degrees of neoliberalism and governmentality in their 
socioeconomic orders. Foucault(2008), 192-194.
80 | Lemke (2010), 195-197.
81 | See, for instance, North et al. (2009), 45 (Footnote 16).
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Mozambique is the result of inter-provincial cooperation between Gaza province 
and Hubei province.82 In some cases, provincial overseas activities have even been 
in direct conflict with the foreign policy objectives of China’s central government.83 
Moreover, the major actors and institutions of the OFDI governance system have 
been created rather recently in order to meet the administrative challenges posed 
by the new complexity of economic relations and international development 
objectives; take, for example, MOFCOM. This ministry was established in 2003 
and given the responsibility of supervising Chinese OFDI in the domestic and 
international contexts while also coordinating foreign aid policy and instruments 
(funds and loans).84 The institution is a merger of multiple functions that were 
carried out by other departments prior to its existence. Another example is the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). It 
was created as an ‘ad hoc’ institution in 2003 and tasked with the management 
of national SOEs, including supervision and approval of their OFDI projects. It 
operates on the premises of the Ministry of Finance,85 and since its establishment, 
it has constantly advanced FDI related deregulation. Likewise, the acting Premier, 
Li Keqiang, and the State Council have asked government agencies to further 
deregulate and reduce “unnecessary administrative approvals.”86
The Rise of “Bureaucratic Entrepreneurs”
It is crucial to understand that in spite of the aforementioned political reform 
process and the multiplicity of actors involved in land-consuming overseas 
investments, the state remains a dominant actor in both the domestic economy 
and outward investment activities. The political reform was the result of a 
choice by the ruling elite to transform the economic structure while ensuring 
the “continuation of the elite strata.”87 Similar to the industrial revolution in 
Great Britain and that country’s subsequent overseas expansion, political actors 
in China gave up a certain portion of their political and legal privileges while 
becoming “new entrepreneurs and legislators” in a process that enhanced the 
intermingling of political office and economic opportunity.88 
The concentration of economic power within the multi-level realm of the 
state is reflected by the fact that among the 500 largest Chinese enterprises, 
the so-called “China 500,” almost all of the assets (96%) and profits (85%) were 
82 | Chichava (2013), 2, 9-11. 
83 | Chen and Jian (2009).
84 | See Xue and Han (2010), 308-309.
85 | See Xue and Han (2010), 308-309.
86 | Wildau (10 May 2013).
87 | Cheng (2001), 241.
88 | Cheng (2001), 241.
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held by SOEs in 2006.89 Currently, the Chinese government is also trying to 
increase its influence over the private sector, which is said to contribute more 
than two thirds of the annual growth in GNP.90 A rising number of private 
enterprises feature a party cell in their organizational set-up.91 However, it 
seems that in some cases, private companies undertake such CCP related activ-
ities primarily as a way to present themselves to relevant cadres and gain access 
to funding. This makes sense in the context of more than two decades of finan-
cial repression and a re-tightening of economic control by the political elite 
that has put the private sector at a disadvantage, both compared to state-owned 
enterprises and international competitors.92 
Since China’s opening up, this process of the “marketization of power”93 
has turned state officials into bureaucratic entrepreneurs. At the same time, the 
party has opened its membership regulations to allow private entrepreneurs in 
the CCP. By 2000, 20% of private entrepreneurs were said to have become party 
members. This trend enhances the synergetic relationship between public and 
private interests, particularly since a growing number of entrepreneurs belong 
to local party committees that exercise great influence at the local level.94 At 
the 18th National Congress of the CCP in 2012, Liang Wengen, the billionaire 
entrepreneur, was elected as a delegate for the second time, the first occasion 
being in 2007. Wengen epitomizes this intermingling of political power and 
economic wealth, as he had originally been a government official before he 
became an entrepreneur.95 
With regard to Chinese OFDI, this dominance of the state, together with 
the shifting interest structure of the actors involved, has several implications. 
On the one hand, overseas investments do reflect the dominance of state actors 
within the domestic economy: most (recorded) OFDI projects were still being 
undertaken by state-owned enterprises as of 2013.96 In Chinese land-con-
suming OFDI in Africa, research by Jansson indicates that SOEs usually 
dominate large-scale investment projects in the oil and construction sectors, 
while private enterprises tend to have small-scale investments in agribusiness, 
manufacturing, and communication (also see Table 5-3).97 Among the invest-
ments in the “land grab” literature that were studied for this book, the majority 
89 | Rudman (2006), 34.
90 | BloombergBusinessweek.com (21 August 2005).
91 | English.news.cn (21 June 2011).
92 | Fewsmith (2001), 170-176.
93 | He (13 November 2012). Also see He (2002).
94 | Rudman (2006), 50.
95 | Tây Sơn News Wire (27 September 2011); and ChinaDaily.com.cn (12 November 2012).
96 | Davies (2013), 8.
97 | Jansson (2009), 3.
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was undertaken by provincial and central SOEs in the mining or construc-
tion sectors, or by those SOEs active in the agricultural Friendship Farms. On 
the other hand, it is important to highlight the changing interest structure of 
state actors, which is reflected by the discursive turn outlined in the previous 
section on guiding ideology. State actors are increasingly in it for profit, which 
they then manage themselves.98 Given that capital investments in Africa are 
said to have a 60% higher return than in Asia,99 this detail seems essential for 
explaining why these investments take place as they do, particularly against the 
Chinese background of declining returns, domestic market saturation, limited 
economies of scale, and high wealth inequality. 
Table 5-3 – Three Levels of Chinese Engagement in Africa (Jansson 2009)100
98 | Also see He (13 November 2012).
99 | Liu (4 November 2011).
100 | Jansson (2009), 3 (Table 1).
ACTORS ACTIVITIES
Level 1 – government
Primarily Chinese and African 
governments and embassies, 
government departments, banks 
(China Export—Import; China 
Development Bank), and other 
financial institutions 
Bilateral relations and of-
ficial visits, FOCAC, party 
to party relations, policy 
bank financed concessio-
nal finance agreements, 
donations (stadiums, 
parliament buildings, 
hospitals), development 
aid, debt relief. 
Level 2 –  
larger company level
Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and larger private Chinese 
companies. These actors 
mostly have close relations with the 
Chinese Embassy in the respective 
African country, but they do not 
always work on projects financed 
by the Chinese government. 
• Large-scale infras-
tructure undertakings 
financed either by 
Chinese concessio-
nal loans, the AfDB, 
the WB, the African 
government, or other 
financial institutions. 
• Extractive industries: 
oil, minerals, timber. 
• Larger manufacturing/
assembly plants. 
Level 3 – small-scale 
economic activity level
Small-scale traders, owners of pro-
cessing plants, and ‘fast-moving’ 
businessmen who entered African 
countries independently. 
Between these actors and the Chi-
nese Embassy there is often very 
little interaction, assistance, and/
or control. 
• Import and trade in 
consumer goods, 
mineral processing, 
timber export, other 
small-scale economic 
activities. 
Land Grabbing and Home Countr y Development176
Changing State-Market Relations
The material presented above highlights two aspects of the changing state-
market relationship that are critical to understanding how and why Chinese 
investments occur. Firstly, the central state is not necessarily in control of what 
is happening and, secondly, the strong position of the state does not imply that 
these investments are not for profit. Rather, the high degree of state fragmen-
tation has provided discretionary power to the provinces, and the emergence 
of bureaucratic entrepreneurs has given rise to changing interest structures 
and an enhanced focus on profit, together with a development discourse that 
matches this interest structure and profit orientation. 
Adding to these increasingly complex state-market relations is a third 
aspect: the SOE management reforms that began in the 1980s (these were 
briefly alluded to in the ‘home country measures’ section of this chapter). 
In fact, over time, the Chinese government and the CCP introduced a policy 
(zhengqi fenkai) that separated “government functions from business opera-
tions.”101 As a consequence, “state-owned companies of all kinds have gradually 
been losing some of the advantages once conferred by their relationship with 
the state.”102 While SOEs gained leeway in terms of choosing CEOs, and now 
can hold on to the profit they generate, they are also held accountable for their 
failures by state officials, who have increasingly become distanced from SOEs. 
As a consequence, a rising number of SOEs has gone out of business.103 
This complex relationship is reflected in Chinese land-consuming OFDI 
in SSA, as even agricultural cooperation projects are operated by Chinese state 
farms on a for-profit basis, often without financial support from the govern-
ment.104 The complex nature of the relationship is also evidenced by the fact that 
construction sector SOEs have turned into contract bidders that pursue their 
own business strategies. Even in the case of China’s policy banks, the marketi-
zation of state interests, as well as the effects of the SOE management reform, 
is of fundamental importance. While bank loans are “heavily influenced by 
government policies and are not to operate in full compliance with the market 
rules,”105 as outlined earlier, banks are not permitted to accumulate debts and/
or engage in unprofitable business. This also applies to the China-Africa Devel-
opment Fund, which is expected to generate returns on the support it provides 
to Chinese businesses investing overseas.106 
101 | Woetzel (8 July 2008).
102 | Woetzel (8 July 2008); Wang (2002).
103 | Woetzel (8 July 2008). 
104 | Brautigam (2009).
105 | Brautigam (2011a), 4.
106 | Brautigam (2011a), 4.
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Also, the assessment of private investors benefits from the differentiated 
analysis of state-market relations. While thus far private entrepreneurs have 
hardly profited from Chinese funding or state institutions when investing over-
seas,107 research shows that their motivation to go abroad is often related to the 
state dominated political economy back home in two main ways. On the one 
hand, their motivation seems to be related to the crowding out effects of IFDI 
policies within China, together with domestic market saturation and unfa-
vorable regulations.108 On the other hand, a detailed study on the practices of 
Chinese companies in Angola has shown that Chinese privately owned enter-
prises (POEs) seem to operate in the periphery of SOEs, with the former taking 
on activities that the latter outsource from their overall production processes. 
This indicates that an isolated assessment of SOE and POE activity might miss 
the pull-and-push dynamics that link the two types of enterprises.109 
Summar y
The assessment of state-market relations underlines that key economic and 
political changes since the 1990s match the shifting development discourse 
in which Chinese land-consuming investments are embedded. The economic 
and political changes also explain the way these investments take place, namely 
their use of modern development finance, for-profit orientation, and/or the 
complex actor constellations. 
The intermingling of political power and economic wealth, the rise of sub-
state actors, and the linked dynamics between SOE and POE activity charac-
teristic of China’s political economy are easily overlooked by those explana-
tions of Chinese land-consuming FDI that assume that these investments are 
primarily conducted by state agents with the intent to secure resources. Such 
a narrow description also tends to overemphasize differences in relation to 
liberal countries. Take the example of home country measures applicable to 
Chinese OFDI: from a comparative perspective, these are very similar to the 
institutional landscape that has been in place in industrialized countries for a 
long time. In fact, China is just catching up to the range of mechanisms that 
companies in OECD countries have at their disposal. The greatest finding of 
this section might indeed be the high degree of institutional similarity (rather 
than uniqueness or innovation) that characterizes Chinese engagement with 
African countries when compared to Western relations with the continent—a 
107 | Jansson (2009); and Brautigam (2009), 257.
108 | Rui et al. (2010), 182.
109 | Action for South Africa (2011), 1; also see Belchior (2010). Overall, activities of 
privately owned enterprises (POEs) are under-researched, and POE projects are hardly 
mentioned in “land grab” databases.
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fact that is particularly interesting with regards to the South-South cooperation 
rhetoric often applied not just by Chinese and African partners, but also by 
multilateral organizations, such as the FAO.110
5. de veLoPmenT conTe x T
China has moved from close to zero OFDI activity to becoming an important 
investor country within less than three decades. From this historical per-
spective, but also with regards to China’s more recent decision to proactively 
promote such capital exports, the linkage of development trajectories and OFDI 
promotion deserves closer attention. After all, OFDI has become an important 
component of the country’s contemporary foreign economic policy as well as its 
diplomatic efforts. Also, FDI research has rightly noted that “OFDI is one part 
of the country’s overall strategy of economic development. It is a means to an end, 
not the goal itself.”111 The next paragraphs will bring together the various threads 
about OFDI in the context of Chinese development that appeared in earlier 
sections. Ultimately, this section provides the foundation for the comparative 
discussion of role of OFDI in the context of home country development.
It is argued that Chinese land-consuming investments are part of a trend by 
the Chinese government to further internationalize development in the search 
for markets, resources, profitable business, and/or political allies, and in the 
face of rising resource pressures, external dependencies and high international 
competition.112 In an international comparison, this globalization of Chinese 
development via its “emerging transnational companies” is nothing out of the 
ordinary. For instance, authors such as Hirsch have drawn attention to the fact 
that transnational or multinational enterprises play important roles in a home 
country’s social and economic development.113 Their foreign supply sourcing 
and embeddedness in international markets are, for instance, important in 
terms of facilitating international economies of scale in spite of the problem 
of domestic diseconomies of space. They also enable industrial upgrading and 
provide institutionalized access to resources looked for in the particular indus-
trial setting:
The MNEs’ value activities lower the barriers separating countries from their foreign 
sources of supply and their international markets. This enables home countries to 
increase the benefits they derive from the international division of labor, exploitation 
110 | Goetz (2018) (for thcoming).
111 | Broadman (2010), 331.
112 | Wilkes and Huang (2011).
113 | Hirsch (2012), 1-2. 
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of economies of scale and the ownership advantages of their MNEs. Other things being 
equal, an extension of the global reach achieved through cross-border value activities 
is likely to compensate for the tax loss and the diminution of sovereignty implied by 
outward FDI.114
At the same time, of course, it can be argued that the wave of deregulation in 
the 1990s, together with advances in transportation and communication, has 
changed the nature of state-market relations, thereby rendering the home coun-
try’s advantages that it can obtain through its companies’ OFDI activities (even) 
less feasible. For instance, transnational enterprises increasingly threaten gov-
ernments to exit their country’s economy and relocate their production activ-
ities to other countries in the case of unfavorable policy measures. Moreover, 
corporate actors pursue a narrow shareholder value objective, and tax evasion is 
widespread. Yet, it seems that in many cases, the perception that the paybacks 
of the “extension of the global reach achieved [by companies] through cross-
border value activities” outweigh the costs still prevails among policy makers. 
Perhaps this is partly due to the lack of theorized alternatives, but it also par-
tially results from the fact that policy makers are often closely interlinked with 
corporate actors and interests, as the specificities of China’s political economy 
have perfectly illustrated. 
According to the outline of the 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010), which has 
become the foundation of China’s evolving OFDI policy framework, the policy 
stance towards OFDI seeks to promote five developmental objectives.115 First, 
going overseas shall raise companies’ competitiveness through enhanced inter-
national economic and technical cooperation, which will provide them with new 
opportunities, economies of scale, and knowhow. Second, OFDI shall support 
the export sector by means of “overseas project contracting and labor service 
cooperation.”116 Third, the sourcing of domestically scarce resources overseas 
is seen by the government to address the dramatic environmental impact of 
China’s development trajectory while securing stable and efficient supplies. 
Fourth, overseas research and development activities are intended to improve 
the technological base and upgrade relevant sectors. Fifth, OFDI is framed as 
a means to globalize the economy by internationalizing production chains and 
business operations. This (foreign) economic strategy is complemented by an 
IFDI strategy that aims both to regulate IFDI such that it becomes “greener” 
and advances the technology and knowhow transfer (see also the 12th Five Year 
Plan, 2011-2015).117 
114 | Hirsch (2012), 1.
115 | Wilkes and Huang (2011).
116 | Based on information provided by Wilkes and Huang (2011), 9-10.
117 | Chinese Government (2011).
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Clearly, the above-presented policy choices and official rhetoric that Chinese 
land-consuming FDI projects are reflective of and embedded in cannot be 
fully captured without looking more closely at the specific development chal-
lenges that the country has faced and that increasingly threaten the political 
elite. China’s development path since opening up has been summarized by 
Wenran Jiang as “heavy industrialization, labor- and capital- intensive manu-
facturing industries, export-led growth, low labor cost and high environmental 
damage.”118 By 1993, the country had turned from petroleum exporter to petro-
leum importer.119 Moreover, the development trajectory has resulted in low 
worker welfare, the stagnation of political reforms, and a burgeoning rise in 
social (wealth) inequality in a context where economic opportunity is linked 
to public office.120 Together with the intense environmental consequences121 of 
the country’s rapid urbanization,122 industrialization, and modernization pro-
cesses, these factors have come to pose a challenge for the country’s social sta-
bility, as well as its food security,123 and they are viewed as matters of national 
security that have the potential to threaten the stability of the political party 
regime. 
The IFDI-led export growth strategy has also had a negative impact on 
domestic enterprises. In many cases, these struggle to compete with foreign 
companies because they lack access to credit services, they have to deal with 
political interference, and are less embedded in international markets. As one 
entrepreneur going overseas put it: “The best food has all been eaten up by 
the global giants and what we can do is to have those leftovers.”124 At the same 
time, the country’s overall industrial productivity and efficiency did not neces-
sarily improve all that much through foreign investment.125 To a certain degree, 
China has been locked in the existing international division of labor, and it has 
become the workshop in the international production line of foreign compa-
118 | Jiang (2009), 587.
119 | Vissers (June 2013), 1-7.
120 | Jiang (2009), 587.
121 | WB and SEPA (China) (2007). 
122 | Liu et al. (2005), 450. 
123 | While China managed to maintain a self-sufficiency rate of 95% with regard to 
food security, defined as grain security, it became a net importer of cer tain crops and 
products such as soybeans, vegetable oils, and sugar. For example, soybean imports 
today cover three quarters of domestic demand. Agricultural investments in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe (e.g., Bulgaria) try to grow these crops for export to China. 
See for instance Economic Observer (11 February 2012) and Council of Ministers (26 
November 2013).
124 | Rui et al. (2010), 182.
125 | Jiang (2009), 589. Moran (2011), 64-71.
Chapter 5: The Chinese Contex t 181
nies, resulting in less skill and technology transfer than had been hoped for 
by the political elite.126 The current challenge is to avoid falling in the so-called 
“middle-income trap” that many emerging economies are confronted with. 
That is, China increasingly loses its competitive edge “against low-income 
countries at low wages;”127 but, at the same time, the country has difficulties 
when trying to “compete with high-income countries on innovation and higher 
value production.”128
Importantly, the changes in China’s OFDI policy preferences and foreign 
policy regarding Africa have occurred in the context of these internal and 
external development challenges. Significant events in this process were the 
country becoming a net oil importer (1992); the collapse of export markets 
during the Asian crisis (1997); and the strong domestic competition that 
resulted from the IFDI-led development strategy, as well as the WTO accession, 
which negatively impacted indigenous enterprises due to their limited access 
to credit and world markets (2001). Moreover, the mounting socioeconomic and 
ecological pressures have pointed to the need to upgrade economic activity back 
home.
Regarding interests, these reforms are part of the political elite’s continued 
pursuit of economic growth as a way to stabilize and legitimize the political 
system though economic success. Moreover, they reflect the interests of the 
country’s resource intensive and export-dependent (state-owned) manufac-
turing industry, which functions as the country’s economic backbone and 
plays an important role in the accumulation of foreign reserves. In addition, 
Chinese land-consuming OFDI also involves a number of actors which respond 
to these policy changes, such as workers that hope to improve their (family’s) 
livelihoods; construction companies that establish themselves as indepen-
dent contract bidders; and/or POEs or SOEs that seek to make their fortune 
overseas, evading political interference and/or crowding out effects of IFDI 
activities back home.
Summar y
Land-consuming OFDI in SSA is part of China’s resource and expansion diplo-
macy that has ensued since the late 1990s, picking up speed in 2000. Overseas 
investments by Chinese companies emerged as part of the toolbox available 
to the Chinese government to pursue certain interests and policy objectives. 
At the same time, the paths taken and choices made regarding the Chinese 
presence in African countries can only be fully grasped by revisiting the core 
126 | Moran (2011), 64-71; Gaullier et al. (2005).
127 | Zhuang et al. (2012), 11.
128 | Zhuang et al. (2012), 11.
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traits of the Chinese political economy, such as the rise of bureaucratic entre-
preneurs, the marketization of power, and the emergence of a “neoliberal 
governmentality,”129 all of which have been conducive to a promotional OFDI 
policy stance and guiding ideology. 
The previous assessment of the home country context also demonstrates 
that China is not an isolated country; rather, the international context matters. 
The choice of instruments, as well as the guiding ideology characteristic of 
Chinese OFDI in SSA, reflects major traits of mainstream economic theory 
that are embedded in the international economic and aid governance archi-
tecture. Interestingly, the international context is crucial for understanding 
the Chinese foreign policy concept of “peaceful development” that aims to dif-
ferentiate China’s expansion overseas from the violent history of the North. 
Regarding the liberal international context within which Chinese expansion 
occurs, the “peaceful development” idea seems less ‘innovative’ than the 
Chinese government wants it to appear. Instead, China is profiting from an 
international economic system that allows countries and societies to expand 
their consumption and production patterns beyond their sovereign borders 
without waging war. In contrast to those of the late 19th century, contemporary 
overseas investments are rationalized within a “win-win” narrative and are part 
of a technical regime of international economic governance that regulates how 
they should take place but does not query their legitimacy, such as the WTO 
or BITs.130 
Moreover, other features of the international context, such as the price 
volatility of international energy markets, their quasi-monopolistic structure, 
and/or the reluctance of Western governments and companies to integrate 
emerging Chinese companies into the international (energy) markets play a 
role in explaining why these investments occur.131 These aspects have led the 
Chinese government to search for new partners—such as African countries—
to facilitate the economic expansion and globalization process that land-con-
suming FDI is part of. At the same time, Chinese OFDI is not a unilateral 
undertaking: African governments play a crucial role in shaping which invest-
ments take place and how.
This section will conclude by looking at the question of whether, in fact, 
OFDI lives up to the rhetoric used for its legitimization. Can we say that 
land-consuming FDI activities in Sub-Saharan Africa are a success story from 
129 | Feng (2009), 432. 
130 | See Chapter 3 and Trentmann (2008), 7. Consequently, this raises the inter-
esting question of what such a “peaceful development” approach would look like under 
a dif ferent international architecture which acknowledged zero-sum aspects of interna-
tional social, ecological, and economic relations.
131 | Goldthau and Witte (2010).
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a home country perspective, particularly given the empirical evidence which 
underlined that many of the stated goals attached to FDI projects in the recip-
ient countries did not materialize? Again, it appears that the reality of these 
investments, as well as their utility, is rather complex. 
From the official Chinese perspective, these investments are said to “deepen 
the development of international energy resources and [...] processing coopera-
tion.”132 In international comparison, China is just catching up to international 
practices and standards of development that have a long tradition within OECD 
countries. Yet, there remains great skepticism among the Chinese public, 
which largely seems to oppose OFDI.133 In particular, overseas investment 
projects that construct hospitals or schools have been commented on with 
rising sarcasm by Chinese netizens who point to the rural areas in China where 
such services and infrastructure are largely missing. In view of the high social 
costs of the Chinese development trajectory over the past three decades, char-
acterized as it is by a dramatic increase in social wealth inequality, the denial of 
social rights, and very low wages, it seems to be widespread public opinion that 
these investments, grants, and social development measures should instead 
be put to work in the Western provinces and rural areas, which for the time 
being remain decoupled from the overall development process.134 The aspect of 
high wealth inequality135 is particularly interesting from a historical perspec-
tive. This usually curbs demand in home countries while also contributing to 
an unprecedentedly high level of capital to be exported. Accordingly, calling 
Chinese land-consuming OFDI a success story at this point does not capture 
the complexity associated with OFDI from the perspective of home country 
development.
6. concLusion 
Given the multifaceted dynamics at play, this chapter has not attempted to 
provide a monocausal explanation of how and why these investments take 
place as they do. As Marks has rightly noted, “[m]onocausal explanations are 
too simple to take account of the complexity of people, societies, and historical 
change.”136 However, the key argument that has been put forward in this case 
study is that these investments are part of several (interrelated) drivers, namely 
132 | See National People’s Congress (2011); and State Council (2012).
133 | Broadman (2010), 330.
134 | Broadman (2010), 330; Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and UNDP China 
(2013), 1-13.
135 | Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and UNDP China (2013), 1-13.
136 | Marks (2007), 13.
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Chinese efforts to diversify the country’s resource supply, open new markets, 
to internationalize production processes, and strengthen the “soft power” in 
international relations.
Moreover, the review of the home country context has highlighted that 
China has moved away from self-identifying as a planned economy aimed at a 
high degree of autarky, and transitioned towards a “socialist market economy”137 
that is increasingly integrated in the world economy. Responding to particular 
events in time, such as the growing external resource dependency, the collapse 
of its main export markets during the Asian crisis, the unfavorably tough com-
petition between foreign investors and domestic industry, and the untenably 
high social and environmental costs of development, the government has 
adopted a promotional policy stance towards OFDI. 
Since 2000, Chinese SOEs going overseas operate in an increasingly elab-
orate institutional framework, and they benefit directly or indirectly from the 
wide range of home country measures supporting overseas activities, such 
as commercial diplomacy, economic cooperation projects, and/or new forms 
of development finance. At the same time, substantial reforms of corporate 
governance have given SOEs more leeway from state control in their business 
operations. Importantly, these ideological shifts and the reform processes are 
part of profound political reforms that have occurred since the 1980s which 
have significantly changed the country’s political economy. While the state 
remains the central actor, the rule of law and markets play a greater role in 
China’s economic governance; regulatory procedures have been eased; a new 
actor group of bureaucratic entrepreneurs—i.e. officials who use their favorable 
political positions in the system to profit economically—has emerged; party 
structures have been opened to private sector actors; and competencies in par-
ticular policy fields have been decentralized, increasing the importance of sub-
state actors (see brief summary in Table 5-4). 
Together, these home country features explain the core empirical charac-
teristics of Chinese land-consuming OFDI in SSA. Accordingly, the sectoral 
composition, with its focus on resources and manufacturing, reflects the home 
country economic setting, i.e. the manufacturing industry’s interest in external 
resources and business opportunities to continue and/or expand its operations; 
and the political elites’ focus on growth as a source of wealth and political sta-
bility. This also explains the minor share of agricultural investments in SSA, as 
these have not been a priority. Instead, SOE-run agricultural and construction 
projects often started at the request of African governments that wanted to 
reactivate the former friendship farms and build infrastructure in exchange 
for resources. From the Chinese perspective, these are part of a “soft power” 
strategy to build up a reputation as a peaceful emerging power that acts to the 
137 | See, for instance, People’s Daily (13 July 2005).
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benefit of its partners. At the same time, the labor exports that are accompa-
nying the increases in trade with and investment to SSA highlight the very low 
levels of worker welfare in the home country—the competitive edge of Chinese 
companies seemingly remains to be their low costs.
Chinese investments in SSA also reflect the increasingly elaborate home 
country measures. As a result of the newly established forms and forums of 
China-Africa economic cooperation, Chinese trade with, and OFDI in Africa 
has risen significantly. At the same time, the altered quality of China-Africa 
cooperation mirrors the profound political reforms and related changes in the 
ideological superstructure and economic governance that have taken place 
since the 1980s. As a consequence of the rise of bureaucratic entrepreneurs, 
the adoption of mainstream economic theory to guide foreign and industrial 
policy, and the reform of SOE corporate governance back home, Chinese com-
panies that have been active in SSA for decades no longer act only as non-
profit operators of aid projects. Using the new leeway at their disposal when 
doing business (for private or public gain), they have often become successful 
contract bidders (e.g., construction companies) and profitable transnational 
companies (e.g., agricultural companies). Even in the case of development 
finance and economic cooperation projects, SOEs apply a for-profit rationale in 
their operations. This also has implications for the role of land in these invest-
ment projects. In projects that use land as space for productive activities (e.g., 
manufacturing and construction), the main driver is clearly to profit from the 
productive activities rather than to secure land. However, even in the case of 
resource exploitation projects, products are often not intended for consumption 
back home, nor are they allocated outside of domestic, regional, or international 
markets. Instead, land consumption in almost all cases is related to the profit 
orientation of related operations.
Finally, this chapter has shown that Chinese OFDI is characterized by a 
diversity of actors, public and private, with divergent and often conflicting 
agendas. In particular, the rising importance of sub-state actors in the Chinese 
development context explains the significance of provincial actors in China’s 
overseas activities. Sometimes the latter can even evolve to the extent of 
non-conformance with central state policy objectives (see summary of findings 
in Table 5-4). From a micro-perspective, the interests in these investments are 
many: on the part of the political elite they represent a welcome mechanism 
to ensure the continued pursuit of economic growth as a way to stabilize and 
legitimize the political system though economic success. Moreover, they reflect 
the interests of the country’s resource-intensive and export-dependent (state-
owned) manufacturing industry. They also involve a diverse range of actors 
that hope to improve their (family’s) livelihoods; establish themselves as inde-
pendent contract bidders; and/or seek alternatives to the political interference 
and/or crowding out effects back home. 
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In conclusion, the multiplicity of actors involved in the investments, as 
well as their entrenchment in mainstream economics, raises the question of 
what exactly makes these investments Chinese? The widely made distinction 
between state-backed and private investments, on the basis of which the dif-
ference between Chinese and non-Chinese investments is usually discussed, 
fails to answer this question in a meaningful way while oversimplifying state-
market relations in the context of OFDI. Instead, the factors that make these 
land-consuming OFDI activities Chinese are to be found in the specific combi-
nation of industrial set-up, development trajectory, contingent events, ideology, 
and political economy that were outlined above.  
More broadly, reflecting on the role of land-consuming OFDI in the context 
of the home country’s development trajectory, these investments are part of 
a trend to “catch up” and establish an open economic system that can meet 
the resource and export interests of the manufacturing industry, which has 
become the backbone of economic development and foreign exchange accumu-
lation since the 1990s. Looking beyond China’s industrial set-up, the invest-
ments reflect the specificities of the country’s current development context, 
and especially its challenges. For instance, the problem of social development, 
which is reflected in surplus labor and low wages, is tied to both increasing 
migration and the ability of Chinese companies to gain a competitive advantage. 
Other key challenges in the context of China’s development include resource 
dependency, which is reflected in the expanding resource diplomacy that these 
investments are part of; unsustainable levels of pollution, which have led to a 
push toward offshore pollution processing segments; and heightened competi-
tive pressures – following the IFDI-led development approach and WTO acces-
sion—that have led to the search for knowhow and technology abroad. 
The consequences of this development for the broader development context 
of China remain to be seen. While the approach since 2000 (and up until 2016) 
has strengthened investment, trade, and aid relations with African countries, 
it is unclear how capital exports will improve worker welfare or productivity 
levels back home. While they might help to diversify resource supplies, estab-
lish trading hubs to access European markets, engage in economic opportu-
nities on the African continent, stimulate exports of manufactured goods, 
and establish economies of scale, they also represent an outflow of capital that 
will no longer be available for investment back home. The capital outflow also 
portends a potential loss in domestic jobs and the danger that large companies 
might move permanently offshore. Though it might be too early to draw any 
strong conclusions, there is no evidence to suggest that we are witnessing the 
off-shoring of Chinese industry’s polluting and energy-intensive operations to 
African countries (in 2016). 
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Category Home Country Context Chinese OFDI in SSA
Devel-
opment 
context
Since opening up in the 1980s, the 
country has focused on the growth of 
its resource-intensive manufacturing 
industry, resulting in rising resource 
dependency, overcapacity, and high 
social and environmental costs.
The resource-intensive manufacturing 
industry is reflected in the sectoral com-
position of Chinese investments, namely 
in the focus on the resources sector and 
manufacturing operations. The small 
share of agricultural projects is a result 
of economic cooperation and part of 
China’s resource diplomacy. 
Home 
Country 
Measures
Reform processes since the 1990s, and 
the “Go Out” OFDI framework since 
2000, have led the country to catch up 
with international standards.
It is unclear how much support compa-
nies receive. However, OFDI in Africa 
could potentially profit from various 
measures, such as commercial diploma-
cy, regulatory reforms, and newly intro-
duced forms of development finance.
Guiding 
Ideologies
The country has shifted away from a 
focus on self-sufficiency and adopted 
a growth agenda for development that 
follows mainstream economic theory 
in many respects.
The ideological shift is reflected in proj-
ects that have been operating for a long 
time in Africa and have recently moved 
from an aid to business management 
approach.
Investor 
Legacy
While China has only recently become 
an important source of investment, it 
shares a long history of aid and politi-
cal cooperation with African countries.
China builds on relations established 
since the 1950s with African countries 
and the related capacities of companies, 
but it has also established diplomatic 
and economic relations with additional 
African countries.
Political 
Economy
China’s political economy has changed 
significantly over the past decades. Key 
events include the rise of bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs, i.e. officials who use 
their favorable political positions to 
profit economically; corporate gov-
ernance reforms that have provided 
SOEs with managerial leeway; the 
opening up of party structures to pri-
vate sector actors; the decentralization 
of competencies in particular policy 
fields and the related rise of sub-state 
actors; and the formalization of regula-
tory procedures.
Changes in the political economy explain 
the diversity of actors and interests 
involved in land-consuming OFDI (e.g., 
provincial actors) and the profit orienta-
tion that even holds true for economic 
cooperation projects (e.g., agricultural 
development centers). The multiple 
actors come from different levels of gov-
ernment and some of act in conflict with 
the central government’s foreign policy. 
The marketization of power has led to a 
profit focus. 
Events Becoming a net energy importer; Asian 
crisis; WTO accession influenced the 
OFDI policy framework, as well as 
the social and ecological costs of the 
development trajectory.
Core events influencing the development 
of a favorable OFDI policy framework 
since the country’s opening up, as well as 
its turn to Africa have been several: the 
rising resources dependency, the Asian 
crisis, and the WTO accession.
Table 5-4 – Brief Review of the Home Country Context and Chinese OFDI in SSA

Chapter 6: British Investments in Africa 
“The Last Frontier to Find Alpha?”1
We want to support African countries to seize the 
opportunities before them and are injecting new energy 
into partnerships to build growth. [...] this government 
believes global business—including British business—
can make an absolutely vital contribution here and we 
will do all we can to foster fur ther commercial ties, open 
up trade and deepen investment.
(Henry Bellingham, Minister for Africa, 20112)
The UK is well placed to benefit from the world of the 
future. The National Security Strategy of the United 
Kingdom is: to use all our national capabilities to build 
Britain’s prosperity, extend our nation’s influence in 
the world and strengthen our security. The networks we 
use to build our prosperity we will also use to build our 
security.
(National Security Strategy (Whitepaper), 2010)
1. inTroducTion
Land-consuming FDI emerging from liberal economies is often portrayed 
as the rational choice of profit-seeking private actors in a context of resource 
scarcity and/or financial crisis. In the case of the UK, for instance, Susan Payne, 
CEO of the London-based Emergent Asset Management, has been repeatedly 
quoted as saying that her African Agricultural Land Fund focuses on Africa as 
“the last frontier for finding alpha”—that is, for finding above-average returns 
1 | Quote by Susan Payne, CEO of Emergent Asset Management in Knaup and von 
Mittelstaedt (30 July 2009).
2 | Speech by Bellingham (2010).
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on investments.3 In a similar vein, other British investors, particularly in the 
biofuel and financial sectors, have argued that above-average returns outweigh 
the risks attached to agricultural and land-consuming projects in Sub-Sa-
haran Africa and other parts of the world. Indeed, investors commonly refer 
to mounting scarcity pressures, growing demand, commodity price rises, and/
or (comparatively) cheap land prices to make these investments appear like 
safe bets while also emphasizing their positive contributions to greater food 
and energy security. Hence, land-consuming investments are seen not only to 
promise above-average returns but to be ethically sound.
In practice, however, the empirical evidence shows that this narrative 
oversimplifies the drivers and interests involved, while the related rhetoric 
of success and the promise of high returns rarely materialize.4 Projects fail, 
people are dispossessed in the process, and seemingly cheap land turns out 
to be very costly due to the upfront investments required to build roads and 
housing and undertake planting.5 Furthermore, the financial crisis also led 
to massive crashes in the share values of companies and/or contributed to the 
ultimate failure of projects. As this case study will show, this verdict applies to 
many of the British land-consuming investments made since 2000. 
The core findings of this chapter accentuate the fact that the empirical char-
acteristics of British land-consuming investments in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
more multi-layered than is commonly acknowledged. Many projects predate 
the 2007/2008 crises and they comprise investments in multiple sectors, 
from construction and mining to farming. They are distributed highly uneven 
across the continent, reflecting the British investor legacy. Biofuels composed 
the largest share of listed projects, and the general emphasis has been on the 
primary sector and related activities (food processing). Overall, the invest-
ments reflect a very diverse private sector: companies with a long presence on 
the African continent are involved, as are early stage companies that invest in 
biofuels, and/or alternative stock markets, and financial investors. In addition, 
several public institutions and multilateral organizations seem to be relevant, 
together with host country governments. Land is of primary importance in 
these investments. It is used as a resource and productive space, and, increas-
ingly, as a strategic asset. The empirical evidence shows the exposure of British 
investment to financial volatility, the dependency on developments back home, 
such as the economic crisis, and the lack of realistic business models.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the history of Brit-
ish-African relations. These relations go far back, but they have intensified sig-
nificantly since 2000. Section 3 then discusses the details of how these invest-
3 | Knaup and von Mittelstaedt (30 July 2009).
4 | WB (2011), 51.
5 | Interview with CEO of Highbury Finance, London, (2013).
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ments occur. In particular, it will focus on land-consuming FDI’s sectoral 
composition and timelines, the role of land, the recipient context, key actors 
and institutions, and the issue of investment funds. The chapter will conclude 
by summarizing the key empirical findings about British land-consuming FDI 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
2. bacKGround on The uK in africa
British relations with the African continent go far back, while the “Second Wave 
of European Imperialism”6 in the 19th century seems to be most relevant for 
the assessment of contemporary relations. Importantly, the dominant presence 
of Britain on the continent continued after the empire’s post-WWII disinte-
gration.7 As of 2011, British companies are still among the top five investors 
and trading partners in former dependencies, and on the political level, most 
former colonies are members in the Commonwealth of Nations, an intergov-
ernmental organization that emerged out of the British Commonwealth.8 
British engagement with the African continent has been characterized by 
several waves of intensifying and decreasing exchanges of capital, people, and 
goods, reflecting broad domestic and global restructuring processes, like, for 
instance, colonization and decolonization. Since 2000, British interest in the 
African continent has been growing again. This was first led by the private 
sector, but then the public sector followed the corporate trend. There seems to 
be a new “gold-rush mood” among British investors and trading companies as 
the following 2012 statement from the CEO of British-American Tobacco (BAT) 
highlights: “So the point really is not whether you should be doing business in 
Africa, but rather how.”9 
6 | Kegley and Raymond (2011), 110-112.
7 | See White (1999), 184-185. British decolonization was the function of multiple 
factors, including nationalist pressures and global economic trends (e.g., UK finan-
cial industry focused beyond formal and informal empire in its investments; decline 
in the worldwide rubber trade after innovative synthetic rubber introduction; improved 
balance of the payment position of Great Britain; new economic strategies pursued in 
the metropolis that focus on North America and Europe; and/or the declining meaning 
of the sterling area). 
8 | See, for instance, the edited volume by Dumett (1999). It critically evaluates the 
influential publication by Cain and Hopkins on British imperialism published in 1993. 
The latter publication is referenced in the following as Cain and Hopkins (2001), which 
refers to the second edition of the 1993 publication. Also see Ernst & Young (2011a), 
38-41. 
9 | Ernst & Young (2012), 9.
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The new focus on African economies by private and, increasingly, public 
actors is reflected in the intensifying trade and investment relations of the UK 
with the continent. From 2007 to 2011, UK FDI in Africa increased by 9 % per 
annum, and UK exports to Sub-Saharan Africa have risen faster than in other 
transitioning or developing countries.10 According to the British Chambers of 
Commerce, currently “[m]ore Chamber member exporters currently export to 
the Middle East and Africa (57 %) than to North America (47 %) and Austral-
asia (40 %).”11 At the same time, UK-African relations are not a one-way street: 
imports from SSA to the UK have nearly tripled, climbing from USD 4 billion 
in 1990 to USD 11 billion in 2004. However, this trend was primarily linked to 
rising imports of a few products (primarily clothing, petroleum, and minerals) 
from a small number of countries, namely South Africa and Botswana.12 
Similar to the case of China, the growing interest in Africa since 2000 
has been accompanied by significant changes in the official rationalization of 
these relations. Moving away from the previous focus on humanitarianism and 
security/terrorism, more recent official statements stress the economic and 
social benefits of engagement with Africa for the actors involved.13 At the same 
time, the budget deficit and fiscal conservatism of the Cameron government 
limited the extent to which this new interest of the UK government could be met 
by assigning resources to its promotion. In fact, “[r]esources allocated to Africa 
are [...] extremely stretched, and the British presence on the continent [which has 
never been a high priority] already consists of a network in which large regions 
are covered by as few as one or two diplomats in the field.”14 As of 2011, the UK’s 
diplomatic presence (e.g., sovereign embassies) ranked tenth after that of the 
US, Russia, China, France, South Africa, Nigeria, Germany, Brazil, and Japan.15 
Against this background of tight budgets, it is worth noting that the UK 
also benefits from membership in institutions of pooled sovereignty, such 
as the European Union (EU), which is an active and important investor and 
trading partner on the African continent.16 However, domestic economic reces-
10 | Ernst & Young (2013), 34; Te Velde and Calì (2006), 9-10; Smallbusiness.co.uk 
(13 October 2011).
11 | Dhillon (3 February 2014).
12 | Simultaneously, EU and global imports from SSA have declined or risen only 
moderately, indicating that the intensification of trade relations between the UK and 
SSA is rather unique. See Te Velde and Calì (2006), 9-10.
13 | E.g. Bellingham (2010); and Cargill (2011). Also, see Chapter 7 on guiding ideology.
14 | Cargill (2011), 3.
15 | Cargill (2011), 3.
16 | Allen (8 October 2012), 9; Cargill (2011), 11. Note: This study has been carried out 
prior to Brexit. The implications of the latter for land-consuming OFDI from the UK are 
not yet clear or forseeable.
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sion and the rise of the BRICS have begun to affect the UK’s relative economic 
and political presence on the African continent. For instance, the UK’s leading 
investor position, particularly in the extractive industries, which it historically 
shared with the US and France, is increasingly contested by newcomers such as 
China and India, the latter of which “edged out” the UK as leading investor in 
Ghana in 2005 (measured by the number of projects per annum since 2000).17 
Simultaneously, some African countries, like South Africa, have started to crit-
ically review the role of British companies in economic development—asking 
whether these are “viable investment partner[s]” or just a “remnant of the 
British Empire,” compared to newcomer investors from the emerging powers.18
Despite the new attention directed towards UK-Africa relations, it is crucial 
to note that by both regional and historical comparison, the share of British 
FDI in Africa since 2000 has been marginal—at least from the investor coun-
try’s point of view. The regional figures point to the issue of asymmetric sig-
nificance mentioned previously.19 In 2011, the African continent continued to 
rank lowest regarding the share of total UK FDI stock by region.20 At the same 
time, UK overseas investment flows to the continent have been highly volatile: 
while in 2010, UK overseas investment flows to Africa (GBP 7,822 million) 
were astonishingly close to those to Europe (GBP 11,374 million) and higher 
than those to the Americas (GBP -13,814 million), the year 2011 was character-
ized by divestment (GBP -3,291 million).21 Importantly, UK investment in SSA 
has remained highly concentrated in four countries, namely Kenya, Nigeria, 
Zimbabwe, and South Africa. This reflects legacies of very uneven regional and 
sectoral investment.22 
3. Ke y char acTerisTics of briTish L and-consuminG   
 ofdi in sub-sahar an africa
The complex and evolving nature of economic and political relations between 
the UK and African countries has largely been ignored by common “free 
market” explanations. This section will summarize the key empirical char-
acteristics, focusing on sector distribution, timelines, the role of land, stated 
goals in the recipient context, the phenomenon of investor funds involved in 
agriculture, and other key actors and institutions. 
17 | AfDB/OECD/UNDP/UNECA (2011), 10; and Modern Ghana.com (23 January 2005).
18 | Osei (2011), 1.
19 | See Chapter 3.
20 | Allen and Dar (14 March 2013), 11-12.
21 | Allen and Dar (14 March 2013), 11-12; and Loots and Kabundi (2012), 134. 
22 | Joint Nature Conservation Committee (2009), 14.
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The major findings are as follows: firstly, the majority of “land grab” projects 
consist of biofuel projects which have been initiated since 2005. Secondly, land 
is of primary importance in most of these investments. It is accessed through 
mixed forms of direct lease and/or outgrower schemes. Thirdly, contrary to the 
“profit through scarcity” and “seeking alpha” rhetoric, most biofuel projects, as 
well as some investment funds, have failed, for multiple reasons. Fourthly, the 
respective host country government is a central actor in these investments. It 
often cooperates with British corporations, some of which have been invited to 
participate in host country policy-writing processes—for instance, regarding 
the national biofuel strategy. Fifthly and finally, from the UK perspective, a 
diverse private sector, and, increasingly, public institutions are at work.
Sector
A breakdown of investments by industry highlights both the UK’s colonial 
investor legacy on the continent, with its focus on natural resources, and the 
processes of diversification that have occurred since decolonization.23 While 
detailed data was very difficult to obtain, an itemization of FDI projects by 
industry for the year 2008, which was received upon request from the Office 
for National Statistics (ONS), shows that the bulk of UK FDI went into mining 
and quarrying (42.5 %) and financial services (43.5 %), followed by real estate 
and business services (3.9 %) and food production (2.5 %).24 Not a single project 
was recorded for the agricultural sector during that particular year (see Figure 
61).25 2006 data on British FDI projects by industry and target country also 
emphasizes the aforementioned uneven sectoral and capital stock distribution 
across the continent.26 Regarding sectoral distribution, 74 % of investments 
in South Africa went into financial services (most of which did not have any 
relation to natural resources), while FDI in Kenya was largely geared towards 
food production, and investments in Eastern Africa primarily directed towards 
23 | In 1999, 40 % of UK OFDI in Africa still went to the mining and quarrying industry 
(compared to 20 % worldwide), and two thirds of US OFDI stock was in the petroleum 
sector. In addition, UK OFDI undertakings in African countries have an extraordinary 
high degree of profit repatriation: about 75 cents of every dollar invested went back to 
the parent company (compared to a UK average of 37 cents in other countries). See Te 
Velde (2002), 4. 
24 | Data obtained from Office for National Statistics (UK) via email request in June 
2012. 
25 | Data obtained from Office for National Statistics (UK) via email request in June 
2012. 
26 | Joint Nature Conservation Committee (2009), 14. 
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biofuel production.27 At the same time, British FDI stock was primarily located 
in South Africa.28
The investments that this research project has investigated, as well as newly 
established databases (such as Land Matrix), show that British land-consuming 
OFDI covers the full range of sectors from food and biofuel production, livestock 
farming, and forestry for wood to tourism and mineral extraction (including 
petroleum).29 In more detail, the projects grow, process and trade Jatropha, 
sugar cane, palm oil, cassava, and sweet sorghum; cultivate rice, livestock(e.g., 
beef), and horticulture (e.g., paprika, chilies, maize, and cocoa); exploit 
uranium; or are involved in construction (e.g. infrastructure) and the provision 
of agribusiness support services (e.g., agriculture machinery showcase). 
While the sectoral composition of British land-consuming OFDI is 
important for a better understanding of what is happening, it is equally essen-
tial to be aware that on the project level, this sectoral differentiation might not 
fully capture the nature of activities on the ground in cases where land-con-
suming OFDI is part of processes of integration or conglomeration of the com-
panies involved. In fact, several investor companies are involved in multiple 
sectors that together make up one project. Take, for example, the biofuel 
projects, in which companies integrate the whole supply chain from farming 
to refining to trading activities. In other cases, a single company engages in 
multiple unrelated industries, such as the Avana Group in Madagascar, which 
exploits minerals while also being involved in biofuel production, at least tem-
porarily.30 Finally, some companies have switched their operations from one 
sector to another. One example is Agriterra Ltd., which was active in the petro-
leum sector prior to moving into farming with the goal to “build itself into a 
multi-commodity African focused agricultural business.”31 
From a broader perspective, the rising number of early-stage companies 
involved in the agricultural sector mirrors the widespread belief in its potential 
as a future growth market, as stated by Agriterra Ltd.: “We believe that the agri-
cultural sector in Africa is an area of activity which has the potential to be par-
ticularly resilient to the current global economic climate.”32 At the same time, 
27 | Joint Nature Conservation Committee (2009), 14.
28 | Wei and Balasubramanyam (2004), 177-178; and Schenk (2005), 463-481. 
29 | TradeInvestNigeria.com (10 October 2009); and TradeInvestNigeria (19 November 
2009).
30 | It seems that Avana dropped its biofuel activities and is now focusing on mining 
again; no information is available on the former plans to plant Jatropha on 10.000 ha. 
See, for instance, GEXSI LLP (2008), Slide 58; Energy-profile (2009), 53; Matthews 
(2010), 117-119.
31 | Agriterra Ltd. (29 February 2012).
32 | Agriterra Ltd (6 January 2009).
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the British government remains indeterminate on the matter of agricultural 
OFDI in Africa. On the one hand, statements by the former Minister for Africa 
(2010-2012), Henry Bellingham, clearly reveal the established bias towards the 
extractive sector.33 On the other hand, the CDC Group, the UK’s development 
finance institution, has begun to step up its private equity activities in African 
agriculture, and British industrial policy promotes farmland-consuming “clean 
tech” investments like those in biofuels.
Figure 6-1 – UK OFDI in Africa by Industry, 2008 (in USD millions, ONS 
2008)34
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Timelines
In stark contrast to the case of China, British “land grab” projects have largely 
occurred after the year 2000.35 A closer look at the timelines of British 
land-consuming FDI in SSA shows three investment trends—characterized 
by investment focus and investor type—since 2000. Firstly, around the year 
2000, land-consuming investments were largely conducted by British compa-
33 | Aigaforum (9 June 2011).
34 | Data obtained from the Office for National Statistics upon email request in June 
2012.
35 | It remains unclear whether this is simply owing to the problem of data collection 
through the method of crowdsourcing or if it also reflects the problem of biased atten-
tion towards some industries (e.g., biofuels campaigns by NGOs) and countries (e.g., 
China) compared to others.
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nies already present on the continent, and they were related to legal and insti-
tutional reforms in the recipient country. A good example is Unilever Ghana, 
which acquired plantations in Ghana in 1999 by taking advantage of the oppor-
tunities presented to it by the host government’s divestiture program.36 
Secondly, from 2005/2006, another investment trend can be observed. 
Around that time, a large share of projects was seemingly related to the inter-
national climate negotiations and, more specifically, the emerging British and 
European policy framework promoting renewable energy. The predominant 
investor types were newly founded companies, many of which floated their 
shares on the AIM Stock Exchange in London,37 and financial investors. Both 
actor groups tried to profit from the policy-induced (new) biofuel market and 
related support structures at the domestic, regional (EU), and international 
levels (UN FCCC). Importantly, “old investors” with a long presence on the con-
tinent were hardly involved in this trend. For instance, British Petroleum (BP) 
engaged in biofuel production through a joint venture (“D1-BP Fuel Crops”) with 
D1 Oils Plc., one of the doyens of the crude Jatropha oil industry. However, this 
cooperation remained rather short-lived, and BP exited the project in 2009.38 
Similar divestments happened in other sectors, such as the aviation industry. 
Lufthansa, for example, originally participated in biofuel investments in the 
form of offtake agreements39 with the British biofuel producer Sun Biofuels, 
but later decided to end the cooperation in response to protests regarding the 
potentially unsustainable production of biofuels and the resulting land use 
competition and food insecurity.
Finally, a significant share of investments started in 2008/2009. These 
investors—investment banks and private equity funds (public and private)—
are seeking “alpha.” That is to say, they are aiming to achieve extraordinary 
returns on their investments in spite of the financial crisis. In practice, they 
are making land-consuming investments in agriculture or trying to cash in 
on opportunities offered by international climate finance, like, for instance, 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).40 As a consequence, this group 
of actors is increasingly involved, primarily as shareholders, in the business 
36 | Ntsiful (2010), 129-137.
37 | AIM stands for Alternative Investment Market, a sub-market of the London Stock 
Exchange where small firms can float their shares under less restrictive regulations than 
in the London Stock Exchange.
38 | Bloomberg News (17 July 2009).
39 | An off take agreement is an agreement between a producer and a buyer to acquire 
a cer tain amount of the anticipated production. It is very common in the natural 
resources sector.
40 | For more information on the CDM, see the website of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (http://cdm.unfccc.int/). 
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operations of the early-stage companies that began investing in 2006. Some, 
however, have also taken over the existing operations, such as Highbury 
Finance Ltd. in the case of Sun Biofuels Mozambique.41 While financial inves-
tors involved in agricultural projects are often framed as pioneers in the sector, 
this perception is only partially true. Instead, they follow in the footsteps of 
UK development finance, such as the CDC Group and Department for Inter-
national Development (DFID). Investments in agribusiness have been a major 
part of the CDC’s operations since 1948, allegedly producing high returns of 
“up to 40 percent.”42 Moreover, recent private equity investments by the CDC 
Group were also explicitly intended to motivate financial investors to operate in 
African agriculture projects.43 
A look at these timelines reveals general investment trends, and an assess-
ment of detailed project life cycles shows what is actually happening on the 
ground. In this regard, the empirical evidence reveals that many projects 
do not merit comparison with their rhetoric of success and promise of high 
returns. Instead, they are often rather short-lived, for numerous reasons. For 
example, the case of Sun Biofuels (SBF) shows that a company’s performance 
can suffer from inexperience, false assumptions, lack of funding, and/or the 
financial crisis. In 2005, the company began to grow Jatropha in Ethiopia on 
land with poor soil, which together with drought conditions made the 1.000 ha 
planted trial area economically unviable.44 In the words of the SBF Business 
Development Director, Harry Stourton: “The idea that jatropha can be grown 
on marginal land is a red herring.”45 Consequently, SBF moved its biofuel oper-
ations to Mozambique and Tanzania in 2006. In these countries it acquired a 
total of 4,854 ha and 8.000 ha of prime land, respectively, with long-term plans 
to expand the operations to cover 20.000 ha in total. Yet, the company’s oper-
ations continued to face difficulties in the form of a dramatic decline in share 
value (see Figure 62) due to the financial crisis and a constant lack of funding. 
Finally, in 2011, SBF went into administration after its majority shareholder, 
Trading Emissions Plc., decided to divest. As a consequence, SBF’s Tanzania- 
and Mozambique-located subsidiary companies were sold to financial investors 
and some plots were discontinued. Data is lacking on the latest status of these 
projects (as of 2014).46 
41 | Highbury Finance (2013). 
42 | AltAssets.net (26 April 2006).
43 | AltAssets.net (26 April 2006). CDC (8 November 2013).
44 | Wendimu (2013), 12.
45 | Reppert-Bismarck (21 January 2011); and see Pohl (2010) on Jatropha.
46 | Subsequently, SBF’s subsidiary companies in Tanzania and Mozambique were sold 
to two financial investors in 2011, namely the London based merchant bank Lion’s Head 
Global Partners , operated by former Goldman Sachs employees, and Highbury Finance, 
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A similar story of failed potential emerges from the investigation of most 
biofuel projects. Take, for example, D1 Oils, a UK-based share company founded 
in 2005. It was one of the first companies worldwide to focus on value-added 
operations of Jatropha biofuel production; and it experienced a crash in share 
value from 2007 to 2012 (Figure 62). Throughout its existence, it has been 
struggling with the economic viability of its operations, and up to this day it 
has not paid any dividends to its shareholders. By 2012, D1 Oils’ operational 
losses amounted to more than GBP 1 million.47 In order to demonstrate its com-
mitment to a fresh start, the company changed its name to NEOS Resources 
in 2010, shifted its focus to India, and announced a diversification away from 
Jatropha production in African countries.48 However, this strategy was not suc-
cessful either, as the latest update from NEOS in 2014 highlights. A corporate 
notice from 30 January 2014 states that the company is in the process of selling 
off the assets from its Indian and other ventures: “it will not be possible to reach 
sustainable profitable volumes in the near future and therefore plans to develop 
the trade have been put on hold and all revenue generating activities within 
the Group have effectively ceased with effect from January 2014.”49 Short of 
funding and running the risk of losing its AIM London Stock Exchange listing, 
the company’s board and key shareholders have begun to negotiate “the future 
direction of the Group and its funding requirements for the next 12 months.”50
Another example of the difficulties encountered by these projects is GEM 
Biofuels. The company was founded in 2004, and it has been AIM-listed since 
2007. Focusing on Jatropha production, the company has managed to secure 
over 495.000 ha in Madagascar since 2005.51 Yet, its planting operations came 
to a halt in 2009, when tied-up capital markets and bad plantation manage-
ment forced it to focus on maintaining existing plantations rather than (re)
a project development and investment advisory firm, founded in 2004 with a specializa-
tion in “alternative investment opportunities.” In both cases, the new owners have only 
conducted maintenance work on the former SBF plantations, which means that large 
parts of the acquired land lie fallow. Moreover, LGHP only employs 50 of the former 700 
workers while also falling short of clarifying the problem of outstanding compensation 
payments. See Lion’s Head Global Partners (2013); Highbury Finance (2013); Bergius 
(September 2012); and Bergius (5 July 2013). 
47 | StockMarketWire.com (13 March 2012); Hawkins and Chen (2011), 21-23; Mitchell 
(2010), 118-125.
48 | NEOS Resources Plc (12 October 2011); NEOS Resources Plc (15 November 2011); 
NEOS Resources Plc (15 March 2012).
49 | Investigate.co.uk (30 January 2014).
50 | Investegate.co.uk (30 January 2014).
51 | GEMBioFuels (28 September 2011).
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investing in their planned expansion.52 Thus, during 2011, GEM concentrated 
on letting the plantations mature, and did not engage in any further planting 
while reducing the number of staff. By the end of 2011, it had planted Jatropha 
on a total of 55,737 hectares.53 Still, the share value did not recover, nor did the 
company manage to attract additional funding during 2012.54 Unable to profit 
from its land bank, the company changed its name to Hunter Resources PLC in 
January 2013 to indicate its new investing policy and board changes.55 The latest 
corporate notice from December 2013 stated that the company’s share trading 
had been suspended as it did not become an investment company in time to 
meet AIM London Stock Exchange requirements. The same notice announced 
that the management was in negotiations to become active in Peruvian mining 
projects which are 563km from the city of Lima in an area where eight explo-
ration concessions (a total of 3,500 ha) are located.56 What has happened to the 
Jatropha production remains unclear.
Figure 6-2 – Three Examples of Crashes in Share Value, 2008-2012 
(www.iii.co.uk.uk)
Together, these project timelines emphasize that those explanations which 
identify the financial crisis as a primary driver of land-consuming FDI fall short 
of comprehending the complexity at play. On the one hand, many land-con-
suming projects were started prior to the crisis and seem to be related to other 
52 | Hawkins and Chen (2011), 3, 24-25.
53 | OnVista.de (2014); and GEM Biofuels (12 April 2012).
54 | GEM Biofuels (5 December 2012).
55 | ADVFN.com (1 August 2013); and Hunter Resources Plc (30 December 2013).
56 | Hunter Resources Plc (30 December 2013).
Agriterra Ltd, 2008-
2012
GEM Biofuels, 2010-
2012
D1Oils Plc, 2008-2012
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events in the home and host countries, such as the climate regulations or dives-
titure programs. On the other hand, the financial crisis also resulted in massive 
crashes in the share values of companies and contributed to the failure of inves-
tors in search of profitable investments during a time of economic crisis. 
Moreover, these timelines provide interesting clues about the multiple 
individual and systemic difficulties encountered by different actors during a 
project’s life cycle. For example, the financial situation has been aggravated 
by a systemic conflict of interest between the different actors involved in these 
projects: while companies “on the ground” focus on long-term value creation, 
financial investors “off the ground” are interested primarily in short-term profit. 
In this regard, the operational problems and long maturation timelines of agri-
cultural projects “on the ground” (for instance, five years for Jatropha) led to 
constant struggles for early-stage companies that also negatively impacted the 
respective company’s majority shareholder, usually a financial company prom-
ising high returns to its investors and under pressure to deliver. In the case of 
SBF and its majority shareholder Trading Emissions Plc, a board decision was 
reached in 2010 to deny SBF additional funds, because the “value creation in 
this business was a long-term project.”57
In other cases, data shows that financial investors made unrealistic earnings 
forecasts, sometimes in combination with allegedly fraudulent business prac-
tices. Cru Investment Management and its Africa Invest Fund, for instance, did 
not live up to predicted earnings of 30 % for 2009 to 2010. Instead, Cru and 
Africa Invest were facing fraud investigations for misuse of funds in 2010, as 
money invested in other funds managed by Cru had been transferred to Africa 
Invest as loans, without notification of the respective shareholders. At the same 
time, the CEO Jon Maguire was accused of having withdrawn money without 
proper documentation.58 In 2010, Africa Invest was sold for GBP 175.000. This 
was hardly sufficient to cover fees and liabilities, and investors were unable to 
recover their investments.59An audit by PricewaterhouseCoopers revealed that 
Cru’s asset base was overvalued, and this aggravated liquidity problems in 2011, 
when the company was unable to sell the (illiquid) holdings of land fast enough 
to respond to the massive withdrawal of investors.60 
In summary, the empirical evidence on project timelines illustrates that 
investment projects are characterized by constant changes in focus and details 
over time, including projects that do not end in failure. A good example is the 
aforementioned Unilever Ghana. It operated plantations in Ghana that it had 
57 | Trading Emissions Plc (2011), 7.
58 | Merrett (29 November 2013); BBC (6 February 2010); and Miller (7 July 2011).
59 | Grote (16 March 2010).
60 | Miller (7 July 2011).
Land Grabbing and Home Countr y Development202
acquired in 1999 through the host government’s divestiture program.61 Eight 
years later, in 2010, Unilever sold its majority share in the 7,200 ha Benso Oil 
Plantation Ltd, which is listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange and on which 
more than 9.000 people’s livelihoods depend, to Wilmar Africa.62 This was the 
result of a headquarter decision to concentrate on the company’s core business 
of manufacturing, marketing, and distribution.63 Moreover, the empirical 
evidence highlights the exposure of British land-consuming FDI to financial 
volatility; the dependency on developments in the home country, such as the 
economic crisis; or the inadequacy of business models to factor in the reality 
on the ground in the form of insufficient markets, limited economies of scale 
in agriculture, or bad plantation management. Together, these facts illuminate 
the discrepancy between the ‘profit from scarcity’ rhetoric and the actual per-
formance of the respective companies, even in areas, such as biofuels, that are 
supported by governments worldwide.
Land: Its Role and Use in These Investments
The previous sections showed that British land-consuming FDI takes place in 
multiple sectors and engages multiple actors. At the same time, their assess-
ment has pointed to fundamental challenges that several investment projects 
are facing, sometimes even leading to their ultimate failure. The following 
section will assess more closely the role of land used in these investments, 
major approaches used to access land, as well as relevant features of its gover-
nance. It can be noted that the Chinese cases do not differ in any significant 
way on these issues from the UK projects.
E xtent
The scale of British land-consuming investments varies enormously, with 
projects ranging in size from a 100 ha pilot farm to a total investment of 495.000 
ha (e.g., GEM Biofuels). While this range indicates the great diversity of invest-
ment projects falling under the label of land-consuming FDI, these numbers 
also show that compared to Chinese investments in SSA, the majority of which 
61 | Ntsiful (2010), 129-137.
62 | Wilmar Africa, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Singapore-headquartered Wilmar 
International Ltd, which was “founded in 1991 as a palm oil trading company,” and “is 
today amongst the largest listed companies by market capitalisation on the Singapore 
Exchange and one of Asia’s leading agribusiness groups.” See Wilmar International 
Limited (7 February 2011), 3.
63 | Ntsiful (2010), 129-137. With regard to Unilevers’ standpoint on plantations over 
time, see Jones (2005b), 185-214. Also see statement by Wilmar International Limited 
(7 February 2011), 2.
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use less than 10.000 ha, British investments are fairly large, particularly in the 
biofuel sector. To provide some examples: the Equatorial Palm Oil Company 
(EPO) acquired a total landholding of 169.000 ha-182.000 ha in Liberia;64 
D1 Oils held 155.000 ha in Zambia;65 CAMS Agri-Energy acquired 45.000 
ha in Tanzania;66 and VEPOWER Ltd, a bioenergy company focusing on fuel 
production and power generation, teamed up with Jatropha Africa, a biofuel 
feedstock company, and signed a feedstock acquisition agreement regarding 
the produce from the 50.000 ha leased land area in Ghana.67 However, UK 
investment projects also tend to be large in other sectors, such as timber: the 
Equatoria Teak Company owned by the CDC and FinnFund was managing an 
18,640 ha forest reserve in South Sudan;68 and livestock farming: Madabeef, a 
company active in Madagascar, seems to be operating ranching activities on 
200.000 ha.69 In many cases, companies (e.g., D1Oils, SBF, Agriterra Ltd.) have 
or had enormous land banks in multiple countries located in SSA, making the 
total land at their disposal even larger. 
However, it has already been highlighted above that a large land bank 
does not necessarily result in great returns or necessarily represent high asset 
values for the company in case of a need to sell company assets due to project 
failure. Still, these figures are impressive, at least at first sight and in view of 
the local repercussions in the form of land tenure. In practice, a closer assess-
ment of the timelines and details of many projects reveals a huge discrepancy 
between announced, acquired, and actually planted land area (see Table 6-1). 
For instance, Sun Biofuels’ (failed) business model envisioned 20.000 ha. 
However, the company ‘only’ managed to secure a total of approximately 12,854 
ha-13,854 ha. And of this land area, which spread across three countries, it had 
only planted a total of (approximately) 4,310 ha prior to its failure.70 Similarly, 
64 | Global Witness (20 December 2013); Equatorial Palm Oil (2011); Equatorial Palm 
Oil (2013); and The Rights and Resources Group (2013), 267.
65 | Investigate.co.uk (14 June 2006). There is diverging data on how much land has 
been secured and how much has been planted. See Table 6-1 for competing sources.
66 | Obulutsa (19 September 2008).; Oakland Institute (2011b), 4, 18-19, 30.
67 | BioZio (2011), 110, 127.
68 | In 2010, the CDC and FinnFund divested and sold the companies to unknown 
investors following controversies that resulted from protests by local communities and 
an inability to make the forest plantation economically viable in a sustainable way. 
However, as of 2014, the company and the acquired area, which was leased for 32 
years, continue to exist. It is now managed by Maris Capital, a London based venture 
capital group. See corporate website under Equatoria Teak Company (2014). Also see 
Concession Agreement (28 June 2006), 11, 15; Deng and Mittal (2011), 2, 11, 28-29.
69 | Üllenberg (2008); Hamelinck (2013), 87.
70 | See Table 6-1 for details.
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as of 2011, (then) D1 Oils had only managed to plant a minor part of the total of 
174.000 ha it had negotiated in Zambia in 2006 (see Table 6-1).
These enormous gaps between announced, negotiated, and planted land 
areas under management point to the challenges that these projects face on 
the ground, some of which were already alluded to in the previous section, 
such as expansion difficulties, unprofessional plantation management (GEM), 
inexperience and/or natural events (SBF), land disputes (Equatorial Palm Oil), 
competition over scarce input seeds, lack of funding and/or marginally viable 
business models, and administrative challenges.71 More broadly, these discrep-
ancies between the secured and planted areas over time provide useful data for 
a grounded discussion about the benefits of large-scale agricultural production 
in view of rural development or food security, since most large-scale projects 
have not managed to fully operationalize their business models.
Use and Purpose 
Land in British land-consuming FDI projects fulfills three functions, namely 
land as natural resource, as strategic asset, and as productive space for indus-
trial purposes and/or modernization projects. Lonrho, a formerly UK-listed 
company with an ambiguous reputation and operations in agriculture, infra-
structure, transport, and support services in SSA dating back to 1909, was taken 
over by a Swiss investor in 2013. Two years before that takeover it described the 
attractiveness of investments in land and agriculture in Africa as a composite 
of the following factors: 60 % of the world’s arable land, of which only 10 % is 
cultivated;72 a major continent for oil and gas reserves; a primary source for 
minerals; and the relatively low external debt levels of African countries.73
71 | D1 Oils (2011), 30; and Hawkins and Chen (2011).
72 | These figures are false. They are a modified version of a dominant narrative 
promoting agribusiness in Africa. The origin is a report by McKinsey (2010, 7-8, 42-44) 
which states that “Africa’s agriculture holds enormous potential for companies across 
the value chain. With 60 percent of the world’s uncultivated arable land and low crop 
yields, Africa is ripe for a “green revolution” like the ones that have transformed agri-
culture in Asia and Brazil.” Since then, this storyline has been taken up by international 
organizations (e.g., United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)) and 
businesses, often with a significant change in wording: uncultivated (with crops) land 
has become “unused,” resembling the idea of a “terra nullius.” Take the example of an 
ar ticle by UNECA, which argues that the “world’s largest reservoir of unused arable land, 
about 60 %,” is located in Africa. See Lopes (2014).
73 | See The African Business Journal (May 2013); Bloomberg News (20 July 2011); 
and Lonrho (2012), 1-5.
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Table 6-1 – Discrepancies between Announced, Acquired, and Planted Land Areas 
in Selected Projects74
Project Country Hectares announced/ 
acquired
Hectares 
acquired
Hectares 
planted
Sun 
Bio-
fuels 
(SBF)
Ethiopia75
Business model 
aimed at 20.000 ha, 
but company only 
managed to acquire 
13.000 ha
5.000 ha since 
2005
1.000 ha 
Tanzania76 8-9.000 ha since 
2006
Approx. 
2.000 ha by 
2010
Mozambique77 4,854 ha since 
2006 plus two 
farms of 607 ha 
and additional 
3.000 ha under 
negotiation
2,310 ha
D1Oi-
ls78
Zambia 155.000-174.000 ha 
(including outgrower 
schemes) allocated by 
Zambian government 
in 2006
155.000 ha In 2007: 
2,411 ha; and 
20,760 ha 
through con-
tract farming
GEM 
Biofu-
els79
Madagascar Secured 495,500 
ha; plan: 200.000 ha 
planted area by 2010
Exclusive rights 
over more than 
495.000 ha
55,700 ha (in 
2010), plus 
access to 40.000 
ha forest area
74 | Adopted from Hawkins and Chen (2011), 29-30.
75 | Hawkins and Chen (2011), 29-30.
76 | Bergius (September 2012), 3; Hawkins and Chen (2011), 29-30.
77 | Highbury Finance (2013); Hawkins and Chen (2011), 29-30.
78 | Data remains unclear. According to GEXSI LLP (2008, 50, 55), the company had 
7,386 ha in South Africa and 25,525 ha in Zambia under operation in 2008. Other 
reports state that D1Oils had been allocated 155.000 ha of land by the Zambian 
government in 2005 for Jatropha planting (e.g., Investigate.co.uk (14 June 2006)), 
amounting to a total of 174.000 ha when including the company’s contract farming rela-
tions (e.g., Reuk.co.uk (15 January 2007)). The Home and Mittal (2011, 28) country 
report confirms that the company was using 2,411 ha of managed plantations and 
20,760 ha of outgrower schemes by 2007. The 2010 annual report by D1 Oils shows 
that the company has subsidiaries in multiple African countries (Malawi, Ghana, South 
Africa, Zambia, and Swaziland), all of which focus on biofuels. See D1 Oils (2010), 50. 
However, no data is provided regarding the total land bank or planted area.
79 | Data from 2010; see Gasparatos and Stromberg (2012), 296; Hawkins and Chen 
(2011), 21, 23-24; GEM Biofuels (2010); Biofuelsdigest.com (1 July 2010); Biofuelsdi-
gest.com (25 June 2010); Cleantech Investor (May 2008); Proactiveinvestors.co.uk (25 
November 2009); and GEM Biofuels (28 September 2011).
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Equa-
torial 
Palm 
Oil80
Liberia 169.000 ha; plans to 
develop 50.000 ha 
within first 10 years, 
and 100.000 ha within 
20 years
169.000-
182.000 ha 
since 2008 in 
the form of 
three conces-
sions
Unclear, but 
due to financial 
problems and 
social resistance 
the planted 
area is limited 
(est. 3,200 ha in 
2012 according 
to RRI 2013). 
While use of land as a natural resource or productive space for industrial 
purposes has been a common trait of British land-consuming OFDI in African 
countries, use of land as a strategic asset in overseas investments is relatively 
new, though not unprecedented. In fact, land’s asset function was already a 
component of business models of chartered companies granting land titles, 
and of investment portfolios during late 19th century globalization.81 However, 
historical evidence on land acquisitions by businesses also highlights that land 
constituted only a minor share of personal wealth. Instead, it was largely a reflec-
tion thereof, and land holding was a status symbol rather than a standalone 
promise of extraordinary returns.82 In this context, and against the background 
of the high failure rate of land-consuming investments by funds (presented 
in Section 5), this chapter argues for the need to critically revise contempo-
rary claims that land is an asset class which withstands the wealth destruction 
witnessed in equity investments during times of financial crisis.83 Clearly, the 
aforementioned summary of project timelines highlighted problems related 
to the overvaluation of assets and the limited economies of scale that can be 
gained through large-scale land holding. Moreover, the illiquidity of land turns 
out to be disadvantageous once a project runs into financial problems.
The quality of land is equally important for assessing the meaning and 
impact of British investment projects. Project details show that food and biofuel 
investments occur on prime land, which is defined by fertile soils, moderate 
climatic conditions, and proximity to important infrastructure and cities. 
Agriterra Ltd., for instance, leased 45.000 ha of brownfield agricultural land 
in Sierra Leone, close to the Liberian border, to produce palm oil in an area 
with high levels of rainfall.84 And the Equatorial Palm Oil Company has been 
granted concessions for three palm oil plantations in Liberia, all of which are 
located in a favorable climatic zone, close to cities, and in proximity to ports 
80 | Global Witness (20 December 2013); Equatorial Palm Oil (2011); Equatorial Palm 
Oil (2013); and The Rights and Resources Group (2013), 267.
81 | See Chapter 3.
82 | Nicholas (1999).
83 | Collinson (24 July 2010).
84 | Agritrade (6 February 2012); Agriterra (29 February 2012).
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with facilities that can accommodate export operations.85 Similarly, the plots 
that SBF negotiated for biofuel production in Tanzania and Mozambique were 
prime land, following the project failure in Ethiopia due to poor soils.86 
In most cases, it remains difficult to judge the environmental impact of land 
acquisitions due to the limited data available on the prior use of the lands. The 
few cases where such data is available show that land deals resulted in land-use 
rehabilitation87 as well as land-use change. Particularly in the latter case of 
land-use change, several projects reveal ways in which these investments might 
negatively affect local and regional livelihoods, climates, and landscapes (e.g., 
water security, wildlife habitat, or microclimate). For instance, SBF’s operations 
in Tanzania took place on land formerly used by charcoal makers, including a 
swamp area that was important for local water security.88 In some cases, a given 
company has stalled its operations due to international pressure over the envi-
ronmental implications. This was the case with G4 Industries Ltd, which aban-
doned its 28.000 ha biofuel project in Kenya before operations had begun in 
response to pressure from NGOs over the potential negative impact on wildlife 
in the wetlands of the Tana River Delta.89 
Moreover, the question remains of whether the land is intended to produce 
for overseas consumption, as is widely assumed in the “land grab” literature 
(see Chapter 2). In the case of British land acquisitions, most projects were 
indeed originally intended for international markets, and several had clear 
export infrastructure in place (e.g., Equatorial Palm Oil). In this context, it 
appears that host governments have been largely reluctant to ensure that a 
certain percentage of the harvest is available for domestic consumption and/or 
value-added operations (e.g., refining).90 However, in practice, the exports often 
did not materialize. To provide several examples: the Equatoria Teak Company 
only managed to sell a few consignments (of timber) from its forest reserves in 
South Sudan due to local protests. Consequently, the CDC Group and FinnFund 
sold the concessions in 2010, after three years of operations.91 Also SBF (in 
Mozambique and Tanzania) had only managed to sell and export one consign-
ment of 30 tons of biofuel (Jatropha) by 2011. Thereafter, the company went 
85 | Global Witness (20 December 2013); Equatorial Palm Oil (2011); Equatorial Palm 
Oil (2013); and The Rights and Resources Group (2013), 267.
86 | Hawkins and Chen (2011), 29-30.
87 | For instance, SBF’s operations in Mozambique involved land that had formerly been 
used as a tobacco plantation, and Equatorial Palm Oil (Liberia) engages both in the reha-
bilitation of old plantations and the creation of new ones. Hawkins and Chen (2011).
88 | WWF Tanzania (2009), 84-86.
89 | Cernansky (26 October 2011).
90 | Zagema (2011); and Cotula (2011).
91 | Burnett (7 April 2014).
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into administration and its subsidiaries were sold to new owners who focus 
on plantation maintenance (rather than expansion). Meanwhile, Lufthansa, 
which had a biofuel offtake agreement with SBF, withdrew from this form of 
cooperation due to European protests over unsustainable biofuel production 
practices.92 Similarly, D1 Oils, active in Malawi and Zambia, ended up selling 
locally prior to its closure. The small scale of its operations—largely a function 
of limited availability of input seeds—made the pricing difficult. Marketing 
locally had the advantages of low transport costs and local offtake agreements, 
both of which allowed for agreement on market value.93 In other cases, such as 
Cru Investment Management’s Africa Invest fund, the project had simply col-
lapsed by the time of the first harvest. Regarding the question of how much of 
the biofuel produced in Africa has actually ended up in British transport fuel, it 
is interesting to note that, according to the UK Renewable Fuel Agency, no Afri-
ca-produced biofuel was used in 2010-2011, even though 78 % of biofuels had 
been imported.94 This information correlates with the empirical findings of 
this research project, according to which most British biofuel producers ended 
up selling locally or closing operations altogether.95 
To better understand the utility derived from overseas land acquisitions, it 
is important to look beyond the question of exports. In addition to land, these 
projects employ multiple factors of production, including labor, while also 
creating new markets for British input services and thus potentially creating jobs 
back home. Moreover, they are reflective of profitable policy frameworks, such 
as climate finance and related carbon credits, for which at least two biofuel com-
panies, D1 Oils and the SBF, applied. At the same time, the government operates 
on the assumption that these projects will generate state revenues derived from 
overseas investment earnings, and the early-stage companies’ projects represent 
profitable business streams for London banks issuing Initial Public Offerings.
Strategies of Access
Land is accessed through lease agreements, public-private partnership programs, 
the granting of concessions, joint ventures, outgrower schemes, Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoU) with county districts and tribal communities, and/or the 
purchasing of shares in listed plantations. In many cases, mixed access strate-
92 | Insight Group Plc (26 October 2011); Dahlbeck (2012), 21; Lufthansa (2014); 
Greenaironline.com (23 January 2012).
93 | Mitchell (2010), 124-125.
94 | See UK Trade and Investment (2012), 17.
95 | Instead, land used for UK biofuels has been located in Europe (e.g., France, 
Germany, Ukraine, UK, Belgium), Latin America (e.g., Argentina, Brazil), and Asia (e.g., 
Malaysia, Indonesia), with a focus on oilseeds, rapeseed, palm oil, soy, corn, sugar 
beet, sugar cane, and wheat as input factors. Renewable Fuels Agency (2011), 50. 
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gies are applied, such as plantation production plus outgrower schemes, or the 
purchase of a trading company (e.g., Agriterra Ltd. in Sierra Leone) that has 
preferential supply agreements with a sufficiently large farmer base.96 Moreover, 
several companies rely on additional land-intensive inputs from third parties, 
such as Jatropha seedlings grown by the supplier Diligent Tanzania Ltd. on 
3,500 ha.97 In some cases, the privatization of public plantations provided inves-
tors with access options. For instance, the two plantations acquired by Unilever 
in 1999 and 2004 (through shareholding) both trace back to 1976.98 
Aspects of Governance
Since the land that is leased is often owned by the state, key ministries and 
government agencies are involved in the land deals, as are parliaments.99 At 
the same time, several British biofuel companies have been part of commit-
tees established by host governments to develop governance structures in their 
particular sector. Jatropha Africa participated in the biofuel committee that 
supported the Ghanaian Ministry of Energy during deliberations on a renew-
able energy policy;100 D1Oils took part in a task force committee on renewable 
energy that framed biodiesel regulations in Zambia;101 and G4 International 
West contributed to West Africa’s biofuel strategy under UEMOA.102 
Most of the deals seem to be fully embraced and promoted by the respec-
tive recipient government.103 For instance, the Equatorial Palm Oil Company’s 
96 | Agriterra (29 February 2012).
97 | Chaponniere et al. (2010), 10. From a historical perspective, these strategies 
of indirect land (function) access are not new. During British colonial administration, 
smallholder schemes were often favored over plantations out of concern over social 
tensions and because they were seen to be more efficient. Also see the summary on “Oil 
Palm in Ghana” by the World Rainforest Movement (6 August 2010); and Gyasi (1996).
98 | Ntsiful (2010), 129-137.
99 | Cotula (2011), 16; Lahif f (2012).
100 | Jatropha Africa (22 August 2010). However, due to the unclear policy envi-
ronment and lack of funding, a policy overview by Antwi-Bediako (31 October 2013) 
mentions that Jatropha Africa went into administration.
101 | See Investigate.co.uk (14 June 2006).
102 | See ESG/ICTSD/LeHub/UEMOA/UN Foundation (2008), vii.
103 | In most cases, the terms seem very favorable to foreign investors. In Sierra 
Leone, for example, investors often seem to be exempt from taxation and they are 
allowed to lease land for up to 71 years (for USD 20-30 per ha per year) while profiting 
from low labor costs, which range between two and three dollars per day. See Caulker 
(2010), 12. A similar case is Liberia, which is currently extending and rehabilitating its 
plantations by granting concessions to foreign investors such as the Equatorial Oil Palm 
Company. That this company’s investments are fully embraced by Liberian President 
Land Grabbing and Home Countr y Development210
169.000 ha holding, of which 89.000 ha are concessions granted by the gov-
ernment and 80.000 ha are part of an MoU with the county district and tribal 
communities, is embedded in a plan by the Liberian government to re-establish 
export-oriented plantations as a growth sector and foreign exchange earner. 
On a similar note, Agriterra Ltd.’s lease of over 45.000 ha of brownfield agri-
cultural land has been promoted by the Sierra Leone Investment and Export 
Promotion Agency (SLIEPA) in line with the government agenda to use “oil 
palm as a priority growth sector.”104 SLIEPA, in cooperation with the District 
Councils and the Ministries of Land and Agriculture, has been “earmarking 
and preparing a number of suitable sites for 10.000+ hectare palm planta-
tions.”105 Also, several companies cooperate with state agencies, such as D1 
Oils, which co-manages a 600 ha farm with the Zambian Ministry of Agricul-
ture, and CAMS Agri-Energy Tanzania, which collaborates with a Tanzanian 
seed authority and Indian NGO to reach out to farmers.106 Also, the terms of 
the agreements seem highly favorable to the investor side, as land leases range 
between 32 (Equatorial Teak Company) and 50 years,107 the costs of compensa-
tion schemes appear to be extremely low, while governance structures in the 
host countries are rather weak, and labor costs are very low.108
Aside from governance schemes at the domestic level, some investments 
are also part of international governance arrangements. Jatropha Africa, for 
instance, is an industry partner of an EU-funded interregional cooperation 
program (EU-ACP) on “Capacity Building in South Africa, Namibia and Ghana 
to create Sustainable, Non-Food Bio-Oil Supply Chains.”109
Actors and Institutions
The empirical evidence on the governance of land has highlighted that, as in 
the Chinese case study, the presence of African governments in these invest-
ments is obvious in the form of ministerial and parliamentary involvement, 
Sirleaf is highlighted by the fact that she took part in the 2011 inauguration ceremony 
of the company’s newly established mill. Moreover, the concessions over 50 years were 
enacted by the Parliament of Liberia. Equatorial Palm Oil 2011; Equatorial Palm Oil (23 
February 2010), 6-8; Carrere (2013), 15, 55-56.
104 | Bangura (2011); World Rainforest Movement (9 August 2011).
105 | Caulker (2010), 29.
106 | Obulutsa (19 September 2008).; and WWF (2009), 14-15, 23, 26, 29-36.
107 | One of the largest investments by land area, the 495.000 ha GEM Biofuels 
project in Madagascar, is granted for over 50 years and made up of parcels which range 
between 2,500 and 50.000 ha. Included are the rights to a 40.000 ha natural forest.
108 | Caulker (2010), 12.
109 | Jatropha Africa (n.d.). 
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investment promotion centers, and/or legislation. At the same time, civil 
society groups and local community members seem to remain largely on the 
sidelines during the negotiations, and investor promises made to these groups, 
such as the building of health services and schools or the provision of sufficient 
jobs for the community, are often the first to be broken when a project fails and/
or is taken over by new investors—as, for instance, in the case of the projects of 
SBF in Tanzania and Mozambique.
From the British side, public agencies and government officials from dif-
ferent levels, as well as private actors and institutions, are involved. In addition 
to the prominent roles played by early stage companies, alternative stock 
markets, and financial investors, several public institutions seem to be relevant. 
One such institution is the CDC Group, the UK’s public development finance 
institution that has begun to enhance its efforts with regard to land-consuming 
(private equity) investments in Africa, focusing on infrastructure, real estate, 
and, increasingly, agriculture. Moreover, new political institutions and reforms, 
such as bilateral investment forums or aid programs, have been introduced by 
the acting government as part of a broader attempt to step up commercial diplo-
macy with African countries.
Also, several financial institutions, such as the Standard Chartered Bank, a 
UK merchant bank with a long presence in African economies, and/or invest-
ment funds, and the AIM London Stock Exchange play an important role, as 
the majority of companies rely on their financial services for funding. At the 
same time, the UK government proactively calls on entrepreneurs to make use 
of aid-funded business opportunities in the form of public-private-partner-
ships. Some companies have also accessed aid funding through institutions of 
pooled sovereignty, such as the EU.110 
On a (inter)national and regional level, there are a number of interlinked 
(non-) financial institutions at work, especially in the biofuel sector. These 
include domestic obligatory blending mandates, European and UK directives 
on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions reduction, the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme, and/or UNFCCC-related mechanisms, all of which promote a renew-
able energy market. Also, the newly launched G8 Alliance for Food Security, 
which was established in 2012 and “gathers together donors, partner countries 
and the private sector” to “promote private sector investments in agriculture by 
improving the business environment and explore ways to reduce risk through 
providing better legal and administrative conditions for investors,” has British 
companies among its members.111 In the G8 Alliance program for Tanzania, 
for instance, the UK is expected to contribute GBP 63 million from 2012 to 
2015. Several British companies submitted a letter of intent to participate in the 
110 | P. Harvey (2010).
111 | European Commission (18 May 2012).
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program, namely Syngenta, Unilever, and Vodafone, which basically implies 
expanding their business activities in multiple African countries.112
A significant share of the actors and institutions active in these investments 
also reflects the existence of a transnational or even global business culture 
that is characterized by personal linkages; registration in the same locations, 
namely the tax havens of Mauritius and Guernsey; the involvement of multiple 
investors from different countries in one project; and the reappearance of the 
same actors in different institutions.113 At the same time, the network does not 
consist entirely of private actors but also includes UN agencies (UNECA; UN 
FCCC; WB) and other public agencies on the international (AfDB), regional 
(European Investment Bank), and domestic levels (see Table 6-2).
Table 6-2 – The UK in Africa: Actors involved in Land-Consuming OFDI 
(selected)
112 | See New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (http://new-alliance.org/). For 
a critical discussion of the G8 Alliance in the context of commercial pressure on land, 
concentration of land ownership, and crowding out effects, see Hall and Sulle (2013). 
113 | For instance, SilverStreet advised GAVI alliance, and CAMEC and Agriterra had 
the same board members before CAMEC was sold to a Kazakh firm.
Actors Involved at 
Different Levels of 
Governance
Public Private Hybrid
INTERNA-
TIONAL
Inter- 
national 
agents
• United Nations Industri-
al Development Organi-
zation (UNIDO)
• UNFCCC Clean  
Development  
Executive Board
• UNECA
• European Commission 
Biofuel Directive
• African Union
• NEPAD Cassava 
Initiative
• EU-ACP 
• AU (biofuel promise)
• Jatropha Alliance
• Lufthansa
• UoP Houston
• Refining company in 
Helsinki
• Africa Invest 
(Channel  
Island-listed)
• African Biofuel Board
• G-8 New Alliance for Food 
and Nutrition Security 
• Jatropha Africa in  
cooperation with EU-ACP
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UK National • The CDC Group Plc 
• UK Renewable Fuels 
Agency (closed 2011)
• UK Department of Trade 
and Investment (UK TI)
• British Airways
• G4 Industries ltd
• GEM Biofuels
• CAMS Agri-Energy 
Tanzania
• Schroders  
Investment  
Management
• Vepower Ltd
• Cru Investment 
Management
• Virgin Train
• Biodiesel Plants
• Sun Biofuels Ltd
• Trading Emissions 
Plc
• ReSolve group
• D1Oils (called NEOS 
-Resources Plc since 
2012)
• BP International 
(exited 2009)
• Lion’s Head Global 
Partners (run by for-
mer Goldman Sachs 
employees)
• Highbury Finance
• Principle Capital 
Investments
• Saner Plc
• Avana Group
• Funds
• Private Equity Funds
Subna-
tional
• Regional investors 
(Wales)
• Investment Forums (e.g. 
UK-Nigeria Investment 
Forum 2012)
RECIP-
IENT 
COUNTRY
National • Ministries
• Parliament of Liberia
• President of Liberia
• President of Sierra 
Leone
• Sierra Leone  
Investment and Export 
Promotion Agency
• Jatropha Africa 
(Ghana)
Subna-
tional
• Government agencies 
• Communities
• Farmers
• Contract farmers
• Diligent Tanzania 
Ltd (Seed company)
4. The invesTmenTs in The reciPienT conTe x T:    
 sTaTed GoaLs and muLTiface Ted re aLiT y
British FDI projects are embedded (as described above) in national and regional 
development frameworks which are characterized by their rhetoric of rural 
development, energy/food security, and economic growth with its alleged 
promise of jobs, better livelihoods, and state revenues. The Tanzanian govern-
ment, for instance, has leased 600.000 ha to foreign investors since 2006 in 
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the context of a national development program that prioritizes biofuel produc-
tion.114 Similarly, the Ghanaian government promotes biofuel investments in 
the context of its national energy policy.115 
Many host countries’ national development programs aim to ease the 
administrative process that affects land-consuming FDI. At the core of such 
IFDI-attraction strategies is the perception that the host countries have to 
reduce barriers to investment “and tap their potential and comparative advan-
tages to develop the biofuels sector and benefit from globalization through 
CDM [Clean Development Mechanism] and the global carbon market”116 while 
boosting their agricultural sectors. This is expected to improve negative terms 
of trade and earn foreign exchange through export growth, but also to con-
tribute to greater self-sufficiency in food and energy within the context of global 
market failure, namely the failure of the global market to ensure reliable access 
to cheap resources. Also, on a regional level, these investments are embedded 
in development frameworks. For instance, West African countries agreed on 
a “blueprint for bioenergy, agriculture and rural development” for 2009-2011. 
This so-called UEMOA strategy was facilitated by UN agencies.117 
In line with the official rhetoric, most companies identify their projects as 
impact investments that combine profits with development objectives. Notably, 
there is a difference between “on the ground” and “off the ground” investors. 
“On the ground” companies tend to highlight the benefits of their programs, 
which allegedly contribute to rural development through jobs, housing, or 
health services. “Off the ground” actors, such as the financial companies that 
are majority shareholders in “on the ground” companies, seem to focus more 
on goals related to the context in which their headquarters operate, such as 
the UK and the EU. Trading Emissions Plc., for instance, stated its intent to 
profit from climate change mitigation policy by producing “clean” and renew-
able energy. Moreover, the scarcity rhetoric pursued by most agricultural funds 
appears to be more targeted towards capital from rich investor countries than 
poor ones, as in the latter case scarcity might be associated more with poverty 
than profit.
Whether the choice made by African governments to realize their devel-
opment plans with foreign capital will be sustainable remains to be seen. In 
contrast to contemporary mainstream economics, with its focus on capital 
location, the above highlights that capital ownership and home country context 
could be equally important for a country’s sustainable development. Take, for 
example, those biofuel investments that struggled to gain funding in the UK 
114 | See, for instance, Veit (2010).
115 | Dietrich-O’Connor (2011); and Ministry of Energy, Republic of Ghana (2010), 20.
116 | UNECA (2008), 30.
117 | ESG/ICTSD/LeHub/UEMOA/UN Foundation (2008), 3-26, 110-118.
Chapter 6: Brit ish Investments in Afr ica 215
due to conflicting interests between headquarters and the subsidiary regarding 
timelines, or other events in the home country that affected the realization 
of development plans in the host country, such as the economic recession. 
Another factor to consider is the historically low rate of reinvestment regarding 
the profits made. At the same time, host governments have made unfortunate 
choices, such as providing support without accounting for the specific planting 
season of a crop.118
The discrepancy between planned and actually planted areas of land over 
time, the frequent change of owners, and the high degree of project failure 
all highlight the challenges of realizing domestic development plans through 
private foreign capital. For instance, the company SBF had not resolved its com-
pensation problems by the time the company was resold, and the new investor 
was not interested in acting on the matter either. In many cases, new inves-
tors taking over failed projects do not make necessary investments while only 
reemploying a minor share of the previous workers. In addition, the above-av-
erage remittance rate that has characterized some British subsidiaries in Africa 
for a long time—with 75 cents of every dollar of profit being repatriated to the 
home country119—appears worrisome, as this means that only a minor share of 
the realized profits might actually be reinvested in host country operations. The 
ambiguous developmental impact of these investments also holds true in view 
of the underpinning business models. Many of these foresee the reduction of 
labor over time while relying on constantly low wages and minimum environ-
mental standards to stay economically viable (e.g., Jatropha).120
Consequently, there remains sufficient room for doubt about whether these 
investments, and the extended commercial presence of British companies and 
actors in the form of aid and trade, will be “Delivering Prosperity Together”121 
as claimed. On a national scale, many host countries’ overall governance per-
formance has improved over the last decade.122 At the same time, governance 
areas that are relevant in order for land-consuming OFDI to be beneficial for 
host country development, such as the rule of law, have deteriorated in many 
countries, including those that are considered to be the continent’s economic 
powerhouses (Nigeria, South Africa).123 Also, from a broader perspective, it 
is debatable whether export-oriented biofuel investments are a good way to 
118 | Mitchell (2010), 124-125.
119 | Te Velde (2002), 4.
120 | See, for instance, the case of D1 Oils in Mitchell (2010), 124-125.
121 | Bellingham (2010).
122 | The Africa Report (29 September 2014).
123 | See, for instance, WB Governance Indicators (http://info.worldbank.org/gover 
nance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports); and findings of the 2014 Ibrahim Index of 
African Governance survey (http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/interact/9).
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achieve greater food and energy self-sufficiency, as assumed by many national 
development programs. In fact, many African countries seem to be already 
over-extracting locally produced biomass, and this is a challenge that is likely 
to escalate in view of anticipated population growth, negative effects of climate 
change on land and soils, and/or general land-use conflicts (food vs. fuel vs. 
urbanization/modernization).124 Many governments do not seem to attach any 
export restrictions or local content requirements to land-consuming invest-
ment projects, or to demand the development of domestic refining capacities to 
diversify their countries’ economies.
5. invesTmenT funds for aGricuLTure 
Similar to the issue of labor in the Chinese case, one particular aspect of British 
land-consuming FDI has gained widespread international attention: the rise of 
new actors in the form of investment funds that engage in agricultural projects. 
For a better understanding of what is actually happening, the following para-
graphs outline the key characteristics of these projects. The goal is to capture 
the reality of this investor type, which is responsible for, or at least involved in, 
a significant number of British land-consuming FDI projects (see Table 6-3). 
A first challenge towards the assessment of these funds is their complex 
and evolving nature and opaque structures. Accordingly, the crucial question is 
who is actually investing. Take, for example, the self-proclaimed “largest agri-
cultural fund in Africa,” African AgriLandFund, which has been launched by 
the British hedge fund Emergent Asset Management. It is based on a capital 
transfer made by a US pension fund with the stated intent to make private 
equity investments in African agriculture.125 Running from 2009 to 2011 
under the management of EmVest, an operating company under the control 
of Emergent Asset Management, the fund was spun out of the Asset Manage-
ment investment portfolio in 2011. These constant changes in management 
and shareholding are key characteristics of these funds, which makes it diffi-
cult to capture what is occurring.
Judging from the rhetoric of a range of fund managers, the focus on SSA is 
explained by the region’s favorable conditions for food production. In the words 
of the African AgriLandFund: “because of its series of microclimates, its high-
lands, its agricultural diversity and good logistics, South Africa and Sub-Sa-
haran Africa can deliver an enormous amount of food.”126 At the same time, 
most funds use the same overarching theme to explain their business interest 
124 | Mushi (18 May 2012). 
125 | EdificeCapital.com (2014); and McNellis (2009), 11.
126 | McNellis (2009), 13.
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in farmland and agriculture: they apply a resource scarcity framing. Accord-
ingly, in a world with a growing population, a rising middle class, a declining 
arable land per capita ratio, climate pressures, high commodity prices, and 
competing claims over (farm)land, investments in agriculture promise high 
returns at a time of otherwise meager investment prospects as a result of the 
financial crisis.127 
In practice, however, the connection to farmland and food production is in 
many cases less obvious than it first appears. While empirical evidence does 
highlight a variety of farmland- and food-related activities, it primarily reveals 
funds investing in the private equity of agricultural companies (e.g., Cru Invest-
ment Management) or going into related sectors, such as real estate, trading, 
shipping. So far, only a few funds have invested in land itself. For instance, 
Schroders Investment Management’s “Agricultural Land Fund,” which was 
launched in 2008 when commodity prices peaked, pursues a mixed strategy 
by investing “in companies and funds which ‘will generate capital and income 
from the efficient management of land,’ as well as holding direct stakes in agri-
cultural land.”128 
Moreover, alongside this new trend of investment funds framing agri-
culture and land as an asset class, there are critical voices as well. Take, for 
example, David Bryant, Managing Director of Rural Fund Management (Aus-
tralia), who warns that the rise of investments in natural assets, such as agri-
cultural land, hints at the formation of a new bubble that is likely to burst in the 
future.129 According to Bryant, the rosy predictions of a continuous apprecia-
tion in farmland value are by no means certain. Instead, the correlation of high 
commodity prices and land value raises serious doubts about the long-term 
profitability of such undertakings. From a historical perspective, total returns 
from agriculture, of which land values are a key component, “rose in line with 
[commodity] prices, but were driven back again by economic events,” most of 
which were outside the control of individual companies, such as the Asian 
crisis. In reality, the “property component of agricultural businesses is that 
these assets are natural resources;” and the “dynamic of agricultural property 
business is that the ability to yield, combined with the price of the commodity it 
produces” defines the profitability of the operation and the value of agricultural 
land. 
Returns from large-scale agricultural projects are also severely challenged 
by other factors, such as the price volatility of agricultural markets, and/or the 
risks of currency appreciation, extreme weather events, and pests; the fact that 
“economies of scale in agriculture tend to approach an optimum at relatively 
127 | Schroder (August 2008). 
128 | McNellis (2009), 16.
129 | Bryant (2011), 16-18. 
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low levels of scale”—due to the relative increase of overhead costs compared 
to returns; and the difficulty of establishing adequate corporate structures 
which respond to the volatile and dynamic farming realities on the ground.130 
In practice, and similar to the biofuel projects discussed before, the invest-
ment fund sector has already witnessed cases of dramatic value destruction 
and allegedly fraudulent behavior, as the case of Cru Investment Management 
(Africa Invest) highlighted.131 Moreover, the illiquidity problem experienced by 
Cru Investment shows that holding land as a strategic asset also poses a chal-
lenge in the case of project failure.
Together, these factors indicate that it is not surprising that the business 
rationale of agricultural investment funds often turns out to be less successful 
than it first appears, particularly with regard to the claim of above average 
returns in the medium term (see below). They also suggest that a business 
rationale which assumes appreciation in land and commodity values in its prof-
itability calculations could become troublesome in view of global food security. 
The inherent problem for food security becomes obvious in a 2002 presenta-
tion about falling wheat prices by Silver Street Capital, “an investment manage-
ment firm focusing on investing in two major areas: Africa and the agricultural 
sector.”132 The presentation starts out with a “problem definition” centered on 
the fact that the front month futures prices for wheat were “still around 40 % 
off the 2008 peak.”133 Ascribing declining world wheat inventories to extreme 
weather events since 2008, the presentation comes to a ‘positive’ outlook 
of re-rising wheat prices:134 “Global inventories are now near balance once 
the Black sea shortfall [i.e. reduced production due to drought conditions] is 
replaced [i.e. once US farmers have sold surplus inventories] so any further 
negative surprises in wheat harvests will lead to price rises.”135 While expected 
price increases are clearly bad news for people depending on markets to access 
their food supplies, they are good news for the investor.
Against this background, a growing body of literature has been emerging 
since 2008 that discusses the disconcerting implications of this financializa-
tion of the food sector, i.e. the increasing role of financial actors, instruments, 
and rationalizations in the food and agriculture sector.136 It seems particularly 
worrisome to see financial actors gaining equity related control over various 
130 | Bryant (2011), 16-18.
131 | See Chapter 6 (Section 3).
132 | Silver Street Capital (12 March 2015).
133 | Silver Street Capital (9 August 2010), 10. 
134 | Silver Street Capital (9 August 2010), 10.
135 | Silver Street Capital (9 August 2010), 10. 
136 | For a detailed discussion of the political implications of the financialization of 
the food sector in the form of distancing and private accumulation, see Clapp (2013). 
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activities in the global food-supply-chain.137 This could bestow investors with 
the power to induce scarcity in the medium term in order to increase profits,—
for instance, by withholding crops in storage or not planting anything. It also 
reflects the broader trend of the concentration of land ownership in the hands of 
a few. In this case, the owned land is then leased to farmers or directly operated 
by the investment fund.138 At a minimum, examples from other sectors charac-
terized by similar processes of ownership concentration and control over supply 
chains—from production to storage and distribution—serve as a warning about 
the potential repercussions. Take, for example, the manipulative control of a 
physical commodity market in the form of price rigging through hoarding—an 
accusation that Goldman Sachs was confronted with in 2013, when the stock-
piling of tons of aluminum allegedly drove up prices.139
For the time being, the empirical evidence on UK financial companies 
investing in African land and agriculture (presented below in Table 6-3), high-
lights that reality is starkly different than the assertion that scarcity pressures 
and rising demand will ensure the success of these undertakings, which in 
turn will contribute to food security and reduce import dependency in host 
countries. Instead, Cru Investment Management’s Africa Invest turned out 
to be fraudulent in its use of financial resources and, Susan Payne’s widely 
mentioned African Agricultural Land Fund came under new management 
in 2011, though it did attract an impact investment of USD 500 million from 
another financial investor. At the same time, Actis’ Africa Agribusiness Fund’s 
monopoly in grain handling allegedly led to food price increases in Kenya, high-
lighting the dangers associated with excessive market power. And Schroders’ 
Agricultural Land Fund did not generate the alpha returns promised; in fact, it 
mostly performed under the benchmark level from 2006 to 2013, showed great 
volatility over time, and invested largely in futures rather than equity. 
This empirical evidence, then, raises a very different question: How is it 
that this rhetoric of success and profit continues to be so powerful (and go 
unchallenged) in the media and government policies, even though the count-
er-examples are so numerous? Additional and more detailed assessments of 
these investment projects are needed in order to trace the path of the millions 
of US dollars associated with cases of fund failure. This would help to clarify 
the underpinning interest formations that are characteristic of a significant 
share of these investments.
137 | Also see Patel (2012); and Clapp (2013).
138 | Wilson (28 July 2013). 
139 | Wilson (28 July 2013); United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs (23 July 2013); and The New York Times (26 July 2013). 
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Table 6-3 – Examples of UK Financial Companies Investing in Africa  
(Merian Research and CRBM 2010)140
Name Time Vehicle & Activity Projects Additional Information
Cru  
Investment 
Manage-
ment
Unclear 
start 
(2008?); 
suspend-
ed in 2009
Africa Invest 
Management Ltd. 
London
Activity: Invest in 
agriculture for food 
production (e.g., 
paprika, chilies, 
potatoes) and profit 
from rising global 
food demand
Private equity 
investments in five 
to seven farms in 
Malawi (conflicting 
information)
Approx. 6.000 ha 
and additional  
outgrower schemes
The fund was suspended in 
2009, farms were sold to a 
Malawi farming company, and 
CEO Jon Maguire was accused 
of misuse of financial resourc-
es for personal profit.141
Just before its closure, 
Africa Invest was awarded the 
European Market Research 
Centre award at a UN FAO 
conference, as well as the “Best 
SME in Africa” Award at the 
“Commonwealth  
Business Council— 
African Business Awards 
Ceremony” held in London 
in 2008.142
Actis 
Capital LLP 
London
Actis was 
establis-
hed in 
2004. Un-
til then, it 
had been 
part of 
the CDC, 
the UK’s 
develop-
ment arm, 
which was 
founded 
in 1948 
to invest 
in the 
Common-
wealth.143
Actis Africa Agribusi-
ness Fund
Activity: tea and 
coffee processing, 
aquaculture, horti-
culture, forestry, and 
bio-power.144
Private equity 
investments
Actis was previously part of 
the CDC, which still holds 
40 %.145
Grain Bulk Handlers Ltd., 
in which Actis is invested, 
has established a monopoly 
in grain handling in Kenya 
which has driven up food 
prices.146
In 2009, Actis was voted 
Africa real estate firm of the 
year, highlighting that most 
of its investments are in effect 
not flowing into agricultural 
projects.147 Instead, the Fund 
focuses on mining, gas and 
oil, financial services, and/
or real estate rather than 
agriculture.148
140 | The table is based on Merian Research and CRBM (2010), as well as information 
from corporate websites.
141 | Merian Research and CRBM (2010), 28.
142 | Merian Research and CRBM (2010), 28.
143 | Actis (2014a).
144 | AltAssets (26 April 2006).
145 | AltAssets (26 April 2006). Accordingly, “[a]gribusiness has been a core part of CDC’s 
investments in Africa over the past 50 years and realizations have generated returns of up to 
40 per cent, according to CDC. All of CDC’s portfolio companies need to comply with CDC’s 
business principles, including health and safety, business integrity and social policies.”
146 | Merian Research and CRBM (2010), 9.
147 | Actis (2014a).
148 | Actis (2014b).
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Emergent 
Asset 
Manage-
ment Ltd. 
London149
2008 until 
2011
African Agricul-
tural Land Fund, 
London150
Activity: biofuel, live-
stock, game farming, 
and timber 
Private equity fund 
investing in multi-
ple projects
150.000 ha of land 
under management 
in 15 African coun-
tries (in 2008)
Opened by former employees 
of Goldman Sachs and JP 
Morgan, Susan Payne and 
David Murran. Susan Payne 
also has microfinance projects 
in Africa.
When Susan Payne left 
Emergent Asset Management 
Ltd. in 2011 the fund was 
spun out as well. As of 2012, 
the fund had received a USD 
500 million investment from 
Truestone Impact Investment 
Management.151 
Schroders 
Investment 
Manage-
ment
2008 Schroders Agricultur-
al Land Fund
Hybrid fund in-
volved in real estate, 
private equity, and 
equity markets 152
Follows investment 
theory that 44 % 
growth in popula-
tion over next 40 
years will be highly 
profitable in these 
areas.
Total fund size is 
USD 200.8 million.
The fund shall deliver 10-15 % 
to institutional investors per 
year over 5 years by investing 
25 % in agricultural land 
related equities and commo-
dities—to get returns on land 
holding and land manage-
ment.153
De facto, it had primarily 
invested in futures of agricul-
tural commodities by 2013, 
and it did not generate alpha 
(above-average returns) but 
rather stayed largely below 
the benchmark value while 
reflecting great volatility.154
6. concLusion
This chapter has presented the main empirical characteristics of what has 
happened regarding British land-consuming OFDI since 2000. The key 
empirical characteristics of British land-consuming FDI in African countries 
highlight the necessity to critically investigate investor claims. Instead of rep-
resenting cases of scarcity-induced success, many projects have failed and/
or never lived up to their promise of high returns and developmental impact. 
This holds even in areas, such as the biofuel sector, where government policies 
and international frameworks are highly supportive of related entrepreneurial 
activities. In some cases, the resulting market concentration even led to price 
149 | McNellis (2009), 11, 13.
150 | Murrin (2009); and Private Equity (10 February 2012).
151 | See Private Equity (10 February 2012); and corporate website Truestone Impact 
Investment Management (n.d.).
152 | Also see De Schutter (2011b).
153 | Schroders (2008).
154 | Schroders (2014).
Land Grabbing and Home Countr y Development222
rises, pointing to the challenges associated with massive capital inflows in 
developing countries. 
The predominant actors in British land-consuming FDI in SSA are large 
corporations with a long presence on the continent, early-stage companies, 
and financial investors. More recently, British government officials have also 
become involved in promoting OFDI, and the CDC, the development finance 
institution, has expanded the range of its activities in SSA. It promotes trade 
and investment and also acts as both an indirect and direct investor in land-con-
suming OFDI projects. Important institutions that influence investor rationales 
and/or open business opportunities are the international and domestic climate 
regime, host country privatization policies, the London Stock Exchange, and 
multilateral aid projects.
The UK’s long investor history is obvious in the activities of “old” companies 
in the recipient countries, but also in the responsiveness of new actors to inter-
national/transnational incentive structures. At the same time, it is surprising 
that the majority of investments are undertaken by newly founded companies, 
or by actors (e.g., funds) that engage in new operations (e.g., agriculture). Thus 
far, the majority of investments have used land as a natural resource, with the 
focus on export to world markets. However, the reliance on stock markets for 
industry finance often leads to the problem of crashing share values and a lack 
of patient capital, particularly in agricultural projects with medium-term mat-
uration timelines. 
The previous assessment devoted a section on the nature and implications 
of new actors that have attracted a lot of attention in the contemporary debate, 
namely financial funds investing in the physical commodities of food and land. 
The overview highlighted that their business rationale is less self-explanatory 
than it might appear at first sight. Indeed, their business models might come at 
a high price in cases where this yields market power concentration and wealth 
destruction. Even though their access to large sums of capital puts these inves-
tors at an advantage over competitors that are only active in the productive or 
farming sector, the poor performances of the various funds raises doubt about 
their business rationale and developmental impact. Moreover, and similar to 
the Chinese case study, the agency in host countries featured prominently in 
these investment projects: not only did the respective governments try to attract 
British land-consuming FDI, but British companies also participated in regula-
tory initiatives of host countries.
In conclusion, several tendencies of British land-consuming OFDI seem 
notable and demand a more detailed assessment in the home country context. 
In particular, the British investment projects in SSA reflect a very diverse 
private sector that seems to have distinct business interests that relate to host 
country reforms, biofuels legislation, and/or the search for alternative invest-
ment outlets at a time of financial crisis. In this context, the findings also show 
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the predominant use of alternative stock markets to access funding and the 
related lack of patient capital has led many projects ‘on the ground’ to ulti-
mately fail—highlighting a potential dysfunctionality of the UK’s political 
economy. More recently, public actors and institutions have begun to engage in 
British land-consuming FDI activities, as investors and/or agents that pro-ac-
tively support the private sector through commercial diplomacy. Importantly, 
these investments seem to respond to home country policies and/or crises that 
influence investor choices, and the government promotes them as a part of its 
development agenda and foreign policy—indicating that they do not take place 
in a “free market” vacuum. 
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Table 6-4 – Brief Review of the Empirical Characteristics of UK OFDI155
Category Core Empirical Characteristic
Actors Three types of actors are predominantly involved: corporations with a long 
presence on the continent, early-stage companies, and financial inves-
tors. Recently, the British development finance institution, the CDC, has 
become involved as investor.
Institutions Important institutions include the international and domestic climate 
regime (e.g., the CDM), host country privatization policies, the London 
Stock Exchange, and multilateral aid projects (e.g., the G8 Alliance). 
Increasingly, commercial diplomacy institutions (e.g., bilateral investment 
forums) and British development finance (the CDC Group) are involved.
Sectors While official data shows that British OFDI in SSA goes largely into 
mining projects and financial services, “land grab” databases largely list 
projects in agriculture for food and energy (biofuel) purposes.
Timelines Most investments started around 2000 or later. Three major timelines can 
be identified: around 2000, from 2005 onwards, and post-2007.
Role of 
land
Land is used as a natural resource, as a space where profitable business 
opportunities open up (e.g., construction), and as an asset. Investments of-
ten intend to produce for export; however, they often end up selling locally.
Recipient 
context
British investments are part of national development plans in host coun-
tries which try to attract IFDI. In the case of biofuels, British companies 
were invited by several host governments to participate in the develop-
ment of sectoral regulations.
155 | This table intends to reduce complexity and orientate the reader. In doing so, it 
leaves out some findings presented in this chapter that though important, do not form 
the core of British OFDI in SSA.
Chapter 7: The British Context 
Investments from a Home Country Perspective
1. inTroducTion
The empirical evidence highlights that British land-consuming FDI in African 
countries comprises several sectors, and reflects distinct motivations, as well 
as a wide range of operations. The evidence also shows a complex actor constel-
lation: in addition to the highly diverse private sector, increasingly, agents of 
the public sector are involved. A significant share of these investments clearly 
pre-dates the 2008 crises. The production of food does not seem of primary 
importance in these investments, while biofuels investments have featured 
quite prominently—producing largely for international markets. Together with 
the important role of the financial sector, also the use of land as a strategic asset 
has been increasing. 
This chapter assesses how and why British land-consuming OFDI activ-
ities happen against the background of the investor country. In particular, it 
will discuss these activities in view of the country’s OFDI policy (Section 2), 
the guiding ideology of UK-Africa relations (Section 3), and, finally, against 
the backdrop of the country’s political economy (Section 4) and development 
trajectory (Section 5). The multiple threads emerging from this discussion 
will be summarized in the conclusion (Section 6), which will be guided by 
the question of why these investments occur as they do in and over time. In 
addition to domestic dynamics and international contexts, this section will also 
briefly assess the investments’ likely welfare implications.
It is argued that the following features of the home country context are 
significant in explaining British land-consuming OFDI from a home country 
perspective: (1) The investments are embedded in a long-established OFDI 
framework; however, this framework has undergone some changes in the 
past decade, such as the new “official” focus on Africa and the introduction of 
novel financial instruments. (2) Many investments are part of a foreign policy 
ideology tailored to domestic development ambitions captured under the acting 
government’s “prosperity agenda,” while some relate to (inter)national climate 
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policies. (3) The actors and institutions involved reflect the dominance of the 
financial industry in an era of deregulated capital markets while highlighting 
the challenge of attracting patient capital for agricultural investments through 
the stock exchange (AIM) mechanism. At the same time, (4) the detrimental 
impact of the financialization-led growth model pursued over the last decades 
has led the acting government to support land-consuming FDI in African 
countries as a way to reindustrialize and “rebalance the economy”—after the 
financial crisis hit.
More broadly, four drivers explain why British land-consuming FDI in SSA 
happens from the home country perspective. Accordingly, British land-con-
suming FDI projects are part of multiple strategies to profit from the economic 
reforms and rapidly growing consumer markets in the host countries; to abide 
by the international climate regulations and use domestic energy and climate 
policies to encourage investments in ‘clean’ biofuels; and/or to “seek alpha” 
through alternative investments in the primary sector in African countries at 
a time of the financial crisis, Eurozone crisis, and economic stagnation back 
home. Increasingly, land-consuming FDI projects are also part of a (long-
term) political strategy to economic recovery and international political power 
through rising exports and industrial activity.
2. home counTry me asures 
Britain has benefited from that global system over a long 
period of time. But we cannot afford to rely on history 
or sentiment if we are to earn our living. We cannot 
take it for granted that markets will remain open to our 
business, or that our businesses will always be able to 
take full advantage of the opportunities that exist. 
(Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 20111)
British land-consuming investments in Africa are embedded in a fully devel-
oped framework of home country measures that has evolved over time. Some 
of its elements trace back to the late 19th century, such as the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office that emerged out of the Colonial Office (est.1854) and 
the Dominions Office (est.1925). Historically, the adoption of home country 
measures underwent several stages, from a pre-WWI laissez-faire approach 
to a more guided course since WWI, and an increasingly promotional stance 
1 | BIS (2011a), 3.
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since the mid-1970s.2 The introduction of explicitly promotional OFDI policies 
occurred in the UK in 1974.3 
The shifting OFDI policy stances of the various UK governments reflect 
specific domestic development concerns and international events in time. For 
instance, Treasury instructions in 1919 to tighten OFDI regulations reveal the 
intention to protect foreign exchange and ensure the availability of capital for 
domestic development, like housing, following WWI. Also, more recently, the 
promotion of overseas FDI by the UK government seems to be related to the 
prevailing perception that OFDI is an important component of the UK’s ability 
to “punch above its weight” and maintain “prosperity” at home in a changing 
world order characterized by the rise of the BRICS, that is, to play an extraor-
dinarily influential role in international political and economic relations given 
the country’s actual size.4 At the same time, UK OFDI has remained astonish-
ingly stable, at about 2% of GDP, since the end of WWII while the British share 
in world stock of FDI has mostly ranged between 14% and 15%.5
OFDI: Development, Context, Objectives 
A closer look at the historical evidence shows the nature and sequence of 
events and development objectives that made various governments (under their 
respective political economies and development strategies) reach conclusions 
about the usefulness (or ineffectiveness) of overseas investments to address 
internal or external challenges or realize certain development ambitions. As 
has been mentioned before, the UK moved through several stages in this 
respect, namely a laissez-faire approach during the 19th century, when it was 
a significant capital-exporting country; a permissive approach in the late 19th 
century “when it was rapidly losing its industrial supremacy;”6 a slightly more 
regulated phase post-WWII, when the country was focusing on recovering its 
industry and infrastructure; and an increasingly promotional stance since the 
mid-1970s, following EU accession and the oil crisis, when OFDI was seen as a 
way to help the tarnished manufacturing industry to access European markets.
2 | Atkin (1970), 324-335; and De Beule and Van den Bulcke (2010), 296-297.
3 | De Beule and Van den Bulcke (2010), 296-297.
4 | Atkin (1970), 325; M.Harvey (2011).
5 | While OFDI flows briefly spiked to nearly 15% during 1996-2000, due to an increase 
in mergers and acquisitions of British firms overseas (e.g., Unilever), the percentage 
of overseas FDI as a portion of GDP had dropped again to 2.5% by 2002. However, the 
interim spike had the long-term effect of raising “the stock of UK FDI” to 1980s levels of 
approximately “14.5 per cent of world stock of FDI.” See Schenk (2005), 474. 
6 | Chang (2004), 695-697.
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Over time, government rhetoric suggested that OFDI would facilitate 
the acquisition of natural resources, technology, and know-how for domestic 
industry, promote exports, mitigate market failure, and, to a rising degree, 
create new markets and strengthen UK industry through globalized produc-
tion processes that allow companies to internalize locational advantages. At the 
same time, OFDI has increasingly been perceived as an income earner able 
to moderate the negative post-1947 UK trade accounts. This holds particularly 
true since the Thatcherite era in the 1980s, when the terms of trade deteri-
orated as a result of multiple factors, such as structural changes within the 
economy in the form of deindustrialization, financialization, and deregulation; 
high commodity prices during the oil crisis in the 1970s; and a changing inter-
national context, in which many countries had begun to catch up with regard 
to industrialization, and British companies were losing their competitive edge.7
Through the aforementioned periods, the framing and administration 
of OFDI changed significantly: while the 19th century was characterized by 
a political perception of OFDI that reflected mercantilist thought and great 
power struggles over resources, markets, strategic locations, and spheres of 
influence, increasingly, an economic-technical framing of OFDI gained influ-
ence in public debates and international economic governance. However, more 
recently, under the trade and investment agenda of the acting government 
(since 2011), OFDI has been loosely yet explicitly (re)linked to the UK’s national 
interests. 
In practice, official documentation shows that in the years after the British 
Empire’s disintegration, particularly during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the 
UK focused on resource security and negotiated bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs). The UK governments were concerned over expropriations in the former 
dependencies, where the colonial investor legacy, the call for a New Interna-
tional Economic Order (1974), and the popularity of dependencia theories (early 
1980s) had led to a hostile attitude among host countries towards British FDI.8 
At that time, OFDI policy was still strongly guided by the UK’s foreign policy 
agency, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), which was in charge 
of the negotiations. Once British officials and business reoriented their focus 
towards market access as well as investment and export promotion, competen-
cies were transferred to the UK Trade and Investment Department.9 
As of 2012, proactive OFDI promotion is part of a larger package of industrial 
policy that focuses primarily on export promotion and IFDI attraction while 
being embedded in a reindustrialization program designed to “rebalance the 
7 | Carnell (1996).
8 | For information on the history of UK bilateral investment treaties, see Walter (2000), 
9-11, 23-26.
9 | Walter (2000), 9-11, 23-26.
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economy.”10 The reindustrialization program aims to promote “the growth of 
high-tech industry, small firms, and service providers (tertiary sector).”11 In this 
context, OFDI promotion is framed as helping British business to “go global,” 
thereby opening markets for specific industries that the government perceives 
to be the UK’s comparative advantage (e.g., pharmaceutical, biotech sector, food 
manufacture), encouraging trade, securing access to resources (oil, minerals), 
enhancing competitiveness, and profiting from growth markets overseas and 
from contract work opportunities that might help to secure jobs back home 
(e.g., construction projects).12 While the geographical focus rests on Asia, the 
Gulf, and Latin America, there has been a growing interest in Africa as well. 
For instance, the Foreign Secretary has established a Commercial Taskforce 
“to increase the presence of British companies across Africa.”13 Correlating 
with the intensified commercial diplomacy, exports to African countries, as 
well as investments, increased significantly. However, the case of Angola, a 
major crude oil exporting country with little refining capacity where British 
companies have managed to significantly increase their exports (of refined oil) 
since 2012, highlights that in many cases, the established trade and investment 
legacies of the UK continue to play out as they have done in the past.14 
Jumping on the Corporate Bandwagon and “Rebalancing the 
Economy”15
As of 2014, the UK is categorized as a country with a low degree of OFDI control 
and a high degree of OFDI promotion.16 In comparison, China has been char-
acterized as a country with a high degree of control and promotion of OFDI 
flows. The UK’s set of home country measures involves multiple policy areas. 
It is composed of encouragement policies, simplified approval processes, and 
regularized supervision. While some features were disbanded at a certain 
point, such as the energy attachés, and/or taken over by diplomatic staff, others 
persist, such as the net food-importing country’s agricultural attachés, though 
their locations and numbers have changed, particularly after the UK’s acces-
sion to the European Economic Community in 1973.17 Several agencies were 
10 | BIS (2011a). 
11 | Nagle (2000), 304.
12 | BIS (2011b); BIS (2011a), 1-25; and HM Treasury and BIS (2011), 3-4; FCO 
(2011b).
13 | Bellingham (2010).
14 | Soque (30 June 2014); KPMG (2014).
15 | See HM Treasury and Osborne (9 July 2013); and Cargill (2011), 13.
16 | De Beule and Van den Bulcke (2010), 299. 
17 | The National Archives (2005), 21-22.
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transformed into hybrid organizations that now comprise private and public 
actors. Take, for example, the FCO/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
Joint Export Directorate that became the UK Department of Trade and Invest-
ment (UKTI), a government agency that works closely with industry partners 
and associations. In addition, British investors have increasingly profited from 
the pooled sovereignty of the EU, as well as from multilateral institutions and 
related political and financial support mechanisms. At the same time, it has to 
be noted that the OFDI policy framework should not be overestimated in view 
of effectiveness. In practice, the government budget is tight, and the multi-
level home country measures’ framework lacks coherence. For instance, the 
UK’s BITs can be in disaccord with EU standards, as many have been negoti-
ated prior to the UK’s accession to the European Economic Community (now 
European Union).18 Also, the government does not have a long-term vision for 
its engagement with the African continent.19
The home country measures (HCMs) that apply particularly to investment 
projects in African countries have often been in place for several decades. As 
mentioned above, the BITs were negotiated in the 1980s and 1990s, and the 
Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD), the UK’s export finance and 
credit agency, has been offering political risk insurance for overseas invest-
ments since 1970, in the form of loans to finance purchases, sharing credit 
risks with banks, and insuring UK overseas investors.20 However, the case of 
the UK’s political risk insurance also highlights the degree to which the uti-
lization of home country measure services has amplified: investor insurance 
liability increased by 58% between 1998 and 2001, covering GBP 1 billion.21 
With regard to regional distribution, however, Africa ranks rather low in HCM 
services. In 2007, only 6% of ECGD services went to projects in Africa.22 
Key institutional reforms and program re-conceptualizations linked to these 
long-standing policy frameworks took place under the Labour (1997-2010) and 
Conservative governments (since 2010). These reforms and re-conceptualiza-
tions have proven important for British land-consuming investments in SSA. 
Already in the late 1990s, UK development assistance began to focus on Africa 
while embracing the concept of poverty alleviation through private-sector-led 
growth. In 2010, the Conservative government re-aligned the DFID programs 
with FCO interests, echoing the credo of the 1980s to “give greater weight in the 
allocation of our aid to political, industrial, and commercial objectives along-
18 | Harrison (2010) and (2013).
19 | Chafer (2010).
20 | For an assessment of the UK’s export promotion agencies, see Hauswir th (2006), 
96-102.
21 | TeVelde (2007), 97.
22 | Te Velde (2007), 97.
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side our basic development objectives” (Neil Marten, Minister for Overseas 
Development, 1980).23 
In practice, this has meant that investment-related bilateral aid, which 
research shows to positively correlate with OFDI flows, has increased from 18% 
in the 1970s to 30% in 2002 (as a share of total UK aid).24 Major emphasis lies on 
improving the investment environments of host countries through programs 
that focus on infrastructure, human resource development, macroeconomic 
stability, legal rules, or private sector support.25 For example, the Investment 
Climate Facility for Africa finances policy and regulatory work “to improve the 
investment conditions in Africa,” while providing a platform “for the private 
sector to work in partnership with governments and donors.”26
Moreover, the UK’s development finance institution, the CDC, strength-
ened its geographical focus on Africa (and South Asia) in 2011, and it has trans-
formed its operational strategy from being a “fund of funds” (i.e., intermediary 
equity investments) to becoming an investor engaged in direct private equity 
operations. This move is important as it will result in more equity investment 
geared towards improving the economic fundamentals of recipient countries—
to the benefit of British investors—while reducing the risk potential. By 2011, 
the CDC had invested in several funds that were engaged in land-consuming 
investments in SSA: it transferred USD 20 million to the previously-mentioned 
SilverLandsFund of London-based Silver Street Capital LLP, which concentrates 
on agribusiness operations in Central and Southern Africa. It also invested in 
the Global Environmental Fund (GEF), a firm focusing on clean tech opera-
tions which currently manages 468,860 ha of forestry land in Ghana, Mozam-
bique, Tanzania, Swaziland, and South Africa (in 2014).27 It also made a USD 15 
million investment (i.e., 15% of the total target of USD 100 million) in Schulze 
Global Ethiopia Growth and Transformation Fund I, a private equity invest-
ment fund involved in agriculture and food production in Ethiopia.28 
In the words of Andrew Mitchell, former Secretary of State (2010-2012) for 
DFID, the sole CDC shareholder, these investment activities, particularly the 
investment in Schulze Ethiopia Growth, are living proof of the marked shift 
in geographical and strategic focus that the CDC Group has experienced: “For 
the first time, CDC is directing its much needed capital to help promising 
entrepreneurs and businesses in Ethiopia to transform agriculture and food 
23 | Barder (2005), 7, 10.
24 | Te Velde (2006), 24.
25 | Te Velde (2006), 24; and Te Velde (2007), 96.
26 | Department for International Development (25 March 2013).
27 | Data calculated from data provided by GEF (http://www.globalenvironmental-
fund.com/).
28 | Department for International Development (9 May 2012).
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production.”29 At the same time, the CDC has begun to invest in service indus-
tries catering to the interests of these agribusiness investments. For instance, 
it is involved in the Progression Eastern African Microfinance Equity Fund 
(2012) that provides microfinance in Kenya Tanzania, Rwanda, Zambia, and 
Uganda.30 This is particularly interesting against the background of the out-
grower schemes that are applied by many investor companies. These schemes, 
as described above, rely on farmers who are able to pay for inputs; as a result, 
microfinance has repeatedly been recommended by industry representatives to 
support rural development and private-sector-led growth.
In the bilateral political realm, the Cameron government in the UK has 
begun to step up its commercial diplomacy in the form of high level visits and 
the launch of bilateral investment forums. These resemble similar Chinese 
and French platforms, though they are undertaken in a more ad hoc fashion. 
In this context, the then Minister for Africa, Henry Bellingham (2010-2012), 
stated in 2010 that he was “on track to visit all 53 states in Africa by our next 
general election in 2015.”31 The key actors in this commercial diplomacy spree 
are the FCO, DFID, and UKTI, which are frequently located in the same offices 
in African countries due to the previously mentioned budget cuts that have 
impacted diplomatic infrastructures.32
In addition to these domestic home country measures, the previous chapter 
has highlighted that companies from liberal economies which are well-in-
tegrated in the global economy, such as the UK, also have access to regional 
institutions that belong to the wider set of HCMs. Take, for example, the 
ACP Investment Facility (IF) under the management of the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB). Set up in 2003 to “[p]rovide long term lending to promote 
European objectives,”33 the IF is a “EUR 3.137bn risk-bearing revolving fund 
[...] [that] was established to support investment in private businesses and com-
mercially-run public sector companies (including revenue-generating infra-
structure)” in African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries.34 The IF provides risk 
capital through equity participation, quasi capital, and guarantees, as well as 
ordinary loans (non-concessional and concessional).35 Moreover, other regional 
and international institutions are important, such as the EU-Africa strategic 
29 | CDC (9 May 2012).
30 | Manson (8 March 2012).
31 | Bellingham (2010).
32 | Bellingham (2010).
33 | See, for instance, Sakellaris (4 October 2010).
34 | European Investment Bank (9 December 2010).
35 | Analysis for Economic Decisions (2010), 4-10.
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partnership and related summits and action plans since 2007;36 the Lomé and, 
now, Cotonou agreement between the EU and ACP countries;37 the UNFCCC’s 
Clean Development Mechanism; and the G8’s “New Alliance to improve Food 
and Nutrition Security.”38 
This means that (inter)national regulatory frameworks and support struc-
tures that go beyond the traditional understanding of home country measures 
play a significant role in British land-consuming investments. They impact 
investor choices, and match the self-description of the UK as a cosmopolitan 
economy. The following paragraphs will briefly outline the key features of the 
frameworks that are most important with respect to British land-consuming 
FDI in SSA, the setting of incentive structures at different levels of governance, 
and the creation of new markets: climate finance and biofuels regulations. 
Empirical evidence presented in Chapter 6 pointed to the importance of 
international climate negotiations for overseas biofuel investments. In partic-
ular, the Kyoto Protocol (1997), an agreement related to the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, has been influential because it 
established legally binding greenhouse gases emissions reductions which 
feature prominently in biofuel industry statements, particularly with regards to 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the tradable Carbon Emission 
Reduction (CER) mechanism. For example, Trading Emissions Plc., the invest-
ment company that bought a majority share of SBF (2008-2011), stated at the 
time that it was “paying close regard to the growth and development of these 
businesses and their market position vis-à-vis domestic and international 
climate and renewable energy policy.”39 
Related developments on the European level were equally important in 
the creation of the biofuel market. In 1997, the European Commission (EC) 
published the first white paper which set the target for renewable energy in 
Europe’s energy mix at 12% by 2010.40 The white paper was a response to the 
climate negotiations and related concerns over the potential socioeconomic 
implications of emissions reductions for European growth. Renewable energy 
sources were framed as low-carbon energy sources that would allow the 
European Union Member States to meet the legally binding reduction targets 
36 | See European Union, External Action (2014b); European Union, External Action 
(2014a); and Rodt (2012), 1-6.
37 | See Te Velde and Bilal (2003).
38 | European Commission (18 May 2012). For a critical discussion of the G8 initiative 
as industrial policy to strengthen UK agribusiness, see Haigh (2014).
39 | Trading Emissions Plc (2010), 9, 32.
40 | European Commission (1997).
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(amongst other measures, such as energy efficiency), without threatening the 
overall growth strategy regarding trade and transport activities.41
Consequently, renewable energy has been deemed to improve energy 
(supply) security, foster industrial innovation, provide low-carbon energy, 
and promote rural development—a rhetoric that remains central in European 
development strategies as of 2014. Subsequent EC directives followed this line 
of reasoning while advancing the details: Directive 2003/30/EC established a 
5.75% share of renewable energy in the transport sector, to be reached by 2010. 
In 2009, Directive 3009/28/EC raised the renewable energy target to 10% in 
all Member States by 2020, and it introduced sustainability criteria to counter 
rising criticism of biofuels, particularly regarding their negative impact on food 
security.42 In addition to the introduction of targets and the framing of renew-
able energy as low-carbon energy, the EU established a European Emissions 
Trading Scheme.43 As aviation emissions have been included in the scheme 
since 2012, the aviation sector has taken great interest in the biofuel industry. 
In the case of British investments in SSA, Lufthansa had signed offtake 
41 | See, for instance, the guidance note from the Department for Transport (5 
November 2012). It discusses the renewable transport fuels obligations (RTFO) and 
applies this narrative. 
42 | The European Commission introduced sustainability criteria in 2009 (European 
Directive 2009/28/EC, ar ticles 17, 18 and 19). These relate to greenhouse gas (GHG) 
reductions, biodiversity, high-carbon stock land, and agro-environmental practices. The 
sustainability scheme is based on two tools: firstly, voluntary schemes (to be assessed 
and recognized) and multilateral and bilateral agreements that promote “sustainable 
production of agricultural raw materials”; and, secondly, a review of “default values” in 
the context of CO2 accounting. While these sustainability criteria focus solely on the 
environmental aspect of biofuel investments, social sustainability criteria (e.g., land 
rights, wages) were deliberately lef t unacknowledged, as these conflict with WTO rules 
on trade barriers (Directive 2009/28/EC, ar ticles 17, 18 and 19). Moreover, they ignore 
the problem of direct and indirect land use changes as a result of biofuels production, 
which would significantly change the CO2 calculation—to the extent that biofuels are 
more CO2 intensive than fossil fuels, while their land take creates a wide range of new 
problems. In the policy world, the view that renewable resources provide low-carbon 
energy, persists. See, for instance, UK Trade and Investment (2012, 16): “Reducing 
carbon emissions of the transport sector is vital if the UK is to meet its 2020 targets; 
the replacement of fossil fuels in vehicles by biofuels has been identified as one of the 
key mechanisms.” A more detailed analysis of assumptions and critical interrogation of 
framings in the European biofuels debate is provided by Franco et al. (2010). 
43 | European Directive 2003/87/EC. This cap and trade scheme uses market mech-
anisms to limit emissions from intensive industry while rewarding companies with low 
emissions. See Cleveland and Tietenberg (29 August 2009).
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agreements with SBF, and it conducted trial flights with biofuels.44 While the 
company backed out of that agreement in the face of mounting protest in the 
home country, it continues to consider Jatropha and its resourcing via offtake 
agreements as a viable option to meet its CO2 emission reduction requirements 
in the near future.45
The international and European agreements have also had relevant reper-
cussions at the domestic level. While the UK government introduced its first 
biofuel regulations in 2000 as a response to the Kyoto Protocol obligations, 
it raised the targets in 2003 to 20% CO2 savings by 2050 (compared to 1990 
levels). The 2003 Energy White Paper stated that the “increased use of biofuels 
is considered a way to contribute to the achievement of these targets.”46 In 2007, 
the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) was legally enacted by the 
government. It required major transport fuel suppliers “to ensure that a per-
centage of their sales were from a renewable source, intended to deliver carbon 
savings in the transport sector and provide a sound platform for private sector 
investment in renewable fuels infrastructure and technology.”47 From 2008 to 
2011, the Renewable Fuel Agency, a non-departmental public body, adminis-
tered the implementation of the RFTO.48 Moreover, the Climate Change Act 
was published, establishing a framework to cut between 26% and 32% of the 
UK’s carbon emissions by 2020, and 80% by 2050 (compared to 1990 levels).49 
With regard to the socioeconomic outlook, the “clean tech” industry has been 
reframed as a future industrial growth sector under the reindustrialization 
program, and has also been at the core of the traditional HCM framework (see 
above). For instance, the 2009 UK Low Carbon Transition Plan foresees the 
medium-term creation of 1.2 million green jobs. 
It is usually difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of such frameworks in 
achieving their objectives of CO2 reduction and reindustrialization. However, 
the empirical assessment of biofuel projects in Chapter 6 has provided valuable 
insights in this regard, and they will be presented in the remainder of this 
section. Operators of British land-consuming FDI in the biofuel industry, as 
well as financial investors in London, constantly refer to these political frame-
works, if only to use the related rhetoric in their promotional materials. Biofuel 
investments appear as a ‘safe bet’ in view of the (predicted) growth in demand 
44 | See UK Trade and Investment (2012), 26-27. 
45 | Personal communication with Lufthansa staff, November 2014.
46 | MRL Public Sector Consultants (2014); Department of Trade and Industry (2003).
47 | See MRL Public Sector Consultants (2014).
48 | The Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation applies to fuel suppliers. These have 
to prove that a cer tain percentage of fuel consists of renewable energy sources. See 
Department for Transport (5 November 2012).
49 | UK Climate Change Act (2008).
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for bioenergy in the future, which is based on the assumption that biofuels will 
become an alternative to oil. Moreover, the framing of biofuels as an alternative 
energy source that provides “clean” energy and contributes to “green growth” 
through multiplier effects in the form of jobs and energy security in the host, as 
well as the home country, bestowed these investments initially with a positive 
image.50 By 2004, so-called “clean tech” companies made up 6% of the AIM 
London Stock Exchange’s initial public offerings (IPOs).51 
However, contrary to the extremely ambitious sector goals embedded in 
the policy framework and/or business plans of companies involved in biofuel 
projects that aim at becoming a “clean energy leader,” and in spite of the largely 
positive outlook of companies and sector analysts alike, the empirical data pre-
sented in Chapter 6 showed that most biofuel projects experienced dramatic 
wealth destruction. Aside from operational challenges, alternative energy (i.e. 
first generation biofuels) has not lived up to its socioeconomic and environ-
mental promises, and the business models rely on minimum social and envi-
ronmental standards to be economically viable.52 In the UK context, the Galla-
gher Review (Renewable Fuels Agency 2008), commissioned by the Secretary 
of State for Transport to study the “indirect effects of biofuels production,”53 
came to the conclusion that biofuels contributed to rising food prices and 
deforestation while failing to reduce CO2 emissions. Subsequently, the report 
called for a moratorium on biofuel investments until government could ensure 
that only idle and marginal lands were used for biofuel production—if they do 
exist.54 
50 | This framing and rhetoric is directly taken from the official frameworks, such as 
European Directive 2009/28/EC, which explicitly argues as follows: “The control of 
European energy consumption and the increased use of energy from renewable sources, 
together with energy savings and increased energy efficiency, constitute important 
parts of the package of measures needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
comply with the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, and with fur ther Community and international greenhouse gas emission reduc-
tion commitments beyond 2012. Those factors also have an important part to play in 
promoting the security of energy supply, promoting technological development and 
innovation and providing opportunities for employment and regional development, 
especially in rural and isolated areas.” For a discussion of the evolving bioenergy direc-
tives, see Ismail and Rossi (2010).
51 | Cleantech Investor (March 2007).
52 | This finding is not unique to the British case. See Hunsberger et al. (2017) and 
Goetz et al. (2018).
53 | Renewable Fuels Agency (2008).
54 | The UK Renewable Fuels Agency (RFA), the first organization globally with an inde-
pendent board intended to assist in the implementation of the Renewable Fuel Trans-
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In summary, the multi-level regulatory climate regime that biofuels are 
embedded in and supported by highlights a key problem, namely that such 
frameworks and measures might have significant undesirable repercussions. 
It is ironic that it was the growing awareness of the negative feedback loops 
between food and energy production that led many investors to focus on Jatro-
pha-based biofuel projects, assuming that such projects could flourish on 
marginal land. In practice, however, the empirical evidence presented, such as 
the SBF trial plots in Ethiopia, has revealed that Jatropha is not economically 
viable under harsh conditions. Moreover, its prevalence on prime land clearly 
intensifies the negative feedback between food and energy production under 
conditions of insufficient governance while hardly resulting in economically 
viable undertakings conducive to rural development.
Summar y
Four observations follow from the interrelation of UK HCMs and British 
land-consuming investments in SSA. First, OFDI promotion continues to be 
a by-element of the UK’s broader trade and investment strategy, which puts 
primary emphasis on export promotion, market access, and the attraction of 
IFDI.55 This is highlighted by white papers and strategy papers published since 
2000.56 At the same time, the OFDI approach to SSA has become more planned 
as a consequence of institutional reform, changing strategies, and geographical 
program adjustment. 
Second, from a broader perspective, the proactive government approach and 
the cooperation of public and private actors in the area of OFDI reflect the newly 
adopted “grand strategy” of the current UK government.57 It tries to encourage 
the close cooperation of government agencies in support of British trade and 
port Obligation (RF TO) from 2008-2011. It identified additional problems preventing 
sustainable biofuels production: First, “under a largely voluntary system, obligated 
suppliers are able to buy un-certified biofuels on the spot market, avoiding the need to 
establish supply contracts that are longer term;” second, the lack of a “price premium for 
feedstock with assured Carbon and Sustainability provenance” discouraged producers; 
and, third, the sustainability criteria under the European Renewable Energy Directive 
“focused on avoiding the worst practices rather than promoting the best”—setting only 
very broad sustainability standards in view of land use, which were related to biodiver-
sity and carbon stocks. See Renewable Fuels Agency (2008), 6-8; and Renewable Fuels 
Agency (2011), 6.
55 | See, for instance, BIS (2011a); and HM Treasury and BIS (2011).
56 | BIS (2011a); UK Trade and Investment (2006); BIS (2011b); UK Trade and Invest-
ment (2011).
57 | E.g., BIS (2011a); or Allen (8 October 2012).
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investment activities (e.g., cooperation by UK DTI, DFID, the FCO, and BIS58), 
and reflects the government’s decision to revive the economy by jumping on 
the rising corporate interest in the African continent as a new growth region. 
In particular, the rise in investment-related aid, a significant part of which is 
going to SSA, will have a positive impact on British investment flows to the 
region. For instance, the CDC Group and DFID have expanded their opera-
tional activities and shifted their focus (at least part of it) towards SSA.59 At the 
same time, aid-funded business opportunities are promoted by the FCO and 
UK DTI and facilitated by DFID. New trade policy initiatives, such as the Africa 
Free Trade initiative (AFTi) promoted by UK DTI, are also explicitly geared 
towards securing market access in SSA. Overall, however, it is important to 
remember that it was the private sector that led the way and invested in African 
economies, and that the government largely followed suit, matching public 
finance programs with private sector interests. 
Third, despite the growing interest in SSA-directed OFDI, recent budget 
cuts and the dramatic indebtedness of the UK government limit the prospects 
of the ambitious grand strategy approach. This problem is multiplied by the 
fact that the UK does not have a coherent and long-term vision for its political 
and economic relations with African countries.60 However, the access to EU 
support structures mitigates the budget constraint problem. 
Fourth, the importance of UK-Africa relations is highlighted by the impres-
sive quantitative increase in UK OFDI in Africa during the last decade. This is 
remarkable, considering that it is happening at a time when UK OFDI flows 
worldwide have been falling dramatically, from USD 233,371 million in 2000 
to USD 11,020 million (sic!) in 2010.61 While the dramatic fall of OFDI flows is 
related to the financial crash and the Eurozone crisis, the intensified trade and 
investment with African economies correlates with UK interests of the private 
(and, more recently, public) sector to participate in and profit from the conti-
58 | This acronym stands for the UK Department for Business, Innovation & Skills.
59 | E.g., the CDC shif ted from intermediary equity to direct equity and debt invest-
ments, and DFID established Challenge Funds to support UK companies overseas.
60 | Chafer (2010, 1) has argued that “[...] policy relating to Africa is often short-
termist and preoccupied with meeting, often annual, targets, with the result that a 
long-term view of the strategic importance of Africa is not taken and that the resources 
deployed in support of UK Africa policy by the FCO/MoD/DFID are not deployed in a stra-
tegic way (e.g., initiatives launched one year and then abandoned a year or two years 
later, leading to waste of effor t and resources). On Africa policy, both London and Paris 
are confronted by what one might describe as the „ends vs. means“ dilemma: in other 
words, both the UK and France wish to remain key players in Africa but increasingly do 
not have the means (financial and personnel) of their ambitions.” 
61 | See Annex 1 of Allen and Dar (14 March 2013).
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nent’s growth dynamics. It strongly mirrors an international trend, namely the 
shifting perception within the capital markets of the African continent.62 For 
instance, the British Standard Chartered Bank estimates that the region will 
grow at a rate of 7% per annum, faster than China.63 In practice, data from 
2001, 2002, and 2003 highlights that UK OFDI has generated “profit rates that 
are two to three times higher in Africa than worldwide.”64 However, this is a 
finding that hardly matches the empirical evidence about land-consuming FDI 
presented in this book. 
3. GuidinG ideoLoGy 
The rhetoric running through the key documents of the political and finan-
cial mechanisms introduced above highlights that British land-consuming 
investments are embedded in a guiding ideology (in the form of several sets 
of ideas that perform ideological functions) about national development and 
international grandeur that has emerged over the last decade from significant 
government speeches, reports, and white papers across several policy sectors. 
While some elements of this ideological schema are clearly about framing 
development challenges and pathways of the UK regarding economic recovery, 
others serve to legitimate the measures taken, by underlining that they help to 
mitigate environmental challenges, or that they are tailored to host countries’ 
interests while ensuring domestic security and prosperity back home, creating 
jobs, ensuring international influence, strengthening energy security, and 
meeting climate obligations. In summary, the argumentative structure of the 
guiding ideology flowing through relevant government documents connects 
growth, prosperity, and security, and takes the form of a hypothetical syllo-
gism along the following lines: when there is private-sector-led growth there is 
prosperity,65 and when there is prosperity, there is security (and vice versa);66 
therefore, when there is private-sector-led growth, there will be both prosperity 
and security.67
62 | See Ernst & Young (2012). Accordingly, between 2003 and 2011, the number of 
FDI projects increased by 253%, from 339 (2003) to 857 (2011), and—as the diverse 
sector distribution in the China case indicated—this growth in the number of projects 
was associated with an increasing share in the non-extractive industry sectors, such as 
manufacturing or business services.
63 | Ernst & Young (2012), 18.
64 | Te Velde and Calì (2006), 12.
65 | BIS (2011a).
66 | HM Government (2010).
67 | HM Treasury and BIS (2011); and BIS (2011a). 
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In more detail, the discourse surrounding British investments in Africa 
reflects the fundamental transformations that have taken place in view of 
domestic and international economic relations. On the one hand, a shift in UK 
industrial policy is detectable. After decades of an arm’s length approach and 
relative neglect of this sector, the current UK government openly embraces a 
closer linkage of business and state actors, domestically, as well as with regards 
to overseas business opportunities;68 and it favors reindustrialization as a way 
to promote domestic economic recovery.69 On the other hand, the tone in bilat-
eral relations has begun to shift from an asymmetric top-down rhetoric that 
highlighted the challenges of African economies to one that praises the oppor-
tunities African economies have to offer. In this context, the public statement 
by BIS that national economic interests are a key driver behind the intensified 
relations with African countries constitutes a major change in the UK’s more 
recent development policy.70 In fact, following the empire’s post-WWII disinte-
gration, international development narratives concentrated strongly on topics 
of humanitarianism and security, and national interests were considered by 
many (politicians and public) to be a rhetorical taboo in relation to Africa.71 
Additionally, the outlook on international economic relations has changed. 
Since the failure of the OECD initiative to promote a multilateral investment 
regime in the 1990s—during which time bilateralism was framed as a step 
away from multilateralism—the UK now officially embraces bilateralism as a 
stepping stone towards multilateral economic institutions.72 
68 | This “grand strategy” is envisioned in multiple government white papers and 
publications, such as the “Trade and Investment” Whitepaper (BIS (2011a)) and the 
FCO’s Five Year Plan (FCO (2011a)). It is also mentioned in government speeches 
(Hague 2010). Accordingly, “British Ministers” can be “a valuable asset when it comes 
to persuading other countries to work with us or adopt our objectives as their own”; 
and “joint initiatives between businesses” can be influential in “changing attitudes” in 
dif ferent governance forums as well. See Hague (2010); HM Treasury and BIS (2011); 
BIS (2011a), 55-59.
69 | Hague (2010).
70 | BIS (2011a).
71 | Cargill (2011).
72 | The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was an initiative in the mid-1990s 
(1995-1997) by the US and other OECD countries to negotiate universal investment 
rules, similar to those for trade under the WTO. For more information, see the collection 
of ar ticles at the Global Policy Forum (2014).
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A British Africa Policy?
As mentioned above, British land-consuming overseas investments in SSA 
are part of development rhetoric about coming to terms with international 
challenges and changes and about “rebalancing the economy” through trade, 
investment, and reindustrialization in particular areas, such as “advanced 
manufacturing, life sciences, creative industries, green energy and non-fi-
nancial business services.”73 In this context, OFDI is seen as a way to secure 
overseas business opportunities and “allow [...] businesses to grow and diver-
sify.”74 However, the lack of a coherent long-term vision means that there is no 
visionary ‘Africa policy’ in place. 
To counter concerns about the fact that trade and investment has become a 
topic of British foreign policy, all relevant official documentation (see Table 7-1) 
applies the rhetoric of mutual benefit, using mainstream economic arguments 
(“win-win”) while also embracing an image of the UK as a country charac-
terized by “enlightened national interest.”75 As the “Trade and Investment for 
Growth” white paper puts it:
[...] as we work to rebuild our economy, we must redouble our effor ts to enable devel-
oping countries to build their own paths to growth through trade and investment, and to 
help them develop the capacity to do so, especially in Africa. This is the right thing to do 
both on moral grounds and for Britain’s national interest.76
In the words of the former Minister for Africa, MP Henry Bellingham (2010-
2012), the UK pursues “a foreign policy in which the promotion and protec-
tion of human rights around the world is indivisible from our efforts to bring 
security and prosperity to Britain, and, of course, in Africa as well.”77 On the 
project level, the mutual benefit rhetoric is taken up by framing many invest-
ment projects as impact investments that contribute to the host country’s devel-
opment while generating above-average returns. Yet, in spite of this mutual 
benefit rhetoric, the African continent continues to be portrayed largely as a 
source of primary commodities, i.e. as possessing “relatively abundant reserves” 
to meet the “global demand for oil, minerals, natural gas, food and agriculture 
and other natural resources.”78 
73 | HM Treasury and BIS (2011), 4.
74 | BIS (2011a), 4; also BIS/FCO/UK Trade and Investment (2012).
75 | FCO (2011a), 1-2.
76 | BIS (2011a), 4.
77 | Bellingham (2010).
78 | BIS (2011a), 41.
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In his speech “UK and Africa: Delivering Prosperity Together,” Bellingham 
lists three aspects of how this mutual development agenda is being opera-
tionalized. Firstly, cooperation with governments and enterprises has been 
intensified in order to profit from “the trade and investment opportunities 
on offer.”79 Secondly, enhanced intra-African trade has been supported by the 
UK government. And, thirdly, the “removing of barriers to Africa’s goods in 
global markets” is being promoted.80 In practice, the discourse supports several 
measures that were introduced to operationalize the new interest in African 
resources and growth markets, such as the Africa Free Trade initiative (AFTi81), 
the proactively pursued commercial diplomacy in the form of high level forums 
and visits, the channeling of aid funding through the Foreign Office (FCO), 
the alignment of DFID programs with FCO trade and investment objectives 
using, for instance, global challenge funds, and the generally close cooperation 
between the government and private sector. 
Table 7-1 – Key Documents Outlining the UK’s Development in Relation to UK in 
Africa (selected)82 
Speeches
2010 – “Britain’s Foreign Policy in a Networked World,” William Hague (FCO)
2010 – “UK and Africa: Delivering Prosperity Together,” Henry Bellingham (Minister 
for Africa)
2011 – “The UK Prosperity Agenda—growth, open markets and good governance,” 
Henry Bellingham 
Government (White) Papers
1997 – White paper, “Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century,” 
DFID
2000 – White paper, “Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the 
Poor,” DFID
79 | Bellingham (2010).
80 | Bellingham (2010).
81 | BIS (2012), 8.
82 | The references for the documents listed are as follows: Hague (2010); Bellingham 
(2010); Bellingham (2011); BIS (2011a); FCO (2011b); HM Treasury and BIS (2011); 
UK Department of Trade and Investment (UKTI) (2011); DTI (2004); UK Department of 
Energy & Climate Change (DECC) (2007); DFID (2000); DFID (1997); HM Government 
(2010); FCO (2011a); BIS (2011c); RFA (2008); DECC (2006); Department for Envi-
ronment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) (2008); RTFO (2007); Commission for Africa 
(2005); Commission for Africa (2010).
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2004 – White paper, “Making Globalization a Force for Good,” DTI
2007 – White paper, “Meeting the Energy Challenge,” DECC
2010 – Strategy paper, “A Strong Britain in an age of Uncertainty: The National Security 
Strategy,” HM Government
2011 – White paper “Trade and Investment for Growth,” BIS
2011 – Strategy paper, “A Charter for Business,” FCO
2011 – Strategy paper, “The Plan for Growth,” HM Treasury and BIS
2011 – Strategy paper, “Britain open for business,” UKTI
2011 – Strategy paper, “FCO: Business Plan 2011-2015,” FCO
Reports and policy
2011 – Report, “International Trade & Investment: The Economic Rationale for Govern-
ment Support,” BIS 
2008 – Report, “Ensuring the UK’s Food Security in a Changing World,” DEFRA
2008 – Policy, “Climate Change Act 2008, Charter 27”
2008 – Report, “The Gallagher Review of the indirect effects of biofuels production,” RFA 
2007 – Legislation, “The Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation Order (RTFO) 2007”   
2006 – Report, “The Energy Challenge: Energy Review Report 2006,” DECC
International Policy
1997 – International Agreement, “Kyoto Protocol,” UNFCCC 
2003, 2007, 2009 – Policy, EU Renewable Energy Directives
2005 – Report, “Our Common Interest,” Commission for Africa
2010 – Report, “ Still Our Common Interest,” Commission for Africa
Summar y
The UK’s changing development rhetoric, which has moved from humanitar-
ianism to mutual development, as well as its renewed interest in the African 
continent, correlates with the contemporary challenges that the country is 
facing. These include prolonged economic recession, the financial crisis, and 
the failure of the financialization-led growth model—embraced by British 
governments since the Thatcher era—to generate sufficient jobs, growth, 
and revenues (for more details, see also Section 4 on political economy). Most 
striking is the similarity of the Chinese and British guiding ideologies—the 
mutual development rhetoric applied in British policy documents might have 
been influenced by the rise of the BRICS and the popular discourse character-
istic of South-South Cooperation.83
83 | Goetz (2018) (for thcoming).
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At the same time, the empirical evidence on the timelines of British 
land-consuming FDI projects emphasizes that the framing of UK-Africa rela-
tions as mutual development opportunity and national security measure is the 
result of the government jumping on the corporate trend of investing in African 
economies, a trend that has been gaining momentum since 2000. Therefore, 
the relatively recent promotion of British land-consuming FDI in SSA by the 
UK government has to be seen in the broader effort to address the economic 
recession that the country has been suffering from since 2007/2008. Many 
investors who saw Africa as a new growth region where novel markets could 
be won, and extraordinary profits and returns on investments earned, moved 
their business focus towards African economies long before the 2008 crisis 
became an additional driver to look for profitable options overseas. However, 
the crisis does seem to have instigated actors from the public sector to redirect 
development finance, expand commercial diplomacy, and introduce a range of 
mechanisms to support this trend as part of a national recovery approach.
Importantly, the change in UK-Africa relations that is reflected in the appli-
cation of a “grand strategy” of business-government cooperation for economic 
development and the strengthening of explicitly identified British stronghold 
industries (in the form of advanced manufacturing, life sciences, creative 
industries, green energy, and non-financial business services) does not only 
apply to international economic relations.84 Instead, the core characteristic of 
the close cooperation and coordination between public and private actors is a 
reflection of the fundamental domestic reforms that have been occurring over 
the past two decades. These are characterized by the ongoing privatization of 
public services, which has led to the state funded operation of public services 
by private actors—under the assumption that this will promote private sector 
growth while enhancing efficiency. 
84 | HM Treasury and BIS (2011), 4.
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4. PoLiTicaL economy
As a country that has a proud and successful history of 
trading and benefiting from investment and that sees 
these factors vital to our prospects for growth, the 
UK offers a good case for how, in practice, trade and 
investment drive growth.
(Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
201185)
While the UK continues to be portrayed as having the ideal type of liberal 
economy,86 particularly against the European background of so-called coor-
dinated continental economies, this simplified typology ignores the changes 
that have taken place since the 1980s, such as the increase in public regula-
tion during the New Public Management era in the 1990s,87 the adoption of a 
“grand strategy” approach towards trade and investment under Conservative 
rule (since 2011), and the changing quality of (foreign) economic policy and 
state-market relations. 
This section will focus on two aspects of British political economy, namely 
state-market relations in the context of financialization88 and the transforma-
tion of the political economic paradigm. It will show that both are relevant for 
a meaningful understanding of what is occurring with regard to land-con-
suming FDI. The major arguments emerging from the findings are as follows: 
firstly, even though the financial sector (aka “the City”) features prominently 
in overseas investments, it would be wrong to argue that these investments 
are primarily driven by it. Instead, there is an overlap of interests and “intel-
lectual capture” across different actor groups in the public and private sectors. 
Secondly, these investments are embedded in broader economic restructuring 
endeavors, such as reforms that aim at the delivery of public services by private 
actors and foreign economic policies that focus on strengthening the capacity 
of British producers to retain influence in international political and economic 
governance while rebalancing the economy. However, in the meantime, thirdly, 
the economy remains highly dysfunctional in view of industry finance, as has 
been highlighted by biofuel investments in SSA. 
85 | BIS (2011a), 17.
86 | Hall and Soskice (2001).
87 | Hood et al. (1999). 
88 | This term refers to a shif t of power from industry capitalism to finance capitalism.
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The Cit y, Once Again?—State-Market Relations in the Context of 
Financialization
The empirical evidence on industrial finance (presented in the previous 
chapter), together with the rising number of investment funds “seeking alpha,” 
has highlighted the prominent role of the financial sector in British land-con-
suming investments in SSA. Based on this evidence and the liberal character-
ization of the UK economy, it would be rather easy to conclude that, similar 
to claims about the British Empire and ‘gentlemanly’ capitalism in the 19th 
century, the financial sector in London is once again—under “free market” 
conditions—the primary driver of these investments. However, state-market 
relations in general, and issues pertaining to finance and industrial devel-
opment in particular, are far more complex than the liberal characterization 
would suggest—even under conditions of financialization. Also, the national 
context continues to influence the perceptions of and options available to finan-
cial investors, as in those cases where the capital that is exported via London to 
Sub-Saharan countries has its origins outside of the UK.
In fact, the empirical evidence about British investments in SSA has empha-
sized that there are multiple actors and mechanisms at play, extending beyond 
stock markets and private enterprises, such as public policy-induced markets 
in the renewables sector, public finance through the CDC Group, and/or invest-
ment-related aid programs. Moreover, the old narrative, according to which 
the financial sector (alias “the City”) was the sole driver behind the colonial 
expansion, has long been undermined by subsequent historical research.89 
Next, I will highlight relevant developments that have occurred in the financial 
and state sectors since the 1980s, both with regard to actor constitution and 
economic orientation, and in view of related changes in state-market relations. 
While the financial sector plays a key role in the British economy, it is 
important to note that the City’s actor composition and business culture has 
been altered significantly since the “Big Bang” stock exchange reforms in 
the mid-1980s—in the sense that it has been globalized. These reforms have 
opened the investment banking sector to foreign competitors, resulting in the 
89 | Great Britain’s political economy of decision making was fairly complex at the end 
of the 19th century, when “fractions between free marketers and interventionists ran 
across business and political actors,” and the bias towards financial interests in public 
policy was the outcome of many factors, such as personal ties, profit seeking, and/or 
regime stability. In the medium term, overseas expansion facilitated the continuation of 
elite strata and the maintenance of a high degree of social inequality (characterized by 
low domestic demand), in spite of the profound changes in the economic and political 
systems that emerged as a consequence of the first Industrial Revolution. Cain and 
Hopkins (1987), 199-200; and Halperin (2005). 
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dramatic decline of investment banks under British ownership and the related 
“death of gentlemanly capitalism.”90 The latter has been described by Augar 
as the demise of a business culture characterized by strong relational ties 
and aristocratic cultural traits.91 In its place, a global financial business elite 
has emerged.92 The corresponding internationalization of London’s financial 
sector is well reflected in the British biofuel investments in SSA, where lead 
actors have personal linkages with US investment banks, sometimes being 
former high level employees. For example, Susan Payne and David Murrin, 
who launched the Emergent Asset Fund in 1997, had worked as traders at JP 
Morgan and Goldman Sachs.93 Also, Bim Hundal, founder of Lion’s Head 
Global Partners, a London-based investment banking group which took over 
the operations of Sun Biofuels in Tanzania in 2011, previously worked for over 
17 years at Goldman Sachs, running the capital markets business for Central 
Europe, Russia, the Middle East, and Africa.94 
At the same time, the state and its political economy paradigm have trans-
formed considerably, moving from “embedded liberalism” to an “embedded 
financial orthodoxy”95 and “free market” ideology during the Thatcher era 
in the 1980s. This shift has been characterized by deregulation, a hands-off 
approach, and an arm’s length industrial policy. In practice, this paradigm 
modification has had far-reaching consequences for the state’s relations with 
the financial sector and the society, as well as with regard to industry develop-
ment. Since these developments partially explain how British land-consuming 
FDI occurs, the following paragraphs will introduce them by focusing on three 
aspects, namely transformations of the state, industrial development, and 
societal implications. 
Firstly, the state has grown ever more dependent on the City’s overseas 
earnings as a result of this paradigmatic shift.96 In fact, financial sector OFDI 
90 | See Augar (2001) for a description of the demise of the British banking system 
since the late 1980s.
91 | Augar (2001), 6.
92 | Augar (2001), 6-7. Accordingly, the reasons for this failure were multiple: British 
banks did not have the level of experience and scale of their US counterparts; the 
hands-off approach under Thatcher led to “the existence of a vacuum where the author-
ities should have been;” and the business culture itself that had largely remained 
unchanged since the 1950s and revealed traits of new aristocracy that “inhibited good 
management.” Augar (2001), 320. 
93 | Oakland Institute (2011a). 
94 | Lion’s Head Global Partners (n.d.).
95 | Cerny and Evans (2004), 53.
96 | Augar (2006), 181.
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earnings “kept the trade account in reasonable balance.”97 While the trade in the 
goods account had deteriorated over time, its last net surplus being recorded in 
1980-1982, the UK’s trade in (financial) services has largely been in surplus 
since the mid-1960s.98 Contributing factors for this growing dependency 
of the state on the financial sector are structural and personal, comprising, 
for instance, rising public debt due to the tax cuts during the Thatcher era; 
personal ties and “intellectual capture”;99 the need for electoral funding of 
political parties and the fact that the financial sector has made significant con-
tributions to the acting government’s Conservative party; and the phenomenon 
of revolving doors.100 
Secondly, the financialization of the British political economy since the 
1980s has impacted the country’s industrial development, especially by aggra-
vating the negative deindustrialization path101 that had set in post-WWII.102 
While the collapse of the manufacturing sector during the late 1970s was 
strongly related to the oil crisis, the financialization of the economy and the 
adoption of the “free-market ideal based on neo-classical political economy” 
slowed reinvestments by the private sector necessary to modernize the UK’s 
industrial base.103 Specifically, four aspects contributed to this effect, which 
is best described by the rise of market control over organizational control. On 
the one hand, British companies had hardly established organizational control 
models at the time of liberalization. On the other hand, the accounting practices 
and corporate law made it more unlikely for organizational reforms to occur, 
as they treated investments in labor, as well as returns on labor, as expenses, 
making it—from a market control perspective—undesirable to invest in these 
factors of production and thereby enhance productivity and foster innovation. 
In addition, the framing of market control as “shareholder value” prevented 
97 | BIS (2010), 15.
98 | BIS (2010), 15.
99 | The degree to which governments embraced the financial sector as source of pros-
perity is reflected by a speech made by (then) chancellor Gordon Brown at the annual 
Mansion House Dinner in 2004, in which he praised the City’s innovative capacity to 
adopt to changes in the international economy (e.g., derivatives), and referred to it as a 
role model for British industry at a time of globalization. See Brown (2004).
100 | See Augar (2006), 180-186.
101 | Negative deindustrialization means that the decline in industry production was 
not the result of upgrading of economic production or economic re-orientation, but 
primarily the result of companies going into administration.
102 | Specifically, the traditional separation of finance and industry in the UK acceler-
ated the decline of the industrial sector. See Lazonick and O’Sullivan (1997). Also see 
HM Treasury and BIS (2011) for a critical assessment of this development path.
103 | The New Political Economy Network (2010), 14, 11, 12.
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changes towards greater organizational control within the company structures, 
as these would negatively impact the “principal.”104 Finally, the generous (finan-
cial) rewards received by the top managers of industrial companies applying 
market control strategies advanced the adoption of market control strategies.105 
In view of British land-consuming FDI in SSA, biofuel projects, such as the 
SBF, highlight a key difficulty presented by this political economy, namely the 
absence of patient capital and lagging reinvestment.
Thirdly, the process of financialization has also produced multiple long-
term effects with regard to state-society relations, both domestically and inter-
nationally. As a result of an ongoing domestic reform process, public services 
under the new public management approach became increasingly commodi-
fied and framed as commercial contracts.106 This process led to a high degree of 
interconnectedness between private and public actors in the provision of public 
services that is characteristic of the UK’s political economy today. In the context 
of British land-consuming FDI, this trend is highlighted by the shift of public 
development finance and diplomacy to match corporate interest in the African 
continent. 
At the same time, this process of publicly-funded privatization also led to 
the gradual integration of citizens into financial markets with their volatile 
pressures, increasingly linking the realization of British workers’ social 
security rights with the livelihoods of people in other countries. In fact, the 
history of pension funds depicts the ensuing connection of workers and people 
through financial markets, where the prosperity of some might be founded 
on the impoverishment of others through land-consuming investments that 
result in forced disappropriation and/or low workers’ welfare. Pension funds 
and other institutional investors began to divest from fixed-interest securities, 
searching instead for more profitable investments. Some have started to explore 
investments in commodities and farmland, though not necessarily in SSA. For 
104 | Lazonick and O’Sullivan (1997, 29) have highlighted the importance of this 
“shareholder” ideology in preventing change: “The ideology that the ‘shareholder’ is the 
‘principal’ of the industrial corporation helps to ensure that such organizational trans-
formations will not take place. This ideology places a premium on economic perfor-
mance that reaps the benefits of prior investments in productive capabilities while 
ignoring the new investments in organizational learning that can potentially generate 
greater returns for more people in the future.” 
105 | Lazonick and O’Sullivan (1997), 27.
106 | The New Political Economy Network (2010), 13-14. Accordingly, “[p]ublic 
services were turned into quasi-markets governed by cost efficiency and targets. 
Commercial values all but supplanted the ethos of public service. [...] A new kind of 
consumer compact between individual and the market began to replace the old social 
welfare contract.”
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instance, BT Pension Scheme, a large UK pension fund, stated its intent in 
2012 to replace its commodity future investments with farmland investments 
in the near future.107 These actors have prominent supporters, such as Sir Bob 
Geldof, who allegedly “warn[s] UK pension funds they are missing out on the 
‘last great investment opportunity left’ by not placing money in Africa.”108 
The Transformation of the Political Economy Paradigm
The resulting dominance of the financial sector within the UK economy is 
highlighted by the sectoral distribution of British OFDI in SSA (see introduc-
tion).109 At the height of the “embedded financial orthodoxy,” Gordon Brown 
praised the achievements of the financial sector as an extraordinary contri-
bution to the UK’s prosperity and economic position in the globalized world. 
Accordingly, the fact that over 40% of the world’s foreign equities are trans-
acted in London was perceived as proof of the rise of “an era that history will 
record as the beginning of a new golden age for the City of London” and that 
will benefit the UK at large.110
However, these hopes for a financialization- and service-led solution to the 
economic development challenges posed to the UK by deindustrialization and 
a globalized economy were unrealistic—and soon to be shattered. Instead, the 
financial crisis and the ensuing Eurozone crisis aggravated problems that had 
been accumulating. Key examples are the rising unemployment (over 8% till 
2009),111 unsustainable and rising wealth inequality,112 and mounting private 
sector debt.113 Regarding the latter, it is important to note that part of the 
rising private sector debt was escalating personal debt whose share of dispos-
able income increased from 45 per cent to 160 per cent between the 1980s and 
2007.114 While other European countries managed to recover from the finan-
cial crash, at least partially, Britain, with its reliance on the financial sector 
experienced a prolonged economic recession up until 2014. At the same time, 
growing public debt and fear over international marginalization made the 
development approach seem unsustainable. 
107 | Bow (13 March 2012). It remains unclear whether this actually happened—
according to the latest BT Pension Scheme report (2013), it did not. 
108 | Silver Street Capital (20 June 2010), quoting an ar ticle in the Financial Times.
109 | US Central Intelligence Agency (2014).
110 | See Brown (2002). 
111 | TradingEconomics.com (2014)
112 | See Hills et al. (2010); and The Equality Trust (2012).
113 | The New Political Economy Network (2010), 10.
114 | The New Political Economy Network (2010), 25.
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Consequently, the detrimental impact of the financialization-led growth 
model pursued over the last decades has been identified in the then acting 
government’s Plan for Growth (2011-2015):
This Plan for Growth is an urgent call for action. 
Britain has lost ground in the world’s economy, and needs to catch up. 
If we do not act now, jobs will be lost, our country will become poorer and we will f ind it 
dif ficult to afford the public services we all want. If we do not wake up to the world around 
us, our standard of living will fall, not rise. In the last decade other nations have worked 
hard to make their economies more competitive. They have reduced their business tax 
rates, removed barriers to enterprise, invested in their infrastructure, improved their 
education systems, reformed welfare and increased their exports. 
Sadly the reverse has happened in Britain over the last ten years. The UK economy 
stopped saving, investing and exporting and instead turned to a model of growth that 
failed. It resulted in rising levels of debt, over-leveraged banks, an unsustainable 
property boom, and a budget deficit that was forecast to be the largest of any of the 
world’s twenty leading economies. Continuously rising but unaffordable government 
spending disguised the fact that it was an unsustainable economic boom, with the 
economy becoming steadily more unbalanced, less competitive and less prepared to 
meet the challenges of the future.115
The ongoing transition towards a new political economy paradigm has been 
promoted under the heading of “rebalancing the economy”116 and guided by 
the FCO. The current Conservative government aims to address the legacy of 
deindustrialization through reindustrialization in the form of advanced man-
ufacturing projects:
We want to remain the world’s leading centre for financial services, yes; but we should 
determine to become a world-leader in, for example, advanced manufacturing, life 
sciences, creative industries, green energy and non-financial business services.117 
Aside from financial services, telecommunications technology, clean tech 
and low-carbon goods and services, business to business services (excluding 
finance), biotech and pharma, energy and utilities, retail, oil, and gas are 
among the key sectors that have been identified as contributors to UK economic 
115 | HM Treasury and BIS (2011), 3.
116 | BIS, FCO, UK Trade and Investment (2012). 
117 | HM Treasury and BIS (2011), 3.
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growth.118 In practice, this new development approach, implemented under the 
current government’s “Plan for Growth” (2011-2015), focuses on private sector 
growth through export promotion, access to growth markets, high-quality IFDI 
attraction, and OFDI advancement. For its operationalization, the FCO and UK 
TI have begun to cooperate across government agencies and work closely with 
industry, the government has stepped up its commercial diplomacy in Africa, 
and new aid programs have been created that call for public-private partner-
ships in their realization, thereby opening up publicly-funded business oppor-
tunities for British companies overseas. 
The relatively open economy, with a deregulated capital market and a 
great dependency on foreign inputs, leaves the government with only limited 
options at its disposal to moderate the negative side effects of its economy’s 
global exposure and financialization. In this regard, reindustrialization as an 
approach to rebuilding the economy seems to be among the few measures 
remaining that would not prompt fears of retaliatory action from countries and 
actors that the UK has come to rely on.
Summar y
The assessment of state-market relations highlights that simply pointing to the 
financial sector to explain why land-consuming investments occur does not 
tell the whole story. One must also take into account the “embedded finan-
cial orthodoxy” that has informed British economic policies and trajectories 
since the 1980s; the intellectual capture of the public sector agents who have 
prepared the ground for the dominance of “the City” and the neglect of the 
industrial sector; the increasing dependence of public and private sector actors 
on financial markets in their operations; and, more recently, the adoption of 
a strategy to strengthen industry through better coordination of government 
agencies and their cooperation with the private sector. 
Core traits of the British political economy explain certain characteristics of 
land-consuming OFDI in SSA. Firstly, the great number of financial investors 
involved in these investments has been highlighted. The material presented 
above shows that this situation has developed for multiple reasons. Clearly, 
some investors have begun investing in African economies and agricultural 
projects as part of their strategy to “seek alpha” at a time of financial crisis back 
home. Others, however, are involved primarily as providers of industry finance. 
In fact, most of the early-stage companies that invested in biofuel projects had 
to turn to the AIM stock exchange for funding. In this context, the short-term 
focus of the financial investors who are financing such operations reflects the 
dysfunctional nature of the existing structures for industry finance, specifically 
118 | Ernst & Young (2011b), 18 (Graph 19).
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the lack of patient capital. For example, the case of the SBF highlights that 
financial investors withdraw their investments after a period of time that does 
not match the long maturation time of Jatropha plantations, contributing to the 
failure of the project. 
Secondly, following the financial crisis, British land-consuming OFDI has 
taken place in the context of a rise in commercial diplomacy and a reorienta-
tion of existing UK development finance programs. Take, for example, the stra-
tegic modification that occurred in the CDC Group’s investment strategy. The 
increasing presence of public actors and institutions in private British OFDI 
projects in SSA is related to the government’s renewed interest in industrial 
policy and the rebalancing of the UK’s economy. 
5. de veLoPmenT conTe x T
The current government promotes OFDI as a way to “rebalance the economy”119 
and maintain the UK’s influential international status as a major investor and 
trading country. At the same time, the UK has a long investor legacy, and a 
promotional OFDI policy stance has been evident since the 1970s. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that in the case of British land-consuming FDI projects 
in African countries, national and foreign factors have played crucial roles in 
the interest formation of investors, such as the IFDI attraction programs of 
recipient countries; the international and European climate regime and the 
related creation of a market for biofuels; and the Eurozone crisis that led to a 
search for new growth markets. Importantly, though, it was the private sector 
that pioneered the UK’s reorientation towards the African continent. Due to 
the liberal economic context of the home country, global markets and overseas 
developments are key parameters shaping corporate portfolios. In the context 
of British OFDI in Africa, it is the perception of the continent as a new growth 
region that has been influential.
From the perspective of the home country’s development context, the 
empirical evidence that emerges from official documentation, policies, and 
speeches suggests that overseas investments in SSA are explicitly linked to par-
ticular national interests and development ambitions of individual or collective 
actors. In addition to concerns about the home country’s energy security and 
CO2 emission targets, as well as related policy regimes that explain the high 
number of biofuel investments by early-stage companies, these investments 
are also part of the search for (more) profitable investment outlets by the finan-
cial sector. More recently, these investments have become part of the proactive 
trade and investment agenda of the current UK government (since 2011)—a 
119 | See, for instance, BIS/FCO/UK Trade and Investment (2012).
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development that contrasts starkly with the “embedded financial orthodoxy,” 
“free market” ideology, and related development strategies pursued since the 
1980s. It seems remarkable that OFDI in Africa today is part of a larger devel-
opment ambition to both rehabilitate the country’s crisis-stricken state budget 
and economy through reindustrialization and secure its international position 
by promoting investment in productive assets and related operations, such 
as export promotion and overseas expansion. Yet, the financial sector clearly 
remains an important component of the British economy, and the focus on 
reindustrialization is seen as a necessary complement to address the develop-
ment challenges yielded by the financialization-led growth model over time. 
In fact, the development model that has been pursued since the 1980s, 
with its focus on the financial sector and “free market” ideology, has come at a 
high cost in view of economic and social development, and since the financial 
crisis in 2008, the volatility of state revenues and incidents of social unrest 
have provided an additional incentive to modify the emphasis of the existing 
development model.120 Among the most pressing problems of the service-ori-
ented development trajectory is the neglect of productive industry. For decades, 
the productive sector only contributed a small share of the country’s GDP, and 
the UK’s share in the international trade of manufactured goods has been 
declining. Since 2000, the rise of, and heightened competition from, emerging 
countries has aggravated the problems confronting the British manufacturing 
industry and the government. 
On a national level, this non-productive development trajectory has resulted 
in a vicious cycle of lagging investment in the industrial base at home, declining 
exports and increasing imports (machinery and transport equipment), deteri-
orating terms of trade, and a growing dependence on the financial sector for 
jobs, growth, and revenues.121 This situation is further aggravated by the coun-
try’s increasing dependence on external resources (energy and food), which is 
unsustainable, especially during times of high and/or very volatile commodity 
prices.122 Socially, the country has recently faced rising unemployment—repeat-
edly over 8% between 2009 and 2012;123 rising wealth and economic opportu-
120 | For a discussion of the UK’s financialization-driven development trajectory, also 
see Lapavitsas (2014).
121 | Te Velde and Calì (2006), 8.
122 | In 2005, the UK, the EU’s largest energy producer and exporter (e.g., natural 
gas and oil), became a net importer of energy due to its declining oil and natural gas 
reserves. See US Energy Information Administration (2013) and Kuzemko (2010). The 
UK is also a net food-importing country, raising concerns during the food price crisis 
in 2007/2008. In 2008, the UK imported 40% of its food needs. See Cabinet Office 
(2008), i-x.
123 | TradingEconomics.com (2014).
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nity inequality, which was identified as a core driver of the 2011 London riots;124 
and mounting private sector debt, partly due to a personal debt load whose 
share of the disposable income rose to 160% in 2007 (compared to 45% in 
1980).125 The global economic slowdown also aggravated the mounting public 
debt. Since the financial recession began, the national debt has risen to 76.6% 
of GDP (January 2014), without accounting for the financial sector interven-
tions.126 
Summar y
British land-consuming FDI has become part of the transformation of indus-
trial policy towards reindustrialization. This is an official strategy to moderate 
unemployment; provide decent wages; ease social tensions; and increase state 
revenue while improving international accounts through the increased export 
of advanced manufacturing goods, thereby retaining the country’s interna-
tional economic standing. In the context of the financial crisis, the strength-
ening of high-tech manufacturing in particular sectors is supposed to provide 
the UK with the competitive advantage needed to successfully participate and 
compete in international markets. 
However, tight government budgets and a dysfunctional industry finance 
system pose serious hurdles to operationalizing the then acting (Cameron) gov-
ernment’s attempt to strengthen the secondary sector.127 Moreover, it would 
be unrealistic to assume that the core traits of the country’s political economy 
have changed since the crisis. Although the government has begun to promote 
reindustrialization, the key characteristics that run across all of the UK govern-
ment parties, such as the credo of marketization and privatization, continue 
to prevail. Instead, the “grand strategy” approach towards OFDI promotion 
and reindustrialization shall mitigate the high costs of the “cosmopolitan 
economy,” which include unemployment, private debt, rising wealth inequality 
and increasing import dependency, and declining state revenues. Also, the 
strategy is said to ensure the favorable position of the UK in world politics—
allowing the country to “punch above its weight” despite changes in the inter-
national political and economic landscape.128
124 | The Equality Trust (2012). In 2010, a national survey on inequality revealed 
that the UK suffers from high levels of systematic inequality (within and across social 
groups) of income and opportunity. See Hills et al. (2010), 386.
125 | The New Political Economy Network (2010), 25, 10.
126 | Watt (7 June 2010).
127 | Theodora.com (31 January 2014). 
128 | For a detailed discussion of the UK‘s attempts to position itself in a changing 
world, see M. Harvey (2011).
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At the same time, international incentives have played a strong role in 
spurring contemporary land-consuming FDI. It is important to recall that the 
current government jumped on the corporate bandwagon rather late. In fact, 
British-African trade and investment relations have increased since 2000, 
when Africa was increasingly framed as a new growth region by the British 
private sector. Only after the financial crisis in 2007/2008 did the government 
adopt this perception as a way to address the country’s prolonged economic 
recession. Significant events that influenced private decision making regarding 
the utility of land-consuming OFDI in SSA include economic reforms in the 
host countries (e.g., divestiture programs) and the emergence of a climate 
regime after Kyoto (1997).
Whether the foreign economic policy approach will be successful remains 
to be seen. However, at this point in time (2016), there is reason for doubt. On 
the one hand, a quote by the former Minister for Africa, Henry Bellingham, 
reflects the assumption that British relations with African economies will 
continue to be characterized by their asymmetry, sustaining prosperity on the 
one side while mitigating “abject poverty” on the other: “[o]pen markets offer 
the only realistic hope of pulling billions of people in developing countries out 
of abject poverty, while sustaining prosperity in the industrialized world.”129 
This would be disadvantageous for the host countries. 
At the same time, the empirical evidence reveals the reality that many 
projects, particularly in the ‘clean’ energy sector, witnessed dramatic wealth 
destruction over time and never actually realized their business goals. Even 
putting these operational challenges aside, alternative energy (i.e. first-gener-
ation biofuels) did not live up to its socioeconomic and environmental prom-
ises.130 Moreover, the short-term focus on value creation by financial inves-
tors collided with the long-term maturation timelines of the projects “on the 
ground.” Further investigation would be needed to identify the extent to which 
capital exports made during the Eurozone and financial crises are, in effect, 
manifestations of capital flight. According to one interview from a British 
corporate actor, the case of Cyprus, where savings above Euro 100.000 were 
taxed by a compulsory capital levy to moderate state debts, has led to capital 
owners deliberating on relocating their savings out of fear that something 
similar might take place in other European countries in the medium term. In 
this case, then, capital exports would aggravate the UK’s domestic problems, 
such as lagging investments, rather than addressing them. Finally, historical 
evidence on the implications of OFDI for home country development under-
lines the high cost that such a capital export strategy might entail due to the 
129 | Bellingham (2010). 
130 | Renewable Fuels Agency (2008), 8.
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often-inverse relationship of capital exports and domestic job creation; and/or 
lagging reinvestment in industry back home.
6. concLusion
Overall, this case study has highlighted a great variety of factors at play in 
British land-consuming OFDI (from 2000 until 2015). The key argument that 
has been put forward is that these investments are part of multiple strategies 
to profit from the economic reforms and rapidly growing consumer markets in 
the host countries, to advance biofuels investments in the context of interna-
tional and domestic energy and climate policies, and/or to “seek alpha” through 
alternative investments in the primary sector in Africa at a time of the finan-
cial crisis and economic stagnation back home. Increasingly, land-consuming 
OFDI to Sub-Saharan Africa is also part of a (long-term) political strategy to 
economic recovery and international political power through rising exports 
and industrial activity. Importantly, the private sector perceived Africa as a new 
growth region as early as 2000. Only later did the government jump on the 
corporate trend in an attempt to revive the economy. 
Specifically, British OFDI in SSA is reflective both of the country’s long 
investor legacy and the government’s promotional policy stance towards OFDI 
since the 1970s; as well as the domestic challenges the country has been facing 
recently, such as the rising energy insecurity and the socioeconomic costs of 
the non-productive development model. British companies are experienced at 
factoring international incentive structures into their business operations; in 
contrast, Chinese companies are just beginning to globalize their operations. 
This is clearly reflected by the fact that host country and international reforms 
played an important role in corporate decision making, in addition to home 
country developments. More recently, the Conservative government (under 
David Cameron) in the UK explicitly (re)aligned OFDI in Africa with its foreign 
policy interests, namely by sustaining the country’s favorable international 
economic and political presence at a time of domestic crises and global re-or-
dering. As a result, OFDI in Africa has become part of ODA-funded business 
opportunities; has been backed by commercial diplomacy; and has been 
promoted by a rhetoric that no longer frames the continent as a place ridden by 
humanitarian crises, but as a region of great opportunity and hope.
Consequently, these investments happen in the context of multiple coun-
try-specific developments that can be divided between pre-crisis and post-crisis 
dynamics. Pre-crisis dynamics include, for instance, economic liberalization 
in host and investor countries since the 1980s, as well as the introduction of 
domestic targets for biofuels to meet CO2 emission targets and strengthen 
energy security. Post-crisis dynamics include the increasing severity of socio-
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economic problems in the financial-sector-dependent domestic economy; the 
changing landscape at the international level, where the rise of new economic 
powers has led to increasing competition over political influence, economic 
opportunities, and access to resources; and the development of a fear among 
the British political elite which recognizes that the UK has an exceptional 
position in world politics relative to its actual geographical size, and that, 
accordingly, the country might lose its status as a great power in the future. At 
the same time, financial actors in the UK’s deregulated capital markets have 
been drawn to African growth economies and the “real asset” sector at a time of 
economic crisis, when private equity investments are no longer profitable and 
growth at home is stagnant. In addition, the growing availability of multilateral 
finance mechanisms and development programs—particularly in the area of 
renewable energy, food security, and carbon credits—seems to have impacted 
investor choices.
These findings on how British land-consuming FDI occurs underline the 
broader argument that as in the case of liberal economies, these investments 
are not the outcome of so-called “free markets,” but that the country’s legacy, 
development trajectory and ambitions, political economy, guiding ideology, 
and international context matter. The investments around the year 2000 were 
related to host country reforms, largely conducted by investors with long histo-
ries in the host economies, often dating back to the late 19th century. Another 
cluster of investments reflects the emerging climate regulations and has 
involved a high number of early stage companies trying to profit from the newly 
created markets. Once the financial crisis hit, financial investors in search of 
extraordinary returns at a time of economic recession became involved in the 
investment projects. At the same time, the then acting government in the 
UK adopted a proactive approach, intensifying commercial diplomacy with 
African countries and introducing bilateral investment forums in the French 
and Chinese model, though on an ad hoc basis. Still, ODA programs have 
been aligned with foreign policy goals, and they place special emphasis on 
supporting private companies investing overseas. In this context, the official 
rhetoric with regards to African countries has changed significantly—they are 
now described as markets of opportunity rather than areas in need of human-
itarian intervention. 
Moreover, it has become clear that the importance of financial actors and 
the AIM stock exchange in these operations does not verify the assumption that 
these investments are largely driven by the financial sector. Instead, it reflects 
the intellectual capture and overlap of public and private-sector actors charac-
teristic of the UK’s political economy, and refers back to the financialization-led 
development trajectory pursued since the 1980s. Consequently, and promoted 
by public policy, financial actors play a major role in the British economy and 
land-consuming OFDI, both as direct investors as well as the main source of 
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industry finance. The problems associated with this constellation have been 
visible in British OFDI projects, namely in the difficulty of identifying who 
is actually involved in a project due to the constant changes in shareholding 
and the lack of patient capital. The latter is something that institutional devel-
opment finance (the CDC) and DFID-directed aid programs are intended to 
address. Similarly, the sectoral composition of British land-consuming OFDI 
reflects the country’s investor legacy. The investments are directed to a few 
countries, and they primarily head towards the resources and services sectors. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this sectoral composition resembles the economic con-
stitution of the home country, which is characterized by high external resource 
dependency and a strong services sector.
Finally, this case study has shown that British OFDI involves a wide range 
of interests from the very diverse private sector. Many of these actors share the 
perception of Africa as a new growth region. Consequently, we see investment 
funds from the public and private sector that try to profit from this growth 
dynamic at a time of economic recession back home. Others respond to public 
policy-induced markets. Early-stage companies, for instance, invest in the 
production of biofuels in African countries, which continue to be framed as 
“land-abundant,” in spite of the ongoing land crisis. At the same time, related 
industries support these investments, such as actors from the aviation sector 
that seek access to cheap fossil fuel alternatives, and try to cooperate with 
biofuels companies through offtake agreements. What is surprising is the large 
numbers of inexperienced investors that engage in land-consuming OFDI, 
often with very unrealistic expectations and/or business models in place – a 
fact that also explains the high number of failed projects. From an official 
perspective, these investments are promoted as a way to strengthen economic 
recovery through increases in exports and sustained access to cheap resources. 
Moreover, geopolitical considerations have entered the debate, reflecting 
realist assumptions. Accordingly, an intensified economic presence is useful 
to sustain the country’s influence at the international level at a time of global 
restructuring. 
Similar to the Chinese case, and against the background of the diverse 
range of actors and interests at play, this book’s description of British OFDI 
shows that what makes these investments British is the specific combination 
of industrial set-up, development trajectory, contingent events, ideology, and 
political economy in and over time. 
More broadly, reflecting on the role of land-consuming OFDI from a home 
country perspective, the previous assessment stresses that these investments 
are part of a trend among private sector actors that has gained speed in the 
context of financial crises in the UK and the Eurozone, namely to profit from 
overseas growth markets and/or to respond to incentives provided by host 
country reforms or the domestic/international climate regime. More recently, 
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the investments have become part of the government’s attempt to support these 
corporate interests. The deeper context is the failure of the UK’s financializa-
tion-led development path to deliver sufficient jobs, revenue, and other aspects 
of economic development. Against this background, the renewed expansion of 
the productive industry at home and abroad is part of a broader strategy and 
“prosperity agenda” that promises to deliver security while advancing domestic 
prosperity and growth:
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom is: to use all our national capa-
bilities to build Britain’s prosperity, extend our nation’s influence in the world and 
strengthen our security. The networks we use to build our prosperity we will also use to 
build our security.131
The success of British land-consuming investment projects and the new foreign 
policy they are part of is not at all clear, however. The high project failure rate, 
regular involvement of fraudulent actors, and danger of capital flight all point 
at the challenges confronting these investments. Moreover, government efforts 
have so far not addressed the dysfunctional features of the home country polit-
ical economy, such as the lack of patient capital or the effects of financialization 
on the state and society (as of 2016).
131 | HM Government (2010), 9.
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Table 7-2 – Brief Review of the Home Country Context and British OFDI in SSA
Category Home country Context UK OFDI in SSA
Development 
context
Since the 1980s, the country has pursued a 
financialization-led development trajectory 
and neglected its productive sector, resulting 
in deteriorating terms of trade, a decline 
in British manufacturing, and high social 
and economic costs, particularly at a time 
of financial crisis, and in the context of 
heightened international competition (e.g., 
BRICS). Also, the country is a net importer 
of food and energy and confronted with 
the challenge of meeting its CO2 emission 
targets under the climate regime.
The unsustainable develop-
ment trajectory has resulted 
in attempts to address related 
problems and reindustrialize. As 
a consequence, the British gov-
ernment has been proactively in-
volved in land-consuming OFDI 
in SSA since 2010/2011. The 
outcomes of this involvement 
have to been seen yet. Moreover, 
the development trajectory, 
with its neglect of the industrial 
sector, and the investor legacy, 
with its focus on resources, 
explain the predominance of 
investments in resources and 
(financial) services (and fewer 
investments in manufacturing) 
characteristic of UK OFDI in 
SSA. At the same time, new 
actors (e.g., funds, early-stage 
companies) are investing in land 
for agricultural production.
Home Coun-
try Measures
The UK as a long-term liberal economy has 
had a promotional policy stance towards 
OFDI since its accession to the EU in the 
1970s, as well as an elaborate HCM frame-
work. Recently, OFDI has become a part of 
the country’s foreign policy. 
OFDI and trade to Africa as a 
new growth region is proactively 
promoted by newly introduced 
instruments, such as aid-funded 
business opportunities facilitat-
ed by DFID; new trade policy 
initiatives; and commercial 
diplomacy.
Guiding 
Ideologies
OFDI is embedded in a rhetoric which ar-
gues that related private sector-led growth is 
important for prosperity and national security 
and necessary for “rebalancing the economy.”
In the particular case of Africa, 
the guiding ideology has shifted. 
It now links OFDI in Africa with 
national economic interests, for-
merly a taboo (after decoloniza-
tion); rhetoric of mutual benefit 
has been adopted.
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Political 
Economy
Since the 1980s, the political economy has 
been characterized by an “embedded finan-
cial orthodoxy” that only now is being chal-
lenged. Core traits are the overlap of public 
sector and financial sector interests through 
intellectual capture and personal affinity and 
the financialization of society.
The dominance of the financial 
sector in the British political 
economy is reflected in the 
prominent role of financial actors 
in the investments (in the form 
of finance provision and direct 
investments). More recently, 
public actors have become 
involved (e.g., the CDC), jumping 
on the corporate bandwagon. 
Most remarkable is the high 
number of early-stage companies 
responding to energy and climate 
policies. 
Events Several incentives have influenced investor 
choices: host country reforms; climate regime 
and energy policies; and the financial crisis.
These events explain different 
actors involved in land-consum-
ing OFDI, namely old companies 
exploiting opportunities in host 
countries; new companies trying 
to profit from the novel climate 
and energy regime; and financial 
actors in a post-crisis search for 
“alpha.”
Investor 
Legacy
As a former empire and long-term investor in 
African economies, the UK is still a dominant 
investor country today.
This investor legacy is also high-
lighted by the uneven investment 
structure in terms of sectors (e.g., 
resources, financial services) and 
countries.
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Conclusion and Outlook
This project has sought to provide a more accurate version of the reasons for and 
the impact of “land grabbing” from a home country perspective. Consequently, 
it has assessed the empirical characteristics of Chinese and British land-con-
suming OFDI in SSA since 2000 (until 2015) in the home country settings, 
linking project-level data with the home countries’ institutional frameworks, 
political economies, ideologies, and development trajectories. The comparative 
study of two major investor countries in SSA that are at different junctures of 
their economic development and have very dissimilar political economies was 
well-suited to identify the main country-specific and cross-country factors at 
play. 
The book has shown that both countries’ investments cover a range of dif-
ferent sectors, from agriculture to mining. Moreover, it has argued that diverse 
purposeful agents partake in land-consuming OFDI for distinct reasons. 
In fact, Chinese and British investments involve actors that are part of both 
the powerful and the marginalized groups in the home country’s political 
economy. Some actors simply respond to the opportunities open to them—
expecting higher returns, competitive advantages, and/or growing markets.1 
Others pursue these enterprises to ‘fight the limits’ they are confronted with 
back home—in the form of limited political influence, ecological boundaries, 
political interference, low social mobility and welfare, crowding out effects, 
limited markets, and/or (comparatively) low returns on investments made. 
Often, the fairly low opportunity costs reflected in the related rationalizations 
and expectations of the different actors explain why these investments occur, 
despite the high risks attached and the mixed record of economic success. Ulti-
1 | In this context, it is also important to note that even though a company is unprof-
itable and accumulates huge losses, the chief executive staff still receives above-av-
erage annual salaries. See, for instance, Equatorial Palm Oil (2014).
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mately, land-consuming OFDI projects are a function of geopolitical consid-
erations, embedded in country-specific guiding ideologies, influenced by the 
social, economic, and ecological dimensions of domestic development, related 
to country-specific events, and supported by institutional frameworks—
rather than being the outcome of any single master plan or mind. Therefore, 
their explanation from a home country perspective goes beyond the focus on 
resource security and/or the search for profitable investments. 
Overall, this project makes three contributions to the contemporary research 
on “land grabbing” that will be summarized in the following sections in greater 
detail. First, it provides actual empirical evidence on Chinese and British 
investment activities and explains these from a home country perspective. The 
findings of the two case studies will be revised in Section 1 and 2, respectively. 
Second, the comparative research design identifies the differences, as well as 
the similarities, that are characteristic of both countries’ overseas investments, 
in and over time. The review of the comparative findings of the contemporary 
and historical assessment will take place in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. The 
conclusion of the chapter considers the role(s) of land-consuming OFDI for 
home country development (Section 5). 
1. china in africa: resources, aLLiances, marKe Ts,   
 and GLobaLiz aTion
From an official perspective, Chinese land-consuming FDI projects in SSA, 
as this book has argued, are part of multiple strategies to diversify supply and 
access to resources (mineral products), foster political alliances and expand the 
country’s soft power in international relations, develop and open new markets, 
and internationalize and upgrade China’s industry in response to the competi-
tive pressures as well as the ecological and social challenges back home. In this 
regard, these projects are part of the country’s political transformation and the 
broader economic liberalization and globalization process, and reflective of its 
political economy. 
From a project-level (agency) perspective, Chinese land-consuming invest-
ments comprise a very diverse range of actors and interests that often reflect 
the country’s social and economic conditions. In practice, the projects include 
workers that hope to improve their families’ standard of living; state-owned 
and private-owned companies searching for lucrative business opportunities; 
and central state officials that support and use the increasing levels of trade 
and investment in their diplomatic strategy to build political alliances. Chinese 
land-consuming investments also involve state-owned and foreign manufac-
turing companies in China that are interested in the access to cheap resources 
and new markets; sub-state government officials and representatives of China’s 
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financial institutions that promote the export of labor and pursue intergov-
ernmental economic cooperation to facilitate growth and moderate the social 
tensions of their administrations’ development plans; Chinese companies that 
have been crowded out by inward FDI and thus have tried to find new business 
opportunities overseas; and/or national oil companies interested in diversifying 
their portfolio in the face of declining reserves‐to‐production ratios (R/P ratio)2 
of Chinese oil fields and rising demand. Moreover, the investments comprise 
Chinese state-owned agribusiness companies delivering economic cooperation 
projects; as well as infrastructure companies that use changes in corporate law 
to act as contract bidders, in addition to implementing China-Africa coopera-
tion programs.
In the following paragraphs, the core empirical elements of Chinese 
land-consuming FDI in SSA will be reviewed in the context of the social, eco-
logical, and economic dimensions of China’s development trajectory, as well 
as in view of the country’s political economy, institutional frameworks, and 
ideological context. 
The empirical findings have shown that these investment projects take place 
in a wide range of sectors, from farming and mining to infrastructure con-
struction. They mostly pre-date the 2007/2008 crises, with some projects even 
tracing back to before the year 2000. Most projects involve multiple agencies 
from the private and public sectors, home and recipient countries (including 
key ministries and host country parliaments), and multilateral agencies. They 
are also embedded in the national development strategies of the home and 
host countries, and often rely on funding from third parties. Surprisingly, the 
Chinese government’s official data suggests that investments in agriculture, 
the central focus of the “land grabbing” debate, only make up a minor share of 
total Chinese FDI (measured by value) in Sub-Saharan Africa. Also, the role of 
land in these investments is multifaceted. A significant share of projects uses 
land as a resource for mining or farming. However, other equally important 
projects use it as a productive space in which infrastructure projects are 
realized, Special Economic Zones constructed, or processing plants operated. 
On the operational level, most projects extract and produce primary commod-
ities for domestic, regional, or international markets, rather than for export 
back to China. Moreover, the projects function on the basis of market princi-
ples and mainstream economic theory, and they are profit-oriented. The latter 
also applies to economic cooperation projects, including Chinese development 
finance.
Home-country-specific structures, agencies, ideologies, and events provide 
for a better understanding of why these investments occur, while also expli-
cating their extent and the forms they take. Since the early 1990s, China’s 
2 | Jiang and Sinton (2011), 1-14.
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government has opted for an IFDI-led, export-oriented economic development 
path. While the country has experienced tremendous quantitative economic 
growth during this period, specific events at different points in time have high-
lighted the shortfalls of this development trajectory. Insofar as they have pre-
sented a threat to the political and economic elite and/or led to relevant changes 
in the country’s actor constellation, structural setting, or ideological super-
structure, these events have been significant for Chinese OFDI policy and reg-
ulation. In particular, four successive events stand out: the economic expansion 
beyond the carrying and provisioning capacity of the country’s resource base in 
the mid-1990s, the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, the WTO accession in 2001, 
and subsequently, rising civil discontent with the socioeconomic and ecological 
implications of the development pathway In the home country context, these 
events have stressed China’s growing external dependency on resources, ecolo-
gies, markets, and political cooperation. They have also demonstrated the neces-
sity of upgrading the country’s domestic processing operations to improve the 
ecological and social conditions, and to reduce the crowding out effects of WTO 
accession on Chinese industry. In response to these events—and the under-
lying challenges for Chinese actors (individuals, firms, government) that have 
made them meaningful—the Chinese government has adopted an increas-
ingly promotional policy stance towards OFDI (of which land-consuming FDI 
in Sub-Saharan Africa forms a part). 
As a result, China, formerly a country with close to zero overseas invest-
ments, has become a major global capital exporter by 2009. While African 
economies still receive the smallest share of total Chinese OFDI, the conti-
nent’s overall share has been rising significantly since 1991 (1991: 0.2%; 2007: 
5.9%).3 The home country’s development trajectory also explains the sectoral 
composition of Chinese land-consuming FDI in African countries, namely 
the strong focus on resources for energy and industrial purposes, as well as 
the importance assigned to manufacturing activities and overseas markets. 
In addition, the infrastructure projects have improved the operating space 
of (Chinese) companies in African countries, and/or have strengthened the 
diplomatic relations by demonstrating the government’s commitment to host 
country requests.
At the same time, it is this official emphasis on resources and commer-
cial activities that sheds light on the surprisingly small share of agricultural 
investments in total OFDI since 2000. African governments have repeatedly 
asked the Chinese government to engage in the rehabilitation of the so-called 
Friendship Farms as part of the mutual benefit approach that allegedly char-
acterizes China-Africa cooperation. In response, the Chinese government has 
agreed to build 30 agricultural demonstration centers across Africa, and it has 
3 | TopForeignStocks.com (13 June 2009); and Renard (2011), 18.
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become involved in other food security activities in the partnering countries 
through capacity building measures, donations to multilateral programs, and/
or the establishment of a special fund (China-Africa Development Fund) that 
supports agricultural operations overseas. Largely, these activities relate to the 
reputational concerns of the Chinese government, which has to rely on soft 
power to advance its economic and political interests in its relationships with 
African countries. Thus, investments in the agricultural sector, particularly 
by SOEs, have been driven by the desire to demonstrate a different approach 
than the major resource importers from the North, with their violent histories 
of expansion and exploitation. At the same time, these activities have enabled 
Chinese actors, such as the Chinese agribusinesses which run the Friendship 
Farms on the basis of mainstream managerial economics, to internationalize 
their operations and gather first-hand managerial experience as transnational 
companies. 
Moreover, the home country’s particular actor constellations and ideological 
context are important factors in understanding Chinese land-consuming OFDI 
from a home country perspective. They constitute important “mechanisms 
of selection”4 with regard to the responses to the particular events described 
above, while also explaining the form of these land-consuming investments. 
In particular, the victory of the economically liberal faction within the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) in the 1990s has led to the adoption of an expansionist 
guiding ideology of development. Importantly, (GDP) growth is perceived by 
the political elite as a way to identify whether development plans and strategies 
for economic governance are achieving success. It has thus come to determine 
political career paths within the CCP. In addition, the cluster of expansionist 
ideas (alias: guiding ideology) frames growth as a means to ensure the stability 
of the political regime by offering jobs and opportunities to the Chinese pop-
ulation. In this regard, the adoption of the set of ideas about growth performs 
ideological functions—it legitimizes, rationalizes, and promotes what is hap-
pening. It also drives overseas investment of which land-consuming OFDI 
forms a part.
Concurrently, political reforms since the 1990s have resulted in the growing 
importance of sub-state actors in the home country’s domestic politics and inter-
national relations; the rising degree of “rule by regulation;”5 the modification of 
Chinese corporate law so that it bestows SOEs with discretionary managerial 
power in their enterprises; and the shifting mindset of political agents who 
act as “bureaucratic entrepreneurs” and are interested in profitable business.6 
Together, these home country features explain why multiple actors with diverse 
4 | Hein (2001), 16. 
5 | Feng (2009), 432; and Yu (2008), 23.
6 | Cheng (2001), 241.
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interests are involved in the initiation, implementation, and operationalization 
of Chinese land-consuming OFDI projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Regarding Chinese land-consuming FDI in SSA, this politico-economic 
and ideological transformation process explains the shifting nature of Chi-
na-Africa cooperation visible on policy and project levels. Powerful interests 
of the country’s altered political and economic elite, particularly the manufac-
turing industry and bureaucratic entrepreneurs at different levels of govern-
ment, in economic expansion, resource security, and profitable business oppor-
tunities have shaped OFDI-related policies. Official documentation, significant 
speeches, and white papers published since 2000 showcase the government’s 
move away from the historical framing of self-reliance and autarky as the 
ultimate (foreign) policy goal informing China-Africa relations. Instead, main-
stream economic ideas have become the core framing and modus operandi of 
economic cooperation. This has resulted in the profound modification of how 
projects are run by Chinese actors. For instance, construction companies that 
were previously aid-funded have become successful entrepreneurs and contract 
bidders on the African continent, and even aid projects have adopted a for-profit 
rationale in their operations. 
It remains unclear how successful the promotion of land-consuming OFDI 
will be in securing resources, opening markets, strengthen political partner-
ships, and/or internationalizing China’s industrial base. Clearly, China-Africa 
trade and investment activities have intensified significantly. At the same time, 
the trade and investment patterns strongly take after traditional asymmetries 
of North-South relations, with the focus on resources and the export of machin-
ery.7 Regarding the official framing of China-Africa cooperation as “mutually 
beneficial,” the effect could be very different for China and African countries. 
From a home country perspective, manifold evidence from other countries’ glo-
balization experiences emphasizes that the impact of overseas expansion on 
home country development is ambiguous and might entail the export of jobs 
and the hollowing out of the productive sector, amongst other problems. From 
a host country perspective, the outcome depends on whether the governments 
steer these activities to support the genuine development and diversification of 
their economies. 
Overall, the varied assemblage of interests that range from geopolitical 
considerations, crowding out effects, individual hopes for a better life, and/
or the specific characteristics of the Chinese political economy explains why 
the increase in land-consuming OFDI is likely to continue, even though many 
projects might fail and associated risks remain high. 
7 | See for instance State Council (2013).
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2. uK in africa: Grow Th reGions, cLimaTe and enerGy  
 securiT y, reindusTriaLiz aTion 
British land-consuming FDI projects in Sub-Saharan Africa are part of multiple 
strategies to profit from the economic reforms and rapidly growing consumer 
markets in the host countries, to respond to international and domestic energy 
and climate policies and the markets created for biofuels, and/or to “seek alpha” 
through alternative investments in the primary sector in Africa at a time of the 
financial crisis and economic stagnation back home. Increasingly, land-con-
suming FDI activities in Sub-Saharan Africa are also part of a (long-term) polit-
ical strategy to use OFDI as a means to economic recovery and international 
political power through rising exports and industrial activity. 
From the official perspective, land-consuming FDI projects are benefitting 
from a liberal policy stance towards capital exports that was adopted back in the 
1970s. Only recently has OFDI to Sub-Saharan Africa also become an explicit 
component of the UK’s foreign economic policy, which reflects the coun-
try’s self-identification as a “cosmopolitan” economy and major political and 
economic power (and former empire). This policy frames overseas investments 
(alongside trade and IFDI) as a way to facilitate home country growth, thereby 
generating wealth, welfare, political stability, and international recognition. In 
this view, the overseas economic networks associated with OFDI can be used to 
sustain or expand the country’s “soft power” at the international level. 
From the project-level perspective, British land-consuming FDI in Sub-Sa-
haran Africa mirrors the interests of a highly diverse private sector character-
istic of the UK’s liberal political economy. Some actors with long histories of 
operating on the continent have exploited the opportunities presented to them 
through divestiture programs, while others, such as the financial sector, have 
just begun to engage in land-consuming investments in the wake of multiple 
crises. Also, the adoption of biofuels and CO2 emission targets provided incen-
tives to newcomers to invest in agricultural projects and produce for the related 
markets. Early-stage companies have started to invest in Jatropha plantations, 
and actors of the aviation industry—affected by the CO2 emission targets—
have become involved and have offered these companies medium-term offtake 
agreements for their seemingly clean energy products. Despite the predom-
inance of food and biofuel production projects in the “land grab” databases, 
British land-consuming investments cover a wide range of other sectors, 
including mineral extraction and construction services.8  
8 | In this context, official UK OFDI data reminds us that financial services (43%) and 
mining (42.5%) were the largest sectors (measured by value) in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
pointing at the UK investor legacy with its focus on natural resources, as well as its 
economic constitution with a strong financial-sector orientation back home.
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Most British projects produce for export to international markets or the 
UK. In many cases, however, the export-oriented business models designed 
by British companies did not materialize due to pricing problems, funding 
issues, and/or inexperienced plantation management, to name just a few of 
the problems encountered on the ground. As a result, many projects ended up 
selling their products in the host country or regionally; or went into admin-
istration. Land has been perceived primarily as a resource or financial asset, 
and again in contrast to the Chinese case, less often as a space for productive 
activities. 
On the subject of timelines, three trends are observable in the 2000 to 2015 
period. The first trend comprises investments made around the year 2000. 
The empirical details of British land-consuming investment projects indicate 
that at that time, host country divestiture programs and private sector percep-
tions of Africa as a new growth region were fundamental factors impacting 
investor decisions. Importantly, these factors emerged when economic growth 
in Britain and its major trading and investment partners was stagnant. The 
related investments were conducted by companies that had a long presence in 
the host countries, and/or they involved companies with the financial capacity 
and international experience and mindset to respond to these national and 
international incentives. 
The second trend comprises land-consuming FDI projects that took place 
between 2000 and 2007. Most of these were related to international, European, 
or domestic renewable energy and climate policies, namely directives, targets, 
and carbon credits developed to achieve energy security and/or CO2 emis-
sions-reduction targets.9 Specifically, they were operated primarily by new 
business actors, such as the early-stage companies that often had little prior 
experience in agriculture, and whose business models aimed to profit from 
these new policy regimes and related markets—they frequently failed to do so. 
The third bulk of British land-consuming investments started after 2007. 
These projects have been strongly linked to the financial crisis, the economic 
recession in the UK, and the Eurozone crisis. These economic shocks have led 
financial actors to seek new investment outlets, often in the form of primary 
commodities. They have done this either as a hedge against inflation or, given 
the dire economic situation in the UK, the partner countries of continental 
Europe, and the crisis-ridden US, in pursuit of new growth markets. Since 
2011, the British government has also tended to jump on this corporate trend by 
trying to promote British OFDI in African countries as a way to revive its man-
ufacturing sector and develop new export and business opportunities.
The following paragraphs will review the core empirical elements of British 
OFDI in SSA in the context of the social, ecological, and economic dimensions 
9 | UK Department of Energy &Climate Change (2006) and (2007).
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of the UK’s development trajectory, as well as in view of the country’s political 
economy, institutional frameworks, and ideological context. 
Compared to the Chinese example, the UK case study findings highlight that 
in a country with an open economy, host country dynamics and international 
events play out more prominently. Notably, the UK’s investor legacy and long 
history as a liberal economy, as well as its long-term promotional OFDI policy 
stance, explain why a significant share of British land-consuming investments 
have been made in response to particular pull factors, such as host country 
reforms and international policy regimes. At the same time, the sectoral com-
position of British land-consuming FDI with its focus on resources echoes the 
country’s investor legacy, as do the highly unequal investment patterns across 
different recipient countries. In fact, the land-consuming investments are 
concentrated in a few countries and focus on the same sectors that have char-
acterized British-African economic relations for over a century. The limited 
number of manufacturing projects also mirrors the (financial-) service-sector 
orientation of the home country and the “embedded financial orthodoxy” of its 
political economy.
At the same time, the specific home country setting, namely the actor con-
stellation, development context, and ideological superstructure, remains central 
to the explanation of how these investments take place. Take, for example, the 
dysfunctional system of industrial finance that is characteristic of the British 
political economy. Its effects are evidenced by the lack of patient capital that has 
plagued British biofuel and agricultural projects, often leading to their failure. 
Moreover, the strong presence of financial actors in British land-consuming 
OFDI projects reflects the “intellectual capture,” as well as the overlapping 
interests of seemingly distinct public and private sector actor groups, that are 
characteristic of the UK’s political economy of growth. 
The relatively recent involvement of the British government in land-con-
suming OFDI activities in SSA has concurred with changes in the guiding 
ideology. In fact, the set of ideas that promote, rationalize, and legitimize 
(land-consuming and other) FDI in Africa has been modified in outlook and 
emphasis. The UK government now emphasizes the “mutually beneficial” 
nature of UK-Africa business relations, explicitly associating overseas invest-
ments more with national and foreign economic interests rather than unilat-
eral humanitarianism. In the context of the 2007 financial crisis and ensuing 
economic recession, the UK government identified the financialization-led 
development approach, with its focus on financial services and its dependency 
on credit-financed public and private consumption, as posing a key challenge 
to economic recovery and the operative functioning of the state.10 The core 
10 | Confederation of British Industry (2011), 6; Pettinger (3 January 2014); Pettinger 
(8 January 2014).
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problems of that approach include reduced and increasingly volatile govern-
ment revenue; the country’s declining industrial base, which has gone hand 
in hand with the loss of decent jobs and deteriorating terms of trade, partic-
ularly since the country became a net importer of energy sources;11 economic 
recession at a time of international financial crisis; and rising socioeconomic 
inequality and the associated risk of social disintegration. Against this back-
ground, the Conservative government (since 2010) has begun to frame and 
re-engage in OFDI activities as a means to stimulate growth, access resources, 
improve industrial competitiveness, and provide for socioeconomic essentials 
such as jobs. 
Official documentation also references realist assumptions and geopolitical 
considerations and suggests that the country’s economic expansion—through 
further extension of the international economic networks comprising OFDI, 
IFDI, and trade—correlates with political power in international relations. 
Land-consuming (and other) FDI to SSA is framed as an important compo-
nent of the government’s ambition to play an influential role in world politics 
by sustaining the country’s economic and political presence overseas and in 
multilateral institutions. On an institutional level, this rhetoric is matched both 
by an increase in the UK’s commercial diplomacy and by the aligning of UK 
development finance and programs with the country’s foreign policy goals. As 
a result of this “grand strategy” approach, development finance is increasingly 
being invested in the private sector operations of British companies currently 
active in African countries. 
It remains to be seen how successful British land-consuming FDI in SSA 
turns out to be in meeting the multiple expectations associated with it. While 
trade and investment has increased significantly, the investment activities are 
spread very uneven, both with regards to countries and sectors. Moreover, the 
high project failure rate, regular involvement of fraudulent actors, and danger 
of capital flight all point at the challenges confronting these investments, on 
the project level as well as from a home country perspective. Overall, the official 
rhetoric seems overly optimistic regarding the utility of OFDI for the home 
country while no long-term strategy exists regarding the UK’s engagement with 
Africa. At the same time, government efforts have so far hardly addressed the 
dysfunctional features of the home country political economy, such as the lack 
of patient capital or the effects of financialization on the state and society. From 
a host country perspective, the impact is strongly dependent on the steering 
of these investments to the benefits of the affected populations and societies. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the attraction of large-scale land-consuming 
11 | On the implications and reasons for Britain’s industrial decline, see Skidelsky (24 
January 2013).
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FDI often comes at a high cost for the affected populations and ecologies, with 
no safeguards in place. 
3. difference as variaTion: a counTry-case comParison
Given the complexity of Chinese and British land-consuming FDI described 
above, what does the comparative study of the contrasting cases tell us about the 
country-specific as well as cross-country features and dynamics at play? In this 
section, three (interrelated) arguments are made. Firstly, multiple differences 
exist regarding Chinese and British land-consuming OFDI. However, these 
differences are not necessarily significant in explaining why these investments 
happen, nor are they antithetic. Instead, differences are best understood as vari-
ations of the particular composition of actors and interests involved. Secondly, 
the complexity of (f)actors at play forbids any monocausal explanations of what 
is happening. Thirdly, it is important to note the similarities that exist regarding 
Chinese and British land-consuming OFDI. From a home country perspective, 
land-consuming OFDI is backed by relatively similar policy frameworks, and 
sets of ideas that associate OFDI with particular socioeconomic and geopolit-
ical interests. On the project level, the investments apply the same managerial 
economics. The following paragraphs will explicate the comparative findings 
under the headings of difference, complexity, and similarity. 
In view of difference, firstly, the particular mix of home-country-specific 
conditions explains how and why land-consuming investments occur, and ulti-
mately highlights what makes them Chinese or British. In other words: differ-
ences do not refer to any sort of (antithetic) absolute difference in how and 
why these investments occur from a home country perspective. Moreover, not 
every difference is inevitably significant in the comparative explanation of how 
and why land-consuming OFDI occurs—a circumstance that holds for both the 
project level and the aggregate one. 
 In practice, the sectoral composition of Chinese investments reveals a focus 
on manufacturing and infrastructure projects, as well as energy resources, 
while British investments are largely resource and service-oriented and include 
a significant share of agricultural projects aimed at biofuel and food production. 
Regarding the role of land, Chinese investors prioritize its use as a resource 
and space for productive activities, whereas British investors use it mostly as a 
resource and, increasingly, as an asset. This does not, however, imply that all of 
these investment projects are related to the 2007/2008 resource and financial 
crises. In both cases, a large share of land-consuming OFDI projects began 
prior to the 2007/2008 timeline. Chinese projects often build on, or rehabil-
itate former aid projects, particularly in the agricultural sector where some 
projects can be traced back to the 1970s. Moreover, a large share of Chinese 
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investments involves equity investments in existing projects, often in the form 
of a Chinese SOE investing in an African company that is itself an SOE or 
has close ties to the host government. Many British investments also go into 
existing enterprises (such as plantations) and involve companies which have 
had a long presence on the continent. At the same time, the bulk of early-stage 
companies are involved in greenfield investments, specifically the operation of 
plantations for export purposes. 
The most obvious difference can be observed in the actor composition of 
both countries’ land-consuming FDI projects. In spite of the great diversity of 
public and private actors from the host and home countries that are involved 
during a project’s lifecycle, in the Chinese case, the investigated projects were 
predominantly executed by SOEs. British investments, in contrast, were under-
taken primarily by private companies and financial investors, with the excep-
tion of the CDC Group. However, the case study has also shown that the British 
government has become involved through commercial diplomacy and/or the 
provision of investment-related development finance to British investors oper-
ating in African countries.
Moreover, different events, investor legacies, and political economies play 
important roles. In the Chinese case, the country is a relatively new source of 
FDI in Africa. The OFDI policy supporting this trend has emerged since the 
1990s in response to particular events, such as the country’s rising resource 
dependency in the 1990s, the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, and WTO acces-
sion in 2001. This means that Chinese land-consuming OFDI is strongly 
related to political reforms that have occurred since the 1990s and led to funda-
mental change and partial liberalization of the country’s industrial and foreign 
economic policies and related administrative procedures. Contrastingly, in the 
British case, the country’s long investor legacy and presence on the continent 
is of importance. Consequently, investments made prior to 2007/2008 were 
largely related to external pull factors, such as reforms in the host economies, 
the perception that African countries provided profitable business opportuni-
ties, or the international climate regime. Political reforms and home country 
strategies have come into play only more recently, in the form of a revised 
foreign policy regarding the British presence in African countries. 
In the Chinese case, public sector reforms seem to have set the ground for 
the investments to occur as they do, however, in the British case it has been 
the private sector that has triggered the government to reconsider its engage-
ment with African countries at a time of stagnant growth back home. In both 
cases, the public and private sectors overlap greatly, either through the strong 
role of SOEs in the domestic economy (China); the guiding ideology shared by 
public and private actors involved in the political economy of growth relevant 
for overseas investments in Africa (UK and China); or though revolving doors 
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and the dependency of capitalist states on the economy to generate the revenues 
and jobs that are necessary for societal reproduction. 
It is also noteworthy that most Chinese investment projects produce for 
domestic or regional markets in Africa, while most British investors planned to 
export to international markets or the UK. In the Chinese case, investors have 
just begun globalizing their activities and are producing largely for local and 
regional markets in the host countries. In the UK case, this export orientation 
is largely a continuation of historical investment patterns, as well as a reflection 
of the capacities of relevant actors. 
Additionally, the rationales embedded in relevant official documentation 
and policies reflect another way in which Chinese and British land-consuming 
OFDI projects differ. In the case of China, these investments cater to the inter-
ests of a political economy of growth characterized by a very resource-inten-
sive and export-oriented manufacturing sector, the marketization of power by 
state representatives, and the official interest in improving China’s position and 
influence in the international political and economic landscape. Consequently, 
these investments open new markets, form part of a globalization process of 
Chinese companies, focus on the diversification of energy supplies, and are 
embedded in an official strategy to intensify political and economic networks. 
Contemporary agricultural projects have largely been motivated by reputational 
concerns and stem from the “mutual benefit” principle of China’s Africa policy, 
i.e. they are intended to give something back in exchange for the increased, yet 
highly asymmetric trade and investment relations, thereby fostering good rela-
tions. Moreover, many investment projects have a medium-term profit strategy 
built in to their operations. The core actors in the Chinese political economy 
are government officials, SOEs, and the private sector, all of which pursue the 
same expansionist agenda, albeit for different reasons. Documented rational-
izations range from considerations of political stability and resource security to 
access to new markets and the hope of finding profitable business opportuni-
ties overseas in light of the fierce competition back home.
In the case of the UK, the political economy comprises private actors 
seeking profitable investments in established sectors and, more recently, new 
actors trying to profit from newly created markets for renewable energy or the 
presence in new growth markets. The important role of the financial sector as a 
source of industry finance in these investments also reflects on the service-sec-
tor-driven growth strategy that has been pursued by British governments since 
the 1980s. More recently, in the face of the financial crisis, public actors have 
re-engaged with the industrial sector in pursuit of a source of growth. However, 
it remains to be seen what this implies for land-consuming FDI in SSA. At the 
same time, the dominance of the financial sector in British OFDI in general 
reflects the problems generated by the country’s political economy, namely the 
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lack of patient capital, which is needed, for instance, in the agricultural and 
industrial sectors.
Together, these details of Chinese and British land-consuming FDI in SSA 
highlight the core differences between the predominant trends, particularly 
in view of their actor composition, sectoral distribution, timelines, events, and 
strategic rationalizations. These differences relate to home country-specific 
aspects of the political economy, development context, investor legacy, and 
institutional setting. However, a closer look at how Chinese and British invest-
ments transpire also shows that many of these differences are not useful in 
explaining the purpose of these investments. Clearly, there are more public 
actors involved in the Chinese case, and a greater presence of financial investors 
in the UK case. At the same time, Chinese investments are largely for-profit, 
and are rationalized using mainstream economic thought. This means that 
the important role of public actors reflects China’s role as a newcomer to the 
international economic realm, and not the final purpose of these investments. 
Accordingly, the country has to rely more strongly on inter-governmental coop-
eration to open new markets for industrial expansion and to diversify the coun-
try’s supply of industrial resources. Moreover, the findings refer back to the 
Chinese domestic set-up, which clearly favors state enterprises. 
In the UK case, meanwhile, this difference in actor composition does not 
mean that private investments appear in a vacuum. Instead, the less frequent 
involvement of public actors seems related to the UK’s long-established ties 
with the African continent and private actors’ correspondingly lengthy opera-
tional histories there. Moreover, these investments are embedded in national 
and international public policy frameworks and supported by home country 
measures. The huge number of financial actors is reflective of the “embedded 
financial orthodoxy” that has guided UK’s domestic development policies since 
the Thatcher era. 
Secondly, in view of the causal mechanisms at play in each case, the com-
parison accentuates that the interrelation of the country-specific conditions and 
outcomes is characterized by complexity. It is impossible to ascribe any of the 
domestic undercurrents in the form of agency, ideology, structure, and events 
a precise function as independent or dependent variables or to give a single (f)
actor primary importance in explaining the outcome, namely land-consuming 
FDI ventures. Instead, these domestic undercurrents are co-determinant 
over time. The example of China shows this most clearly. Since the country’s 
opening up, its socioeconomic and ecological dimensions of development have 
changed fundamentally and, as a result, so have the guiding ideology and 
actor constellations. China today embraces the type of overseas investments 
it termed exploitative four decades ago, and it has fundamentally reformed its 
administration, political system, and aid system in order to foster the newly 
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adopted manufacturing and export-oriented growth strategy that matches the 
interests and international ambitions of its bureaucratic entrepreneurs.
Finally, thirdly, the comparative study of these two cases reveals institu-
tional and ideological similarities between these rather different countries that 
highlight the important role of OFDI in contemporary development approaches 
of home countries. Over the past three decades, China has adopted an elab-
orate system of home country measures and is in the process of catching up 
with policy frameworks that are standard in OECD countries. This means that 
the countries only differ with regard to the degree (high/low) of stimulus and 
control exercised in their home country FDI policies.12 While China applies 
high stimulus and control, the UK is characterized by high stimulus and low 
control.
Additionally, both countries have changed the guiding ideology under-
lying their foreign economic policies and overseas operations; however, the 
alterations differ in scale. On the one hand, China has fundamentally shifted 
from an earlier focus on autarky towards embracing open system features and 
factoring in other countries’ land and resources in its development policy. In 
this process, a previous set of ideas on development and international rela-
tions has been replaced by another. On the other hand, the UK has (slightly) 
shifted the emphasis of its foreign policy towards Africa, and it has recently 
stepped up its commercial diplomacy to profit from the new growth region. 
The former guiding narrative of unilateral humanitarianism is increasingly 
complemented by a rationale of “mutual benefit” and “delivering prosperity 
together” that seems strikingly similar to the rhetoric commonly applied in 
South-South cooperation. 
In fact, the two countries share a similar outlook on foreign economic policy 
when it comes to the role of OFDI promotion in accessing markets, securing 
resources, promoting exports, or strengthening the country’s “soft power” and 
position in the international political and economic landscape (also see con-
cluding discussion in Section 5). However, the detailed explanations of why 
both countries promote OFDI in Africa are rather different, and they reflect the 
particular political economies in the two countries at certain points in time. On 
the project level, both countries’ investment projects pursue a for-profit ratio-
nale, and involve a rather diverse range of actors.
12 | See, for instance, Buckley et al. (2010), 243-277.
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4. chinese and briTish “L and Gr abs” in    
 hisToricaL PersPecTive
A remaining question is the novelty of contemporary Chinese and British 
land-consuming investments when compared to large-scale land acquisitions 
in the late 19th century. Broad references to colonialism made by some in the 
“land grab” debate often oversimplify the past and/or the present; for instance, 
such critiques’ narrow focus on resources as the sole determining factor can 
have this effect. On the contrary, large-scale land acquisitions in the past and 
present are highly similar in terms of the complexity of their main empirical 
characteristics. In the late 19th century, and again today, land-consuming 
investment activities serve(d) a variety of purposes aside from that of securing 
resources. These purposes include opening markets, acquiring strategic assets, 
expanding spheres of influence, and searching for profitable business oppor-
tunities. Moreover, the 19th century investments, just like the contemporary 
ones, involved a diverse range of agents; and instead of being a total success 
story, many were confronted with insurmountable problems on the ground 
which led to their ultimate failure.
But what does a more detailed historical comparison of large-scale land 
acquisitions in the South tell us about the similarity of key elements over time? 
This section will look more closely at a selected range of aspects to highlight 
the co-existence of path-dependent and new aspects of Chinese and British 
land-consuming OFDI activities in SSA since 2000 (and until 2015)—making 
them both novel and old, to a certain degree. To narrow down the historical 
comparison of differences and similarities to a manageable size and concen-
trate on this co-existence argument, the discussion will revolve around three 
aspects: ideology, uneven development geographies, and institutions. These 
aspects have been central to the analysis of land-consuming OFDI from a home 
country perspective, and they evidence the importance of the events of the 19th 
century for our contemporary world.13 In fact, the “global transformation” that 
was the industrial revolution in the 19th century has brought about particular 
ideologies and structures and a range of significant events that are still visible 
today.14
In terms of similarities, firstly, it is striking to see that in both China and 
the UK, the guiding ideology supporting capital exports uses basically the same 
narrative that was common during the Scramble for Africa in the 19th century. 
Together with trade and IFDI, OFDI is said to improve the home country’s 
economic setting, to secure access to resources, to open export markets, and to 
sustain or reach a favorable position in the international economic landscape. 
13 | Buzan and Lawson (2013), 1-17.
14 | Buzan and Lawson (2013), 1-17.
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Overall, the official narrative during the Scramble, as well as today, promotes 
land-consuming investments as “not a choice, but a necessity.”15 
However, a closer look at this ideological conformity also shows the develop-
ment of new aspects regarding the official rationalization and implementation 
of land-consuming investment activities—in the form of an ideological turn. 
During the Scramble, overseas investments were part of the “doctrinal, qua-
si-religious [...]” free trade doctrine, but this has changed since WWII.16 While 
its core principles of multilateralism and non-discrimination persist, trade and 
investments have come to belong “to the more technical pages of economic 
theory and the diplomatic fineprint of international rules” under the protec-
tion of the WTO and/or bilateral consultations.17 Accordingly, contemporary 
land-consuming OFDI is rationalized, legitimized, and promoted using the 
frames of mainstream economic theory, and it is an ordinary component of 
both home countries’ industrial and foreign policies. Furthermore, host gov-
ernments apply this technical frame too, and are actively involved in many of 
the Chinese and British OFDI activities, welcoming them as another source of 
capital that can be used to progressively finance national development plans – 
a narrative that also greatly resembles the rhetoric of colonial governments 
during the Scramble.18 
The book has argued that this technical framing of international economic 
exchanges in general, and of (land-consuming and other) OFDI in particular, 
together with the institutionalization and legalization of the principles of mul-
tilateralism and non-discrimination, has enabled China to pursue a “peaceful 
development” approach. The institutions and strategies that have supported 
China’s economic expansion since the 1990s, and its globalization since 2000, 
are fairly similar to those of the OECD countries; indeed, they are catching up 
with those standard measures, even though the Chinese government claims 
that they are innovative.19 At the same time, we see that the rising Chinese 
involvement on the African continent has alerted “old” investor countries such 
as the UK. In fact, an increasing number of OECD countries have started to 
re-engage with OFDI promotion beyond the formal frameworks they have 
in place. Also, the UK has stepped up its commercial diplomacy via official 
visits and bilateral investment fora, but it has also refocused its development 
programs to Africa (and Asia). 
Secondly, another comparison can be made regarding the uneven economic 
development geography. Vis-à-vis the international economic context, Chinese 
15 | Compare Hobson (1965), 73.
16 | Trentmann (2008), 7. 
17 | Trentmann (2008), 7. 
18 | See Cottrell (1975), 28.
19 | State Council (2011b).
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and British land-consuming OFDI activities clearly reflect—and most likely 
sustain—an international division of labor that emerged during the industrial 
revolution and the European imperial age of the 19th century. Unless African 
governments proactively engage with and steer capital imports to support 
economic diversification, their countries will continue to occupy the lowest 
positions in this order as primary commodity exporters and/or markets for 
industrialized goods in the world economy. 
At the same time, the cases of China and the UK also reveal that these 
land-consuming investments are part of some relatively novel processes of 
global economic restructuring that might lead to an alteration of this develop-
ment geography. In fact, as an emerging economy, China has become a major 
investor in Africa within the last two decades, and it is currently aiming to 
strengthen and improve its positional status within this international division 
of labor through upgrading. At the same time, the UK is trying to hold onto its 
favorable international position. To that end, it has started promoting land-con-
suming OFDI as a way to remain visible internationally, as well as rebalance its 
economy and profit from overseas growth markets. 
From the viewpoint of uneven national development geographies, it is worth 
noting that certain conditions in the home countries are remarkably similar to 
those of the past. Now, as it did in the late 19th century, rising OFDI takes place 
in a home country context of high socioeconomic and wealth asymmetries. 
This observation is particularly interesting when recalling Hobson’s argument 
that the concentration of wealth might have been one reason why capital was 
‘free’ and available in home countries for profitable investment overseas.20 At 
the same time, the UK case highlights that due to the realization of particular 
social security rights through financial market instruments, the situation is 
now more complex than in the 19th century. For instance, the rising aspiration 
of pension funds and public investors to invest in land-consuming overseas 
investment projects means that a diverse range of actors, including workers, 
have been implicated as implicit shareholders in this phenomenon since 2000. 
Thirdly and finally, a core social institution rooted in the 19th century 
remains central to land-consuming OFDI today: the corporation.21 During the 
era of colonialism, exploration, and free trade, chartered companies operated 
on the basis of a royal or government charter that outlined the terms and goals 
of their activities and granted them the right to military engagement and land 
governance. Importantly, institutions like the chartered company facilitated 
costly overseas enterprises by bringing together multiple investors and their 
capital resources through the practice of shareholding. As early as 1855, such 
companies were granted limited liability, which greatly reduced the risk carried 
20 | Hobson (1965), 85-92; also see Chapter 3 (Section 2).
21 | Sukdhev (2012), 37-46.
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by their shareholders.22 At the same time, provisions such as the ultra-vires 
doctrine forbid the companies to act outside the charter rights assigned to them 
by the government.23 
While the corporation has remained an important institution regarding 
trade and capital exports until today, state-market contexts have changed signifi-
cantly. Most countries have subscribed to the open system economy and liberal 
principles. Furthermore, the charter has been replaced by a formal adminis-
trative process, and the legal means of protection available to corporations have 
been strengthened as a result of BITs, domestic reforms, and multilateral insti-
tutions. Plus, government provisions, such as the ultra-vires doctrine, have been 
cut, and trade and capital flows deregulated in many countries. In addition, 
both the relevant infrastructure (communication, transport) and the interna-
tional economic governance structure have been improved. Overall, corpora-
tions’ operational freedom vis-à-vis the state has been augmented as a result of 
these changes. In fact, the favorable economic context and the reduction of the 
risk associated with overseas operations also explain the rise of capital exports 
in the form of OFDI.24 
In view of these altered state-market relations, the case studies have high-
lighted that the Chinese and British governments try to influence corporate 
decision making through compulsory, institutional, and productive forms 
of power in their interactions with economic actors. Accordingly, material, 
symbolic, and normative resources are applied by state agents in these invest-
ment processes through regulations (e.g., energy and climate policies); home 
country measures ranging from commercial diplomacy to financial incentives; 
and discursive framings. The fact that political and economic elites in both 
countries are closely interlinked on an individual, as well as intellectual, level 
helps to exert sway in both directions: from the public to the private sector and 
the private sector to the public sector. However, compared to the prevalence 
of government doctrines that companies had to obey in the 19th century, the 
public sector’s influence on corporate behavior has decreased fundamentally, 
and corporate operations now tend to be associated with the representation of 
narrow shareholder values.25 
Against this background, it is surprising to note the multiple ways in which 
the Chinese and British governments promote overseas investments using 
political and economic narratives similar to those popular in the late 19th 
century. In practice, foreign land, in its function as resource, marketplace, pro-
22 | Sukdhev (2012), 37-46.
23 | Mack (1930).
24 | See the rise of IFDI and OFDI in the World Bank’s country data (http://data.world-
bank.org). 
25 | Sukdhev (2012), 37-46.
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ductive space, strategic location, and/or financial asset, features prominently 
in the development policies and foreign economic policies of these two home 
countries. Moreover, overseas FDI stock in areas deemed to be of the utmost 
importance to the functioning of the home country’s economy and society is 
considered to belong to that country’s core infrastructure; it is often referred to 
as critical infrastructure (that needs protection).26
Thus, the two governments argue and act on the presumption that foreign 
lands are available to realize their national development objectives, as well as 
that their support for corporate overseas activities will be of economic, social, 
and political advantage to their countries. The involvement of state actors in 
OFDI activities highlights that these serve to open new markets, access cheap 
resources, and improve the relative trade and foreign exchange position of the 
home country, thereby enhancing its competitiveness, creating jobs, improving 
the terms of trade, and strengthening economic and political spheres of influ-
ence. It follows from this line of official reasoning that land-consuming OFDI 
in SSA is framed as an important step in ensuring the stability of the existing 
political and economic regimes.
It remains to be seen whether the rhetoric and expectations surrounding 
land-consuming OFDI will materialize, either on the project level or in the 
aggregate. At a minimum, the limited leeway that governments have to ensure 
that the accessed resources are sold back home, that profits are repatriated, or 
that corporate activity contributes to the prosperity and security of the home 
country in other ways, raises serious doubts about the core presumptions of 
the two countries’ official rationalizations. The case of China highlighted some 
instances in which corporate actors acted in conflict with the central govern-
ment’s foreign ambitions. In the case of the UK, the prevailing dominance of 
the financial sector and the focus on shareholder value in overseas operations 
does not seem to be conducive to strengthening the productive sector. However, 
it is too early to judge the cumulative impact of OFDI on China and the UK. 
Overall, this historical comparison has underlined the fact that broad refer-
ences to historical events are not meaningful in explaining the quality of con-
temporary phenomena such as “land grabbing.” Instead, a detailed assessment 
is necessary to apprehend the changes and continuities over time, and thereby 
to learn more about what is unique today.
26 | Wikileaks (2009b).
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5. L and Gr abbinG for home counTry de veLoPmenT?   
 a synThesis of observaTions
Throughout this book, the argument has been made that land-consuming 
OFDI and home country development are closely interrelated. In conclusion, 
this section will synthesize findings and reflect upon the role of OFDI for home 
country development. 
From an official line of reasoning, these investments are part of public 
policies that count on foreign lands to meet national development goals; as 
well as of foreign economic and diplomatic strategies to access resources, enter 
new markets, restructure the economy, and/or expand/sustain the sphere of 
influence using industrial activities and economic power. The investments are 
supported in both countries by political elites that are closely interlinked with 
dominant economic actors, on a personal level, by way of “intellectual capture,” 
or through political institutions, like, for instance, the opening up of China’s 
CCP to entrepreneurs and/or party finance in the UK.
OFDI, together with trade, is framed and perceived by the managerial and 
economic elites of the UK and China to advance their macro-level development 
agenda and address the structural problems they face. On the Chinese policy 
level, concerns about the rising dependency on external resources and markets, 
together with the fear of unsustainable levels of pollution, social welfare, and 
crowding out effects on indigenous industry have led to the adoption of an 
elaborate OFDI policy framework promoting overseas investment. In the 
British case, the main issues that yielded the establishment of a promotional 
and increasingly state-supported OFDI strategy included the EU accession and 
interests in market access shortly after the oil crisis; concerns about energy 
security; and the search for growth markets following the financial crisis and 
prolonged economic recession.
Concurrently, both countries’ political elites pursue geopolitical ambitions 
in their cooperation with Africa, a continent that in their eyes has much to offer, 
namely resources, growth markets, and business opportunities. The intensifi-
cation of economic networks and cooperation in this new growth region is said 
to build and/or sustain the home country’s favorable (relative) position in the 
international political landscape and increase its economic strength at a time 
of global restructuring.
In this context, this research identified particular clusters of ideas linked 
to land-consuming OFDI (referred to throughout as the ‘guiding ideology’). 
These have proven important in the associated perceptions, as well as policy 
and decision-making processes of countries and individuals. They shape the 
expectations and imagined futures of a wide range of diverse actors. Specifi-
cally, they reflect, justify, and obscure powerful interest structures, mobilize 
support, and create the institutions and purposeful agencies at play in OFDI 
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activities in Africa. In line with the nature of ideologies, these clusters of ideas 
are “intended to be believed in by those affirming them publicly and by all men, 
because they are “true,” and they thus have universal character.”27 
In both country cases, firstly, mainstream economic theory is at the core of 
the guiding ideology that frames these investments as an economic “necessity” 
and technical management issue. It informs the official language and norma-
tive narrative on land-consuming FDI in Africa, and parts of it are also taken 
up by private actors, and reflected in the overly optimistic expectations. In 
addition, secondly, China and the UK reference modern development prescrip-
tions that focus on economic expansion as a way to prosperity, international 
political status, and domestic security. Propagated in significant white papers, 
as well as official documents and speeches, the framing of development in both 
cases comes close to President Truman’s 1949 declaration that increases in the 
productivity and activity of an economy are “key to prosperity and peace” and 
preconditions of a progressively “higher standard of living.”28 This policy pre-
scription towards development is, however, nothing unusual. To the contrary, 
“economic growth has maintained its position at or near the top of policy pri-
orities in most countries,” and is commonly framed as conditio sine qua non 
for prosperity, wellbeing, progress, and security.29 Other policy objectives, like 
“free trade, increased competitiveness, lower taxes, reducing government’s 
deficit, innovation and higher productivity” are referred to as a way to provide 
for “increases in economic output.”30
This means that both countries share a global “quest for modernity [...] all 
wrapped in distinctive economic and political structures.”31 Consequently, con-
temporary land-consuming OFDI from China and the UK does not mark a 
turning point away from old development prescriptions or “free market” ideas, 
as is assumed by some authors who apply a narrow resource-security framing 
in their analyses.32 Rather, OFDI from these countries reflects the assertion 
of existing practices and ideologies, namely the uneven development geogra-
phies with regard to the processes of value creation and consumption; and the 
prevalence of mainstream economic theory which promotes capital exports 
due to their framing as a technical management issue (rather than contentious 
control grabbing issue), and their macro-economic explanation as a rational 
choice to foster exports, access resources, expand skills and know-how, create 
employment, and ultimately sustain a country’s economic growth. 
27 | Gouldner (1976), 33.
28 | Gillespie (2001), 1. 
29 | Victor (2008), 18.
30 | Victor (2008), 18-18.
31 | Gillespie (2001), 1. Also see Victor (2008), 18-19.
32 | E.g., IISD (2013).
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At the same time, land-consuming OFDI projects present several inconsis-
tencies of the expansionist development paradigm, the difficulties and violence 
of which have been at the heart of development studies. For instance, the expec-
tation of unlimited economic expansion accompanying these capital move-
ments (as found in official documentation) tends to disregard the existence of 
ultimate physical or territorial limits, the perception of which has influenced 
zero-sum mercantilist policies during previous eras.33 Yet, the materiality of 
land-consuming projects is in many cases the very expression of such limits, 
meaning that (ideally) these are facilitating international economies of scale in 
spite of the problem of domestic diseconomies of space, or advance a country’s 
growth in spite of the decline of the national resource base.34 
Moreover, the development paradigm hides the asymmetric cost and benefit 
distribution of uneven development geographies by using technical terms, such 
as international division of labor;35 or by suggesting that the location, not the 
ownership, of capital matters. Yet, by its very definition, foreign direct invest-
ment (land-consuming or not) is about “establish[ing] a long-lasting interest 
and significant control over a particular enterprise overseas.”36 Therefore, 
land-consuming FDI can be understood “as an interest in the power to consume 
or control land-based wealth (stemming from different land uses and activi-
ties).”37 In fact, many “grabs” occur silently, through majority shareholding of 
a company.
Some land-consuming FDI projects are part a corporation’s attempt to 
incorporate fragments of the supply chain—for instance, by acquiring business 
operations within the same production vertically or horizontally. Together with 
the uneven development geographies involved, the practice of land-consuming 
FDI projects thus points to the many neo-illiberal advances in and aspects of 
the host and home country economies, such as the concentration of ownership 
and control through forms of majority shareholding, conglomeration, and/or 
the aforementioned processes of integration of production processes within a 
single company. 
In conclusion, it seems important to remember that this book has aimed 
to provide a meaningful account of Chinese and British land-consuming 
investments from 2000 until 2015; pointing to the necessity to study the 
co-dependency and -determinacy of actors, structures, ideas, events, including 
contingencies, of the global “land grab” from the home country perspective. 
33 | Sornarajah (2010), 49-53; and Moran (2011), 1-9
34 | Bunker and Ciccantell, 2003.
35 | See, for instance, Lavoie (2014), 1-30; Sornarajah (2010), 49-53; Moran (2011), 
and 1-9; Denisia (2010). 
36 | Goetz (2015), 180-181.
37 | Goetz (2015), 180-181; GRAIN ( 2008); Borras and Franco ( 2010).
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Since then, the UK has decided by way of a referendum to exit the European 
Union, the terms of which are still being negotiated; China has stepped up 
its upgrading efforts by way of mergers and acquisitions in other regions, 
while beginning to invest in African industrialization, and establishing a 
development finance infrastructure that rivals the Bretton Woods system; and 
the current US government seems to turning away from previous forms of 
American multilateralism. The effects of these developments for OFDI policy 
in general, and land-consuming FDI in particular, were at the time of writing 
largely unforeseeable and at the time of publication, unpredictable. If anything, 
these constant changes underline that OFDI from a home country perspective 
remains in flux, and so do related policy paradigms. 
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l i
nv
es
t-
m
en
t f
or
 th
e 
ce
m
en
t f
ac
to
ry
 a
m
ou
nt
s 
to
 U
SD
 7
2 
m
ill
io
n.
 
A
lle
ge
dl
y,
 th
e 
fa
ct
or
y 
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n 
to
ok
 p
la
ce
 w
ith
ou
t a
 p
ri
or
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l i
m
pa
ct
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t. 
M
or
eo
ve
r, 
th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t 
co
m
m
en
ce
d 
w
ith
ou
t a
 p
ri
or
 r
es
et
tle
m
en
t o
f t
he
 2
30
 fa
m
ili
es
 
aff
ec
te
d 
by
 th
e 
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n.
 
B
y 
20
11
B
ra
ut
ig
am
 
(2
01
0,
 Ju
ne
 2
); 
D
ur
an
 2
01
2:
 
C
em
en
tc
hi
na
.
ne
t (
20
11
, M
ay
 
31
).
Z
T
E 
En
er
gy
 
Es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
in
 2
00
7,
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
fo
cu
se
s 
on
 R
&
D
 o
f b
io
-e
ne
rg
y,
 R
&
D
 
of
 e
ne
rg
y 
sa
vi
ng
 a
nd
 s
ys
te
m
 s
er
-
vi
ce
s,
 a
nd
 p
al
m
 c
ul
tiv
at
io
n 
an
d 
oi
l 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 tr
ad
e.
 I
t i
s 
a 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 
of
 th
e 
Z
T
E 
C
or
po
ra
tio
n 
(i
ts
 la
rg
es
t 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r)
, a
 S
he
nz
he
n-
ba
se
d 
co
rp
or
at
io
n 
w
ith
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
lin
ks
 to
 
th
e 
C
hi
na
 M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 A
er
os
pa
ce
.
D
em
oc
ra
tic
 
R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f 
C
on
go
3,
50
0
10
 to
 6
00
 
ha
 a
re
 
us
ed
 a
s 
an
 
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ta
l 
pl
ot
.
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
Fo
od
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
fo
r 
lo
ca
l u
se
.
P
ro
je
ct
 A
pp
ro
ac
h:
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 fa
rm
er
s 
in
 fo
od
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
 
an
d 
pl
an
tin
g 
hi
gh
 
yi
el
di
ng
 c
ro
ps
.
Z
T
E 
En
er
gy
 s
ta
rt
ed
 p
ro
du
ci
ng
 fo
od
 in
 2
00
8 
on
 a
n 
ex
pe
ri
-
m
en
ta
l p
lo
t o
f 1
0 
ha
 n
ea
r 
K
in
sh
as
a,
 in
 c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
D
R
C
 M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
. A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
co
rp
or
at
e 
w
eb
si
te
, Z
T
E 
En
er
gy
 w
as
 a
ls
o 
ac
cr
ed
ite
d 
as
 a
 s
up
pl
ie
r 
of
 th
e 
U
N
 W
or
ld
 F
oo
d 
P
ro
gr
am
m
e,
In
 2
01
0,
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 b
ec
am
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
e 
eff
or
t t
o 
re
ha
bi
lit
at
e 
D
om
ai
ne
 a
gr
op
as
to
ra
l i
nd
us
tr
ie
l d
e 
la
 N
’S
el
e 
(D
A
IP
N
), 
a 
fo
rm
er
 S
in
o-
C
on
go
le
se
 c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
pr
oj
ec
t 
da
tin
g 
ba
ck
 to
 1
97
2.
 T
he
 a
re
a 
of
 6
00
 h
a 
w
as
 g
ra
nt
ed
 fo
r 
th
e 
ne
w
 p
ro
je
ct
 b
y 
th
e 
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 in
 2
01
0.
T
he
 
pr
oj
ec
t –
 fo
cu
se
d 
on
 m
ai
ze
, s
oy
be
an
, k
id
ne
y,
 c
as
sa
va
, a
nd
 
ve
ge
ta
bl
es
 –
 w
as
 s
up
po
se
d 
to
 in
vo
lv
e 
C
hi
ne
se
 in
ve
st
or
s 
as
 
w
el
l a
s 
ot
he
r 
fo
re
ig
n 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
A
fr
ic
an
 D
ev
el
op
-
m
en
t B
an
k.
 
T
hi
s 
pr
oj
ec
t i
s 
on
e 
of
 s
ev
er
al
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l p
ro
je
ct
s 
in
 th
e 
D
R
C
 th
at
 is
 o
pe
ra
te
d 
by
 a
 s
ub
si
di
ar
y 
of
 th
e 
Z
T
E 
C
or
po
ra
-
tio
n.
20
07
B
ae
nd
e 
(2
01
0,
 
M
ar
ch
 2
9)
; 
B
ra
ec
km
an
n 
(2
00
9,
 S
ep
te
m
-
be
r)
; C
A
IT
EC
 
(2
01
0)
; Z
T
E 
En
er
gy
 (n
.d
.b
); 
Z
T
E 
En
er
gy
 
(n
.d
.a
); 
Pu
tz
el
 
an
d 
K
ab
uy
ay
a 
(2
01
1)
, 3
4-
35
; 
Z
T
E 
En
er
gy
. 
(n
.d
.c
).
Z
T
E 
A
gr
ib
us
in
es
s C
om
pa
ny
 L
td
.
T
hi
s 
co
m
pa
ny
 is
 a
 s
ub
si
di
ar
y 
of
 th
e 
Sh
en
zh
en
- b
as
ed
 Z
T
E 
C
or
po
ra
tio
n 
w
ith
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
lin
ks
 to
 th
e 
C
hi
na
 
M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 A
er
os
pa
ce
. I
t i
nv
es
ts
 in
 
ag
ri
cu
ltu
re
 a
nd
 p
al
m
 o
il 
pr
oj
ec
ts
, 
an
d 
is
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 Z
T
E 
C
or
po
ra
tio
n’
s 
de
ci
si
on
 to
 d
iv
er
si
fy
 it
s 
op
er
at
io
ns
.
D
em
oc
ra
tic
 
R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f 
C
on
go
10
0.
00
0 
25
6
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
Pa
lm
 o
il 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
fo
r 
lo
ca
l u
se
.
P
ro
je
ct
 A
pp
ro
ac
h:
P
la
nt
at
io
n.
T
he
 Z
T
E 
pr
oj
ec
t i
n 
th
e 
D
R
C
 w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
co
ns
um
ed
 u
p 
to
 
10
0.
00
0 
ha
. I
t w
as
 n
eg
ot
ia
te
d 
in
 2
00
7 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
D
R
C
 M
i-
ni
st
ry
 o
f A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 a
nd
 th
e 
Z
T
E 
C
or
po
ra
tio
n.
 I
t i
nt
en
de
d 
to
 c
on
ve
rt
 p
al
m
 o
il 
in
to
 b
io
fu
el
s,
 r
ep
or
te
dl
y 
in
 a
ba
nd
on
ed
 
pl
an
ta
tio
ns
 in
 B
an
du
nd
u 
an
d 
Eq
ua
te
ur
. H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 
pr
oj
ec
t d
id
 n
ot
 m
at
er
ia
liz
e.
 I
ns
te
ad
, a
s 
of
 2
01
3,
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
op
er
at
ed
 a
 2
56
 h
a 
fa
rm
 th
at
 p
ro
du
ce
d 
m
ai
ze
, s
oy
, m
ea
t, 
ch
ic
ke
n,
 a
nd
 e
gg
s.
 O
ffi
ci
al
ly
, t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 h
as
 s
ai
d 
th
at
 h
ig
h 
tr
an
sp
or
t c
os
ts
 m
ad
e 
th
e 
pa
lm
 o
il 
pr
oj
ec
t u
np
ro
fit
ab
le
.
N
eg
ot
ia
-
tio
ns
 in
 
20
07
B
ra
ut
ig
am
 
(2
00
9)
; B
ra
u-
tig
am
 a
nd
 
Z
ha
ng
 (2
01
3)
, 
16
86
; P
ut
ze
l 
an
d 
K
ab
uy
ay
a 
(2
01
1)
, 3
4-
35
; 
B
ei
pi
ng
. 
(2
00
9,
 Ju
ly
 1
0)
; 
K
os
w
an
a-
ge
 (2
01
1,
 
A
pr
il 
29
); 
Su
n 
(2
01
1)
, 1
5.
M
al
aw
i C
ot
to
n 
C
om
pa
ny
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 is
 a
 jo
in
t v
en
tu
re
 
of
 th
e
C
hi
na
-A
fr
ic
a 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t F
un
d 
an
d 
th
e 
Q
in
gd
ao
 R
ui
ch
an
g 
C
ot
to
n 
C
or
po
ra
tio
n.
M
al
aw
i
A
cc
es
s 
to
 
la
nd
 th
ro
ug
h 
11
0.
00
0 
ru
ra
l h
ou
se
-
ho
ld
s.
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
C
ot
to
n 
pr
od
uc
tio
n,
 in
-
cl
ud
in
g 
ag
ri
cu
ltu
re
 a
nd
 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 fo
r 
ex
po
rt
 to
 
C
hi
na
.
P
ro
je
ct
 A
pp
ro
ac
h:
C
en
tr
al
 fa
rm
in
g 
co
nt
ra
ct
 
sc
he
m
e 
(“
co
m
pa
ny
 +
 
ru
ra
l h
ou
se
ho
ld
”)
T
he
 M
al
aw
i C
ot
to
n 
C
om
pa
ny
 in
vo
lv
es
 o
ve
r 
11
0.
00
0 
ru
ra
l 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 u
nd
er
 a
 c
en
tr
al
 fa
rm
in
g 
co
nt
ra
ct
 s
ch
em
e.
 T
he
 
fa
rm
er
s 
pr
od
uc
e 
co
tt
on
, a
nd
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
in
pu
ts
 
as
 w
el
l a
s 
ta
ke
s 
th
e 
ha
rv
es
t a
nd
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
 it
 a
t a
 s
pi
nn
in
g 
an
d 
gi
nn
in
g 
pl
an
t i
n 
B
al
ak
a 
fo
r 
ex
po
rt
 to
 C
hi
na
. I
n 
20
11
, t
he
 
co
m
pa
ny
 h
ar
ve
st
ed
 c
lo
se
 to
 4
0.
00
0 
to
nn
es
 o
f c
ot
to
n.
 T
o 
en
-
su
re
 s
uffi
ci
en
t c
ot
to
n 
su
pp
ly
 fo
r 
do
m
es
tic
 g
in
ne
ri
es
, M
al
aw
i 
pu
t a
n 
ex
po
rt
 b
an
 in
 p
la
ce
 fo
r 
un
pr
oc
es
se
d 
co
tt
on
. A
t t
he
 
sa
m
e 
tim
e,
 a
 C
hi
na
 R
es
tr
ai
nt
 A
gr
ee
m
en
t w
as
 n
eg
ot
ia
te
d 
to
 
re
du
ce
 te
xt
ile
 im
po
rt
s.
20
08
C
hi
na
 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
B
an
k 
(2
01
2,
 
M
ay
 3
1)
; C
hi
-
ro
m
bo
 (2
00
9,
 
D
ec
em
be
r 
29
).
SU
K
A
LA
 S
A
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 is
 a
 C
hi
na
-M
al
i j
oi
nt
 
ve
nt
ur
e 
w
ith
 a
 7
0%
 m
aj
or
ity
 s
ta
ke
 
by
 th
e 
C
hi
ne
se
 s
ta
te
-o
w
ne
d 
C
LE
T
C
.
M
al
i
5.
00
0
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
B
io
fu
el
s 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
(e
th
an
ol
) f
or
 d
om
es
tic
 
an
d 
re
gi
on
al
 m
ar
ke
ts
 
(B
ur
ki
na
 F
as
o)
. T
he
 
m
ol
as
se
s 
is
 u
se
d 
as
 
an
im
al
 fe
ed
.
P
ro
je
ct
 A
pp
ro
ac
h:
Su
ga
r 
ca
ne
 p
la
nt
at
io
n 
an
d 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
.
T
he
 C
hi
na
-M
al
i j
oi
nt
 v
en
tu
re
 o
w
ns
 a
 s
ug
ar
ca
ne
 p
la
nt
at
io
n 
of
 a
pp
ro
xi
m
at
el
y 
5.
00
0 
ha
. I
t s
ta
rt
ed
 in
 th
e 
fo
rm
 o
f a
 d
eb
t-
eq
ui
ty
-s
w
ap
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
C
hi
ne
se
 s
ta
te
-o
w
ne
d 
co
m
pa
ny
 
C
LE
T
C
 a
nd
 th
e 
M
al
ia
n 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t. 
T
he
 a
rr
an
ge
m
en
t g
av
e 
th
e 
C
hi
ne
se
 s
id
e 
co
nt
ro
l o
ve
r 
op
er
at
io
ns
 d
ue
 to
 it
s 
m
aj
or
ity
 
st
ak
e 
(7
0%
) i
n 
th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t.
T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 d
at
es
 b
ac
k 
to
 1
99
6,
 b
ut
 it
 h
as
 c
ha
ng
ed
 s
ig
ni
fi-
ca
nt
ly
 o
ve
r 
tim
e.
 P
ri
or
 to
 th
e 
jo
in
t v
en
tu
re
 w
ith
 a
 C
hi
ne
se
 
m
aj
or
ity
 s
ta
ke
, i
t w
as
 p
ar
t o
f a
n 
ai
d 
an
d 
te
ch
ni
ca
l c
oo
pe
ra
-
tio
n 
pr
og
ra
m
 u
nd
er
 c
oo
pe
ra
tiv
e 
an
d 
tr
an
si
tio
na
l m
an
ag
e-
m
en
t. 
A
ls
o,
 p
re
cu
rs
or
 fa
ct
or
ie
s 
w
er
e 
bu
ilt
 a
nd
 r
en
ov
at
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
C
hi
ne
se
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t i
n 
th
e 
19
60
s 
an
d 
19
80
s.
19
96
D
ia
z-
C
ha
ve
z 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
0)
, 
41
, 5
0,
 5
3,
 
11
3;
 B
ax
te
r 
an
d 
M
ou
ss
ea
u 
(2
01
1)
;
N
ol
te
 a
nd
 V
o-
ge
t-K
le
sc
hi
n 
(2
01
3)
, 1
6-
17
;
W
or
ld
 T
ra
de
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
(2
00
4)
, 5
0;
 
X
in
hu
an
et
.
co
m
 (2
00
9,
 
Fe
br
ua
ry
 1
1)
.
N
-S
U
K
A
LA
 S
A
A
 C
hi
na
-M
al
i j
oi
nt
 v
en
tu
re
 c
re
at
ed
 
in
 2
00
9.
M
al
i
19
,1
42
 (l
on
g-
te
rm
 v
is
io
n 
of
 
le
as
eh
ol
d 
fo
r 
su
ga
r 
pr
od
uc
-
tio
n)
85
7 
ha
 
tit
le
d 
la
nd
 
fo
r 
fa
ct
or
y 
pr
em
is
es
 
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
Su
ga
r 
ca
ne
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
fo
r 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
(c
an
dy
).
C
om
pa
ny
 G
oa
l:
P
ro
du
ci
ng
 1
03
,6
80
 
to
nn
es
 o
f s
ug
ar
 a
nd
 9
,6
 
m
ill
io
n 
lit
er
s 
of
 e
th
an
ol
 
pe
r 
ye
ar
.
T
he
 c
re
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
, d
ed
ic
at
ed
 to
 g
ro
w
in
g 
an
d 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 s
ug
ar
 fo
r 
fo
od
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n,
 w
as
 a
pp
ro
ve
d 
by
 th
e 
M
al
ia
n 
pa
rl
ia
m
en
t i
n 
20
09
. T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 h
as
 a
 r
en
ew
ab
le
 
50
-y
ea
r 
la
nd
 le
as
e 
fo
r 
an
 a
re
a 
of
 1
9,
14
2 
ha
. T
he
 C
hi
na
 E
X
IM
 
B
an
k 
fin
an
ce
d 
th
e 
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n 
of
 a
 p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
fa
ct
or
y 
ba
-
se
d 
on
 a
 p
re
fe
re
nt
ia
l l
oa
n 
w
hi
ch
 c
ov
er
s 
le
ss
 th
an
 th
e 
ov
er
al
l 
co
st
s.
 M
ai
n 
co
m
pe
tit
or
s 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
co
m
pl
ai
ni
ng
 a
bo
ut
 th
e 
pr
ef
er
en
tia
l p
os
iti
on
 o
f t
hi
s 
ve
nt
ur
e.
 F
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e,
 
th
e 
U
S 
C
om
pa
ny
 S
ch
ae
ff
er
 h
as
 a
lle
ge
d 
th
at
 N
-S
U
K
A
LA
 S
A
 
pl
an
s 
to
 e
xp
an
d 
on
 la
nd
 o
ri
gi
na
lly
 r
es
er
ve
d 
fo
r 
Sc
ha
eff
er
 
in
 a
n 
at
te
m
pt
 to
 p
re
se
rv
e 
its
 q
ua
si
-m
on
op
ol
is
tic
 p
os
iti
on
 
in
 M
al
i. 
T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
63
9 
pe
rm
an
en
t a
nd
 1
0.
00
0 
se
as
on
al
 
jo
bs
.
20
09
D
ia
z-
C
ha
ve
z 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
0)
, 
50
, 5
3,
 1
13
; 
B
ax
te
r 
an
d 
M
ou
ss
ea
u 
(2
01
1)
;
W
ik
ile
ak
s 
(2
00
9a
); 
X
in
hu
an
et
.
co
m
 (2
00
9,
 
Fe
br
ua
ry
 1
1)
.
C
ho
ng
Q
in
g 
Se
ed
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n
T
he
 s
ta
te
-o
w
ne
d 
(m
un
ic
ip
al
) c
om
-
pa
ny
 r
un
s 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l 
de
m
on
st
ra
tio
n 
ce
nt
er
s 
th
at
 w
er
e 
an
no
un
ce
d 
du
ri
ng
 th
e 
20
06
 F
O
C
A
C
 
m
ee
tin
g.
Ta
nz
an
ia
62
-3
00
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
Fo
od
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n,
 m
os
tly
 
fo
r 
do
m
es
tic
 m
ar
ke
ts
; 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 lo
ca
l f
ar
m
er
s.
P
ro
je
ct
 A
pp
ro
ac
h:
C
en
tr
al
iz
ed
 o
ut
-g
ro
w
er
 
sc
he
m
e 
w
ith
 lo
ca
l 
fa
rm
er
s.
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 g
ro
w
s 
an
d 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
hy
br
id
 r
ic
e 
(i
ts
 o
w
n 
in
-
te
lle
ct
ua
l p
ro
pe
rt
y)
. T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
’s
 s
ee
ds
 a
re
 s
ai
d 
to
 d
ou
bl
e 
th
e 
us
ua
l o
ut
pu
t. 
So
m
e 
of
 th
e 
ri
ce
 m
ig
ht
 b
e 
so
ld
 to
 C
hi
na
. 
T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 is
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 p
ro
fit
 fr
om
 th
e 
C
hi
ne
se
 e
xp
er
ie
n-
ce
 a
nd
 b
oo
st
 th
e 
Ta
nz
an
ia
n 
ag
ri
cu
ltu
ra
l d
ev
el
op
m
en
t.
20
06
C
hi
na
D
ai
ly
.
co
m
.c
n 
(2
00
8,
 
M
ay
 1
7)
; T
an
z-
an
ia
n 
A
ff
ai
rs
 
(n
.d
.);
 M
os
hi
 
an
d 
M
ut
ui
 
(2
00
8)
, 5
-7
.
In
te
rg
ov
er
nm
en
ta
l A
gr
ee
m
en
t
T
he
 tw
o 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
al
le
ge
dl
y 
si
gn
ed
 
an
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t s
tip
ul
at
in
g 
th
at
 C
hi
na
 
w
ou
ld
 d
el
iv
er
 fe
rt
ili
ze
rs
 a
nd
 p
ro
vi
de
 
ot
he
r 
fo
rm
s 
of
 a
ss
is
ta
nc
e,
 w
hi
le
 
Se
ne
ga
l w
ou
ld
 g
ro
w
 p
ea
nu
ts
 fo
r 
ex
po
rt
 to
 C
hi
na
.
Se
ne
ga
l
10
0.
00
0
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
Fo
od
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n.
It
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
re
po
rt
ed
 th
at
 th
e 
fa
rm
er
s’
 a
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
of
 S
en
eg
al
 
or
ga
ni
ze
s 
th
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
of
 p
ea
nu
ts
 o
n 
10
0.
00
0 
ha
, w
ith
 
30
%
 o
f t
he
 y
ie
ld
 to
 b
e 
sh
ip
pe
d 
to
 C
hi
na
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
st
 p
ro
ce
s-
se
d 
at
 lo
ca
l f
ac
to
ri
es
. I
t s
ho
ul
d 
be
 n
ot
ed
 th
at
 w
hi
le
 C
hi
na
 
im
po
rt
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
m
ou
nt
s 
of
 p
ea
nu
ts
 fr
om
 S
en
eg
al
, t
he
 
de
ta
ils
 o
f t
hi
s 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 c
as
e 
ha
s 
no
t b
ee
n 
co
nfi
rm
ed
.
Sm
al
le
r 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
2)
, 1
6;
 
C
hi
na
 D
SI
C
 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
Tr
ad
e 
C
o.
 L
td
. 
(2
01
4)
; T
he
 
Ja
pa
n 
Ti
m
es
 
(2
01
3,
 M
ar
ch
 
26
).
D
at
on
g 
En
te
rp
ri
se
s
T
he
 p
ri
va
te
 C
hi
ne
se
 c
om
pa
ny
 in
ve
s-
te
d 
in
 s
es
am
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n.
Se
ne
ga
l
35
.0
00
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
Fo
od
 (s
es
am
e)
 p
ro
du
c-
tio
n 
fo
r 
ex
po
rt
 to
 C
hi
na
, 
La
tin
 A
m
er
ic
a,
 a
nd
 
Eu
ro
pe
.
P
ro
je
ct
 A
pp
ro
ac
h:
O
ut
-g
ro
w
er
 s
ch
em
e 
ev
en
tu
al
ly
 in
vo
lv
in
g 
up
 
to
 2
00
.0
00
 p
eo
pl
e.
T
he
 C
hi
ne
se
 p
ri
va
te
 c
om
pa
ny
 a
nn
ou
nc
ed
 p
la
ns
 to
 in
ve
st
 
U
SD
 5
 m
ill
io
n 
an
d 
pr
od
uc
e 
15
0.
00
0 
to
nn
es
 o
f s
es
am
e 
pe
r 
ye
ar
. I
t i
s 
no
t c
le
ar
 w
he
th
er
 th
os
e 
pl
an
s 
ca
m
e 
to
 fr
ui
tio
n.
 
It
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
re
po
rt
ed
 th
at
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 r
ec
ei
ve
d 
cr
ed
it 
fr
om
 
C
ai
ss
e 
N
at
io
na
le
 a
nd
 s
ub
si
di
es
 fr
om
 th
e 
Se
ne
ga
le
se
 s
ta
te
, 
an
d 
th
at
 th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t i
s 
pa
rt
 o
f t
he
 S
en
eg
al
es
e 
G
ro
w
th
 P
la
n 
(“
G
O
A
N
A”
). 
T
hi
s 
pl
an
 r
es
ul
te
d 
fr
om
 th
e 
fo
od
 c
ri
si
s,
 a
nd
 it
 
in
cl
ud
es
 th
e 
pr
om
ot
io
n 
of
 fo
re
ig
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 a
gr
ic
ul
-
tu
re
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
fr
ee
 r
ep
at
ri
at
io
n 
of
 p
ro
fit
 a
nd
 ta
x 
br
ea
ks
. 
A
lle
ge
dl
y,
 th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t f
ac
ed
 p
ro
bl
em
s 
be
ca
us
e 
fa
rm
er
s 
so
ld
 
th
ei
r 
ha
rv
es
t t
o 
ot
he
r 
bu
ye
rs
 a
t a
 b
et
te
r 
pr
ic
e.
 
20
08
Sm
al
le
r 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
2)
, 1
7;
 
Le
w
is
 (2
00
9,
 
Fe
br
ua
ry
 
11
); 
A
id
da
ta
.
or
g 
(n
.d
.a
); 
Pe
op
le
’s
 D
ai
ly
 
(2
00
9,
 F
eb
ru
a-
ry
 2
0)
.
Jo
nk
en
 F
ar
m
T
he
 fo
rm
er
 fr
ie
nd
sh
ip
 fa
rm
 is
 o
pe
-
ra
te
d 
by
 J
ia
ng
su
 A
gr
ic
or
p 
(J
ia
ng
su
 
St
at
e 
Fa
rm
s 
G
ro
up
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n)
 
an
d 
Z
ho
ng
gu
o 
A
gr
ic
or
p 
(C
hi
na
 
N
at
io
na
l A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
G
ro
up
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n)
 s
in
ce
 2
00
3.
Z
am
bi
a
3,
50
0
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
Fo
od
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
(c
ro
ps
, 
hu
sb
an
dr
y,
 a
ni
m
al
 b
re
e-
di
ng
) f
or
 lo
ca
l m
ar
ke
ts
.
T
he
 C
hi
ne
se
 p
ro
je
ct
 in
 Z
am
bi
a 
em
pl
oy
s 
20
0 
pe
op
le
. T
he
 
pr
oj
ec
t d
at
es
 b
ac
k 
to
 1
99
4,
 w
he
n 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 b
eg
an
 to
 
re
ha
bi
lit
at
e 
a 
fo
rm
er
 C
hi
na
-Z
am
bi
a 
fr
ie
nd
sh
ip
 fa
rm
. T
he
 
fa
rm
 w
as
 a
n 
as
si
st
an
ce
 p
ro
je
ct
, b
ut
 it
 w
as
 p
ri
va
tiz
ed
 in
 
19
90
 b
ec
au
se
 it
 w
as
 n
ot
 e
co
no
m
ic
al
ly
 v
ia
bl
e.
 S
in
ce
 2
00
3,
 
Ji
an
gs
u 
A
gr
ic
or
p 
(J
ia
ng
su
 S
ta
te
 F
ar
m
s 
G
ro
up
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n)
 
an
d 
Z
ho
ng
gu
o 
A
gr
ic
or
p 
(C
hi
na
 N
at
io
na
l A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t G
ro
up
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n)
 n
ow
 h
ol
d 
40
%
 a
nd
 6
0%
 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y 
of
 th
e 
Fr
ie
nd
sh
ip
 F
ar
m
. 
19
94
/2
00
3
M
w
an
aw
i-
na
 (2
00
8)
; 
Fr
ee
m
an
 e
t 
al
. (
20
08
), 
17
; 
Li
u 
(n
.d
.),
 1
-2
, 
12
-1
4;
 C
hi
na
 
N
at
io
na
l 
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
G
ro
up
 C
or
po
-
ra
tio
n 
(n
.d
.).
 
C
hi
pa
ta
 C
ot
to
n 
C
om
pa
ny
 
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 (n
ow
 th
e 
C
hi
na
 A
fr
ic
a 
C
ot
to
n 
C
om
pa
ny
) i
s 
a 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 o
f 
Q
in
gd
ao
 N
ew
 T
ex
til
es
 L
td
, a
 C
hi
ne
se
 
SO
E 
th
at
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
pr
es
en
t i
n 
Z
am
-
bi
a 
si
nc
e 
20
04
.
Z
am
bi
a
2,
50
0 
co
nt
ra
ct
 
fa
rm
er
s,
 
w
ith
 a
 v
is
io
n 
of
 2
0.
00
0 
co
nt
ra
ct
 
fa
rm
er
s
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
C
ot
to
n 
pr
od
uc
tio
n.
P
ro
je
ct
 A
pp
ro
ac
h:
In
te
rm
ed
ia
te
 c
on
tr
ac
t 
fa
rm
in
g,
 w
hi
ch
 in
vo
lv
es
 
th
re
e 
ac
to
r 
gr
ou
ps
, i
.e
. 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
, t
he
 a
ge
nt
, 
an
d 
th
e 
fa
rm
er
.
T
he
 C
hi
pa
ta
 C
ot
to
n 
w
as
 r
en
am
ed
 in
to
 th
e 
C
hi
na
 A
fr
ic
a 
C
ot
to
n 
C
om
pa
ny
, f
ol
lo
w
in
g 
a 
20
08
 in
ve
st
m
en
t b
y 
th
e 
C
hi
na
 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t B
an
k.
 I
t i
s 
a 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 o
f Q
in
gd
ao
 N
ew
 T
ex
-
til
es
 L
td
., 
w
hi
ch
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
op
er
at
in
g 
in
 Z
am
bi
a 
si
nc
e 
20
04
. 
O
ri
gi
na
lly
, o
nl
y 
2,
50
0 
ou
t o
f t
he
 e
nv
is
io
ne
d 
20
.0
00
 c
on
tr
ac
t 
fa
rm
er
s 
w
er
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
.
T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 is
 o
ne
 o
f s
ev
er
al
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 b
y 
th
e 
C
hi
ne
se
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 in
 th
e 
Z
am
bi
an
 c
ot
to
n 
se
ct
or
. T
he
se
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
ha
ve
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n 
in
 th
is
 s
ec
to
r.1
 T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 c
on
-
fo
rm
s 
w
el
l w
ith
 th
e 
pl
an
s 
of
 Q
in
gd
ao
 p
ro
vi
nc
e 
to
 u
pg
ra
de
 
its
 d
om
es
tic
 te
xt
ile
 in
du
st
ry
.
C
hi
na
 
D
ev
el
op
-
m
en
t B
an
k 
(2
01
2,
 M
ay
 
31
); 
C
hi
ne
se
 
Em
ba
ss
y 
in
 
th
e 
R
ep
ub
lic
 
of
 Z
am
bi
a 
(2
01
3,
 S
ep
te
m
-
be
r 
10
); 
P
hi
ri
 
(2
01
3,
 S
ep
-
te
m
be
r 
11
); 
Sc
ho
ne
ve
ld
 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
4)
, 
25
-2
7;
 T
im
es
 
of
 Z
am
bi
a 
(2
00
4,
 Ju
ne
 
14
); 
Ts
ch
ir
le
y 
an
d 
K
ab
w
e 
(2
00
9)
; W
an
g 
(2
01
4,
 Ju
ne
 
30
); 
Pe
de
rs
en
 
(2
00
9)
.
SU
C
O
C
O
M
A
T
he
 C
hi
ne
se
 s
ta
te
-o
w
ne
d 
co
m
pa
ny
, 
C
om
pl
an
t, 
a 
w
ho
lly
-o
w
ne
d 
su
bs
id
ia
-
ry
 o
f t
he
 s
ta
te
-o
w
ne
d 
St
at
e 
In
ve
st
-
m
en
t a
nd
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t C
or
po
ra
tio
n 
(S
D
IC
). 
SD
IC
 r
el
ie
s 
on
 C
om
pl
an
t 
to
 im
pl
em
en
t C
hi
ne
se
 fo
re
ig
n 
co
-
op
er
at
io
n 
pr
og
ra
m
s,
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 in
 
th
e 
ar
ea
 o
f c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n.
 
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
un
cl
ea
r
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
La
nd
 r
es
to
ra
tio
n,
 a
nd
 
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n 
of
 a
 s
ug
ar
 
re
fin
er
y
It
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
re
po
rt
ed
 th
at
 S
U
C
O
C
O
M
A
’s
 p
ro
je
ct
 r
ev
ol
ve
d 
ar
ou
nd
 r
es
to
ri
ng
 ir
ri
ga
te
d 
la
nd
 fo
rm
er
ly
 u
se
d 
by
 a
 s
ta
te
-o
w
-
ne
d 
su
ga
r 
co
m
pa
ny
 fo
r 
su
ga
r 
ca
se
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n.
 T
he
 c
ur
re
nt
 
st
at
us
 o
f t
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 is
 u
nc
le
ar
. H
ow
ev
er
, a
 c
ab
le
 fr
om
 th
e 
U
.S
. E
m
ba
ss
y 
in
 A
nt
an
an
ar
iv
o,
 a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
co
rp
or
at
e 
in
fo
r-
m
at
io
n,
 s
ug
ge
st
s 
th
at
 th
e 
C
hi
ne
se
 S
O
E 
C
om
pl
an
t m
an
ag
es
 
tw
o 
su
ga
r 
re
fin
er
ie
s 
in
 A
m
bi
lo
be
 a
nd
 
N
am
ak
ia
 s
in
ce
 2
00
8,
 u
nd
er
 a
 tw
en
ty
-y
ea
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
co
nt
ra
ct
. C
om
pl
an
t a
ls
o 
bu
ilt
 a
 s
ug
ar
 r
efi
ne
ry
 in
 M
or
on
da
va
, 
fin
an
ce
d 
by
 th
e 
C
hi
ne
se
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t. 
W
hi
le
 th
is
 w
as
 tu
rn
ed
 
ov
er
 to
 th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t o
f M
ad
ag
as
ca
r 
in
 2
00
8,
 C
om
pl
an
t 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
to
 m
an
ag
e 
op
er
at
io
ns
 in
 2
01
2.
Ü
lle
nb
er
g 
(2
00
9)
; W
ik
i-
le
ak
s 
(2
01
0b
); 
C
om
pl
an
t 
(n
.d
.);
 S
D
IC
 
(n
.d
.);
 S
D
IC
 
(n
.d
.a
); 
To
ss
a 
(2
01
2,
 A
ug
us
t 
25
). 
V
is
co
un
t E
ne
rg
y
O
ffi
ci
al
ly
, t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 p
re
se
nt
s 
its
el
f a
s 
a 
“C
hi
ne
se
 s
up
po
rt
ed
 
N
ig
er
ia
n 
fir
m
.”
N
ig
er
ia
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
B
io
fu
el
 
fa
ct
or
y 
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n.
In
 2
00
6,
 th
e 
Eb
on
yi
 S
ta
te
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t a
nd
 th
e 
C
hi
ne
se
 
co
m
pa
ny
 s
ig
ne
d 
a 
M
oU
 a
bo
ut
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
a 
fa
ct
or
y 
fo
r 
pr
od
uc
in
g 
bi
of
ue
l. 
T
he
 fa
ct
or
y 
w
as
 b
ui
lt 
as
 a
 tu
rn
ke
y 
pr
oj
ec
t 
by
 T
ia
nj
in
 E
ne
rg
y 
R
es
ou
rc
es
 L
td
., 
a 
C
hi
ne
se
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
co
m
pa
ny
. 
T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 b
y 
V
is
co
un
t E
ne
rg
y 
is
 in
te
nd
ed
 to
 im
pr
ov
e 
do
m
es
tic
 e
ne
rg
y 
se
cu
ri
ty
. H
ow
ev
er
, w
hi
le
 it
 m
at
ch
es
 
N
ig
er
ia
’s
 N
at
io
na
l B
io
fu
el
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t P
ol
ic
y,
 th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t i
s 
pr
ob
le
m
at
ic
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 fo
od
 s
ec
ur
ity
 a
nd
 (t
he
 la
ck
in
g)
 la
nd
 
us
e 
ra
tio
na
le
. T
he
 e
th
an
ol
 p
la
nt
 in
te
nd
s 
to
 p
ro
du
ce
 2
0.
00
0 
ga
llo
ns
 o
f e
th
an
ol
 p
er
 y
ea
r, 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
in
pu
t o
f 1
50
.0
00
 
to
nn
es
 o
f a
 m
ix
 o
f c
as
sa
va
 a
nd
 s
ug
ar
 c
an
e.
20
06
B
io
pa
ct
 (2
00
6,
 
A
ug
us
t 1
4)
; 
Is
ig
uz
o 
(2
00
6,
 
A
ug
us
t 2
8)
; 
R
ot
hk
op
f 
(2
00
7)
, 3
36
; 
O
ye
ra
nt
i e
t a
l. 
(2
01
0)
; M
cD
o-
w
el
l (
20
12
).
H
eb
ei
 H
an
he
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t C
om
pa
ny
 
T
hi
s 
is
 a
 s
ta
te
-o
w
ne
d 
pr
ov
in
ci
al
 
co
m
pa
ny
.
U
ga
nd
a
 1
7.
00
0 
(1
0-
ye
ar
 
ta
rg
et
)
17
3
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
Fo
od
 (m
ai
ze
, r
ic
e,
 v
eg
e-
ta
bl
es
) p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
fo
r 
lo
ca
l a
nd
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
m
ar
ke
ts
.
T
he
 H
eb
ei
 C
om
pa
ny
’s
 1
0-
ye
ar
 ta
rg
et
 is
 to
 d
ev
el
op
 a
ro
un
d 
17
.0
00
 h
a.
 I
n 
20
10
, i
t w
as
 g
ro
w
in
g 
m
ai
ze
, v
eg
et
ab
le
s,
 a
nd
 
tr
ee
s 
on
 th
e 
to
ta
l a
re
a 
of
 o
nl
y 
17
3 
ha
. H
eb
ei
 H
an
he
 I
nv
es
t-
m
en
t C
om
pa
ny
 h
as
 s
ta
rt
ed
 in
 U
ga
nd
a 
in
 2
00
9.
20
09
W
an
g 
(2
01
1,
 
O
ct
ob
er
 1
0)
; 
A
id
da
ta
.o
rg
 
(n
.d
.b
).
C
hi
na
 I
nt
er
na
tio
na
l W
at
er
 a
nd
 
El
ec
tr
ic
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n
T
he
 s
ta
te
-o
w
ne
d 
co
m
pa
ny
 is
 
at
ta
ch
ed
 to
 th
e 
C
hi
ne
se
 M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 
C
om
m
er
ce
.
Z
im
ba
bw
e
10
0.
00
0
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
Ir
ri
ga
tio
n 
sy
st
em
 c
on
s-
tr
uc
tio
n.
 
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
’s
 c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t o
f Z
im
-
ba
bw
e 
w
as
 n
ot
 s
uc
ce
ss
fu
l, 
an
d 
th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t n
ev
er
 g
ot
 o
ff
 th
e 
gr
ou
nd
. I
ni
tia
lly
, t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 h
ad
 b
ee
n 
ap
pr
oa
ch
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
Z
im
ba
bw
ea
n 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t t
o 
bu
ild
 a
n 
ir
ri
ga
tio
n 
sy
st
em
 a
nd
 
bo
os
t a
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n.
 I
n 
th
e 
pr
oc
es
s 
of
 im
pl
em
en
-
tin
g 
th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t, 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 d
is
co
nt
in
ue
d 
its
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
du
e 
to
 p
ol
iti
ca
l d
iffi
cu
lti
es
.
T
he
 H
er
al
d 
(2
01
3,
 
D
ec
em
be
r 
4)
; S
W
 R
ad
io
 
A
fr
ic
a 
(2
00
3,
 
A
ug
us
t 1
).
SU
C
O
B
E 
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 is
 a
n 
affi
lia
te
 o
f 
C
O
M
P
LA
N
T
, a
 C
hi
ne
se
 S
O
E.
 
C
O
M
P
LA
N
T
 is
 a
 w
ho
lly
-o
w
ne
d 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 o
f t
he
 s
ta
te
-o
w
ne
d 
St
at
e 
In
ve
st
m
en
t a
nd
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t C
or
po
ra
-
tio
n 
(S
D
IC
).
B
en
in
4,
80
0
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
B
io
fu
el
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
(e
th
an
ol
) f
or
 e
xp
or
t t
o 
Eu
ro
pe
.
P
ro
je
ct
 A
pp
ro
ac
h:
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 u
se
s 
su
ga
r 
ca
ne
 fr
om
 it
s 
ow
n 
la
nd
 
pl
ot
, p
lu
s 
ca
ss
av
a 
fr
om
 
lo
ca
l f
ar
m
er
s 
in
 th
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
of
 b
io
fu
el
s.
Si
nc
e 
20
03
, S
U
C
O
B
E 
ru
ns
 th
e 
Sa
vé
 F
ac
to
ry
, w
hi
ch
 w
as
 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
in
 1
97
3 
by
 B
en
in
 a
nd
 N
ig
er
ia
. A
ft
er
 a
 p
er
io
d 
of
 m
is
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 e
co
no
m
ic
 c
ri
si
s,
 th
e 
fa
ct
or
y 
ha
d 
un
de
rg
on
e 
se
ve
ra
l m
an
ag
em
en
t c
ha
ng
es
. T
he
 fa
ct
or
y 
pr
od
uc
es
 a
nd
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
 s
ug
ar
 c
an
e 
in
to
 s
ug
ar
 a
nd
 a
lc
oh
ol
. 
It
 e
m
pl
oy
s 
ap
pr
ox
. 5
.0
00
 w
or
ke
rs
, o
f w
hi
ch
 4
,6
37
 a
re
 c
as
ua
l 
an
d 
se
as
on
al
 w
or
ke
rs
, m
os
tly
 w
om
en
. T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 r
el
ie
s 
on
 e
xt
er
na
l h
ar
ve
st
s 
to
 c
om
pl
em
en
t i
ts
 o
w
n 
ag
ri
cu
ltu
ra
l o
ut
-
pu
t. 
In
 a
dd
iti
on
 to
 th
e 
su
ga
r 
ca
ne
 p
ro
du
ce
d 
on
 4
,8
00
 h
a 
of
 
la
nd
, w
hi
ch
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 is
 le
as
in
g 
fo
r 
99
 y
ea
rs
 (r
en
ew
ab
le
), 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 u
se
s 
ca
ss
av
a 
bo
ug
ht
 fr
om
 lo
ca
l f
ar
m
er
s 
fo
r 
its
 
pl
an
t o
pe
ra
tio
n.
 A
s 
a 
re
su
lt,
 th
er
e 
ha
s 
be
en
 a
 c
as
sa
va
 p
ri
ce
 
hi
ke
 in
 B
en
in
.
SU
C
O
B
E 
C
om
pa
ny
 in
 B
en
in
 is
 a
n 
affi
lia
te
 o
f t
he
 C
hi
ne
se
 
SO
E 
C
O
M
P
LA
N
T.
 
20
03
N
on
fo
dj
i 
(2
01
1)
; T
os
sa
 
(2
01
2,
 A
ug
us
t 
25
).
Sp
ec
ia
l E
co
no
m
ic
 Z
on
e 
(S
EZ
)
T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 is
 h
ea
de
d 
by
 th
e 
Ta
iy
ua
n 
Ir
on
 &
 S
te
el
 G
ro
up
, t
he
 S
ha
nx
i 
G
ro
up
, a
nd
 th
e 
Ti
an
li 
G
ro
up
.
M
au
ri
tiu
s
20
0-
50
0
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
B
ui
ld
 a
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 
hu
b 
in
 th
e 
fo
rm
 o
f a
 
Sp
ec
ia
l E
co
no
m
ic
 Z
on
e,
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
lig
ht
 in
du
st
ri
-
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s,
 m
ed
ic
in
es
, 
te
xt
ile
s,
 a
nd
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
cs
.
N
eg
ot
ia
tio
ns
 b
eg
an
 in
 2
00
7,
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t i
n 
20
09
, a
nd
 
co
m
pl
et
io
n 
is
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
in
 2
01
6.
 C
om
pr
is
in
g 
an
 a
re
a 
of
 2
00
 
to
 5
00
 h
a,
 th
is
 S
EZ
 is
 h
ea
de
d 
by
 C
hi
ne
se
 c
om
pa
ni
es
. I
t i
s 
in
te
nd
ed
 to
 b
ec
om
e 
a 
m
aj
or
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
 h
ub
 fo
r 
C
hi
ne
se
 
lig
ht
 in
du
st
ri
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s,
 m
ed
ic
in
es
, t
ex
til
es
, a
nd
 e
le
ct
ro
-
ni
cs
. I
t i
s 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 to
 a
cc
om
m
od
at
e 
40
 C
hi
ne
se
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 
an
d 
cr
ea
te
 3
4.
00
0 
jo
bs
, o
f w
hi
ch
 8
.0
00
 w
ill
 b
e 
gi
ve
n 
to
 C
hi
-
ne
se
 c
on
tr
ac
to
rs
. T
he
 S
EZ
 is
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 g
en
er
at
e 
U
SD
 2
20
 
m
ill
io
n 
th
ro
ug
h 
ex
po
rt
s 
an
d 
to
 a
tt
ra
ct
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 w
or
th
 
U
SD
 7
50
 m
ill
io
n.
 O
n 
a 
gl
ob
al
 s
ca
le
, C
hi
na
 p
la
ns
 to
 b
ui
ld
 5
0 
Sp
ec
ia
l E
co
no
m
ic
 Z
on
es
.
B
y 
20
09
A
lv
es
 (2
01
1)
; 
B
ra
ut
ig
am
 
an
d 
Ta
ng
 
(2
01
1)
; D
w
in
-
ge
r 
(2
01
0,
 
A
ug
us
t 2
).
aPPendix b: briTish invesTmenTs in africa     
(22 invesTiGaTed ProjecTs)
C
om
pa
ny
R
ec
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ie
nt
 C
ou
nt
ry
Si
ze
 (h
a)
Pu
rp
os
e,
 A
pp
ro
ac
h,
 
an
d 
G
oa
l
P
ro
je
ct
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
Ti
m
el
in
es
So
ur
ce
s
A
nn
ou
n-
ce
d
A
cq
ui
re
d
U
nd
er
 
P
ro
du
c-
tio
n
P
ro
je
ct
A
nn
ou
nc
ed
 
La
nd
Tr
an
sf
er
H
ar
ve
st
Su
nB
io
fu
el
s (
SB
F)
 
SB
F 
is
 a
 U
K
-b
as
ed
 c
om
pa
ny
 
w
ith
 s
ev
er
al
 s
ub
si
di
ar
ie
s 
ac
ro
ss
 
A
fr
ic
a.
 I
t w
as
 e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
in
 
20
05
. I
n 
20
08
, i
t c
am
e 
un
de
r 
m
aj
or
ity
 c
on
tr
ol
 (s
ha
re
ho
ld
in
g)
 
of
 T
ra
di
ng
 E
m
is
si
on
s P
lc
. (
T
E)
, a
 
ca
rb
on
 tr
ad
in
g 
fu
nd
 m
an
ag
ed
 
by
 E
EA
 F
un
d 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Lt
d.
 I
n 
20
11
, S
B
F 
w
en
t i
nt
o 
ad
-
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n,
 a
nd
 it
s 
op
er
at
io
ns
 
w
er
e 
cl
os
ed
 o
r 
so
ld
 o
ff
 to
 
in
ve
st
or
s.
Et
hi
op
ia
80
.0
00
 
5.
00
0 
1.
00
0 
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
: 
P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 b
io
di
es
el
, u
si
ng
 
Ja
tr
op
ha
 (o
ri
gi
na
lly
 o
n 
m
ar
gi
na
l l
an
d,
 
la
te
r 
on
 p
ri
m
e 
la
nd
).
P
ro
je
ct
 A
pp
ro
ac
h:
P
la
nt
at
io
n 
an
d 
ou
tg
ro
w
er
 s
ch
em
e.
C
om
pa
ny
 G
oa
l:
SB
F:
 to
 b
ec
om
e 
th
e 
la
rg
es
t p
ro
vi
de
r 
of
 b
io
fu
el
, fi
rs
t f
or
 e
xp
or
t m
ar
ke
ts
, 
la
te
r 
fo
r 
th
e 
A
fr
ic
an
 m
ar
ke
t.
T
E:
 to
 p
ro
fit
 fr
om
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 m
i-
tig
at
io
n 
po
lic
y 
by
 p
ro
du
ci
ng
 “
cl
ea
n”
 
an
d 
re
ne
w
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y.
In
 2
00
5,
 S
B
F 
si
gn
ed
 a
 le
as
e 
w
ith
 B
en
sh
an
gu
l G
um
uz
 
R
eg
io
na
l S
ta
te
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t f
or
 8
0.
00
0 
ha
 a
nd
 p
ur
ch
as
ed
 
80
%
 o
f N
at
io
na
l B
io
fu
el
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n 
(E
th
io
pi
a)
 to
 s
tr
en
gt
he
n 
pr
es
en
ce
 in
 E
th
io
pi
a.
 S
B
F 
w
as
 a
ls
o 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
e 
dr
af
tin
g 
of
 th
e 
Et
hi
op
ia
n 
B
io
fu
el
s 
St
ra
te
gy
. 
SB
F 
Et
hi
op
ia
 w
as
 n
ot
 e
co
no
m
ic
al
ly
 v
ia
bl
e 
du
e 
to
 p
oo
r 
so
il 
co
nd
iti
on
s,
 li
m
ite
d 
se
ed
 in
pu
t, 
an
d 
th
e 
la
ck
 o
f t
hi
rd
 p
ar
ty
 
fin
an
ce
 (i
n 
ad
di
tio
n 
to
 T
E)
. T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 u
se
d 
se
ed
 in
pu
t 
fr
om
 D
1O
ils
 (U
K
) a
nd
 D
ili
ge
nt
 T
an
za
ni
a 
Lt
d.
 (t
he
 D
ut
ch
 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 u
se
s 
3,
50
0 
ha
 th
ro
ug
h 
ou
tg
ro
w
er
 s
ch
em
e 
to
 
pr
od
uc
e 
se
ed
s 
fo
r 
pl
an
tin
g)
.
SB
F 
w
en
t i
nt
o 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n 
in
 2
01
1,
 w
he
n 
T
E,
 it
s 
m
aj
or
ity
 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r, 
de
ni
ed
 it
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 fu
nd
s.
 I
t i
s 
un
cl
ea
r 
w
ha
t 
ha
pp
en
ed
 to
 th
e 
Et
hi
op
ia
n 
op
er
at
io
n 
of
 S
B
F.
20
05
 
20
05
B
er
gi
us
 
(S
ep
te
m
be
r 
20
12
); 
Tr
ad
in
g 
Em
is
si
on
s 
P
lc
. 
(2
00
8)
; T
ra
di
ng
 
Em
is
si
on
s 
P
lc
 
(2
01
1)
, 7
; H
aw
-
ki
ns
 a
nd
 C
he
n 
(2
01
1)
, 2
9-
30
; 
So
so
ve
le
 (2
01
0)
, 
12
0;
 T
ra
di
ng
 
Em
is
si
on
s 
P
lc
 
(2
00
9)
.
Ta
nz
an
ia
8-
9.
00
0 
2.
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0 
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F 
Ta
nz
an
ia
 n
eg
ot
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te
d 
a 
99
-y
ea
r 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t-b
ac
ke
d 
le
as
e 
in
 2
00
6.
 T
he
 8
-9
.0
00
 h
a 
w
er
e 
sp
re
ad
 o
ve
r 
11
 v
ill
ag
es
 w
ith
 
11
,2
00
 p
eo
pl
e.
 T
hi
s 
la
nd
 w
as
 fo
rm
er
ly
 u
se
d 
by
 c
ha
rc
oa
l 
m
ak
er
s 
an
d 
al
so
 in
cl
ud
ed
 a
 s
w
am
p 
ar
ea
 im
po
rt
an
t f
or
 lo
ca
l 
w
at
er
 s
ec
ur
ity
. T
he
 a
ff
ec
te
d 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
w
as
 p
ro
m
is
ed
 a
 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
of
 U
SD
 2
50
 p
er
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
.
A
ft
er
 S
B
F 
w
en
t i
nt
o 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n,
 th
e 
Ta
nz
an
ia
n 
su
b-
si
di
ar
y 
w
as
 s
ol
d 
to
 L
io
n’
s 
H
ea
d 
G
lo
ba
l P
ar
tn
er
s 
(i
n 
20
11
). 
T
he
re
 h
av
e 
be
en
 a
lle
ga
tio
ns
 th
at
 th
is
 c
om
pa
ny
 o
nl
y 
em
pl
oy
s 
50
 o
f t
he
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
70
0 
w
or
ke
rs
, a
nd
 th
at
 it
 h
as
 a
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ta
in
ed
 
fr
om
 a
dd
re
ss
in
g 
th
e 
pr
ob
le
m
 o
f t
he
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co
m
pl
et
e 
pr
oc
es
s 
of
 
co
m
pe
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at
in
g 
th
e 
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ec
te
d 
po
pu
la
tio
n.
20
06
B
er
gi
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 (S
ep
-
te
m
be
r 
20
12
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3;
 H
aw
ki
ns
 a
nd
 
C
he
n 
(2
01
1)
, 
29
-3
0,
 8
8,
 9
6,
 
19
6.
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e
4,
85
4 
pl
us
 
tw
o 
fa
rm
s 
of
 
60
7 
ha
 a
nd
 
ad
di
tio
na
l 
3.
00
0 
ha
 
un
de
r 
ne
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-
tia
tio
n
2,
31
0 
SB
F 
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e 
se
cu
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d 
la
nd
 u
nd
er
 a
 5
0-
ye
ar
 D
U
A
T
 
le
as
e 
th
at
 w
as
 b
ac
ke
d 
by
 th
e 
ho
st
 g
ov
er
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en
t. 
T
he
 la
nd
 is
 
co
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id
er
ed
 to
 b
e 
of
 p
ri
m
e 
qu
al
ity
 r
eg
ar
di
ng
 th
e 
co
m
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na
tio
n 
of
 c
lim
at
e,
 lo
ca
tio
n,
 s
oi
l q
ua
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y,
 a
nd
 in
fr
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tr
uc
tu
re
. T
he
 
co
m
pa
ny
 a
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o 
si
gn
ed
 a
 M
oU
 to
 s
up
pl
y 
th
e 
st
at
e-
ow
ne
d 
en
te
rp
ri
se
 P
et
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le
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 d
e 
M
oç
am
bi
qu
e 
SA
 w
ith
 J
at
ro
ph
a 
cr
ud
e 
oi
l, 
an
d 
it 
pl
an
ne
d 
to
 e
xp
or
t b
io
fu
el
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 E
ur
op
e 
an
d 
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di
a.
 I
n 
20
10
, c
ru
de
 o
il 
w
as
 s
ol
d 
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O
P
 H
ou
st
on
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ex
pe
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m
en
ts
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tio
n 
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; a
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1,
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 lo
t o
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es
 o
f b
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w
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 s
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to
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r 
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.
A
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er
 S
B
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w
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at
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1,
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M
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-
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e 
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ry
 w
as
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to
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ur
y 
Fi
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e.
 T
hi
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ro
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ct
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
nd
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ve
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m
en
t a
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is
or
y 
fir
m
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ou
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 in
 
20
04
, t
ha
t f
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 o
n 
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lte
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at
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e 
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ve
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m
en
t o
pp
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tu
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s.
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T
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 n
ew
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ve
st
or
 c
la
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s 
to
 h
av
e 
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f t
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 to
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l a
re
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4 
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) u
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pe
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tio
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 p
ro
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H
ig
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H
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C
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B
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el
s 
M
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e 
(2
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K
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 b
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er
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m
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pe
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s 
pl
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ns
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 a
nd
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w
er
 p
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U
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 r
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at
ed
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G
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P
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P
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f b
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 c
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ny
 h
as
 le
as
ed
 a
 5
0.
00
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 p
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w
 
Ja
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 s
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ur
in
g 
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. I
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d 
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k 
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m
en
t w
ith
 J
at
ro
ph
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A
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a 
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 c
ur
re
nt
 s
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f o
pe
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tio
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 is
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le
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 c
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aj
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at
ro
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A
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ic
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 a
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w
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m
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in
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 b
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B
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Z
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 1
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ve
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T
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 c
om
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 b
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n 
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t i
n 
G
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er
at
ed
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 p
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n 
fr
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G
ha
na
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0
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
P
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io
n 
of
 p
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m
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U
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le
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G
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ra
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 in
 1
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ro
ug
h 
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e 
ho
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 g
ov
er
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en
t’s
 d
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ur
e 
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og
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m
. I
n 
20
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, U
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le
ve
r 
so
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 it
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m
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ity
 s
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re
 in
 th
e 
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20
0 
ha
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so
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il 
P
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nt
at
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 (w
hi
ch
 is
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ed
 o
n 
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e 
G
ha
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 S
to
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 E
xc
ha
ng
e,
 a
nd
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n 
w
hi
ch
 m
or
e 
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.0
00
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op
le
’s
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ve
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 d
ep
en
d)
 to
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ilm
ar
 A
fr
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a.
N
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 (2
01
0)
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tr
op
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fr
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a
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tr
op
ha
 A
fr
ic
a 
is
 a
n 
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st
ry
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ne
r 
of
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 fu
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ed
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og
ra
m
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C
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 B
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in
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ou
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 A
fr
ic
a,
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 a
nd
 
G
ha
na
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 C
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at
e 
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st
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N
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-f
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d 
B
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C
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t s
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s 
re
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es
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d 
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at
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 is
 u
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le
ar
.
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ro
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 p
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 b
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efi
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m
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.
C
om
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ny
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 p
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ne
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w
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 p
ar
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er
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 w
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l A
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an
 c
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m
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iti
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-
po
rt
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m
ic
 d
ev
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m
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t.
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w
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t o
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R
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rg
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G
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na
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M
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0.
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 b
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ta
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 w
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t f
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 o
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an
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m
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 to
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xp
an
d 
to
 5
0.
00
0 
ha
 in
 p
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
 w
ith
 th
re
e 
vi
lla
ge
s 
in
 G
ha
na
 (n
o 
tim
el
in
e)
. T
he
 la
te
st
 p
ro
je
ct
 s
ta
tu
s 
is
 u
nc
le
ar
. A
 r
ep
or
t b
y 
A
nt
w
i-B
ed
ia
ko
 (3
1 
O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
3)
 m
en
tio
ns
 th
at
 J
at
ro
ph
a 
A
fr
ic
a 
w
en
t i
nt
o 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n,
 d
ue
 to
 th
e 
la
ck
 o
f f
un
di
ng
 
an
d 
di
ffi
cu
lt 
po
lic
y 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t. 
Pe
rs
on
al
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
w
ith
 th
e 
G
ha
na
ia
n 
fa
rm
 m
an
ag
er
 in
 2
01
2 
in
di
ca
te
d 
th
at
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 h
ad
 c
om
e 
un
de
r 
G
ha
na
ia
n 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
an
d 
w
as
 
lis
te
d 
as
 a
 c
om
pa
ny
 w
ith
 li
m
ite
d 
lia
bi
lit
y 
in
 G
ha
na
.
Ja
tr
op
ha
 A
fr
ic
a 
(2
01
0,
 A
ug
us
t 
22
); 
Ja
tr
op
ha
 
A
fr
ic
a 
(n
.d
.d
); 
Ja
tr
op
ha
 A
fr
ic
a 
(n
.d
.a
); 
Ja
tr
op
ha
 
A
fr
ic
a 
(n
.d
.b
); 
Ja
tr
op
ha
 
A
fr
ic
a 
(n
.d
.c
); 
A
nt
w
i-B
ed
ia
ko
 
(2
01
3,
 O
ct
ob
er
 
31
).
D
1 
O
ils
T
he
 U
K
-b
as
ed
 s
ha
re
 c
om
pa
ny
 
w
as
fo
un
de
d 
in
 2
00
5.
 I
n 
M
ar
ch
 
20
12
, i
t c
ha
ng
ed
 th
e 
na
m
e 
to
 N
EO
S 
R
es
ou
rc
es
 P
lc
. A
s 
of
 
20
14
, i
t i
s 
in
 th
e 
pr
oc
es
s 
of
 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 a
 n
ew
 b
us
in
es
s 
st
ra
te
gy
.
Z
am
bi
a 
(s
ub
si
di
a-
ri
es
 a
ls
o 
in
 M
al
aw
i, 
G
ha
na
, S
ou
th
 
A
fr
ic
a,
 S
w
az
ila
nd
, 
an
d 
A
si
a)
22
0.
00
0 
(t
ot
al
 fo
r 
In
di
a,
 I
n-
do
ne
si
a,
 
M
al
aw
i 
an
d 
Z
am
bi
a)
15
5.
00
0-
17
4.
00
0 
in
 Z
am
bi
a 
(i
nc
lu
di
ng
 
ou
tg
ro
w
er
 
sc
he
m
es
) 
2,
41
1 
pl
an
te
d 
an
d 
20
,7
60
 
us
ed
 
th
ro
ug
h 
co
nt
ra
ct
 
fa
rm
in
g 
(i
n 
Z
am
bi
a 
in
 2
00
7)
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
B
io
fu
el
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
fo
r 
ex
po
rt
 a
nd
 
do
m
es
tic
 u
se
. 
P
ro
je
ct
 A
pp
ro
ac
h:
Se
lli
ng
 J
at
ro
ph
a 
oi
l f
or
 d
ir
ec
t u
se
 
in
 d
ie
se
l e
ng
in
es
 o
r 
to
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 
pr
od
uc
in
g 
bi
od
ie
se
l.
D
1 
O
ils
, f
ou
nd
ed
 in
 2
00
5,
 u
se
d 
to
 b
e 
th
e 
bi
gg
es
t J
at
ro
ph
a 
pr
od
uc
er
 w
or
ld
w
id
e,
 w
ith
 s
ev
er
al
 s
ub
si
di
ar
ie
s 
in
 A
fr
ic
a 
an
d 
A
si
a.
 H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
st
ru
gg
lin
g 
w
ith
 
ec
on
om
ic
 v
ia
bi
lit
y 
of
 it
s 
op
er
at
io
ns
 th
ro
ug
ho
ut
 it
s 
ex
is
te
nc
e,
 
an
d 
ha
s 
ne
ve
r 
pa
id
 a
ny
 d
iv
id
en
ds
 to
 it
s 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
. 
D
1 
O
ils
 a
ba
nd
on
ed
 it
s 
pl
an
 to
 s
el
l J
at
ro
ph
a 
cr
ud
e 
oi
l i
nt
er
-
na
tio
na
lly
, a
ft
er
 it
s 
pa
rt
ne
r 
B
ey
on
d 
Pe
tr
ol
eu
m
 (B
P
, f
or
m
er
ly
 
B
ri
tis
h 
Pe
tr
ol
eu
m
) w
ith
dr
ew
 fr
om
 a
 jo
in
t v
en
tu
re
 p
ro
je
ct
 
on
 J
at
ro
ph
a 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
in
 2
00
9.
 S
in
ce
 th
en
 th
e 
oi
l h
as
 o
nl
y 
be
en
 s
ol
d 
do
m
es
tic
al
ly
. 
Fr
om
 2
00
7 
to
 2
01
2,
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
’s
 s
ha
re
 v
al
ue
 d
ra
st
ic
al
ly
 
de
cr
ea
se
d;
 b
y 
20
12
, o
pe
ra
tio
na
l l
os
se
s 
am
ou
nt
ed
 to
 m
or
e 
th
an
 G
B
P
 1
 m
ill
io
n.
 T
o 
in
di
ca
te
 a
 fr
es
h 
be
gi
nn
in
g,
 th
e 
co
m
-
pa
ny
 c
ha
ng
ed
 it
s 
na
m
e 
to
 N
EO
S 
R
es
ou
rc
es
 in
 2
01
2,
 s
hi
ft
ed
 
its
 fo
cu
s 
to
 I
nd
ia
, a
nd
 a
nn
ou
nc
ed
 a
 d
iv
er
si
fic
at
io
n 
be
yo
nd
 
Ja
tr
op
ha
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
 A
fr
ic
an
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
. H
ow
ev
er
, s
ev
er
e 
fi-
na
nc
ia
l d
iffi
cu
lti
es
 h
av
e 
co
nt
in
ue
d.
 A
s 
of
 2
01
4,
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
is
 in
 th
e 
pr
oc
es
s 
of
 s
el
lin
g 
off
 it
s 
as
se
ts
, w
hi
le
 n
eg
ot
ia
tin
g 
its
 
fu
tu
re
 b
us
in
es
s 
ou
tlo
ok
 w
ith
 m
aj
or
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s.
 
20
05
20
05
St
oc
kM
ar
ke
tW
i-
re
.c
om
 (2
01
2,
 
M
ar
ch
 1
3)
; 
H
aw
ki
ns
 a
nd
 
C
he
n 
(2
01
1)
, 
21
-2
3;
 M
itc
he
ll 
(2
01
0)
, 1
18
-1
25
; 
N
EO
S 
R
e-
so
ur
ce
s 
P
lc
. 
(2
01
2,
 O
ct
ob
er
 
12
); 
N
EO
S 
R
es
ou
rc
es
 P
lc
. 
(2
01
2,
 N
ov
em
-
be
r 
15
); 
N
EO
S 
R
es
ou
rc
es
 P
lc
. 
(2
01
2,
 M
ar
ch
 
15
); 
In
ve
st
ig
at
e.
co
.u
k 
(2
01
4,
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
30
).
D
at
a 
on
 
to
ta
l h
ec
ta
re
s 
se
cu
re
d 
or
 o
pe
-
ra
te
d 
re
m
ai
ns
 
un
cl
ea
r. 
Se
e 
al
so
 G
EX
SI
 
LL
P
 (2
00
8)
, 5
0,
 
55
; I
nv
es
tig
at
e.
co
.u
k 
(2
00
6,
 
Ju
ne
 1
4)
; R
eu
k.
co
.u
k 
(2
00
7,
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
15
).
C
ru
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t M
an
ag
em
en
t
T
hi
s 
in
ve
st
m
en
t c
om
pa
ny
 
w
as
 in
di
re
ct
ly
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
op
er
at
io
ns
 in
 M
al
aw
i t
hr
ou
gh
 
sh
ar
eh
ol
di
ng
 (1
4.
54
%
) i
n 
th
e 
M
al
aw
i-b
as
ed
 A
fr
ic
a 
In
ve
st
 
Fu
nd
 (r
un
ni
ng
 fr
om
 2
00
6-
20
08
). 
T
he
 fu
nd
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 
C
ru
’s
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 w
en
t i
nt
o 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n 
in
 2
01
1.
 
M
al
aw
i
6.
00
0 
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
In
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
ag
ri
cu
ltu
ra
l l
an
d 
fo
r 
fo
od
 a
nd
 la
nd
 m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
w
ith
 a
 
fo
cu
s 
on
 p
ap
ri
ka
 a
nd
 c
hi
lie
s 
gr
ow
n 
fo
r 
ex
po
rt
.
C
om
pa
ny
 G
oa
l:
P
ro
fit
in
g 
fr
om
 g
ro
w
in
g 
sc
ar
ci
ty
 
(r
el
at
ed
 to
 th
e 
ri
si
ng
 g
lo
ba
l d
em
an
d 
fo
r 
fo
od
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n)
 b
y 
in
ve
st
in
g 
in
 
ag
ri
cu
ltu
ra
l l
an
d;
 g
en
er
at
in
g 
in
co
m
e 
fr
om
 e
ffi
ci
en
t m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f l
an
d 
an
d 
fr
om
 h
ol
di
ng
 d
ir
ec
t s
ta
ke
s 
in
 
ag
ri
cu
ltu
ra
l l
an
d.
 
C
ru
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t M
an
ag
em
en
t m
an
ag
ed
 th
e 
A
fr
ic
a 
In
ve
st
-
m
en
t F
un
d 
fr
om
 2
00
6 
to
 2
00
8.
 T
he
 fu
nd
 o
pe
ra
te
d 
fiv
e 
to
 s
ev
en
 fa
rm
s 
co
ve
ri
ng
 6
.0
00
 a
cr
es
 in
 M
al
aw
i. 
It
 h
ad
 a
 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 fa
rm
 w
or
kf
or
ce
 o
f m
or
e 
th
an
 1
,4
50
 w
or
ke
rs
, a
nd
 
it 
co
op
er
at
ed
 w
ith
 m
or
e 
th
an
 5
.0
00
 o
ut
gr
ow
er
 fa
rm
s.
In
 2
01
0,
 th
e 
au
di
to
r 
P
ri
ce
w
at
er
ho
us
eC
oo
pe
rs
 fo
un
d 
th
at
 it
 
w
as
 u
nl
ik
el
y 
fo
r 
C
ru
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t M
an
ag
em
en
t t
o 
re
cu
pe
ra
te
 
th
e 
m
on
ey
 it
 h
ad
 r
ec
ei
ve
d 
as
 lo
an
s,
 d
ue
 to
 th
e 
ov
er
va
lu
ed
 a
s-
se
t b
as
e.
 T
he
 C
ru
 tr
us
te
e,
 C
ap
ita
l, 
fr
oz
e 
th
e 
m
on
ey
 o
f t
he
 s
ix
 
fu
nd
s 
m
an
ag
ed
 b
y 
C
ru
. T
he
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 m
an
ag
ed
 b
y 
A
fr
ic
a 
In
ve
st
 F
un
d 
in
 M
al
aw
i w
er
e 
so
ld
 in
 2
01
0 
fo
r 
G
B
P
 1
75
.0
00
. 
T
he
 m
on
ey
 w
as
 u
se
d 
fo
r 
fe
es
 a
nd
 li
ab
ili
tie
s,
 w
hi
le
 in
ve
st
or
s 
ha
rd
ly
 r
ec
ov
er
ed
 th
ei
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
. M
or
eo
ve
r, 
a 
fr
au
d 
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
to
ok
 p
la
ce
, d
ue
 to
 th
e 
al
le
ge
d 
m
is
ap
pr
op
ri
at
io
n 
of
 fu
nd
s.
 M
on
ey
 fr
om
 A
rc
h 
fu
nd
s 
m
an
ag
ed
 b
y 
C
ru
 h
ad
 
be
en
 le
nt
 to
 A
fr
ic
a 
In
ve
st
 w
ith
ou
t s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
 n
ot
ifi
ca
tio
n,
 
an
d 
A
fr
ic
a 
In
ve
st
 a
nd
 C
ru
 c
ha
ir
m
an
 M
ag
ui
re
 h
ad
 a
lle
ge
dl
y 
w
ith
dr
aw
n 
m
on
ey
 w
ith
ou
t f
ol
lo
w
in
g 
pr
op
er
 p
ro
ce
du
re
. C
ru
’s
 
ca
se
 e
ve
n 
re
su
lte
d 
in
 a
 b
ri
efi
ng
 to
 th
e 
U
K
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t.
B
B
C
 (2
01
0,
 
Fe
br
ua
ry
 
6)
;G
ro
te
 (2
00
9,
 
M
ar
ch
 2
4)
; 
G
ro
te
 (2
00
9,
 
A
pr
il 
14
); 
G
ro
te
 
(2
01
0,
 M
ar
ch
 
16
); 
M
er
ia
n 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
C
R
B
M
 (2
01
0)
, 
28
; M
er
re
tt
 
(2
01
3,
 N
ov
em
-
be
r 
29
); 
M
ill
er
 
(2
01
1,
 Ju
ly
 7
); 
N
ts
if
ul
 (2
01
0)
, 
12
9-
13
7;
Pa
le
r 
(2
01
0,
 Ju
ly
 1
4)
.
C
A
M
S 
A
gr
i-E
ne
rg
y 
Ta
nz
an
ia
 
C
A
M
S 
A
gr
i-E
ne
rg
y 
be
lo
ng
s 
to
 
th
e 
C
A
M
S 
gr
ou
p,
 e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
in
 1
97
2.
 I
n 
th
e 
19
70
s,
 th
e 
gr
ou
p 
fo
cu
se
d 
on
 a
ir
po
rt
 a
nd
 
po
rt
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
; n
ow
 it
 in
ve
st
s 
in
 e
m
er
gi
ng
 m
ar
ke
t g
ro
w
th
 
se
ct
or
s,
 s
uc
h 
as
 r
en
ew
ab
le
 
en
er
gy
, o
il 
an
d 
ga
s,
 c
ar
bo
n 
cr
ed
its
, h
ou
si
ng
, p
ro
je
ct
 fi
na
n-
ce
, t
ec
hn
ol
og
y,
 in
fr
as
tr
uc
tu
re
. 
C
A
M
S 
A
gr
i-E
ne
rg
y 
st
ar
te
d 
op
er
at
in
g 
in
 2
00
8.
 I
ts
 c
ur
re
nt
 
st
at
us
 (a
s 
of
 2
01
4)
 is
 u
nc
le
ar
.
Ta
nz
an
ia
45
.0
00
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
Sw
ee
t s
or
gh
um
-b
as
ed
 e
th
an
ol
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
th
at
 d
oe
s 
no
t u
nd
er
m
in
e 
fo
od
 s
ec
ur
ity
.
P
ro
je
ct
 A
pp
ro
ac
h:
Fo
od
 a
nd
 F
ue
l: 
fa
rm
er
s 
al
re
ad
y 
gr
ow
 
sw
ee
t s
or
gh
um
; t
he
 ta
ll 
st
al
ks
 c
an
 b
e 
us
ed
 fo
r 
et
ha
no
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n,
 w
ith
ou
t 
us
in
g 
fo
od
 g
ra
in
. P
ro
je
ct
 w
ill
 b
e 
pr
o-
fit
ab
le
 d
ue
 to
 r
is
in
g 
fu
el
 p
ri
ce
s 
an
d 
C
O
2 
re
du
ct
io
n 
fin
an
ce
 s
ch
em
es
.
T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 in
 T
an
za
ni
a 
w
as
 s
et
 u
p 
in
 2
00
8,
 u
si
ng
 4
5.
00
0 
ha
 
of
 la
nd
 in
 tw
o 
co
un
ty
 d
is
tr
ic
ts
. T
he
 a
im
 is
 to
 d
ev
el
op
 e
th
an
ol
 
an
d 
po
w
er
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
fr
om
 s
w
ee
t s
or
gh
um
 s
ta
lk
s,
 w
ith
 d
is
-
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
ce
nt
er
s 
in
 r
ur
al
 T
an
za
ni
a.
 F
un
ds
 h
av
e 
be
en
 r
ai
se
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
eq
ui
ty
 fi
na
nc
in
g 
an
d 
fr
om
 a
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 b
an
k 
in
 
Lo
nd
on
. T
o 
pr
od
uc
e 
et
ha
no
l, 
th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t i
nt
en
ds
 to
 u
se
 
C
hi
ne
se
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 o
f f
er
m
en
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
di
st
ill
at
io
n 
in
 e
ac
h 
vi
lla
ge
. T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 c
oo
pe
ra
te
s 
w
ith
 th
e 
Ta
nz
an
ia
n 
se
ed
 
au
th
or
ity
 a
nd
 w
ith
 a
n 
In
di
an
 N
G
O
 to
 r
ea
ch
 o
ut
 to
 fa
rm
er
s.
 
20
08
O
bu
lu
ts
a 
(2
00
8,
 
Se
pt
em
be
r 
19
);
O
ak
la
nd
 I
ns
-
tit
ut
e 
(2
01
1b
), 
4,
 1
8-
19
, 3
0;
 
W
W
F-
T
P
O
 
(2
00
9)
, 1
4-
15
, 
23
, 2
6,
 2
9-
36
; 
Lo
ch
er
 a
nd
 S
ul
-
le
 (2
01
3)
, 6
-7
, 
13
-1
4,
 3
2,
 3
6.
Lo
nr
ho
 
Lo
nr
ho
 –
 a
 fo
rm
er
ly
 U
K
 li
st
ed
 
co
m
pa
ny
 w
ith
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 in
 
ag
ri
cu
ltu
re
, i
nf
ra
st
ru
ct
ur
e,
 
tr
an
sp
or
t, 
an
d 
su
pp
or
t s
er
vi
ce
s 
in
 S
SA
 d
at
in
g 
ba
ck
 to
 1
90
9 
– 
w
as
 ta
ke
n 
ov
er
 b
y 
tw
o 
Sw
is
s 
in
ve
st
or
s 
in
 2
01
3,
 a
nd
 it
 h
as
 
re
st
or
ed
 it
s 
st
at
us
 a
s 
a 
pr
iv
at
e 
co
m
pa
ny
.
A
ng
ol
a
2
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
of
 a
 Jo
hn
 D
ee
re
 e
qu
ip
-
m
en
t d
ea
le
rs
hi
p.
 
C
om
pa
ny
 G
oa
l: 
P
ro
fit
in
g 
fr
om
 A
fr
ic
an
 g
ro
w
th
 
m
ar
ke
ts
.
Lo
nr
ho
, a
 fo
rm
er
ly
 U
K
-li
st
ed
 c
om
pa
ny
 w
ith
 a
n 
am
bi
gu
ou
s 
re
pu
ta
tio
n,
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
ov
er
 b
y 
a 
Sw
is
s 
in
ve
st
or
 in
 2
01
3.
 T
w
o 
ye
ar
s 
be
fo
re
 th
at
 ta
ke
ov
er
 L
on
rh
o 
de
sc
ri
be
d 
th
e 
at
tr
ac
tiv
e-
ne
ss
 o
f i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 in
 la
nd
 a
nd
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 in
 A
fr
ic
a 
as
 a
 
co
m
po
si
te
 o
f t
he
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
fa
ct
or
s:
 A
fr
ic
a 
ho
st
s 
a 
la
rg
e 
sh
ar
e 
of
 th
e 
w
or
ld
’s
 a
ra
bl
e 
la
nd
; i
t r
em
ai
ns
 th
e 
m
aj
or
 c
on
tin
en
t 
fo
r 
oi
l a
nd
 g
as
 r
es
er
ve
s 
as
 w
el
l a
s 
th
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
so
ur
ce
 fo
r 
m
in
er
al
s;
 a
nd
 A
fr
ic
an
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
 h
av
e 
re
la
tiv
el
y 
lo
w
 e
xt
er
na
l 
de
bt
 le
ve
ls
. T
he
 c
ur
re
nt
 s
ta
tu
s 
(a
s 
of
 2
01
4)
 a
nd
 th
e 
tim
el
in
es
 
of
 th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t a
re
 u
nc
le
ar
.
 B
lo
om
be
rg
 
N
ew
s 
(2
01
1,
 
Ju
ly
 2
0)
; L
on
rh
o 
(2
01
2)
, 1
-5
.
25
.0
00
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
Fo
od
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
(r
ic
e)
 fo
r 
do
m
es
tic
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n.
In
 2
00
9,
 L
on
rh
o 
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 a
nn
ou
nc
ed
 it
 h
ad
 s
ig
ne
d 
a 
de
al
 
w
ith
 th
e 
A
ng
ol
an
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t t
o 
ca
rr
y 
ou
t a
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l p
ro
-
je
ct
s 
on
 2
5.
00
0h
a 
of
 la
nd
 in
 th
e 
pr
ov
in
ce
s 
of
 U
íg
e,
 Z
ai
re
 a
nd
 
B
en
go
. T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 s
ec
ur
ed
 a
 5
0-
ye
ar
 le
as
e.
 T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 
w
as
 to
 b
e 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
sc
op
e 
of
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t i
ni
-
tia
tiv
es
 to
 p
ro
m
ot
e 
ag
ri
cu
ltu
ra
l r
ec
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
p-
m
en
t. 
T
he
 a
gr
ee
m
en
t, 
si
gn
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
A
ng
ol
an
 s
id
e 
by
 th
e 
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 a
nd
 R
ur
al
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t M
in
is
te
r, 
A
fo
ns
o 
Pe
dr
o 
C
an
ga
, a
nd
 b
y 
th
e 
di
re
ct
or
 o
f G
es
te
rr
a,
 G
es
tã
o 
de
 T
er
ra
s 
A
rá
-
ve
is
, C
ar
lo
s 
A
lb
er
to
 J
ai
m
e,
 a
nt
ic
ip
at
ed
 r
ic
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n.
 T
hi
s 
de
al
 w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
us
ed
 u
p 
th
e 
bu
lk
 o
f t
he
 p
la
nn
ed
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
on
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l p
ro
je
ct
s 
in
 2
00
9 
(U
SD
 6
 m
ill
io
n)
, a
nd
 w
ou
ld
 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
le
ve
ra
ge
d 
w
ith
 A
ng
ol
an
 fi
na
nc
in
g.
 A
s 
of
 2
01
4,
 it
 is
 
un
cl
ea
r 
w
ha
t h
as
 b
ec
om
e 
of
 th
is
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 in
ve
st
m
en
t. 
T
he
 
w
eb
si
te
 o
f t
he
 n
ow
 S
w
is
s 
co
m
pa
ny
, h
ow
ev
er
, s
ug
ge
st
s 
th
at
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 is
 s
til
l a
ct
iv
e 
in
 th
e 
fa
rm
in
g 
se
ct
or
, s
ta
tin
g 
th
at
 
it 
ha
s 
“6
0%
 o
f [
ag
ri
cu
ltu
ra
l, 
A
.G
.] 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
co
m
in
g 
fr
om
 
ou
r 
ow
n 
fa
rm
in
g 
op
er
at
io
ns
, a
nd
 4
0%
 fr
om
 o
ut
 g
ro
w
er
s 
(i
nc
lu
di
ng
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 fa
rm
s 
an
d 
Lo
nr
ho
 o
rg
an
is
ed
 lo
ca
l 
co
op
er
at
iv
es
 a
nd
 s
m
al
l f
ar
m
er
 p
ro
gr
am
s)
.”
20
09
B
ur
gi
s 
(2
00
9,
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
16
); 
Lo
nr
ho
 F
re
sh
 
(n
.d
.);
 L
on
rh
o 
Lt
d.
 (2
01
4,
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
24
); 
M
ac
au
hu
b 
(2
00
9,
 J
an
ua
ry
 
14
).
P
ro
ca
na
T
he
 2
00
7 
bi
oe
ne
rg
y 
pr
oj
ec
t o
f 
P
ro
ca
na
, a
 s
ub
si
di
ar
y 
co
m
pa
ny
 
of
 th
e 
B
ri
tis
h-
ba
se
d 
fir
m
 
B
io
en
er
gy
 A
fr
ic
a,
 d
id
 n
ot
 g
et
 o
ff
 
th
e 
gr
ou
nd
.
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e
30
.0
00
30
.0
00
--
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 b
io
fu
el
 fr
om
 s
ug
ar
 
ca
ne
 e
th
an
ol
.
In
 2
00
7,
 a
ft
er
 n
eg
ot
ia
tio
ns
 a
nd
 a
 s
ig
ne
d 
co
nt
ra
ct
 w
ith
 th
e 
M
oz
am
bi
ca
n 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t, 
th
e 
B
ri
tis
h-
ba
se
d 
co
m
pa
ny
 B
io
-
en
er
gy
 A
fr
ic
a 
de
ci
de
d 
no
t t
o 
fo
llo
w
 th
ro
ug
h 
w
ith
 it
s 
bi
of
ue
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
so
ut
he
rn
 M
oz
am
bi
qu
e.
 C
on
se
qu
en
tly
, t
he
 g
o-
ve
rn
m
en
t c
an
ce
lle
d 
th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
, a
ss
ig
ni
ng
 3
0.
00
0h
a 
in
 G
az
a 
pr
ov
in
ce
 fo
r 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
f a
 s
ug
ar
 c
an
e 
pl
an
ta
tio
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
of
 e
th
an
ol
. E
ar
lie
r 
in
 2
00
7,
 P
ro
ca
na
 h
ad
 a
ls
o 
an
no
un
ce
d 
its
 p
la
ns
 to
 in
ve
st
 a
n 
ad
di
tio
na
l U
SD
 5
10
 m
ill
io
n 
in
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
of
 a
 n
ew
 p
la
nt
 fo
r 
th
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
of
 e
th
an
ol
, 
su
ga
r, 
el
ec
tr
ic
ity
 a
nd
 fe
rt
ili
ze
rs
.
20
07
A
lla
fr
ic
a.
co
m
 (2
00
9,
 
D
ec
em
be
r 
23
); 
B
io
pa
ct
 (2
00
7,
 
Se
pt
em
be
r 
4)
.
C
en
tr
al
 A
fr
ic
an
 M
in
in
g 
an
d 
Ex
pl
or
at
io
n 
C
om
pa
ny
 P
lc
 
(C
A
M
EC
)
C
A
M
EC
 w
as
 li
st
ed
 a
t t
he
 
A
IM
 S
to
ck
 E
xc
ha
ng
e 
du
ri
ng
 
20
02
-2
00
9.
 I
ts
 M
oz
am
bi
ca
n 
op
er
at
io
ns
 s
ta
rt
ed
 in
 2
00
5.
 T
he
 
co
m
pa
ny
 d
el
is
te
d 
fr
om
 A
IM
 
on
ce
 it
 w
as
 b
ou
gh
t b
y 
a 
K
az
ak
h 
fir
m
 in
 2
00
9.
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e
30
0.
00
0 
in
 
20
05
; p
lu
s 
67
,6
20
 in
 
20
07
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
M
in
in
g 
(c
ok
in
g 
an
d 
th
er
m
al
 c
oa
l).
D
ur
in
g 
20
02
-2
00
9,
 C
A
M
EC
 w
as
 a
ct
iv
e 
in
 m
in
in
g 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 in
 
D
R
C
, S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a,
 Z
im
ba
bw
e 
an
d 
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e.
 I
n 
20
05
, 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
te
n 
lic
en
se
s,
 c
ov
er
in
g 
30
0.
00
0h
a,
 to
 
ex
pl
or
e 
fo
r 
co
al
 in
 M
oz
am
bi
qu
e’
s 
no
rt
he
rn
 T
et
e 
P
ro
vi
nc
e.
 
In
 2
00
7,
 C
A
M
EC
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
th
e 
m
aj
or
ity
 s
ha
re
 o
f B
el
de
 E
m
p-
re
en
di
m
en
to
s 
M
in
ei
ro
s 
Li
m
ita
da
 (B
el
de
) o
f S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a.
 
T
hr
ou
gh
 th
e 
jo
in
t v
en
tu
re
, C
A
M
EC
 a
tt
ai
ne
d 
th
re
e 
ad
di
tio
na
l 
m
in
in
g 
lic
en
se
s 
(c
oa
l),
 c
ov
er
in
g 
67
,6
20
ha
 a
lto
ge
th
er
.
C
A
M
EC
 a
ls
o 
he
ld
 a
pp
ro
xi
m
at
el
y 
54
.8
4%
 o
f A
gr
ite
rr
a 
Lt
d.
, a
 
B
ri
tis
h 
ag
ri
bu
si
ne
ss
 a
ct
iv
e 
in
 M
oz
am
bi
qu
e 
(s
ee
 b
el
ow
) a
nd
 
ha
d 
co
m
m
on
 d
ir
ec
to
rs
 w
ith
 th
is
 c
om
pa
ny
 (a
s 
of
 2
00
9)
. I
n 
20
09
, C
A
M
EC
 w
as
 s
ol
d 
to
 E
ur
as
ia
n 
N
at
ur
al
 R
es
ou
rc
es
 C
or
-
po
ra
tio
n,
 a
 K
az
ak
h 
fir
m
. T
he
re
af
te
r 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 c
ha
ng
ed
 
its
 m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 w
ith
dr
ew
 fr
om
 th
e 
Lo
nd
on
-b
as
ed
 A
IM
 
St
oc
k 
Ex
ch
an
ge
.
20
05
A
gr
ite
rr
a 
Lt
d.
 
(2
00
9,
 J
an
ua
ry
 
12
); 
C
re
am
er
 
M
ed
ia
 (2
00
9,
 
N
ov
em
be
r 
11
); 
M
ar
im
a 
(2
01
2,
 
A
ug
us
t 2
0)
; 
R
ef
ra
ct
or
ie
s 
W
in
do
w
 (n
.d
.);
 
W
eb
b 
(2
00
9,
 
Se
pt
em
be
r 
18
); 
M
ac
au
hu
b 
(2
00
9,
 A
pr
il 
22
). 
A
gr
ite
rr
a 
Lt
d
Si
nc
e 
20
09
, A
gr
ite
rr
a 
ha
s 
be
en
 
an
 A
IM
-li
st
ed
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l b
us
i-
ne
ss
 a
ct
iv
e 
in
 th
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n,
 
pr
oc
es
si
ng
 a
nd
 tr
ad
in
g 
of
 m
ul
-
tip
le
 c
om
m
od
iti
es
 in
 A
fr
ic
a.
 
It
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
ai
m
in
g 
to
 “
bu
ild
 
its
el
f i
nt
o 
a 
m
ul
ti-
co
m
m
od
ity
 
A
fr
ic
an
 fo
cu
se
d 
ag
ri
cu
ltu
ra
l 
bu
si
ne
ss
.”
 U
nt
il 
20
08
, t
he
 
co
m
pa
ny
 w
as
 a
ct
iv
e 
in
 th
e 
oi
l e
xp
lo
ra
tio
n 
bu
si
ne
ss
 a
nd
 
na
m
ed
 W
hi
te
 N
ile
.
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e
17
,0
50
 (s
in
ce
 
20
08
/2
00
9)
, 
pl
us
 2
,5
00
 
(s
in
ce
 2
01
3)
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
Fo
od
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n,
 n
am
el
y 
liv
es
to
ck
 
(b
ee
f r
an
ch
) a
nd
 fe
ed
lo
t; 
in
te
nd
ed
 fo
r 
do
m
es
tic
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
an
d 
ex
po
rt
.
A
gr
ite
rr
a 
Lt
d.
’s
 s
ub
si
di
ar
y,
 M
oz
bi
fe
 L
td
., 
ru
ns
 th
e 
M
av
on
de
 
St
ud
 R
an
ch
 a
nd
 th
e 
D
om
be
 R
an
ch
 th
at
 a
lto
ge
th
er
 c
om
pr
is
e 
16
.0
00
ha
. T
he
 1
00
0h
a 
M
av
on
de
 S
tu
d 
R
an
ch
 is
 e
nv
is
io
ne
d 
to
 
ex
pa
nd
 b
ot
h 
w
ith
 r
eg
ar
d 
to
 la
nd
 a
nd
 h
er
d 
si
ze
; t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 
is
 in
 n
eg
ot
ia
tio
ns
 a
bo
ut
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 3
.0
00
ha
. T
he
 1
5.
00
0h
a 
D
om
be
 R
an
ch
 h
as
 a
 le
as
e 
(D
U
A
T
) u
nt
il 
20
61
 th
at
 w
as
 g
ra
n-
te
d 
by
 th
e 
M
oz
am
bi
ca
n 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t. 
In
 a
dd
iti
on
, a
s 
of
 2
01
2,
 
th
e 
co
m
ap
ny
 o
pe
ra
te
d 
th
e 
1,
05
0h
a 
V
an
du
zi
 F
ee
dl
ot
 a
nd
 m
a-
na
ge
d 
m
ai
ze
 p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s.
 T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
’s
 o
bj
ec
tiv
e 
is
 to
 b
ui
ld
 a
 to
ta
l h
er
d 
in
 e
xc
es
s 
of
 1
0.
00
0 
he
ad
 b
y 
20
15
. 
In
 J
an
ua
ry
 2
01
3,
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
th
e 
2,
50
0h
a 
In
ha
zo
ni
a 
R
an
ch
. 
A
gr
ite
rr
a 
Lt
d.
 
(2
01
2,
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
29
); 
A
gr
ite
rr
a 
Lt
d.
 (n
.d
.b
); 
V
er
di
n 
(2
00
9,
 
M
ar
ch
 2
6)
.
Si
er
ra
 L
eo
ne
A
cc
es
s 
to
 
3,
50
0 
fa
rm
er
s,
 
an
d 
45
.0
00
ha
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
C
oc
oa
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
an
d 
tr
ad
in
g;
 p
al
m
 
oi
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n.
P
ro
je
ct
 A
pp
ro
ac
h:
B
uy
in
g 
a 
tr
ad
in
g 
co
m
pa
ny
 w
ith
 a
 
bu
yi
ng
 r
eg
is
te
r 
of
 3
,5
00
 fa
rm
er
s 
to
 
ac
ce
ss
 c
oc
oa
; s
ec
ur
in
g 
a 
le
as
e 
on
 
br
ow
nfi
el
d 
ag
ri
cu
ltu
ra
l l
an
d 
su
ita
bl
e 
fo
r 
pa
lm
 o
il 
pl
an
ta
tio
ns
.
A
gr
ite
rr
a 
op
er
at
es
 m
ul
tip
le
 b
us
in
es
se
s 
in
 S
ie
rr
a 
Le
on
e.
 
It
 b
ou
gh
t a
 S
ie
rr
a 
Le
on
e-
ba
se
d 
tr
ad
in
g 
an
d 
ag
ri
cu
ltu
ra
l 
co
m
pa
ny
 to
 e
xp
an
d 
its
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 in
 c
oc
oa
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
an
d 
tr
ad
in
g,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
st
or
ag
e,
 a
 b
uy
in
g 
re
gi
st
er
 o
f 3
,5
00
 
fa
rm
er
s,
 a
nd
 a
 3
,2
00
ha
 c
oc
oa
 p
la
nt
at
io
n.
 T
he
re
 a
re
 a
ls
o 
pl
an
s 
to
 in
cl
ud
e 
co
ff
ee
 a
nd
 p
al
m
 o
il 
pr
od
uc
tio
n.
 A
s 
of
 2
01
4,
 
ne
go
tia
tio
ns
 a
re
 in
 p
la
ce
 to
 a
cq
ui
re
 a
n 
ad
di
tio
na
l 1
,6
00
ha
 o
f 
la
nd
 a
dj
ac
en
t t
o 
th
is
 p
la
nt
at
io
n.
 T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
ai
m
s 
to
 p
la
nt
 a
 to
ta
l o
f 4
.0
00
ha
 b
y 
20
17
, w
ith
 th
e 
ul
tim
at
e 
ai
m
 o
f p
ro
du
ci
ng
 a
 m
in
im
um
 o
f 8
.0
00
 to
nn
es
 o
f c
oc
oa
 p
er
 
an
nu
m
 b
y 
20
20
/2
02
1.
 A
gr
ite
rr
a 
al
so
 b
ou
gh
t c
on
tr
ol
 o
ve
r 
a 
le
as
e 
of
 4
5.
00
0h
a 
br
ow
nfi
el
d 
ag
ri
cu
ltu
ra
l l
an
d 
th
at
 is
 s
ui
ta
bl
e 
fo
r 
pa
lm
 o
il 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
w
ith
 h
ig
he
st
 le
ve
ls
 o
f r
ai
nf
al
l (
as
 
of
 2
01
2)
.
A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
Si
er
ra
 L
eo
ne
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t a
nd
 E
xp
or
t 
P
ro
m
ot
io
n 
A
ge
nc
y 
(S
LI
EP
A
), 
th
e 
“P
re
si
de
nt
 a
nd
 C
ab
in
et
 
ha
ve
 id
en
tifi
ed
 o
il 
pa
lm
 a
s 
a 
pr
io
ri
ty
 g
ro
w
th
 s
ec
to
r 
an
d 
ar
e 
pr
ep
ar
ed
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 s
up
po
rt
 a
t t
he
 h
ig
he
st
 le
ve
ls
 to
 a
cc
el
er
at
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t.”
 I
n 
th
is
 c
on
te
xt
, S
LI
EP
A
 is
 “
ea
rm
ar
ki
ng
 a
nd
 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
a 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 s
ui
ta
bl
e 
si
te
s 
fo
r 
10
.0
00
ha
+ 
pa
lm
 
pl
an
ta
tio
ns
.”
 C
om
pa
ni
es
 a
re
 a
bl
e 
to
 le
as
e 
la
nd
 u
p 
to
 7
1 
ye
ar
s,
 fo
r 
U
SD
 2
0-
30
 p
er
 h
a 
pe
r 
ye
ar
, w
ith
 b
as
ic
 la
bo
r 
co
st
s 
of
 U
SD
 2
-3
 p
er
 d
ay
, fl
ex
ib
le
 la
bo
r 
re
gu
la
tio
n,
 a
nd
 0
%
 ta
xe
s 
fo
r 
so
m
e 
in
ve
st
or
s.
A
gr
ite
rr
a 
Lt
d.
 
(2
01
2,
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
29
); 
A
gr
ite
rr
a 
Lt
d.
 (n
.d
.a
); 
C
ar
re
re
 (2
01
3)
. 
Li
be
ri
a
In
 2
00
9,
 A
gr
ite
rr
a 
si
gn
ed
 a
 m
em
or
an
du
m
 o
f u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 
to
 a
cq
ui
re
 E
qu
at
or
ia
l B
io
fu
el
s 
(G
ue
rn
se
y)
 L
im
ite
d,
 a
 p
al
m
 
oi
l p
ro
du
ce
r 
ba
se
d 
in
 L
ib
er
ia
. E
qu
at
or
ia
l B
io
fu
el
s 
Lt
d.
 (n
ow
 
na
m
ed
 E
qu
at
or
ia
l P
al
m
 O
il 
C
om
pa
ny
, s
ee
 n
ex
t p
ro
je
ct
) h
as
 
a 
to
ta
l l
an
d 
ho
ld
in
g 
of
 1
69
.0
00
ha
 g
ra
nt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
Li
be
ri
an
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t i
n 
th
e 
fo
rm
 o
f c
on
ce
ss
io
ns
. H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 d
ea
l 
di
d 
no
t m
at
er
ia
liz
e 
an
d 
A
gr
ite
rr
a 
de
ci
de
d 
to
 w
ith
dr
aw
 fr
om
 
it 
(s
ee
 b
el
ow
).
M
ac
au
hu
b 
(2
00
9,
 O
ct
ob
er
 
28
); 
Pu
bl
ic
 
Le
dg
er
 (2
00
9,
 
Se
pt
em
be
r 
22
).
Eq
ua
to
ri
al
 P
al
m
 O
il 
C
om
pa
ny
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 w
as
 fo
un
de
d 
in
 
20
05
 a
s 
Eq
ua
to
ri
al
 B
io
fu
el
s,
 
an
d 
ch
an
ge
d 
its
 n
am
e 
to
 
Eq
ua
to
ri
al
 P
al
m
 O
il 
P
lc
 in
 
20
08
. I
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
a 
pu
bl
ic
ly
 
lis
te
d 
(A
IM
) c
ru
de
 o
il 
pr
od
uc
er
 
si
nc
e 
20
10
. 
Li
be
ri
a
89
.0
00
 
(c
on
ce
s-
si
on
), 
pl
us
 
80
.0
00
ha
 
(M
em
o-
ra
nd
um
 
of
 
U
nd
er
s-
ta
nd
in
g)
.
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
Pa
lm
 o
il 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
fo
r 
ex
po
rt
.
P
ro
je
ct
 A
pp
ro
ac
h:
La
rg
e-
sc
al
e 
oi
l p
al
m
 p
la
nt
at
io
n.
T
he
 E
qu
at
or
ia
l P
al
m
 O
il 
C
om
pa
ny
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
gr
an
te
d 
co
nc
es
-
si
on
s 
fo
r 
th
re
e 
pa
lm
 o
il 
pl
an
ta
tio
ns
 in
 L
ib
er
ia
, a
ll 
of
 w
hi
ch
 
ar
e 
lo
ca
te
d 
in
 a
 fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
cl
im
at
ic
 z
on
e,
 c
lo
se
 to
 c
iti
es
, a
nd
 
in
 p
ro
xi
m
ity
 to
 p
or
ts
 w
ith
 fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
th
at
 c
an
 a
cc
om
m
od
at
e 
ex
po
rt
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
. I
n 
20
09
, A
gr
ite
rr
a 
Lt
d.
 w
as
 in
te
re
st
ed
 in
 
ac
qu
ir
in
g 
th
e 
Eq
ua
to
ri
al
 P
al
m
 O
il 
C
om
pa
ny
, h
ow
ev
er
, d
ec
i-
de
d 
ag
ai
ns
t i
t. 
A
s 
of
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 
20
14
, t
he
 U
K
 in
co
rp
or
at
ed
 
co
m
pa
ny
 is
 a
 s
ub
si
di
ar
y 
of
 th
e 
pa
re
nt
 c
om
pa
ny
 a
nd
 u
lti
m
at
e 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 c
om
pa
ny
 K
ua
la
 L
um
pu
r 
K
ep
on
g 
B
er
ha
d 
(“
K
LK
”)
, 
a 
co
m
pa
ny
 in
co
rp
or
at
ed
 in
 M
al
ay
si
a.
 K
LK
 o
w
ns
 a
nd
 c
on
tr
ol
s 
62
.8
6%
 o
f t
he
 E
qu
at
or
ia
l’s
 s
ha
re
 c
ap
ita
l. 
B
ot
h,
 E
qu
at
or
ia
l 
Pa
lm
 O
il 
an
d 
K
LK
 h
av
e 
m
ad
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 lo
ss
es
 in
 th
ei
r 
op
er
at
io
n 
in
 2
01
3 
an
d 
20
14
.
T
he
 E
qu
at
or
ia
l P
al
m
 O
il 
C
om
pa
ny
’s
 1
69
.0
00
ha
 h
ol
di
ng
, o
f 
w
hi
ch
 8
9.
00
0h
a 
ar
e 
co
nc
es
si
on
s 
gr
an
te
d 
by
 th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
an
d 
80
.0
00
ha
 a
re
 p
ar
t o
f a
n 
M
oU
 w
ith
 th
e 
co
un
ty
 d
is
tr
ic
t a
nd
 
tr
ib
al
 c
om
m
un
iti
es
, i
s 
em
be
dd
ed
 in
 a
 p
la
n 
by
 th
e 
Li
be
ri
an
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t t
o 
re
-e
st
ab
lis
h 
ex
po
rt
-o
ri
en
te
d 
pl
an
ta
tio
ns
 a
s 
a 
gr
ow
th
 s
ec
to
r 
an
d 
fo
re
ig
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 e
ar
ne
r.
20
05
Eq
ua
to
ri
al
 P
al
m
 
O
il 
(2
01
5)
; I
n-
ve
st
ig
at
e.
co
.u
k 
(2
00
9,
 A
ug
us
t 
18
); 
Pu
bl
ic
 
Le
dg
er
 (2
00
9,
 
Se
pt
em
be
r 
22
); 
Eq
ua
to
ri
al
 P
al
m
 
O
il 
20
11
; E
qu
a-
to
ri
al
 P
al
m
 O
il 
(2
01
3)
; G
lo
ba
l 
W
itn
es
s 
(2
01
3,
 
D
ec
em
be
r 
20
); 
Eq
ua
to
ri
al
 P
al
m
 
O
il 
(2
01
1)
; 
Eq
ua
to
ri
al
 P
al
m
 
O
il 
(2
01
3)
; T
he
 
R
ig
ht
s 
an
d 
R
e-
so
ur
ce
s 
G
ro
up
 
(2
01
3)
, 2
67
; 
Eq
ua
to
ri
al
 P
al
m
 
O
il.
 (2
01
4)
; 
Ej
at
la
s.
or
g 
(2
01
4)
.
G
EM
 B
io
fu
el
s
Fo
un
de
d 
in
 2
00
5,
 G
re
en
 E
ne
r-
gy
 M
ad
ag
as
ca
r 
(G
EM
) h
as
 b
ee
n 
ac
tiv
e 
in
 e
st
ab
lis
hi
ng
 J
at
ro
ph
a 
pl
an
ta
tio
ns
. S
in
ce
 2
00
7,
 it
 h
as
 
be
en
 li
st
ed
 a
t t
he
 A
IM
 L
on
do
n 
St
oc
k 
Ex
ch
an
ge
. I
n 
20
13
, t
he
 
co
m
pa
ny
 c
ha
ng
ed
 it
s 
na
m
e 
(t
o 
H
un
te
r 
R
es
ou
rc
es
 P
lc
) a
nd
 
op
er
at
io
na
l f
oc
us
.
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
49
5.
00
0 
55
,7
00
 
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
Ja
tr
op
ha
 c
ru
de
 o
il 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
fo
r 
ex
po
rt
 to
 th
e 
EU
, N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
a,
 a
nd
 
A
us
tr
al
as
ia
.
P
ro
je
ct
 A
pp
ro
ac
h:
P
la
nt
at
io
n 
an
d 
ou
tg
ro
w
er
 s
ch
em
e.
 
C
om
pa
ny
 G
oa
l:
 Fo
cu
s 
on
 J
at
ro
ph
a 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
m
ee
ts
 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 c
ri
te
ri
a 
as
 a
 n
on
-e
di
bl
e 
oi
l 
se
ed
 (s
in
ce
 fo
od
-b
as
ed
 b
io
fu
el
 in
du
s-
tr
y 
fa
ce
s 
su
st
ai
na
bi
lit
y 
ch
al
le
ng
es
); 
be
co
m
e 
th
e 
la
rg
es
t p
ro
du
ce
r 
of
 b
io
fu
-
el
s 
in
 M
ad
ag
as
ca
r 
an
d 
th
e 
re
gi
on
. 
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 w
as
 fo
un
de
d 
in
 2
00
4,
 a
nd
 it
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
A
IM
 
lis
te
d 
si
nc
e 
20
07
. F
oc
us
in
g 
on
 J
at
ro
ph
a 
pr
od
uc
tio
n,
 G
EM
 
m
an
ag
ed
 to
 s
ec
ur
e 
ov
er
 4
95
.0
00
ha
 in
 M
ad
ag
as
ca
r. 
A
cc
or
di
ng
 
to
 it
s 
re
po
rt
s,
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 s
ec
ur
ed
 th
is
 la
nd
 –
 w
hi
ch
 
in
cl
ud
ed
 o
ve
r 
40
.0
00
ha
 n
at
ur
al
 fo
re
st
 –
 in
 th
e 
pe
ri
od
 fr
om
 
20
05
 to
 2
01
1 
th
ro
ug
h 
a 
50
-y
ea
r 
le
as
e,
 w
ith
 p
ar
ce
l s
iz
e 
ra
ng
in
g 
fr
om
 2
,5
00
ha
 to
 5
0.
00
0h
a.
 M
or
eo
ve
r, 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
co
nc
lu
de
d 
18
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 w
ith
 lo
ca
l c
om
m
un
es
 fo
r 
ex
cl
us
iv
e 
pl
an
ta
tio
n 
ri
gh
ts
 a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
in
fo
rm
al
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 a
bo
ut
 w
ild
 
se
ed
 d
el
iv
er
y.
 I
n 
20
07
/2
00
8,
 G
EM
 w
as
 e
m
pl
oy
in
g 
4,
50
0 
lo
ca
l f
ar
m
er
s 
in
 n
in
e 
lo
ca
tio
ns
. T
he
 o
ri
gi
na
l p
la
n 
w
as
 to
 
pl
an
t 2
00
.0
00
ha
 b
y 
20
10
. Y
et
, p
la
nt
in
g 
op
er
at
io
ns
 c
am
e 
to
 a
 h
al
t i
n 
20
09
, w
he
n 
tie
d 
up
 c
ap
ita
l m
ar
ke
ts
 a
nd
 b
ad
 
pl
an
ta
tio
n 
m
an
ag
em
en
t f
or
ce
d 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 to
 fo
cu
s 
on
 
m
ai
nt
ai
ni
ng
 e
xi
st
in
g 
pl
an
ta
tio
ns
 r
at
he
r 
th
an
 (r
e)
in
ve
st
in
g 
in
 th
ei
r 
pl
an
ne
d 
ex
pa
ns
io
n.
 I
n 
20
10
, t
he
 fi
rs
t r
ev
en
ue
s 
of
 
G
B
P
 1
8.
00
0 
fr
om
 J
at
ro
ph
a 
oi
l w
er
e 
m
ad
e,
 w
ith
 s
hi
pm
en
ts
 to
 
G
er
m
an
y 
an
d 
A
us
tr
al
ia
. T
he
se
 c
am
e 
la
rg
el
y 
fr
om
 th
e 
ha
rv
es
t 
of
 a
 4
0.
00
0h
a 
fo
re
st
 w
ith
 m
an
y 
Ja
tr
op
ha
 tr
ee
s,
 a
llo
w
in
g 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 to
 s
ta
rt
 h
ar
ve
st
in
g 
ea
rl
ie
r.
D
ur
in
g 
20
11
, G
EM
 c
on
ce
nt
ra
te
d 
on
 le
tt
in
g 
th
e 
pl
an
ta
tio
ns
 
m
at
ur
e,
 a
nd
 it
 d
id
 n
ot
 e
ng
ag
e 
in
 a
ny
 fu
rt
he
r 
pl
an
tin
g.
 I
t a
ls
o 
re
du
ce
d 
th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 s
ta
ff
. 
B
y 
th
e 
en
d 
of
 2
01
1,
 it
 h
ad
 p
la
nt
ed
 J
at
ro
ph
a 
on
 a
 to
ta
l o
f 
55
,7
37
ha
. S
til
l, 
th
e 
sh
ar
e 
va
lu
e 
di
d 
no
t r
ec
ov
er
, n
or
 d
id
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 m
an
ag
e 
to
 a
tt
ra
ct
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 fu
nd
in
g.
 U
na
bl
e 
to
 
pr
ofi
t f
ro
m
 it
s 
la
nd
 b
an
k,
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 c
ha
ng
ed
 it
s 
na
m
e 
to
 
H
un
te
r 
R
es
ou
rc
es
 P
LC
 in
 J
an
ua
ry
 2
01
3 
to
 in
di
ca
te
 it
s 
ne
w
 
in
ve
st
in
g 
po
lic
y 
an
d 
bo
ar
d 
ch
an
ge
s.
 A
 c
or
po
ra
te
 n
ot
ic
e 
fr
om
 
D
ec
em
be
r 
20
13
 s
ta
te
d 
th
at
 s
ha
re
 tr
ad
in
g 
ha
d 
be
en
 s
us
pe
n-
de
d 
as
 th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 d
id
 n
ot
 b
ec
om
e 
an
 in
ve
st
m
en
t c
om
pa
ny
 
in
 ti
m
e 
to
 m
ee
t A
IM
 L
on
do
n 
St
oc
k 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
. 
T
he
 s
am
e 
no
tic
e 
an
no
un
ce
d 
th
at
 th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t w
as
 in
 
ne
go
tia
tio
ns
 to
 b
ec
om
e 
ac
tiv
e 
in
 P
er
uv
ia
n 
m
in
in
g 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 
56
3k
m
 fr
om
 th
e 
ci
ty
 o
f L
im
a,
 in
 a
n 
ar
ea
 w
he
re
 e
ig
ht
 e
xp
lo
-
ra
tio
n 
co
nc
es
si
on
s 
(a
 to
ta
l o
f 3
,5
00
ha
) a
re
 lo
ca
te
d.
 W
ha
t h
as
 
ha
pp
en
ed
 to
 th
e 
Ja
tr
op
ha
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
is
 u
nc
le
ar
.
20
05
Ü
lle
nb
er
g 
(2
00
8)
;
A
D
V
FN
.c
om
 
(2
01
3,
 A
ug
us
t 
1)
; I
nv
es
tig
at
e.
co
.u
k 
(2
00
8,
 
Se
pt
em
be
r 
20
); 
G
EM
B
io
Fu
-
el
s 
(2
01
1,
 
Se
pt
em
be
r 
28
); 
G
EM
B
io
Fu
el
s 
(2
01
2,
 A
pr
il 
12
); 
G
EM
B
io
Fu
el
s 
(2
01
2,
 D
ec
em
-
be
r 
5)
; G
er
la
ch
 
an
d 
Pa
sc
al
 
(2
01
0)
, 7
;
H
aw
ki
ns
 a
nd
 
C
he
n 
(2
01
1)
, 3
, 
24
-2
5;
 H
un
te
r 
R
es
ou
rc
es
 
P
lc
. (
20
13
, 
D
ec
em
be
r 
30
); 
O
nV
is
ta
.
de
 (2
01
4)
; 
B
lo
om
be
rg
 
N
ew
s 
(2
00
9,
 
Se
pt
em
be
r 
30
).
M
ad
ab
ee
f
M
ad
ab
ee
f a
pp
ea
rs
 to
 b
e 
a 
U
K
 
co
m
pa
ny
w
hi
ch
 in
te
nd
s 
to
 r
ai
se
 b
ee
f c
at
t-
le
 o
n 
20
0.
00
0h
a 
fo
r 
th
e 
ex
po
rt
 
m
ar
ke
t. 
St
at
us
 u
nc
le
ar
.
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
20
0.
00
0 
P
ro
je
ct
 P
ur
po
se
:
Li
ve
st
oc
k 
(c
at
tle
) f
or
 e
xp
or
t.
N
o 
de
ta
ils
 a
va
ila
bl
e.
D
ou
gu
et
 (2
01
3,
 
Se
pt
em
be
r 
5)
; 
H
am
el
in
ck
 
(2
01
3)
, 8
7;
 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
La
nd
 C
oa
lit
io
n 
(n
.d
.);
Ü
lle
nb
er
g 
(2
00
8)
; V
an
 D
er
 
W
er
f (
20
12
), 
95
, 1
79
.
A
va
na
 R
es
ou
rc
es
 
T
hi
s 
M
al
ag
as
y 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
U
K
-b
as
ed
 A
va
na
 G
ro
up
 
w
as
 s
et
 u
p 
in
 2
00
8 
to
 h
ol
d 
an
d 
m
an
ag
e 
A
va
na
’s
 a
ss
et
s 
in
 
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r. 
A
va
na
 G
ro
up
 w
as
 
fo
un
de
d 
in
 2
00
7 
to
 d
ev
el
op
 
ur
an
iu
m
 o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s.
 F
or
 
so
m
e 
tim
e 
it 
w
as
 a
ls
o 
ac
tiv
e 
in
 
th
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
of
 b
io
fu
el
s,
 b
ut
 
th
os
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 s
ee
m
 to
 h
av
e 
be
en
 te
rm
in
at
ed
.
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
30
.0
00
 h
a 
(m
in
in
g)
, 
pl
us
 p
la
ns
 
to
 e
st
ab
lis
h 
a 
10
.0
00
ha
 
bi
of
ue
ls
 
pl
an
ta
tio
n
P
ro
je
ct
s P
ur
po
se
:
M
in
er
al
s 
ex
pl
or
at
io
n 
an
d 
ex
pl
oi
ta
tio
n 
(u
ra
ni
um
), 
as
 w
el
l a
s 
bi
of
ue
ls
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n.
C
om
pa
ny
 G
oa
l:
“I
nv
es
tm
en
t i
n 
en
er
gy
 s
ou
rc
es
 th
at
 
im
pr
ov
e 
su
pp
ly
 s
ec
ur
ity
 a
nd
 d
iv
er
si
ty
 
w
hi
le
 r
ed
uc
in
g 
ca
rb
on
 e
m
is
si
on
s 
pe
r 
un
it 
of
 e
ne
rg
y 
us
ed
,”
 n
am
el
y,
 u
ra
-
ni
um
 (n
uc
le
ar
 p
ow
er
) a
nd
 b
io
fu
el
s.
A
va
na
 G
ro
up
 in
 M
ad
ag
as
ca
r 
ex
pl
oi
ts
 m
in
er
al
s.
 T
em
po
ra
ri
ly
 
it 
w
as
 a
ls
o 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 b
io
fu
el
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n.
 I
t s
ee
m
s 
th
at
 
A
va
na
 h
as
 d
ro
pp
ed
 it
s 
bi
of
ue
l a
ct
iv
iti
es
 a
nd
 is
 n
ow
 fo
cu
si
ng
 
on
ly
 o
n 
m
in
in
g.
 T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
m
in
in
g 
lic
en
se
s 
in
 B
er
on
on
o 
ov
er
 a
n 
ar
ea
 o
f 1
8.
00
0h
a,
 a
nd
 in
 S
ta
ro
ka
la
 
an
d 
Ir
in
a 
ov
er
 a
 to
ta
l a
re
a 
of
 1
2,
00
0h
a.
 N
o 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is
 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
th
e 
fo
rm
er
 p
la
ns
 to
 p
la
nt
 J
at
ro
ph
a 
on
 
10
,0
00
ha
 b
y 
20
15
. 
 
20
08
 li
ce
ns
e 
ag
re
em
en
t
20
09
 
an
d 
20
10
 
ex
pl
or
a-
tio
n 
of
 
ur
an
iu
m
A
va
na
 U
ra
-
ni
um
 (n
.d
.);
 
En
er
gy
-P
ro
fil
e 
(2
00
9)
, 5
3;
 
G
EX
SI
 L
LP
 
(2
00
8)
, S
lid
e 
58
; M
at
th
ew
s 
(2
01
0)
, 1
17
-1
19
.
G
4I
nd
us
tr
ie
s L
td
 (
U
K
)
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 w
ith
dr
ew
 fr
om
 
th
e 
bi
of
ue
l p
ro
je
ct
 in
 2
01
1 
du
e 
to
 e
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l c
on
ce
rn
s.
K
en
ya
28
,0
00
 
P
ro
je
ct
 p
ur
po
se
:
B
io
fu
el
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
ba
se
d 
on
 s
w
ee
t 
so
rg
hu
m
. 
P
ro
je
ct
 A
pp
ro
ac
h:
Fi
el
d 
to
 fu
el
 a
nd
 fi
el
d 
to
 p
ow
er
 m
od
el
.
G
4 
In
du
st
ri
es
 L
td
., 
a 
B
ri
tis
h-
ba
se
d 
co
m
pa
ny
 a
ct
iv
e 
in
 p
ow
er
, 
fu
el
 a
nd
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t p
ro
je
ct
s,
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
ed
 in
 th
e 
w
ri
tin
g 
of
 
th
e 
U
EM
A
 b
io
fu
el
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
fo
r 
W
es
t A
fr
ic
a 
20
08
. T
he
 c
om
pa
-
ny
 u
se
d 
to
 h
av
e 
tw
o 
su
bs
id
ia
ri
es
. T
he
 o
nl
y 
on
e 
st
ill
 a
ct
iv
e 
is
 
G
4 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l (
D
en
m
ar
k)
. T
hi
s 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 b
en
efi
ts
 fr
om
 
D
an
is
h 
lo
gi
st
ic
s 
an
d 
in
du
st
ry
, a
nd
 it
 w
or
ks
 w
ith
 th
e 
D
an
is
h 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t t
o 
pr
ov
id
e 
fa
rm
in
g 
so
lu
tio
ns
 in
 A
fr
ic
a 
th
at
 a
re
 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
U
N
. T
he
 s
ec
on
d 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 u
se
d 
to
 b
e 
G
4 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l K
en
ya
, b
ut
 G
4 
In
du
st
ri
es
 L
td
. a
ba
nd
on
ed
 it
s 
28
,0
00
ha
 b
io
fu
el
 p
ro
je
ct
 in
 K
en
ya
 b
ef
or
e 
op
er
at
io
ns
 b
eg
un
. 
T
hi
s 
de
ci
si
on
 w
as
 ta
ke
n 
in
 r
es
po
ns
e 
to
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
fr
om
 N
G
O
s 
ov
er
 th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l n
eg
at
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
w
ild
lif
e 
in
 th
e 
w
et
la
nd
s 
of
 th
e 
Ta
na
 R
iv
er
 D
el
ta
.  
C
er
na
ns
ky
 
(2
01
1,
 O
ct
ob
er
 
26
); 
B
us
in
es
s 
an
d 
H
um
an
 
R
ig
ht
s 
R
es
ou
rc
e 
C
en
tr
e 
(n
.d
.).
Eq
ua
to
ri
a 
Te
ak
 C
om
pa
ny
 (
ET
C
)
T
he
 c
om
pa
ny
 h
as
 o
pe
ra
te
d 
si
n-
ce
 2
00
6,
 to
ge
th
er
 w
ith
 it
s 
si
st
er
 
co
m
pa
ny
 C
en
tr
al
 E
qu
at
or
ia
 T
ea
k 
C
om
pa
ny
. F
ro
m
 2
00
7 
to
 2
01
0 
it 
w
as
 r
un
 b
y 
go
ve
rn
m
en
ta
l 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t f
un
ds
, t
he
 C
D
C
 
an
d 
Fi
nn
fu
nd
; t
he
n 
it 
w
as
 s
ol
d 
to
 u
nk
no
w
n 
in
ve
st
or
s.
Su
da
n
18
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